Robert Howard Green v. the State of Texas
Opinion
Affirm and Opinion Filed January 27, 2022
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas Nos. 05-18-01068-CR,
05-18-01069-CR
ROBERT HOWARD GREEN, Appellant V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F-1676425-T, F-1676426-T
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Osborne, Pedersen, III, and Nowell Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III On August 31, 2018, a jury found appellant, Robert Howard Green, guilty
(i) of sexual assault of a child by penetration of the female sexual organ and (ii) of
indecency with a child by causing the complainant to contact the genitals of
appellant. The jury assessed his punishment at confinement for fifteen years and ten
years, respectively. Appellant raises a single issue that he is entitled to a new trial
because the record cannot be certified in accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 34.6. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Because the sole appellate issue pertains to limited evidentiary and procedural
complaints, we confine our discussion of the facts and the evidence accordingly. A
Dallas County grand jury indicted appellant for the offenses of (i) sexual assault of
a child and (ii) indecency with a child by contact. Appellant pled not guilty to both
charges and elected to have a trial by jury.
Appellant’s three-day jury trial began on August 29, 2018. Several witnesses
testified during the jury trial including (i) complainant, who testified as to the alleged
sexual abuse; (ii) complainant’s guardian, with whom complainant made an outcry
of sexual abuse; (iii) Kimberly Skidmore, who conducted a forensic interview of
complainant; (iv) complainant’s mother; (v) Dr. Kristen Reeder, who conducted
complainant’s REACH examination; (vi) Detective Blayne Burgess, who testified
as to appellant’s arrest and a one-party consent recording between appellant and
complainant; (vii) Leslie Boutte, who testified as to psychological manipulation; and
(viii) appellant, who denied complainant’s claims. Pertinent to this appeal,
Dr. Reeder testified to and prepared a “REACH Program Sexual Abuse Evaluation
Form,” which was admitted into evidence. Detective Burgess testified to a one-party
consent recording that she made of an interview she conducted with appellant—the
recording of which was also admitted into evidence and played for the jury.
After the verdict and sentencing, appellant timely filed his notices of appeal
for each conviction on September 4, 2018. By several orders, our Court ordered the
trial court’s court reporter to file a complete reporter’s record in the appeals. On July
22, 2019, our Court ordered the trial court to make findings of fact regarding whether
appellant has been deprived of the reporter’s record because of ineffective counsel,
indigence, because a portion of the record had been lost or destroyed, or for any
other reason. On October 17, 2019, the trial court conducted the hearing on the
reporter’s record and found, in part:
3) This Court has determined that a portion of the reporter’s record has been lost. The lost record concerns the testimony of two State’s witnesses on the morning of August 30, 2018; specifically, the entire testimony of Dr. Kristen Reeder with the REACH Clinic at Children’s Medical Center and a portion of the testimony of Detective Blayne Burgess with the Dallas Police Department. The parties cannot agree on reconstruction or replacement of the lost portion of the record. Further, this Court cannot determine what constitutes an accurate copy of the record.
4) This Court has determined that Appellant timely requested a reporter’s record and that Appellant is not at fault for the lost portion of the record.
5) The Court finds that the original trial judge who heard the trial of these cases, Quay Parker, is deceased.
6) This Court, having not heard all the evidence in the case, and having no personal knowledge of what occurred at trial, has determined that it cannot resolve the issue of whether or not the lost portion of the record does (or does not) constitute a significant portion of the reporter’s record.
7) Based upon the above findings , this Court cannot with any reliable certainty and/or in accordance with due process afforded to Appellant by the United States Constitution and/or The Texas Constitution, determine that the lost portion of the reporter’s record is or is not necessary to the resolution of the appeal.
Appellant and the State filed their briefs, thereafter.
II. ISSUE PRESENTED
Appellant raises a single issue to our Court, which we reproduce verbatim:
Because the record cannot be certified either as a verbatim transcriptions [sic] of the notes taken at trial or as a transcription of tapes in accordance with TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(a)(2), and because the uncertified portion of the record is necessary to the resolution of his complaint, Appellant asserts he is entitled to a new trial under TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(f).
III. TEXAS RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 34.6
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(f) provides:
(f) Reporter’s Record Lost or Destroyed. An appellant is entitled to a new trial under the following circumstances:
(1) if the appellant has timely requested a reporter’s record; (2) if, without the appellant’s fault, a significant exhibit or a significant portion of the court reporter’s notes and records has been lost or destroyed or—if the proceedings were electronically recorded—a significant portion of the recording has been lost or destroyed or is inaudible; (3) if the lost, destroyed, or inaudible portion of the reporter’s record, or the lost or destroyed exhibit, is necessary to the appeal’s resolution; and (4) if the lost, destroyed or inaudible portion of the reporter’s record cannot be replaced by agreement of the parties, or the lost or destroyed exhibit cannot be replaced either by agreement of the parties or with a copy determined by the trial court to accurately duplicate with reasonable certainty the original exhibit.
TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(f). In Nava v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
discussed the third requirement of rule 34.6(f), which is at issue in the instant case:
The third requirement—that the missing record be necessary to the appeal—was meant to mitigate against the harshness of a rule that
might require a new trial even when no error actually occurred in the proceedings. “The provision in the rule that the appellant show that the missing portion of the record is necessary to her appeal is itself a harm analysis.” When an appellant has not been harmed by the missing portion of the record, he should not be granted relief.
415 S.W.3d 289, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see In Interest of S.V., 599 S.W.3d
25, 32 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, pet. denied) (“The requirement that the missing
portion of the record “is necessary to the appeal’s resolution” is a harm analysis.”)
(citing Issac v. State, 989 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)).1
We review a trial court’s findings related to a lost or destroyed record for an
abuse of discretion. In Interest of S.V., 599 S.W.3d at 32. However, we review a trial
court’s determination as to whether the missing portion of the record is necessary to
the appeal’s resolution de novo. Id. at 33 n. 3.2
1 “Any complaint appellant is unable to determine ‘what was said during the punishment trial, including any comments or findings by the trial court’ is nothing more than pure speculation that the missing record could potentially assist him in his appeal.” Foster v. State, 525 S.W.3d 898, 907 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, pet. ref’d). “We do not require a defendant to prove actual error, only to identify some particular error that the missing record could potentially assist with in his appeal.” Id.
2 We discuss the standard of review in footnote three of In Interest of S.V.:
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Robert Howard Green v. the State of Texas (Robert Howard Green v. the State of Texas) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.