Robert Epega D/B/A Million Dollar Transportation, LLC v. Bruckner Truck Sales and Volvo Financial Services

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 13, 2025
• Docket: 07-25-00226-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00226-CV

ROBERT EPEGA D/B/A MILLION DOLLAR TRANSPORTATION, LLC, APPELLANT

V.

BRUCKNER TRUCK SALES AND VOLVO FINANCIAL SERVICES, APPELLEES

On Appeal from the 47th District Court Potter County, Texas Trial Court No. 112767-A-CV, Honorable Dee Johnson, Presiding

August 13, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Robert Epega doing business as Million Dollar Transportation, LLC, filed

this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order denying his motion to dissolve a writ

of sequestration. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

An appellate court may review only final judgments or interlocutory orders made

immediately appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195

(Tex. 2001); Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352–53 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam). Since interlocutory appeals are exceptions to the general rule, the statutes permitting them are

strictly construed. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 841 (Tex. 2007).

The trial court has not entered a final judgment in this case. We have also found

no statutory authority permitting an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order

denying “Plaintiff’s Amended Motion to Dissolve Pre-Judgment Writ of Sequestration.”

See Jackson v. Trustmark Nat’l Bank, No. 14-07-01082-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 874,

at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 7, 2008, no pet.) (“An order denying a motion

to dissolve a writ of sequestration is interlocutory and not appealable.”); Morgan v. Univ.

Fed. Credit Union, No. 08-16-00342-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 6261, at *1 (Tex. App.—

El Paso July 7, 2017, no pet.) (dismissing interlocutory appeal of order granting a writ of

sequestration for lack of jurisdiction). This Court specifically held in Factory Outlet, Inc.

v. Southline Equip. Co., No. 07-99-00262-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 337, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo Jan. 13, 2000, no pet.), that an order denying a motion to dissolve a writ

of sequestration is not subject to interlocutory appeal and dismissed for want of

jurisdiction.

By letter of July 29, 2025, we notified Epega that it appeared we lacked appellate

jurisdiction. In his response, Epega argues that the order is reviewable under Section

51.014(a)(4) of Civil Practice and Remedies Code as a “de facto” temporary injunction.

That section permits interlocutory appeal from an order that “grants or refuses a

temporary injunction or grants or overrules a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction as

provided by Chapter 65.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4).

2 Texas courts have held that prejudgment orders concerning control or the

disposition of property pending litigation are not temporary injunctions. See Diana Rivera

& Assocs., P.C. v. Calvillo, 986 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet.

denied) (holding that an order to deposit funds into the registry of the court did not

constitute a temporary injunction and was not subject to interlocutory appealable.);

Bowden v. Hunt, 571 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1978, no writ) (“This court

also has recently refused to consider [writs of garnishment] as an appealable temporary

injunction.”); McQuade v. E. D. Sys. Corp., 570 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas

1978, no writ) (“[W]e would be loath to hold that the mere fact that the defendant was

directed to do a certain thing pending trial makes the court’s order a temporary injunction.

Such a holding could encompass every conceivable interlocutory order and would . . .

vitiate the general rule that only final judgments are appealable.”). Such prejudgment

statutory remedies are separate from the statute concerning injunctions and governed by

different procedures. See Bowden, 571 S.W.2d at 551. Likewise, Section 51.014(a)(4)

specifically applies to temporary injunctions governed by Chapter 65 of the Civil Practice

and Remedies Code, whereas writs of sequestration are governed by Chapter 62. See

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.014(a)(4); 62.001–.063; 65.001–65.045. Strictly

construing Section 51.014(a)(4), we hold that an order refusing to dissolve a writ of

sequestration is not an order “overrul[ing] a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction as

provided by Chapter 65” and, therefore, not subject to interlocutory appeal.

3 Because there is no final judgment or appealable order presented for review, we

dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).

Per Curiam

1 Epega’s pending “Emergency Motion for Stay of Enforcement” is also denied as moot.