MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2019 ME 113 Docket: Cum-18-432 Submitted On Briefs: May 30, 2019 Decided: July 18, 2019 Revised: November 21, 2019
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.
ROBERT GOGUEN
v.
JON HADDOW
SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶1] Robert Goguen appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court
(Cumberland County, Mills, J.) dismissing, for failure to state a claim, his
complaint alleging professional malpractice and related causes of action arising
from Jon Haddow’s legal representation of him in federal criminal proceedings.
We affirm the judgment.
[¶2] The federal proceedings at issue here began in January 2011 when
Goguen was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Maine
for knowingly failing to register as a sex offender.1 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2250(a)
(LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-19). Goguen, represented by other counsel,
1 Goguen was convicted of sexual assault in the second degree in Connecticut in 1996. 2
pleaded guilty to the federal charge, admitting in open court that he had
knowingly failed to update his registration.
[¶3] At the same time, Goguen was facing state charges filed in 2010 in
Maine for unlawful sexual contact with a minor (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 255-A(1)(E-1) (2018). He was represented by another attorney on those
charges. It was understood that the state charge could be used by the federal
government to enhance the federal sentence.
[¶4] In October 2011, Goguen, personally and not through counsel, filed
a motion in federal court asking for his then counsel to withdraw and seeking
to withdraw his plea of guilty to the charge of failing to register. That
December, the court (J. Woodcock, J.) granted Goguen’s motion allowing his
counsel to withdraw and appointed Haddow to represent Goguen.
[¶5] In May 2012, Goguen withdrew his motion to withdraw the guilty
plea in the federal prosecution for failure to register, and the state charge of
unlawful sexual contact with a minor was dismissed in July 2012 on the ground
that Goguen was “being sentenced in Federal Court.”
[¶6] At Goguen’s September 2012 federal sentencing hearing on the
failure to register charge, the court informed Goguen, thoroughly and in great
detail, of the possible consequences of his decision whether to admit or proceed 3
to trial on the allegation that he had committed a sex offense while in failure to
register status—a fact that, if proved, would generate a federal sentencing
enhancement. Following that explanation, the court afforded Goguen another
hour to consult with Haddow. After consulting with Haddow, Goguen stated in
open court that he did not dispute that he had committed a sex offense while in
failure to register status. The court sentenced Goguen to a term of months and
a period of supervised release with conditions.
[¶7] In 2013, after Goguen left prison on supervised release, the United
States Probation Office moved to revoke his release on the ground that he had
accessed pornography at the Penobscot Judicial Center law library in violation
of his conditions of release. Haddow was again appointed to represent Goguen.
In open court, Goguen waived his right to an evidentiary hearing and admitted
that he had viewed pornography in violation of the conditions of his supervised
release. Goguen was sentenced, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. United States v. Goguen,
No. 13-2230 (1st Cir. Oct. 9, 2014).
[¶8] More than three years later, in March 2018, Goguen filed his civil
complaint against Haddow in the Superior Court, alleging legal malpractice and
related claims arising from Haddow’s representation of him both at sentencing 4
for failure to register and during the proceedings to revoke his supervised
release. Upon Haddow’s motion, the court (Mills, J.) dismissed Goguen’s
complaint for failure to state a claim. See M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
[¶9] Because undisturbed judgments have been entered, here based on
Goguen’s in-court admissions, finding that he committed a sex offense while in
failure to register status and that he accessed pornography in violation of his
conditions of release, Goguen is collaterally estopped from asserting that
inaccurate legal advice—rather than his own conduct—caused the injuries that
he alleges.2 See Butler v. Mooers, 2001 ME 56, ¶¶ 8-9, 771 A.2d 1034; Brewer v.
Hagemann, 2001 ME 27, ¶¶ 7-10, 771 A.2d 1030.
[¶10] As the trial court noted, in many jurisdictions, a person bringing a
professional malpractice claim against former criminal defense counsel must
plead and prove the additional element of exoneration, if not actual innocence,
of the criminal charge to seek any relief on the basis of incarceration. Brewer,
2001 ME 27, ¶ 6 & nn.3-4, 771 A.2d 1030. Most states require actual innocence,
see Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 991 (Cal. 1998); Rodriguez v.
