Robert H. Lord Co. v. Klein

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedDecember 23, 2004
DocketKENre-03-31
StatusUnpublished

This text of Robert H. Lord Co. v. Klein (Robert H. Lord Co. v. Klein) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robert H. Lord Co. v. Klein, (Me. Super. Ct. 2004).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION KENNEBEC ss. DOCKET NO. RE-0 31 DEM KES = 19 Ioa)c oY ROBERT H. LORD COMPANY

,

Plaintiff v. - ___ DECISION AND ORDER KEITH KLEIN, et al, a Defendants Jak 4 wld

This matter is before the court on Defendants James L. Meader and J&K Builders’ motion to dismiss pursuant to MR. Civ. P. 3; and Plaintiff Robert H. Lord Company’s motion to compel mediation and to impose sanctions and attorney fees.

The present dispute arises out of an alleged contract to supply and install bleachers in the field house at Camp Laurel in Mount Vernon, Maine. Plaintiff Robert H. Lord Co. (hereinafter “the Plaintiff” or “RHL”) asserts that on or about January 30, 2003, it entered into a contract with Defendant James Meader, as principal of Defendant J] & K Builders (hereinafter “the Defendants” or “Meader and J & K”). RHL avers that although it has performed all of its obligations, the Defendants have breached the contract by failing to make timely payments for the work performed. Specifically, RHL

asserts that it is still owed $19,626.75 on the contract, exclusive of fees, interest, and

costs'.

1 At present, it appears that the amount in dispute between the parties has been reduced to around $10,000 In addition to the breach of contract claim asserted against Meader and J & K, RHL’s complaint also includes a claim for foreclosure of a mechanics’ lien against Keith Klein, et al., d/b/a Camp Laurel for the same amount allegedly due from the Defendants. Apparently, RHL and Camp Laurel reached a settlement in the spring of 2004 whereby RHL repossessed the bleachers and also received the sum of $11,000.00. Thereafter, all originally named defendants

other than Meader and J & K were dismissed from the action pursuant to a MLR. Civ. P. 41(a) notice of dismissal, filed by the Plaintiff on October 21, 2004. The Plaintiff filed its complaint on November 4, 2003, but did not serve Meader or J & K with process until nearly a year later, on October 23, 2004. The present motion to dismiss was filed on October 18, 2004.

Rule 3 of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:

Except as otherwise provided in these rules, a civil action is commenced (1) by the service of a summons and complaint, or (2) by filing a complaint with the court. When method (1) is used, the complaint must be filed with the court within 20 days after completion of service. When method (2) is used, the return of service shall be filed with the court within 90 days after the filing of the complaint. If the complaint or the return of service is not timely filed, the action may be dismissed on motion and notice, and in such case the court may, in its discretion, if it shall be of the opinion that the action was vexatiously commenced, tax a reasonable attorney fee as costs in favor of the defendant, to be recovered of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney. MLR. Civ. P. 3. Maine courts should read into this rule “a requirement that process be delivered for service ‘forthwith’ after the filing of the complaint. Excessive or unreasonable delays in service should be a ground for dismissal for insufficiency of process or service under Rule 12(b) except upon a showing of mistake or excusable neglect”. Dalot v. Smith, 551 A.2d 448, 448-49 (Me. 1988) (citing 1 Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 4.1 at 58 (2d ed. 1970)); See also, Town of Ogunquit v. Dep't. of Public Safety, 2001 ME 47, { 10, 767 A.2d 291, 294,

The effect of an involuntary dismissal for insufficiency of service of process is governed by MLR. Civ. P. 41(b)(3). See Fries v. Carpenter, 567 A.2d 437, 439 (Me. 1989). Rule 41(b)(3) provides that “[uJnless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits”. MLR.

Civ. P. 41(b)(3). Put another way, “if the court [] does not otherwise specify the effect of

an involuntary dismissal of a cause of action the dismissal operates as an adjudication 3

on the merits. Accordingly, the dismissal would be with prejudice unless the ground for dismissal falls within the rule’s stated exceptions”. Fries, 567 A.2d at 439.

The Defendants argue that the present matter should be dismissed with prejudice for the Plaintiff's failure to serve the complaint in a timely fashion pursuant to Rule 3. Also, since, in their view, this litigation was vexatiously commenced, the Defendants seek an order directing the Plaintiff to pay all attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by them in this matter. In support of their position on this latter point, Meader and J & K point out that the Plaintiff insists on pursuing claims against them when it has already recovered the bleachers and $11,000.00 pursuant to a settlement agreement entered into with the other originally named defendants. Moreover, the Defendants note that the Plaintiff has failed to discharge a mechanics’ lien filed in relation to this matter, and that it has moved for sanctions against Defendants’ counsel.

In response, the Plaintiff first contends that there is no authority for dismissing a case with prejudice based on lack of service of process. In addition, given that the dispute involves less than $10,000.00, RHL asserts that it did not serve the Defendants with process because the matter was set for mediation, and Plaintiff’s counsel did not wish to impose that expense on his client if it was not necessary. .

In light of the authority cited above, and contrary to the Plaintiff’s position, it appears that the Court can dismiss a complaint with prejudice for failure of service of process. In Fries, the Law Court determined that where a plaintiff fails to make timely service of process, personal jurisdiction of the defendant is never obtained. See Id. Moreover, the Law Court held that an involuntary dismissal for failure of service of process pursuant to MLR. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) is to be treated like a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction when applying the exception in Rule 41(b)(3). That exception provides that

where the Court does not specify the effect of an involuntary dismissal, that dismissal will not operate as an adjudication upon the merits. However, Rule 41(b)(3) does not prohibit the Court from specifically stating that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is with prejudice, effectively bypassing the exception. Furthermore, the Plaintiff's proffered reason for not effecting service can hardly be characterized as excusable neglect. Although the economic impact of litigation on clients is something that all attorneys need to keep in mind, RHL’s own brief reveals that mediation was not set up until August of 2004, nearly nine months after filing the complaint. Thus, Plaintiff's counsel has offered no explanation for why it allowed the 90-day window provided in Rule 3 to close, and then waited another six months on top of that before deciding to zealously prosecute this case.

On the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs, the Court is not persuaded that this case was vexatiously commenced. The mechanics’ lien does not encumber property in which the Defendants have any interest. Likewise, the other reasons cited by the Defendants do not warrant the relief sought.

The Plaintiff seeks an order directing the Defendants to engage in mediation and imposing sanctions and attorneys’ fees against the Defendants and their counsel for unilaterally canceling a mediation scheduled for October 5, 2004.

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Related

Fries v. Carpenter
567 A.2d 437 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1989)
Dalot v. Smith
551 A.2d 448 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1988)
Town of Ogunquit v. Department of Public Safety
2001 ME 47 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2001)

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Robert H. Lord Co. v. Klein, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robert-h-lord-co-v-klein-mesuperct-2004.