MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any May 05 2020, 10:12 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Kay A. Beehler Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Terre Haute, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Matthew B. MacKenzie Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Robert J. Baldwin, May 5, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-2624 v. Appeal from the Knox Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Sherry B. Gregg Appellee-Plaintiff. Gilmore, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 42C01-1704-MR-1
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 1 of 9 STATEMENT OF THE CASE [1] Appellant-Defendant, Robert J. Baldwin (Baldwin), appeals the trial court’s
sentence following his guilty plea to murder, a felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.
[2] We affirm.
ISSUES [3] Baldwin presents two issues on appeal, which we restate as:
(1) Whether the trial court properly took into account his guilty-but-
mentally-ill plea; and
(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its identification of the
aggravators to impose an aggravated sentence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [4] On April 4, 2017, Baldwin collected his five-year-old son from school early and
took him home. At home, Baldwin smothered his son with a pillow, wrapped a
USB cord around his neck, and sat on him until he thought the child had died.
Baldwin called 911 and informed dispatch that he had killed his son. When law
enforcement officers arrived at the residence, Baldwin directed them to the back
bedroom where the officers found the child lying on the bed, blue-faced, and
without a pulse. The child was airlifted to Riley Children’s Hospital, where he
died two days later. When interviewed by the officers, Baldwin confessed to
the murder of his son. He explained that he had been planning to kill his son
for some time. He described that he first attempted to kill the child with a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 2 of 9 pillow, and when he did not succeed, he strangled his son with a USB cord and
sat on him until he stopped breathing.
[5] On April 6, 2017, the State filed an Information, charging Baldwin with
murder, a felony; strangulation, a Level 6 felony; and domestic battery on a
person less than fourteen years old, a Level 6 felony. On May 30, 2017,
Baldwin filed a notice of mental disease or defect. On May 3 and October 3,
2018, Baldwin was evaluated by three court-appointed psychologists. During
these evaluations, Baldwin explained that he had been planning to kill one of
his children for some time because his wife was leaving him, and he thought
that if he killed one of his children he would go to jail where “at least he would
be warm.” (Defendant’s Exh. 1). Baldwin specifically selected his five-year-old
son because the other children were older and strong enough to run away from
him.
[6] On April 9, 2019, Baldwin entered into a plea agreement with the State in
which he agreed to enter a plea of guilty but mentally ill to murder in exchange
for the State’s dismissal of the remaining charges. On August 23, 2019, the trial
court conducted a sentencing hearing. In sentencing Baldwin, the trial court
found as mitigating circumstances: 1) the lack of criminal history; 2) the
presence of mental health issues; and 3) his guilty plea. As aggravating factors,
the trial court listed: 1) the victim’s young age; 2) the abuse of Baldwin’s
position of trust; 3) the premeditation and pre-planning of the murder; and 4)
the lack of remorse. Concluding that the aggravators significantly outweighed
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 3 of 9 the mitigating factors, the trial court sentenced Baldwin to an aggravated
sentence of sixty-five years in the Department of Correction.
[7] Baldwin now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION I. Mental Illness
[8] Baldwin contends the trial court failed to advise him that his “mental illness
would essentially be of no consequence in his sentencing.” (Appellant’s Br. p.
7). He maintains that although he had a longstanding and well-documented
mental illness, he was never “advised of the relative impact such a plea would
have on sentencing.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 8).
[9] It is well recognized that a defendant who enters a plea of guilty but mentally ill
is to be sentenced in the same manner as a defendant who is found guilty of the
offense. See I.C. § 35-36-2-5; see also Georgopulos v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1138, 1141
(Ind. 2000). Thus Baldwin, and other defendants who plead or are found guilty
but mentally ill, are not automatically entitled to any particular credit or
deduction from their otherwise aggravated sentence because they are guilty but
mentally ill. Archer v. State, 689 N.E. 2d 678, 684 (Ind. 1997). Nonetheless, our
supreme court has directed trial courts to, at a minimum, carefully consider on
the record what mitigating weight, if any, to allocate any evidence of mental
illness, even though the court is not obligated to give the evidence the same
weight as does the defendant. Weeks v. State, 697 N.E. 2d 28, 30 (Ind. 1998).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 4 of 9 [10] In its written sentencing statement, the trial court found as follows:
The [c]ourt also considers, as the Defense has requested, that [Baldwin] has been diagnosed with and treated with mental illness for the majority of his life, and has suffered from such to the extent that he was awarded and received social security disability benefits. The [c]ourt appointed mental health evaluators all concluded that [Baldwin] suffers from mental illness. However, they also concluded that [Baldwin] knew what he was doing when he committed this crime and that he was competent to stand trial if a trial was to be held. The [c]ourt has considered this factor in mitigation of his sentence.
[11] (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 25). Accordingly, the trial court considered
Baldwin’s mental illness during sentencing. However, as a trial court is not
obligated to “credit or weigh a possible mitigating circumstance as defendant
suggests it should be credited or weighed” and because Baldwin was found to
be cognizant of his actions at the time of the murder, the trial court awarded his
mental illness only minimal mitigation. Archer, 689 N.E.2d at 684.