2 All torts that Goguen has alleged require proximate causation. See Argereow v. Weisberg, 2018
ME 140, ¶ 27, 195 A.3d 1210 (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Steadman v. Pagels, 2015 ME 122, ¶ 26, 125 A.3d 713 (negligent infliction of emotional distress); Bell ex rel. Bell v. Dawson, 2013 ME 108, ¶¶ 17, 24, 82 A.3d 827 (negligent supervision); Butler v. Mooers, 2001 ME 56, ¶ 9, 771 A.2d 1034 (professional malpractice). 5
Nielsen, 609 N.W.2d 368, 374-75 (Neb. 2000); Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello,
Stein & Gordon, P.A., 727 A.2d 996, 999-1000 (N.H. 1999),3 though some states
require only exoneration, see Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 569-73 (Alaska
1993); Stevens v. Bispham, 851 P.2d 556, 561 (Or. 1993); Peeler v. Hughes &
Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. 1995). See Brewer, 2001 ME 27, ¶ 6 & nn. 3-4,
771 A.2d 1030.
[¶11] Goguen has not, however, alleged that any one of the pertinent
court orders—the judgment of conviction for failing to register, the sentence
imposed upon that conviction, or the order revoking his release—has been set
aside for any reason. Because Goguen has not, through his complaint,
presented any facts necessary to overcome the Maine collateral estoppel bar,
we need not, on the record presented here, opine on whether the elements of
actual innocence or exoneration are necessary or sufficient to proceed with a
professional malpractice claim under Maine law when the alleged malpractice
involved the entry of a judgment of conviction or a subsequent revocation of
release. Further, to the extent that Goguen’s complaint may be seen to allege
3 Cf. Hilario v. Reardon, 960 A.2d 337, 339, 343-45 (N.H.
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2019 ME 113 Docket: Cum-18-432 Submitted On Briefs: May 30, 2019 Decided: July 18, 2019 Revised: November 21, 2019
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.
ROBERT GOGUEN
v.
JON HADDOW
SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶1] Robert Goguen appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court
(Cumberland County, Mills, J.) dismissing, for failure to state a claim, his
complaint alleging professional malpractice and related causes of action arising
from Jon Haddow’s legal representation of him in federal criminal proceedings.
We affirm the judgment.
[¶2] The federal proceedings at issue here began in January 2011 when
Goguen was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Maine
for knowingly failing to register as a sex offender.1 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2250(a)
(LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-19). Goguen, represented by other counsel,
1 Goguen was convicted of sexual assault in the second degree in Connecticut in 1996. 2
pleaded guilty to the federal charge, admitting in open court that he had
knowingly failed to update his registration.
[¶3] At the same time, Goguen was facing state charges filed in 2010 in
Maine for unlawful sexual contact with a minor (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 255-A(1)(E-1) (2018). He was represented by another attorney on those
charges. It was understood that the state charge could be used by the federal
government to enhance the federal sentence.
[¶4] In October 2011, Goguen, personally and not through counsel, filed
a motion in federal court asking for his then counsel to withdraw and seeking
to withdraw his plea of guilty to the charge of failing to register. That
December, the court (J. Woodcock, J.) granted Goguen’s motion allowing his
counsel to withdraw and appointed Haddow to represent Goguen.
[¶5] In May 2012, Goguen withdrew his motion to withdraw the guilty
plea in the federal prosecution for failure to register, and the state charge of
unlawful sexual contact with a minor was dismissed in July 2012 on the ground
that Goguen was “being sentenced in Federal Court.”
[¶6] At Goguen’s September 2012 federal sentencing hearing on the
failure to register charge, the court informed Goguen, thoroughly and in great
detail, of the possible consequences of his decision whether to admit or proceed 3
to trial on the allegation that he had committed a sex offense while in failure to
register status—a fact that, if proved, would generate a federal sentencing
enhancement. Following that explanation, the court afforded Goguen another
hour to consult with Haddow. After consulting with Haddow, Goguen stated in
open court that he did not dispute that he had committed a sex offense while in
failure to register status. The court sentenced Goguen to a term of months and
a period of supervised release with conditions.
[¶7] In 2013, after Goguen left prison on supervised release, the United
States Probation Office moved to revoke his release on the ground that he had
accessed pornography at the Penobscot Judicial Center law library in violation
of his conditions of release. Haddow was again appointed to represent Goguen.
