Robert Eugene Pryor v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided May 12, 2015·No. 14-15-00057-CR·Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED

14-15-00057-CR

FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 5/12/2015 2:53:09 PM CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

NO. 14-15-00057-cr

IN THE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN 14th COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS 5/12/2015 2:53:09 PM

AT HOUSTON, TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk

ROBERT EUGENE PRYOR

APPELLANT

V.

T H E S TAT E O F T E X A S

APPELLEE

On appeal from the 405th Judicial District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Hon. Michelle Slaughter, Presiding

Tr i a l C a u s e N o . 1 3 C R 1 9 1 4

APPELLANT'S ORIGINAL BRIEF

JAMES DUCOTE Te x a s B a r N o . 0 6 1 4 5 5 0 0 3027 Marina Bay Drive, Suite 110 League City, Texas 77573 Phone: (281) 624-6224 Facsimile: (832) 553-7355 e-mail: james@ducotelawfirm.com Attorney for Appellant

NO. 14-15-00057-CR

ROBERT EUGENE PRYOR

APPELLANT

T H E S TAT E O F T E X A S

APPELLEE

I D E N T I T Y O F PA R T I E S A N D C O U N S E L

Appellant certifies that the following is a complete list of the

parties, attorneys, and any other person who has an interest in the

outcome of this lawsuit.

Robert Eugene Pryor

The State of Texas

Counsel for AnDellee

Jack Roady Galveston County Criminal District Attorney 600 59*^^ Street, First Floor Galveston, Texas 77551 Attorney for the State of Texas

JAMES DUCOTE Counsel for Appellant

TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S

Identity of Parties and Counsel Page 2, 3

Index of Authorities S

Statement of the Case 6

Issues Presented 7

Statement of the Facts 8-10

Summary of the Arguments 11

Argument 12-18

In its Judgment Adjudicating Guilt, the 405^ Judicial District Court

should have entered explicitly that there had been no affirmative

finding of a deadly weapon in Appellant's case, rather than the entry

of "N/A in the Judgment.

C e r t i fi c a t e o f S e r v i c e 20

Certificate of Compliance with TRAP 9.4 21

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Kinkade v. State, 184 S.W. 3d 929 at 930 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, 13 no pet).

Ex Parte Brooks, 722 S.W. 2d 140 (Court of Grim. App. 13 December 1986)

Fann v. State, 702 S.W. 2d 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) 13

Polk V. State, 693 S.W. 2d 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) 13

Travelstead v. State, 693 S.W. 2d 400, 402 (Tex. Crim. 16,17 App. 1985)

Asberry v. State, 813 S.W. 2d 526 at 531 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, 17 pet. Ref d.)

Ex Parte Thomas, 638 S.W. 2d 905, 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) 17

Guerrero v. State, 299 S.W. 3d 48 17

RULES

A r t i c l e 4 2 . 1 2 , S e c . 3 f ( a ) 9 2 ) , V. A . C . C . P. 1 2

STATUTES

V. T. C . A . Penal Code Sec. 29.03 6, 8

S TAT E M E N T O F T H E C A S E

Robert Eugene Pryor, Appellant pled guilty of the crime of

Aggravated Robbery, as defined by V.T.C.A. Penal Code Sec. 29.03 in the

405':^ Judicial District Court of Galveston County, Texas. The trial Court

deferred entry of an adjudication of guilt, and sentenced Appellant to

five years community supervision. After contested hearing on the State's

Amended Motion to Adjudicate Guilt - Revoke Community Supervision,

and entered a Judgment Adjudicating Guilt in which an entry of "N/A"

was made below the heading of "Findings on Deadly Weapon".

Appellant now appeals his conviction and sentencing for the offense.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

In its Judgment Adjudicating Guilt, the 405"^ Judicial District Court

should have entered explicitly that there had been no affirmative

finding of a deadly weapon in Appellant's case, rather than the entry of

"N/A" in the Judgment.

