COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA PUBLISHED
Present: Judges O’Brien, Fulton and White Argued at Buckingham, Virginia
ROBERT HARRISON FLINT OPINION BY v. Record No. 0860-24-2 JUDGE MARY GRACE O’BRIEN JULY 22, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY Cheryl V. Higgins, Judge
Meghan Shapiro (Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.
Allison M. Mentch, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
In 2021, Robert Harrison Flint’s license to hunt was revoked for five years. After pictures
of him posing with dead deer surfaced, conservation police officers with the Department of Wildlife
Resources of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Department) obtained a search warrant for his
residence, where they found ammunition and cocaine. Flint was charged with possession of
ammunition as a convicted felon and possession of cocaine, and he filed two motions to suppress
the evidence seized during the search. The court denied both motions. Flint subsequently entered a
conditional guilty plea. On appeal, he argues that the court erred in denying his motions.
BACKGROUND
In 2021, Flint was convicted of possessing ammunition as a felon, and the court revoked his
hunting license for five years. In 2022, Gregory Todd Goff, Jr., a conservation police officer with
the Department, received several photographs from a confidential informant, showing Flint “posing
with dead deer.” In one picture, Flint is “sitting on the end of a tailgate holding a deer by the antlers with a crossbow by his side, and the crossbow bolt in his teeth while [he] is covered in blood.”
Officer Goff subsequently searched Flint’s name in the Department’s computer system, which
produced the following result: “Revocation – Hunt (Expires 10/14/26).” The officer also conducted
a “link search and gained Mr. Flint’s criminal history.” Because it was not the Department’s
procedure to examine underlying court orders, he did not obtain a copy of the actual order revoking
Flint’s hunting license.
Officer Goff applied for a search warrant of Flint’s residence and drafted the accompanying
affidavit based on the photographs and his investigation. The magistrate issued a warrant for the
following offenses: “[Code §] 29.1-338 (Hunt/trap/fish while revoked), [Code §] 29.1-521 (Illegal
possession of wildlife), [Code §] 29.1-548 (Kill deer illegally).” When the search warrant was
executed on November 23, 2022, the officers discovered firearm ammunition and cocaine in Flint’s
bedroom. Flint was charged with one count of possession of ammunition by a convicted felon
under Code § 18.2-308.2 and one count of possession of a controlled substance under Code
§ 18.2-250.
On November 28, 2022, Officer Goff gave a deputy clerk of the Albemarle Circuit Court
clerk’s office the original search warrant, accompanying affidavit, and search inventory and return.
The deputy clerk checked a box on the search inventory and return indicating it was received “in
person . . . on 11/28/22.” The deputy clerk then gave Officer Goff a “certified copy of the search
warrant and return,” which bore a stamp stating: “FILED 2022 Nov 28 AM 11:44.” The clerk also
provided him with a copy of the affidavit, which was clipped to the certified copy of the warrant.
Flint moved to suppress the evidence seized from his residence under Code § 19.2-54
because the affidavit accompanying the search warrant was missing from the clerk’s office.
According to the motion, defense counsel requested copies of the search warrant and affidavit on
-2- two occasions; on both dates, “the clerk’s office informed defense counsel that there was no search
warrant, affidavit, or return on file.”
At the motion hearing, the parties agreed that the search warrant and affidavit could not be
located in the Albemarle Circuit Court clerk’s office. Officer Goff testified that he had filed the
original search warrant and affidavit in the clerk’s office, and he had a copy of the affidavit, which
was admitted into evidence. The court also admitted Officer Goff’s certified copies of the search
warrant and the related search inventory and return. Flint argued that the evidence seized during the
search should be suppressed because (1) Officer Goff, not the magistrate as required by the statute,
filed the affidavit and (2) the “basic purpose of th[e] statute . . . wasn’t fulfilled here” because the
affidavit was not made publicly available.
The court denied Flint’s motion, finding that “a document is filed when it is delivered or
placed among official records to the proper officer and received by the officer, in this case the clerk
of the court.” The court ruled that “[t]he evidence submitted show[ed] that the document was
properly filed in the clerk’s office,” noting that the copies were stamped and signed as received by
the clerk’s office. Further, Flint had “not pointed to any prejudice that he suffered as a result of the
affidavit not being filed by the magistrate.”