In open court, Goguen waived his right to an evidentiary hearing and admitted
that he had viewed pornography in violation of the conditions of his supervised
release. Goguen was sentenced, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. United States v. Goguen,
No. 13-2230 (1st Cir. Oct. 9, 2014).
[¶8] More than three years later, in March 2018, Goguen filed his civil
complaint against Haddow in the Superior Court, alleging legal malpractice and
related claims arising from Haddow’s representation of him both at sentencing 4
for failure to register and during the proceedings to revoke his supervised
release. Upon Haddow’s motion, the court (Mills, J.) dismissed Goguen’s
complaint for failure to state a claim. See M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
[¶9] Because undisturbed judgments have been entered, here based on
Goguen’s in-court admissions, finding that he committed a sex offense while in
failure to register status and that he accessed pornography in violation of his
conditions of release, Goguen is collaterally estopped from asserting that
inaccurate legal advice—rather than his own conduct—caused the injuries that
he alleges.2 See Butler v. Mooers, 2001 ME 56, ¶¶ 8-9, 771 A.2d 1034; Brewer v.
Hagemann, 2001 ME 27, ¶¶ 7-10, 771 A.2d 1030.
[¶10] As the trial court noted, in many jurisdictions, a person bringing a
professional malpractice claim against former criminal defense counsel must
plead and prove the additional element of exoneration, if not actual innocence,
of the criminal charge to seek any relief on the basis of incarceration. Brewer,
2001 ME 27, ¶ 6 & nn.3-4, 771 A.2d 1030. Most states require actual innocence,
see Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 991 (Cal. 1998); Rodriguez v.
2 All torts that Goguen has alleged require proximate causation. See Argereow v. Weisberg, 2018
ME 140, ¶ 27, 195 A.3d 1210 (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Steadman v. Pagels, 2015 ME 122, ¶ 26, 125 A.3d 713 (negligent infliction of emotional distress); Bell ex rel. Bell v. Dawson, 2013 ME 108, ¶¶ 17, 24, 82 A.3d 827 (negligent supervision); Butler v. Mooers, 2001 ME 56, ¶ 9, 771 A.2d 1034 (professional malpractice). 5
Nielsen, 609 N.W.2d 368, 374-75 (Neb. 2000); Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello,
Stein & Gordon, P.A., 727 A.2d 996, 999-1000 (N.H. 1999),3 though some states
require only exoneration, see Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 569-73 (Alaska
1993); Stevens v. Bispham, 851 P.2d 556, 561 (Or. 1993); Peeler v. Hughes &
Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. 1995). See Brewer, 2001 ME 27, ¶ 6 & nn. 3-4,
771 A.2d 1030.
[¶11] Goguen has not, however, alleged that any one of the pertinent
court orders—the judgment of conviction for failing to register, the sentence
imposed upon that conviction, or the order revoking his release—has been set
aside for any reason. Because Goguen has not, through his complaint,
presented any facts necessary to overcome the Maine collateral estoppel bar,
we need not, on the record presented here, opine on whether the elements of
actual innocence or exoneration are necessary or sufficient to proceed with a
professional malpractice claim under Maine law when the alleged malpractice
involved the entry of a judgment of conviction or a subsequent revocation of
release. Further, to the extent that Goguen’s complaint may be seen to allege
3 Cf. Hilario v. Reardon, 960 A.2d 337, 339, 343-45 (N.H. 2008) (vacating the dismissal of a complaint alleging that counsel’s unauthorized motion to withdraw a guilty plea resulted in the convicted offender’s breach of the plea agreement and a ruling that the offender could not seek suspension of a portion of his sentence pursuant to the terms of that agreement). 6
malpractice affecting the sentence imposed by the federal court after Goguen
pleaded guilty to failing to register, the complaint fails to state a claim for relief
because, as is revealed by Goguen’s allegations themselves, the sentence
imposed was at the bottom of the applicable range of the federal sentencing
guidelines given the offense level that pertained to Goguen for his crime of
failure to register.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Robert Goguen, appellant pro se
Benjamin J. Wahrer, Esq., and James M. Bowie, Esq., Thompson Bowie & Hatch LLC, Portland, for appellee Jon Haddow
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number CV-2018-117 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY