Opinion issued February 19, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-13-00299-CR ——————————— ROBERT EARL SCHIELE, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 411th District Court Polk County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 22467
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Robert Earl Schiele was charged by indictment with felony
arson.1 The indictment’s enhancement paragraphs alleged that Schiele previously
1 On March 26, 2013, the Texas Supreme Court ordered this appeal transferred from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2013) (authorizing transfer of cases). We are unaware of any had been convicted of felony burglary and felony retaliation. A jury rejected
Schiele’s theory of the case—that the grease fire began accidentally—and found
Schiele guilty of the charged offense. After finding the enhancement allegations
true, the jury assessed punishment at life in prison. On appeal, Schiele contends
that the evidence at trial was legally insufficient to support his conviction. He also
contends that the trial court erred by (1) admitting, during the guilt/innocence
phase, evidence that he was on parole at the time he committed the charged offense
and had previously violated parole conditions and had his parole revoked, and
(2) admitting, during the punishment phase, evidence of a prior conviction for
injury to a child. We affirm.
Background
On February 7, 2012, the mobile home that Schiele and his family were
renting caught fire and burned to the point that it was not salvageable. Marian
Buffington, a Children’s Protective Services caseworker, testified that she believed
she smelled something burning when she made an unannounced visit to the home
on the day of the fire. She arrived at 10:21 a.m. but left shortly thereafter because
no one answered her knock on the door. She testified that she smelled something
burning as she walked back toward her car and away from the home. But
conflict between the precedent of the Court of Appeals of the Ninth District and that of this Court on any relevant issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2 Buffington did not call 911 because she returned to the front door to check the
smell and could not smell anything while standing there.
Approximately three hours later, Jack Ray, a passerby, drove by the home
and saw smoke and flames. Ray called 911 to report the fire at 1:29 p.m. He
testified that he had driven by the home 15 minutes earlier and had not seen any
evidence of fire at that time.
Officer T. Binford of the Polk County Sheriff’s Department testified that he
was dispatched to the scene around 1:32 p.m. When he arrived five minutes later,
Binford looked in a window and saw “a small fire in the kitchen area” that
“appeared to be on the top of the stove area.” He testified that the house was
“filled with smoke” and that no one was inside.
Schiele had not called 911 to report the fire, but he did call Krystal Philp, his
parole officer, half an hour after Ray reported the fire. At about 1:58 p.m. on
February 7, Schiele left a voicemail for Philp explaining that he had failed to report
that morning due to a fire at home. Philp returned Schiele’s call that afternoon and
made a recording of their conversation, which was played for the jury at trial. In it,
Schiele told Philp that his home caught fire that morning. Schiele told Philp that
he had put out the fire and then left to meet Philp in Huntsville, as she had
instructed the day before, but that he failed to make the meeting because he had to
return home when he learned the fire had re-ignited. Schiele told Philp that he had
3 inhaled smoke and left the home and that he was at a nearby bridge. Earlier that
day, Philp had requested a warrant for Schiele’s arrest based on his failure to report
as instructed.
Captain R. Childers of the Polk County Sheriff’s Department testified that
he arrived at the bridge after another officer had arrested Schiele pursuant to the
arrest warrant. Childers testified that Schiele’s wife, Bessie Lucas, and two
children, were at the bridge with Schiele and the arresting officer. Lucas’s bag
contained a red expandable folder containing important family documents.
Once Childers and Schiele arrived at the police station, Childers conducted a
videotaped interview of Schiele, which was played for the jury. According to
Schiele, he was frying lunch—hot pockets, corn dogs, and French fries—in a
skillet on the electric stove when a grease fire started. Schiele told Childers that a
cabinet caught fire, and that his children ran outside as he fought the fire. Schiele
said that he only left the house after he thought that he had extinguished the fire.
Schiele, Lucas, and the children then walked to a nearby bridge where they waited
for the smoke to clear out of the home. Although Schiele heard sirens within an
hour after he left the home, he did not return because he did not “want to deal with
the landlady.” Schiele surmised that the fire must have blazed back up after he
left.
4 During the same recorded interview, Schiele admitted to Childers that
Schiele had falsely told Philp over the phone that the fire occurred in the morning.
He said that he used the fire as his “excuse” for not reporting to Philp as instructed.
Schiele also admitted to Childers that Philp had told him that an arrest warrant
would issue if he did report to her in the meeting.