Flint filed a second motion to suppress, arguing the evidence should be suppressed under
Code § 19.2-54 not only because the affidavit was missing from the clerk’s office but also because
he did not have a legible version of the affidavit and therefore could not “adequately challenge its
contents.” He also raised a Franks1 claim under the Fourth Amendment, alleging that the warrant’s
affidavit “contained a false assertion . . . made with reckless disregard for the truth, without which
1 The claim is named after the seminal case Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), which established a defendant’s right to challenge a facially valid warrant when the affidavit intentionally or recklessly contains false statements. See Barnes v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 22, 30 (2010). -3- the affidavit could not have established probable cause for any offense.”2 That challenged statement
was that Flint’s hunting license and privilege had been revoked, when in fact only his license was
revoked. He argued that the distinction was significant because under Code § 29.1-301 he was still
allowed to hunt on his family’s land, regardless of the status of his license. Code § 29.1-300
provides that it is “unlawful to hunt, trap or fish in or on the lands . . . of this Commonwealth
without first obtaining a license.” But Code § 29.1-301(A) allows landowners and their children to
hunt “within the boundaries of their own lands” without a license. This means a person may retain
the privilege to hunt on their family’s land even when their hunting license is revoked.
During the motion hearing, the Commonwealth acknowledged that the officer was mistaken
when he wrote that Flint had lost both his hunting license and privilege. Officer Goff testified that
he followed Department procedure when he retrieved only Flint’s criminal record, not the
underlying court order. He explained that his duties included “investigat[ing] potential hunting
violations” and he believed Flint had lost both his license and privilege to hunt after conducting his
search of the Department’s computer system. Officer Goff denied having any malicious intent or
trying to purposefully mislead the magistrate in the affidavit.
Flint’s mother testified that Flint had permission to hunt on her property in Albemarle
County. Myesha Wilson, an investigator with the public defender’s office, stated that when she
discovered the clerk’s office did not have a copy of the search warrant and affidavit, Officer Goff
provided her with a copy. She said she was unable to read the affidavit. Flint argued that the
evidence should be suppressed because the affidavit was illegible. Further, the warrant was lacking
probable cause because, contrary to the statement in the affidavit, he still had his hunting privilege
2 In his motion, Flint argued that he based his Franks motion not on the affidavit itself but on “analogous statements in [Officer] Goff’s police report” and on Officer Goff’s own testimony regarding the warrant’s content. -4- and was allowed to hunt on his family’s land. He further contended that Officer Goff’s statement
was made with reckless disregard for the truth.
The court “disagree[d] entirely with [Flint’s] proposition that the statement was made with
reckless disregard to the truth.” The court further stated the following:
The [c]ourt cannot find that the warrant is illegible or not readable, and as a result not subject to challenge by defendant. In fact, defendant has challenged the substance of the warrant. . . . That leaves the [c]ourt with the question where . . . hunting privileges were not generally revoked and he was legally permitted to hunt on his own land. There isn’t any evidence contained in the search warrant that that was a consideration, nor was Officer Goff required to consider whether or not the hunting took place on his own land, or his mother’s land, or other places for it to be done lawfully. Based on the information contained in the database that Officer Goff queried, [it] provided sufficient basis for Officer Goff to proceed with probable cause statements made in the affidavit.
The court also noted that probable cause exists regardless of any affirmative defenses. Denying
Flint’s second motion to suppress, the court concluded that “[h]ere, someone who’s [sic] hunting
privileges were revoked until 2026, having shown evidence publicly that he was out hunting,
provides probable cause for Officer Goff to go forward and ask questions about and investigate and
ask for a search warrant in this matter.”
Flint subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea for both charges and was sentenced to
six years’ incarceration with “all but four months” suspended.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we ‘consider the facts in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.’” Aponte v. Commonwealth, 68
Va. App. 146, 156 (2017) (quoting Hairston v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 552, 560 (2017)). “It
is the appellant’s burden to show that when viewing the evidence in such a manner, the trial court
committed reversible error.” Id. (quoting Hairston, 67 Va. App. at 560). “This Court is ‘bound by
-5- the trial court’s findings of historical fact unless “plainly wrong” or without evidence to support
them[,] and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and
local law enforcement officers.’” Daniels v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 422, 431 (2018) (quoting
McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198 (1997) (en banc)). But “an appellant’s ‘claim that
evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and
fact that we review de novo on appeal.’” Id. (quoting Moore v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 30, 36
(2018)).