II. Aggravating Circumstances
[12] Baldwin next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it found as
aggravating circumstances that the killing of his son was premeditated and that
he had committed the murder knowingly, because he claims both aggravators
to also be elements of the crime of murder.
[13] So long as a sentence imposed by a trial court is within the statutory range for
the offense, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any May 05 2020, 10:12 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Kay A. Beehler Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Terre Haute, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Matthew B. MacKenzie Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Robert J. Baldwin, May 5, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-2624 v. Appeal from the Knox Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Sherry B. Gregg Appellee-Plaintiff. Gilmore, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 42C01-1704-MR-1
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 1 of 9 STATEMENT OF THE CASE [1] Appellant-Defendant, Robert J. Baldwin (Baldwin), appeals the trial court’s
sentence following his guilty plea to murder, a felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.
[2] We affirm.
ISSUES [3] Baldwin presents two issues on appeal, which we restate as:
(1) Whether the trial court properly took into account his guilty-but-
mentally-ill plea; and
(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its identification of the
aggravators to impose an aggravated sentence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [4] On April 4, 2017, Baldwin collected his five-year-old son from school early and
took him home. At home, Baldwin smothered his son with a pillow, wrapped a
USB cord around his neck, and sat on him until he thought the child had died.
Baldwin called 911 and informed dispatch that he had killed his son. When law
enforcement officers arrived at the residence, Baldwin directed them to the back
bedroom where the officers found the child lying on the bed, blue-faced, and
without a pulse. The child was airlifted to Riley Children’s Hospital, where he
died two days later. When interviewed by the officers, Baldwin confessed to
the murder of his son. He explained that he had been planning to kill his son
for some time. He described that he first attempted to kill the child with a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 2 of 9 pillow, and when he did not succeed, he strangled his son with a USB cord and
sat on him until he stopped breathing.
[5] On April 6, 2017, the State filed an Information, charging Baldwin with
murder, a felony; strangulation, a Level 6 felony; and domestic battery on a
person less than fourteen years old, a Level 6 felony. On May 30, 2017,
Baldwin filed a notice of mental disease or defect. On May 3 and October 3,
2018, Baldwin was evaluated by three court-appointed psychologists. During
these evaluations, Baldwin explained that he had been planning to kill one of
his children for some time because his wife was leaving him, and he thought
that if he killed one of his children he would go to jail where “at least he would
be warm.” (Defendant’s Exh. 1). Baldwin specifically selected his five-year-old
son because the other children were older and strong enough to run away from
him.
[6] On April 9, 2019, Baldwin entered into a plea agreement with the State in
which he agreed to enter a plea of guilty but mentally ill to murder in exchange
for the State’s dismissal of the remaining charges. On August 23, 2019, the trial
court conducted a sentencing hearing. In sentencing Baldwin, the trial court
found as mitigating circumstances: 1) the lack of criminal history; 2) the
presence of mental health issues; and 3) his guilty plea. As aggravating factors,
the trial court listed: 1) the victim’s young age; 2) the abuse of Baldwin’s
position of trust; 3) the premeditation and pre-planning of the murder; and 4)
the lack of remorse. Concluding that the aggravators significantly outweighed
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 3 of 9 the mitigating factors, the trial court sentenced Baldwin to an aggravated
sentence of sixty-five years in the Department of Correction.
[7] Baldwin now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION I. Mental Illness
[8] Baldwin contends the trial court failed to advise him that his “mental illness
would essentially be of no consequence in his sentencing.” (Appellant’s Br. p.
7). He maintains that although he had a longstanding and well-documented
mental illness, he was never “advised of the relative impact such a plea would
have on sentencing.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 8).
[9] It is well recognized that a defendant who enters a plea of guilty but mentally ill
is to be sentenced in the same manner as a defendant who is found guilty of the
offense. See I.C. § 35-36-2-5; see also Georgopulos v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1138, 1141
(Ind. 2000). Thus Baldwin, and other defendants who plead or are found guilty
but mentally ill, are not automatically entitled to any particular credit or
deduction from their otherwise aggravated sentence because they are guilty but
mentally ill. Archer v. State, 689 N.E. 2d 678, 684 (Ind. 1997). Nonetheless, our
supreme court has directed trial courts to, at a minimum, carefully consider on
the record what mitigating weight, if any, to allocate any evidence of mental
illness, even though the court is not obligated to give the evidence the same
weight as does the defendant. Weeks v. State, 697 N.E. 2d 28, 30 (Ind. 1998).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 4 of 9 [10] In its written sentencing statement, the trial court found as follows:
The [c]ourt also considers, as the Defense has requested, that [Baldwin] has been diagnosed with and treated with mental illness for the majority of his life, and has suffered from such to the extent that he was awarded and received social security disability benefits. The [c]ourt appointed mental health evaluators all concluded that [Baldwin] suffers from mental illness. However, they also concluded that [Baldwin] knew what he was doing when he committed this crime and that he was competent to stand trial if a trial was to be held. The [c]ourt has considered this factor in mitigation of his sentence.
