PER CURIAM.
*1182
We have for review Robert Ira Peede's appeal of the postconviction court's order denying Peede's motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction.
See
art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
Peede's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Hurst v. Florida
, --- U.S. ----,
136 S.Ct. 616
,
193 L.Ed.2d 504
(2016), and our decision on remand in
Hurst v. State
(
Hurst
),
202 So.3d 40
(Fla. 2016),
cert. denied
, --- U.S. ----,
137 S.Ct. 2161
,
198 L.Ed.2d 246
(2017). Peede responded to this Court's order to show cause arguing why
Hitchcock v. State
,
226 So.3d 216
(Fla.),
cert. denied
, --- U.S. ----,
138 S.Ct. 513
,
199 L.Ed.2d 396
(2017), should not be dispositive in this case. After reviewing Peede's response to the order to show cause, as well as the State's arguments in reply, we ordered full briefing on Peede's non-
Hurst
related claim.
Having reviewed the arguments presented, we conclude that the postconviction court properly denied Peede's claims. Peede was sentenced to death following a jury's recommendation for death by a vote of eleven to one.
See
Peede v. State
,
474 So.2d 808
, 810 (Fla. 1985).
His sentence of death became final in 1986.
Peede v. Florida
,
477 U.S. 909
,
106 S.Ct. 3286
,
91 L.Ed.2d 575
(1986). Thus,
Hurst
does not apply retroactively to Peede's sentence of death.
See
Hitchcock
,
226 So.3d at 217
. Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of Peede's motion.
After carefully considering all arguments raised by Peede, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken.
It is so ordered.
LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.
CANADY, C.J., concurs in result.
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
LAWSON, J., recused.
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result.
As in prior
Hitchcock
-related cases, I concur in result because I recognize that this Court's opinion in
Hitchcock
is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in
Hitchcock
that
Hurst
should apply retroactively to defendants like Peede.
*1183
Hitchcock
,
226 So.3d at 220-21
(Pariente, J., dissenting).
Applying
Hurst
to Peede's case, in addition to the jury's nonunanimous recommendation for death by a vote of eleven to one, this Court determined on direct appeal that the cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) aggravating factor was not supported by the evidence.
Peede v. State
,
474 So.2d 808
, 817 (Fla. 1985) ;
see
Middleton v. State
, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S637, --- So.3d ----, ---- - ----,
2017 WL 2374697
, at *1-2 (Fla. June 1, 2017) (Pariente, J., dissenting) (explaining how a stricken aggravating factor affects the
Hurst
harmless error analysis). The Court determined that "there was no showing of the heightened premeditation, calculation, or planning that must be proven to support a finding of" the CCP aggravating factor.
Peede
,
474 So.2d at 817
. Thus, if
Hurst
applied to Peede's case, I would conclude that the
Hurst
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and would, accordingly, grant Peede a new penalty phase.
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PER CURIAM.
*1182
We have for review Robert Ira Peede's appeal of the postconviction court's order denying Peede's motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction.
See
art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
Peede's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Hurst v. Florida
, --- U.S. ----,
136 S.Ct. 616
,
193 L.Ed.2d 504
(2016), and our decision on remand in
Hurst v. State
(
Hurst
),
202 So.3d 40
(Fla. 2016),
cert. denied
, --- U.S. ----,
137 S.Ct. 2161
,
198 L.Ed.2d 246
(2017). Peede responded to this Court's order to show cause arguing why
Hitchcock v. State
,
226 So.3d 216
(Fla.),
cert. denied
, --- U.S. ----,
138 S.Ct. 513
,
199 L.Ed.2d 396
(2017), should not be dispositive in this case. After reviewing Peede's response to the order to show cause, as well as the State's arguments in reply, we ordered full briefing on Peede's non-
Hurst
related claim.
Having reviewed the arguments presented, we conclude that the postconviction court properly denied Peede's claims. Peede was sentenced to death following a jury's recommendation for death by a vote of eleven to one.
See
Peede v. State
,
474 So.2d 808
, 810 (Fla. 1985).
His sentence of death became final in 1986.
Peede v. Florida
,
477 U.S. 909
,
106 S.Ct. 3286
,
91 L.Ed.2d 575
(1986). Thus,
Hurst
does not apply retroactively to Peede's sentence of death.
See
Hitchcock
,
226 So.3d at 217
. Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of Peede's motion.
After carefully considering all arguments raised by Peede, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken.
It is so ordered.
LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.
CANADY, C.J., concurs in result.
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
LAWSON, J., recused.
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result.
As in prior
Hitchcock
-related cases, I concur in result because I recognize that this Court's opinion in
Hitchcock
is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in
Hitchcock
that
Hurst
should apply retroactively to defendants like Peede.
*1183
Hitchcock
,
226 So.3d at 220-21
(Pariente, J., dissenting).
Applying
Hurst
to Peede's case, in addition to the jury's nonunanimous recommendation for death by a vote of eleven to one, this Court determined on direct appeal that the cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) aggravating factor was not supported by the evidence.
Peede v. State
,
474 So.2d 808
, 817 (Fla. 1985) ;
see
Middleton v. State
, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S637, --- So.3d ----, ---- - ----,
2017 WL 2374697
, at *1-2 (Fla. June 1, 2017) (Pariente, J., dissenting) (explaining how a stricken aggravating factor affects the
Hurst
harmless error analysis). The Court determined that "there was no showing of the heightened premeditation, calculation, or planning that must be proven to support a finding of" the CCP aggravating factor.
Peede
,
474 So.2d at 817
. Thus, if
Hurst
applied to Peede's case, I would conclude that the
Hurst
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and would, accordingly, grant Peede a new penalty phase.