II. Motion to Suppress under Code § 19.2-54
Flint argues that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Code § 19.2-54
“designat[es] suppression as the remedy if there is a ‘failure’ to file the affidavit within 30 days.”
According to Flint, the statute was violated because (1) “the affidavit was missing from the clerk’s
file . . . until long past the 30-day marker”; (2) “the affiant agent—not the issuing magistrate—filed
the affidavit with the clerk”; and (3) “the affiant[ ]agent produced a copy of the affidavit, which . . .
was illegible, preventing the meaningful review of its content that [Code §] 19.2-54 safeguards.”
Flint contends that suppression is necessary to fulfill the statute’s “notice-based purpose.”
Code § 19.2-54 establishes content requirements for the affidavit that supports a search
warrant. It further provides as follows:
Such affidavit shall be certified by the officer who issues such warrant and delivered . . . by such officer or his designee or agent, to the clerk of the circuit court of the county or city wherein the search is made, within seven days after the issuance of such warrant and shall by such clerk be preserved as a record and shall at all times be subject to inspection by the public after the warrant that is the subject of the affidavit has been executed or 15 days after issuance of the warrant, whichever is earlier . . . . The term “affidavit” as used in this section, means statements made under oath or affirmation and preserved verbatim.
Failure of the officer issuing such warrant to file the required affidavit shall not invalidate any search made under the warrant unless such failure shall continue for a period of 30 days. If the
-6- affidavit is filed prior to the expiration of the 30-day period, nevertheless, evidence obtained in any such search shall not be admissible until a reasonable time after the filing of the required affidavit.
Code § 19.2-54 (emphasis added).
Code § 19.2-54 was designed to further “Fourth Amendment purposes,” and the purpose of
the certification requirement of the statute “is to insure that the affidavit filed with the clerk for the
information of the accused is the same affidavit upon which the finding of probable cause was
based.” Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 127, 136 (1982). That is also “[t]he purpose of the
[statute’s] filing requirement.” Lockhart v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 329, 338 (2001).
We have previously noted that “Code § 19.2-54 is not a penal statute that must be construed
strictly against the Commonwealth.” Daniels, 69 Va. App. at 433. And neither this Court nor the
Supreme Court has ever held that a violation of Code § 19.2-54 requires the exclusion of seized
evidence. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 294 Va. 486, 493 n.1 (2017) (expressing “no opinion
concerning the existence or scope of any suppression remedy under Code § 19.2-54”).
Several cases address the requirements of Code § 19.2-54. In Quintana, the Supreme Court
held that a magistrate’s failure to certify the affidavit before filing it with the clerk’s office did not
require the suppression of evidence because “the affiant identified the challenged affidavit as the
one he subscribed before the magistrate” and because the missing signature “caused defendant no
prejudice.” Quintana, 224 Va. at 136. Therefore, “the statutory purpose was fully served.” Id.
In Lockhart, this Court determined that “the notice-based purpose of Code § 19.2-54 was
achieved and [defendant] suffered no prejudice” when a special police officer, not the
warrant-issuing magistrate, filed the affidavit with the clerk’s office because “the supporting
affidavit filed by [the police officer] was the same one he had subscribed before the magistrate” and
“[t]he affidavit was on file in the clerk’s office available for inspection . . . the day after the search
warrant was issued.” Lockhart, 34 Va. App. at 338. Similarly in Daniels, this Court found that -7- when the affiant investigator timely filed the required affidavit with the clerk’s office and the
defendant failed to identify any prejudice he suffered as a result of the investigator filing the
affidavit, the notice-based purpose of the statute was fulfilled and the court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion to suppress. Daniels, 69 Va. App. at 434.
