In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
________________ NO. 09-21-00120-CR ________________
ROBERT GORDON LETOURNEAU, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 184th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Cause No. 1635010 ________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Robert Letourneau was convicted of solicitation of capital murder
and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice.1 Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 15.03(a), 19.03(a). In his
1 This case was transferred to this Court from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston, Texas, pursuant to a docket equalization order. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 73.001. 1 sole issue on appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
verdict against him. We affirm.
I. Background
A. The State’s Case
For several years before the events giving rise to this case, Appellant and
Brooke Larson 2 were in a dating relationship. When the relationship soured, Larson
sought, and was granted, a restraining order prohibiting Letourneau from entering
the residence that the two of them had shared. Letourneau responded to this action
first by returning to the house, and later by allegedly kidnapping and robbing her.
While he was incarcerated and awaiting trial for these offenses, Appellant
conceived a plot to have Larson murdered so that she would be unable to testify
against him as to any of the pending charges. In furtherance of his plan to kill Larson,
Appellant conspired with Jerry Pinyerd, a fellow inmate, and requested that Pinyerd
locate someone who would kill Larson in exchange for a share of the sales price of
some valuable automobile parts. Pinyerd contacted law enforcement authorities,
who then devised a plan to have undercover officers meet with both Appellant and
2 Because the Texas Constitution grants crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process[,]” we use a fictitious name to identify the individual identified in the record as the intended victim of the crime alleged. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 30(a)(1).
2 Pinyerd to investigate Pinyerd’s allegation and to gather evidence against Appellant.
Pinyerd did not testify at trial, but the officers involved in the undercover activities
testified regarding the evidence that they gathered in support of the case. The jury
found Appellant guilty of solicitation of capital murder and Appellant timely filed a
notice of appeal. We summarize the testimony and evidence below.
1. Lieutenant Arfele’s Testimony
Lieutenant Arfele of the Harris County Sheriff’s Office described his
experience and training in the law enforcement field, as well as his specific
assignment as watch commander at the Harris County jail in late April of 2019, when
Appellant and Pinyerd were inmates at that facility. During Arfele’s tenure at the
jail, Pinyerd approached Arfele through another officer; Arfele then met with
Pinyerd, and that meeting led Arfele to contact the Harris County District Attorney’s
Office so that the matter could be further investigated.
2. Detective Patterson’s Testimony
Detective Patterson with the Houston Police Department described his law
enforcement background and indicated that he became involved in the instant case
when Sergeant Seagler requested his assistance with the investigation. Specifically,
Seagler asked Patterson to obtain a release of Appellant’s storage unit keys, because
the storage unit apparently contained the automobile parts that were intended to
3 finance Larson’s murder. Upon retrieving the keys, Patterson delivered them to
Seagler.
3. Detective Seagler’s Testimony
Sergeant Seagler, a longtime detective with the Houston Police Department,
indicated that the major offender’s division, where he is assigned, investigates
crimes that do not readily lend themselves to other divisions, including murder-for-
hire cases. He described the procedure for approaching this type of case, noting that
the initial step would involve researching and interviewing everyone involved, and
then checking the information for reliability. After determining that the murder plot
was genuine, the officers develop a plan unique to the situation, so that it will be
believable and workable. When first meeting the suspect, it is important to establish
a rapport, so that each step of the process will naturally flow from the previous one.
Seagler became involved with this case when the Harris County District
Attorney’s Office contacted him and requested him to play the role of the killer for
hire. To further this “sting operation” Seagler first met with Pinyerd, also known as
“Minus 1,” to arrange for him to introduce Seagler to Appellant and vouch for
Seagler’s authenticity as a “hitman.” The authorities then provided Pinyerd a
telephone number to give Appellant, with the expectation that Appellant would call
that number if he wished to advance the reported plan to murder Larson. Seagler
used the alias “Joe” while working in an undercover capacity, and his partner used
4 the name “Rusty.” When Appellant called Seagler at the number that Seagler had
provided through Pinyerd, the two of them discussed the objective over the
telephone on four occasions, and eventually met at the jail both before and after
completing Larson’s alleged murder. Seagler recorded these conversations and
played them for the jury.