S TAT E M E N T O F T H E F A C T S

On November 5,2013, Appellant pled guilty to the offense of

Aggravated Robbery as defined in V.T.C.A. Penal Code Sec. 29.03. The

trial court deferred entering an adjudication of guilt, and sentenced

Appellant to 5 ears community supervision. On March 25, 2014 the

State of Texas by and through her Criminal District Attorney a Motion to

Adjudicate Guilt-Revoke Community Supervision, a copy of which is

attached as Exhibit "A", alleging that Appellant had violated certain

conditions of his community supervision order, to wit:

"la. On or about the 24*^^ of January, 2014, in Galveston

County, Texas, said Defendant, Robert Eugene Pryor, did then and there

commit the offense of Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity; and

lb. On or about the 24^ day of January, 2014, in Galveston

County, Texas, said Defendant, Robert Eugene Pryor, did then and there,

commit the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance; and

12. Said Defendant did fail to pay his Community Supervision

Fee as ordered and is currently $180.00 in arrears; and

13. Said Defendant did fail to pay the Costs of Court as ordered

and is currently $30.00 in arrears; and

16. Said Defendant did fail to pay the reimbursement to

Galveston County for compensation of appointed counsel as ordered

and is currently $30.00 in arrears; and

16A. Said Defendant did fail to pay Crime Stoppers Program

payment as ordered and is currently $25.00 in arrears; and

19. Said Defendant did fail to pay $10.00 to reimburse for the

costs of drug/alcohol screening; and

40. Said Defendant was in possession of a machete."

On October 20, 2014 the State of Texas by and through her Criminal

District Attorney a Second Amended Motion to Adjudicate Guilt-Revoke

Community Supervision, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B",

changing item la. of its first motion to read:

"la. On or about the 24'^ ^ay of January, 2014, in Brazoria

County, Texas, said Defendant, Robert Eugene Pryor, did then and there

commit the offense of Theft of Property >=$50.00<$500.00; and".

On December 15,2014 contested hearing was had on the State's

amended motion. Appellant entered pleas of "True" to all of the State's

allegations, except lb and 40, to which he entered pleas of "false" and

"not true" respectively. After hearing the Trial Court found true all of the

State's allegations, except allegations lb and 40, which it found to be

not true. Correlatively; the Court found that because of his incarceration

in the Brazoria County Jail, Appellant didn't have the ability to pay the

fees cited in the State's motions (Alleged violations Nos. 12,13,16,16A

and 19].

The Court sentenced Appellant to serve eighteen years in the

Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

In its Judgment Adjudicating Guilt, the 405*^ Judicial District Court

should have entered explicitly that there had been no affirmative

finding of a deadly weapon in Appellant's case, rather than the entry of

"N/A" in the Judgment.

FIRST ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE EXPLICITLY ENTERED THAT THERE

An integral and indispensible part of the Texas Parole scheme is

the possibility of parole for a person convicted of most felony crimes.

The operation, timing and possibility of parole depends on the offense

for which the inmate was convicted, the sentence which was imposed,

and upon the behavior of the inmate while in prison. For the offense of

aggravated robbery the availability of parole and the portion of the

sentence which must be served before an inmate becomes eligible for

parole depends upon whether the convicted inmate "used or exhibited a

deadly weapon during the commission of a felony offense or during

immediate flight therefrom". Article 42.12, Sec. 3f (a392}, V.A.C.C.P.

The major, if not the sole, mechanism for transmitting this

information to the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole is contained

within the Judgment (In Appellant's case since this was a hearing on the

State's Motion to Adjudicate Guilt-Revoke Community Supervision and

the State's Second Amended Motion to Adjudicate Guilt-Revoke

Community in which Appellant was adjudicated guilty this information

was transmitted in the Order of Deferred Adjudication and the

Judgment Adjudicating Guilt). This document should convey to the

Institutional Division whether there was an affirmative finding of a

deadly weapon.

There are numerous cases defining and requiring the explicitness

of a finding of a deadly weapon.

"The purpose of the deadly weapon finding is to assist in

calculating a prisoner's parole eligibility date." Kinkade v. State, 184 S.W.

3d 929 at 930 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, no pet).

In Brooks. Ex Parte Brooks, 722 S.W. 2d 140 (Court of Grim. App.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Robert Eugene Pryor v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2015).

Robert Eugene Pryor v. State (Robert Eugene Pryor v. State) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Kinkaid v. State
184 S.W.3d 929 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2006)
Asberry v. State
813 S.W.2d 526 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1991)
Adams v. State
685 S.W.2d 661 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1985)
Fann v. State
702 S.W.2d 602 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1986)
Polk v. State
693 S.W.2d 391 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1985)
Travelstead v. State
693 S.W.2d 400 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1985)
Guerrero v. State
299 S.W.3d 487 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2009)
Ex Parte Brooks
722 S.W.2d 140 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1986)
Ex Parte Thomas
638 S.W.2d 905 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1982)