Here, like in Lockhart and Daniels, someone other than the warrant-issuing magistrate filed
the affidavit with the clerk’s office. But despite Flint’s contention to the contrary, this alone does
not violate Code § 19.2-54. See Lockhart, 34 Va. App. at 338 (finding no error when the police
officer and not the magistrate filed the affidavit with the clerk’s office because the notice-based
purpose was fulfilled and defendant did not suffer any prejudice). The key is whether the
notice-based purpose of the statute was fulfilled and whether Flint suffered prejudice.
The circumstances of this case are unique. Unlike in Quintana, Lockhart, and Daniels, the
search warrant and affidavit here are missing entirely from the clerk’s office. No version of the
warrant affidavit is available at the office for inspection. But we do have Officer Goff’s testimony
that he gave a clerk at the Albemarle Circuit Court clerk’s office the original search warrant and
accompanying affidavit five days after the execution of the warrant. The record also contains a
certified copy of that warrant and a copy of the affidavit, which Officer Goff received from the
clerk. The search warrant bears a stamp on it, reading: “FILED 2022 Nov 28 AM 11:44,” and it
was clipped together with the affidavit. Officer Goff testified that the affidavit he filed with the
clerk’s office was the original on which the search warrant was based. He also provided a copy of
the affidavit to the investigator for the public defender’s office. Finally, Flint cross-examined
Officer Goff about the affidavit’s content. Under these circumstances, the court did not err in
finding that Flint had sufficient information to determine that “the affidavit filed with the clerk . . .
[wa]s the same affidavit upon which the finding of probable cause was based.” Quintana, 224 Va.
at 136.
-8- Further, several of the cases concerning Code § 19.2-54 address a defendant’s failure to
show prejudice resulting from the alleged statutory violation. See Quintana, 224 Va. at 136 (“[T]he
omission of the magistrate’s signature in the [affidavit] caused defendant no prejudice . . . .”);
Lockhart, 34 Va. App. at 338 (“[Defendant] suffered no prejudice as a result of the affidavit not
having been filed by the magistrate.”); Daniels, 69 Va. App. at 434 (“[Defendant] has not pointed to
any prejudice he suffered as a result of the affidavit not having been filed by the magistrate.”).
During oral argument, Flint contended he was prejudiced because the copy of the affidavit
was “illegible.” But during the suppression hearings, Flint cross-examined Officer Goff about the
content of the affidavit. Further, the court made a factual finding that the copy of the affidavit was
not “illegible or not readable.” We are bound by this finding unless it was clearly erroneous. See
Daniels, 69 Va. App. at 431. Flint contends that the court’s finding was indeed clearly erroneous
and points us to the copy of the affidavit in the record. But we do not engage in fact finding, and the
court merely remarked that the copy was “somewhat difficult to read,” not that it was illegible, and
it later specifically stated that it “cannot find that the warrant is illegible or not readable.” The court
also highlighted that Flint was able to challenge the content of the affidavit.
Flint also posits that “[t]here is no independent legal requirement that a litigant prove
prejudice when raising this claim on appeal” and that “the prejudice discussed in those cases[] is
merely a component of the ‘notice’ analysis; if an accused is not prejudiced, that may be further
indication that the notice-based purpose of [Code §] 19.2-54 was satisfied.” We do not express an
opinion regarding whether there is an independent requirement of prejudice because, even if Flint is
correct and prejudice is only “a component of the ‘notice’ analysis,” that contention does not
-9- strengthen Flint’s argument. Indeed, in Flint’s own words, the fact that Flint did not suffer any
prejudice3 is “further indication that the notice-based purpose of [Code §] 19.2-54 was satisfied.”
Because the notice-based purpose of the statute was fulfilled and Flint did not suffer any
prejudice, we do not address whether Code § 19.2-54 requires suppression of evidence when the
notice-based purpose is not fulfilled or whether a good faith exception permits the admission of the
seized evidence.
III. Franks Motion—Suppression under the Fourth Amendment
Flint argues that the search of his residence violated the Fourth Amendment because the
affidavit contained the false statement that his hunting privilege was revoked and that statement was
made “with reckless disregard rather than mere negligence.” Without that statement, Flint contends,
the affidavit did “not supply probable cause.” According to Flint, Officer Goff failed to exercise
due care when he did not conduct a follow-up investigation to determine whether Flint’s license as
well as his privilege to hunt was revoked because he knew “Flint’s prior offense did not qualify for
any mandatory revocation of his hunting privilege.”