During his testimony, Seagler laid out the steps in the investigation. They
obtained the key to the storage unit and searched and photographed the contents;
they verified that Appellant was serious about his wish to have Larson killed; they
staged Larson’s murder; they confronted Appellant about the apparent murder; and
they searched Appellant’s jail cell to retrieve the notes he had used to communicate
with Seagler. Seagler acknowledged that he and Appellant used coded language to
communicate about the planned murder and stated that it is normal to do so because
of the necessarily clandestine nature of the intended crime.
4. Investigator Mauldin’s Testimony
Mauldin described his career path, which eventually led him to become an
investigator at the Harris County District Attorney’s Office, a position he has held
since 2007. Much of his current job involves locating and interviewing witnesses
and collecting and evaluating evidence. The major offender’s division, where the
witness was currently assigned at the time of trial, primarily focuses on murder
5 investigations, including the solicitation of capital murder that is the subject of this
case.
Like Seagler, Mauldin described the usual course of approaching such a case,
noting that it requires investigating the report to determine its legitimacy and
developing a strategy appropriate to the situation and the individuals involved. After
an unsuccessful attempt to record a conversation between Pinyerd and Appellant,
Mauldin met with Pinyerd several more times to obtain information about Pinyerd’s
conversations with Appellant. During one such meeting, Mauldin gave Pinyerd a
telephone number to call to reach Sergeant Seagler, as the hitman, to discuss the
murder for hire of Appellant’s former girlfriend, Larson. Letourneau called Seagler,
and Mauldin listened to those conversations. He echoed the testimony of other
witnesses regarding the development and execution of the plan, and described the
June 12, 2019 meeting with Appellant, when detectives met with Appellant,
ostensibly to inform him of Larson’s death. After that meeting, they obtained a
search warrant for Appellant’s jail cell, and the items recovered during that search
included Appellant’s various handwritten notes, including his statement that he had
earlier refused to speak with law enforcement officers because he believed that they
were planning to entrap him.
6 5. Brooke Larson’s Testimony
As noted above, Larson and Appellant were in a romantic relationship for
several years. When Appellant’s financial issues made their relationship increasingly
problematic, she told him not to return from a trip to California.
Appellant returned to the Houston area despite Larson’s request, and the
ensuing friction between them caused her to obtain a restraining order against him,
which he promptly violated. Soon afterward, he filed a lien against her house,
apparently contending that he had performed work and paid for materials used in the
renovation of the property, which Larson denied. Approximately one month later,
Appellant kidnapped Larson as she was leaving her office. He forced her to withdraw
money from three ATMs, and repeatedly threatened to kill her if she either failed to
follow his instructions or attempted to communicate with anyone. Fortunately for
Larson, she and her daughter had previously devised a code phrase to communicate
danger. Larson was able to use this method to alert her daughter of the threat, and
her daughter called the police. After Larson convinced Appellant that her daughter
had called the police, he dropped her off near her house and left the scene on foot.
Larson pressed criminal charges against Appellant, and he was arrested
approximately a week after the kidnapping.
Due to the anxiety caused by Appellant’s actions, Larson closed her business
and left the state. She remained away until Seagler contacted her and requested her
7 cooperation in setting up the murder for hire case against Appellant. Larson
participated in staging her own murder in the bathroom of the house she previously
shared with Appellant so that law enforcement authorities could show Appellant a
photograph of the purported crime scene.
6. The Recordings
The State’s exhibits 4 through 9 contain recordings of telephone and face-to-
face conversations between Appellant and Seagler. Although the audio quality of the
recorded telephone conversations is good, the other recordings are less than ideal,
due to the technical capability of the recording equipment used and the acoustics at
the jail, where Seagler met Appellant and recorded their interactions.