[11] (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 25). Accordingly, the trial court considered
Baldwin’s mental illness during sentencing. However, as a trial court is not
obligated to “credit or weigh a possible mitigating circumstance as defendant
suggests it should be credited or weighed” and because Baldwin was found to
be cognizant of his actions at the time of the murder, the trial court awarded his
mental illness only minimal mitigation. Archer, 689 N.E.2d at 684.
II. Aggravating Circumstances
[12] Baldwin next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it found as
aggravating circumstances that the killing of his son was premeditated and that
he had committed the murder knowingly, because he claims both aggravators
to also be elements of the crime of murder.
[13] So long as a sentence imposed by a trial court is within the statutory range for
the offense, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v.
State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 5 of 9 2007). An abuse of the trial court’s sentencing discretion occurs if its decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
therefrom. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to enter a
sentencing statement at all, its stated reasons for imposing sentence are not
supported by the record, its sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly
supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or its reasons for
imposing sentence are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91.
[14] Turning to the trial court’s identification of aggravators, Baldwin challenges the
trial court’s finding that the killing of his son was premeditated as the element
of premeditation is also an element of the crime of murder. In its written
sentencing statement, the trial court observed with respect to this aggravator as
follows:
The [c]ourt also finds as an aggravating factor that this crime was pre-planned and pre-meditated. [Baldwin] told the police that he planned to kill three (3) of his children and that he killed [his son] first because the opportunity was there. He knew when he picked that child up that day what he was going to do and he went through with it. That child could not have had any idea when he went home with his own father, what his father had planned for him and at five (5) years old, he was defenseless, an innocent child. Further, [Baldwin] showed absolutely no remorse for his actions. He just wanted to commit a crime so bad he would go to prison. He saw no other way out of a bad situation, so he killed his child instead of protecting him, in order to take care of himself.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 6 of 9 (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 24). Murder is defined as the knowing or
intentional killing of another human being. See I.C. § 35-42-1-1. As such, the
element of pre-meditation is not specifically included as an element of the
crime. Rather, here, the trial court used the premeditated nature of the killing—
as confessed by Baldwin—as a description of the nature and circumstances of
the offense. See McCann v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ind. 2001) (Generally,
the nature and circumstances of a crime is a proper aggravating circumstance);
Concepcion v. State, 567 N.E.2d 784, 791 (Ind. 1991) (holding that the manner in
which a crime is committed can be considered as an aggravating circumstance.)
[15] Baldwin also asserts that the trial court aggravated his sentence because he
committed the murder “knowingly” and attributes this “knowing” aggravator
to the trial court’s comment that when law enforcement officers arrived at
Baldwin’s house, his responses to their questions were “clear, logical,
understandable.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 8). However, in the trial court’s written
sentencing statement, the court only listed four aggravators: 1) the victim’s
young age; 2) Baldwin’s abuse of position of trust; 3) the premeditation and pre-
planning of the murder; and 4) his lack of remorse. Thus, even though the trial
court might have described Baldwin as knowingly killing his son, the trial court
did not count it as a specific aggravator for sentencing.
[16] Nevertheless, even if “knowing” could be considered an improper aggravator,
we may affirm the sentence if we can “say with confidence that the trial court
would have imposed the same sentence.” Webb v. State, 941 N.E. 2d 1082, 1090
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Here, under the particularly heinous circumstances of his
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 7 of 9 crime, we are very confident that the trial court would not have wavered by
imposing a lesser sentence. The gruesome killing of a five-year-old child at the
hands of his own father merely for the father’s own interest because he wanted
someplace “warm” to go to is particularly monstrous. (Defendant’s Exh. 1).
The callous character of this crime is exacerbated by the fact that Baldwin failed
to succeed the first time and the child had to endure suffocation, strangulation,
and suffocation again, followed by a two-day unsuccessful fight for his life at
Riley’s Children’s Hospital. Baldwin never showed any remorse. We affirm
the trial court’s sentence.
CONCLUSION [17] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court properly took into account
Baldwin’s guilty-but-mentally-ill plea, and appropriately identified the
aggravating circumstances in pronouncing Baldwin’s sentence.
[18] Affirmed.
[19] Tavitas, J. concurs
[20] Mathias, J. concurs with separate opinion
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 8 of 9 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Robert J. Baldwin, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-2624 Appellant-Defendant,
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Mathias, Judge concurring
[21] I concur in full with my colleagues. I write only to reiterate that competency
evaluations immediately upon arrest are the best way for our criminal justice
system to fairly treat those defendants who are mentally ill or deficient. At some
point, such immediate competency evaluations will be recognized as an integral
part of due process. See Wampler v. State, 67 N.E.3d 633 (Ind. 2017).
[22] In this case, Baldwin’s first mental health evaluation was approximately 30
days after his arrest. His matter-of-fact responses to the doctors in the face of his
monstrous acts lead me to believe that an earlier examination would not have
mattered.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2624 | May 5, 2020 Page 9 of 9