“The Fourth Amendment entitles a defendant to a hearing designed to challenge a facially
valid search warrant only under limited circumstances.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 485,
497 (2015). “There is, of course, a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting
the search warrant.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). Thus, “[i]n order even to
obtain an evidentiary hearing on the affidavit’s integrity, a defendant must first make ‘a substantial
preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard
for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit.’” Barnes v. Commonwealth, 279
Va. 22, 31 (2010) (quoting United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1990)). “This
3 Flint’s alleged prejudice stems from his contention that the affidavit was illegible. But we are bound by the court’s determination regarding legibility because it was not clearly erroneous or without evidence to support it. Flint did not allege any other prejudice. - 10 - showing ‘must be more than conclusory’ and must be accompanied by a detailed offer of proof.”
Id. (quoting Colkley, 899 F.2d at 300). “Mere negligence in recording the facts relevant to a
probable-cause determination is not enough.” Id. at 32 (quoting United States v. Photogrammetric
Data Servs., Inc., 259 F.3d 229, 238 (4th Cir. 2001)).
Importantly, “before a circuit court conducts an evidentiary hearing, the court is required to
‘set to one side’ the alleged false or reckless information or omission and determine whether the
warrant affidavit supports a finding of probable cause.” Id. at 33 (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 156).
“[P]robable cause exists when ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place.’” Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 178 (2009) (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006)). A court determines probable
cause based on “what the totality of the circumstances meant to police officers trained in analyzing
the observed conduct for purposes of crime control.” Barnes, 279 Va. at 34 (quoting Parker v.
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 96, 106 (1998)). But it “‘does not “demand any showing”’ that a police
officer’s belief regarding criminal activity be ‘correct or more likely true than false.’” Byrd v.
Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 589, 595 (2011) (en banc) (quoting Slayton v. Commonwealth, 41
Va. App. 101, 106 (2003)).
Here, Flint alleges that the statement that both his hunting privilege and license—not only
his license—were revoked was made with reckless disregard for the truth. Even setting this
statement aside, the affidavit contains enough information to establish probable cause. The affidavit
still states that Flint’s hunting license was revoked. Virginia law provides that it is “unlawful to
hunt, trap or fish in or on the lands . . . of this Commonwealth without first obtaining a license.”
Code § 29.1-300.
Flint argues that there was no probable cause because he was hunting on his family’s land
when the picture with the crossbow and a dead deer was taken. Code § 29.1-301(A) allows
- 11 - landowners and their children to hunt “within the boundaries of their own lands” without a license.
However, the officer had no indication that the picture was taken on Flint’s family’s land. Flint,
whose hunting license was revoked, was posing with a dead deer and a crossbow on the bed of a
truck. Officer Goff followed his training when he investigated that matter. Because probable cause
“‘does not “demand any showing”’ that a police officer’s belief regarding criminal activity be
‘correct or more likely true than false,’” it was reasonable for the court to conclude that there was
probable cause that Flint was illegally hunting. Byrd, 57 Va. App. at 595 (quoting Slayton, 41
Va. App. at 106).
As Flint failed to make the threshold showing that the challenged statement was necessary
to establish probable cause, we do not review the court’s determination that the statement was not
made with reckless disregard for the truth.4 See Barnes, 279 Va. at 33 (explaining that a court first
must set aside the alleged false statement to determine whether there was probable cause regardless
of the statement and only then proceed to conduct a Franks hearing). The affidavit established
probable cause even without the challenged statement, and the court therefore did not err in denying
Flint’s Franks motion.
CONCLUSION
Because the statutory notice-based purpose was fulfilled and because Flint did not make the
required threshold showing of no probable cause without the challenged statement, we affirm the
circuit court’s denial of both motions to suppress.
Affirmed.
4 We note that the court made a factual finding that Officer Goff’s statements were not made with reckless disregard. Such factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. See West v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 679, 689 (1993) (stating that where the court found no intentional falsehoods or mistakes the “findings are not reversible unless plainly wrong or not supported by the evidence” (quoting Moats v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 349, 355 (1991))). - 12 -