In the initial telephone conversation, Appellant called Seagler, or “Joe,” at the
number Pinyerd had previously given Appellant, and stated, “Minus told me to give
you a call.” Over the course of all four of the calls, Seagler and Appellant can be
heard discussing whether to accomplish Larson’s murder by means of a road rage
incident or a burglary. It is clear that they are discussing Larson in the conversations
because they specifically mention her street address and the name of her business.
Moreover, it is apparent that they are planning a murder; not only does Seagler,
posing as “Joe,” mention the risk of engineering a road rage incident to kill Larson,
citing the threat traffic cameras would pose, he instead suggests a break-in at
Larson’s home, and the two discuss Larson’s upgraded alarm system and living
8 arrangements in the context of the likelihood of successfully committing the murder
and the chance of being caught. They also discuss the automobile parts to be sold to
finance the cost of “Joe’s” services, and the ready availability of guns in the state.
The recordings made in the Harris County jail reflect the same content as the
telephone recordings. They are, however, more informative, because they show
Appellant and “Joe” communicating by means of notes held up to the glass partition
separating them, to avoid being overheard. Some of these notes are either legible on
the recording or are in evidence and demonstrate the nature of Appellant’s intent;
one of Appellant’s notes reads “no witness no charge.” Most of the conversations
focused on the details of the murder plot, the means of payment therefor, and the
secrecy needed to avoid detection.
B. Appellant’s Testimony
Appellant was the sole defense witness at both the guilt and the punishment
phase of his trial wherein he disputed every piece of evidence against him. He
testified that he and Larson had a wonderful relationship, and that the restraining
order took him by surprise. He testified that he neither kidnapped nor robbed her.
Most importantly, Appellant denied that he solicited Pinyerd to help him hire
someone to kill Larson. Instead, he offered other explanations of the incriminating
evidence that the State had presented. He stated that the incident Larson portrayed
as a kidnapping and robbery was a consensual encounter, and that Larson voluntarily
9 gave him money to repair his vehicle. Appellant acknowledged that although he did
seek help from other inmates, including Pinyerd, to liquidate the contents of his
storage unit, he planned to use the sales proceeds not to pay a hired killer, but to hire
an attorney to represent him in an unrelated case. As for the plan to murder Larson,
he testified that he thought from the beginning that the murder conspiracy was
fictitious, because Pinyerd told him so; he stated that he played along with the
contrived murder plot to induce the authorities to deposit funds into his jail
commissary account. He did not, however, explain how Pinyerd and the authorities
intended to “frame” him for a murder for hire, or why he voluntarily cooperated in
what he described as a “setup,” and an attempt to “scam” him. He likewise did not
explain why he would willingly participate in the fictional murder-for-hire scheme
for the $130 deposit he received into his inmate account, or why the State would
have targeted him with the plan in question.
II. Standard of Review
Evidence is legally sufficient to support a criminal conviction if any rational
trier of fact could have found each essential element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt after considering the cumulative force of all the incriminating
circumstances in the light most favorable to the conviction. See Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1979); Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 808-09 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2015); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 2.01.
10 III. Analysis
To substantiate Appellant’s conviction for solicitation of capital murder, the
evidence must show that he requested, commanded, or attempted to induce Pinyerd
to solicit another person to murder his intended victim for remuneration. Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 15.03(a); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(3). Appellant contends that
the State could not satisfy this burden because Pinyerd was unavailable to testify at
trial, and the State therefore could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant solicited Pinyerd to do anything at all, much less facilitate a murder for
hire. We disagree.
While it is true that no witness stated under oath that Appellant solicited
Pinyerd to commit capital murder, and that nowhere in the recordings or in his
testimony did Appellant admit to having done so, the jury’s consideration was not
limited to such direct evidence. Instead, the jury was permitted to draw reasonable
inferences from the evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any portion of the
evidence presented. See Edward v. State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 655-56 (Tex. Crim. App.
2021).
The record contains ample evidence from which the jury could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant solicited Larson’s murder. Appellant
sought to pay someone to kill Larson; murder for remuneration constitutes capital
murder. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(3). Not only did Seagler and Mauldin
11 testify that Appellant was planning Larson’s murder for hire, but Appellant’s own
conversations as contained in the recordings submitted to the jury establish and
support the conclusion that Appellant intended to pay Seagler to kill Larson. Their
discussions included a cost/benefit analysis of staging a burglary versus a road rage
incident, noting the likelihood of being apprehended with either plan. Appellant
preferred the road rage approach to the murder but was dissuaded by Seagler’s logic
that following that plan involved too great a risk of being detected; as Seagler noted,
dashboard cameras were everywhere, and a burglary would be “cleaner for both of
us.” They also discussed any possible impediments to the burglary, such as an alarm
system or other household residents or neighbors who might complicate the
situation, and Appellant provided detailed information to Seagler about the alarm
system and about the victim.
The recorded conversations contain no indication, whatsoever, that Appellant
knew he was speaking with law enforcement, or that the true purpose of selling the
items in his storage unit was to finance his legal prosecution of another matter as he
testified at trial, rather than a murder.
If, as Appellant averred, he intended to use the money from the sale to hire an
attorney, there would have been no need for secrecy, because hiring an attorney is a
perfectly legal activity. Appellant’s emphasis on using secretive communications,
such as using notes rather than speech and holding his finger to his lips to silence
12 Seagler, makes it clear that he was planning something he did not want others to
hear; those conversations and notes, along with other evidence presented at trial
established the criminal nature of the plan and that Appellant solicited Seagler to kill
Larson. The jury accordingly could have disbelieved Appellant’s testimony and
could have believed based on the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, that
Appellant requested, commanded, or attempted to solicit another person to murder
his intended victim for remuneration. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 15.03(a); Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(3). See Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 88 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002).
Appellant’s contention that he knew all along that he was speaking with the
police is likewise unpersuasive, entitling the jury to disregard it. Id. Not only did
the State discredit Appellant’s testimony that he wrote a note about police
involvement early in the investigation, but the idea that Appellant was “playing”
Seagler for his and Pinyerd’s financial benefit could reasonably have been found by
the jury not to be credible, considering the risk involved and the minimal benefit
realized. Id.
When evidence conflicts, we presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in
favor of the verdict, if a rational trier of fact could do so. See Edward, 635 S.W.3d
at 656. Because a rational trier of fact could have believed the State’s evidence over
Appellant’s testimony, we will not disturb the jury’s decision that Appellant solicited
13 Larson’s capital murder. Id. at 655-56. Appellant attempted to refute the charges
against him by claiming he merely played along with the murder for hire plan solely
to get money from the State, and he claimed he did not approach Pinyerd, but that
Pinyerd approached him to take advantage of the apparent opportunity to profit from
a contemplated sale of automobile parts. The jury was not, however, bound to accept
this testimony, and the jury could have rejected all of his testimony. See Ortiz, 93
S.W.3d at 88. Moreover, the jury could have concluded based on the evidence and
logical inferences therefrom that Appellant “requested, commanded, or attempted to
induce” Pinyerd to locate someone who would kill Larson for money. Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(3). If the plan to kill Larson had been Pinyerd’s idea, Pinyerd
likely would not have alerted law enforcement authorities, as Arfele’s testimony
implied, so the jury could have inferred that Pinyerd’s decision to cooperate with the
investigation indicated that Appellant had made the indefensible request the State
alleged. In short, the jury, making its permissible logical inferences from the
evidence before it, was justified in finding that Appellant solicited Pinyerd to find
someone who would commit the intended murder. We overrule Appellant’s sole
point on appeal.
IV. Conclusion
Because the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant solicited
Pinyerd to locate someone who would kill Larson for remuneration, sufficient
14 evidence supports Appellant’s conviction of solicitation to commit capital murder.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
________________________________ CHARLES KREGER Justice
Submitted on August 12, 2022 Opinion Delivered September 7, 2022 Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.