Philp testified that Schiele had failed to report to her on February 6, the day
before the fire. When Philp asked Schiele to explain his failure to report, Schiele
told her that he left home to go to work, but his boss’s truck broke down, and that
his other attempts to find a ride to meet Philp were unsuccessful. Philp told
Schiele that the records from his electronic monitor showed something different—
that Schiele never left home on February 6. Schiele responded that the monitor
must not have been working properly. Philp ended the conversation by telling
Schiele to report to her in Huntsville at 10:00 a.m. the next day, February 7. She
told Schiele that she would request a warrant for his arrest if he did not report to
her on February 7 at 10 a.m. She also told him that she would request a warrant
for his arrest if further investigation of his electronic monitor records confirmed
that Schiele was falsely claiming to have left home on February 6. When Schiele
failed to report on February 7 as instructed, Philp submitted a violation report, and
a warrant issued around 1:11 p.m. that day.
5 Jay Barbee, Polk County Fire Marshal and arson investigator, investigated
the fire. Barbee testified that the origin of the fire was a pot that had been on the
electric stove. Barbee estimated that the burner had to have been on for 30 to 45 to
melt the sides of the pot. Barbee testified that he could not determine whether the
burner had been left on intentionally and that there was no evidence that an
accelerant was used to start the fire.
James Booker, Schiele’s parole officer at the time of trial, sponsored the
results of Schiele’s drug test, which showed that Schiele tested positive for
methamphetamine two days after the fire. He also sponsored a document in which
Schiele admitted in writing that he used methamphetamine on February 6, the day
before the fire.
Booker also told the jury about the records obtained from Schiele’s
electronic monitoring system. They showed that Schiele’s home monitor was
unplugged at 8:05 a.m. on February 7, the day of the fire. The system nevertheless
continued to monitor Schiele’s entry and exit from his home due to a battery
backup, about which officers do not tell parolees. Booker testified that the records
showed that, on the day of the fire, Schiele left home at 9:29 a.m., returned at
12:51 p.m., and left again at 1:14 p.m, approximately 15 minutes before Ray
reported the fire to 911.
6 Sandra Henderson, who lived nearby, testified that she was the owner of the
home, and had rented it to Schiele’s wife, Lucas, since September 2011.
Henderson testified that Lucas complained about bedbugs and roaches in January
2012. Henderson was willing to pay for an exterminator to treat the home and told
Lucas that they needed to schedule the extermination for a time when no one
would be home, but she never heard anything else about it.
Although Henderson occasionally had helped Lucas by caring for her
children, driving her to life and career skills courses, and helping her organize her
important documents into the red folder, Henderson ultimately posted an eviction
notice around February 3, 2012, for unpaid rent. Henderson testified that on
February 7, the day of the fire, she saw Lucas and her two children walking away
from the home at 9:00 a.m., with Lucas carrying a large bag.
Sufficiency of Evidence
In his first issue, Schiele contends that there was legally insufficient
evidence to support his conviction because no direct evidence shows that he
intentionally set the fire, and he presented evidence suggesting the fire was an
accident and was extinguished when he left the home.
A. Standard of Review
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on
7 that evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, a jury was rationally
justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d
516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–
19, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979)). “The jury is the sole judge of credibility and weight to
be attached to the testimony of witnesses.” Id. Juries are permitted to draw
reasonable inferences from facts as long as each is supported by the evidence
presented at trial. Id. We determine whether the necessary inferences are
reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. at 526 (citing Hooper v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). We presume the jury
resolved conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict and defer to that
determination. Id. The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial
evidence cases. King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
B. Applicable Law
As relevant in this case, a person commits arson if he “starts a fire,
regardless of whether the fire continues after ignition, or causes an explosion with
intent to destroy or damage any building, habitation, or vehicle knowing that it is
located on property belonging to another.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 28.02(a)(2)(D) (West 2011). A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his
8 conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (West 2011); Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
C. Analysis
There was no dispute that Schiele’s actions caused the grease fire in the
mobile home—the central issue in the case was whether he committed the actions
with the requisite intent. Intent is most often proven through circumstantial
evidence. See Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991),
overruled on other grounds, Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992); Dominguez v. State, 125 S.W.3d 755, 761 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, pet. ref’d). And a jury may infer intent from any facts that tend to prove its
existence, such as the acts, words, and conduct of the defendant. Hernandez, 819
S.W.2d at 810; Beltran v. State, 593 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980);
Dominguez, 125 S.W.3d at 761.
Here, the jury rationally could have inferred that Schiele intended to cause
the fire from several of his actions before and immediately after the fire. First, the
jury heard Schiele admit to Childers in the interview that Schiele did not report the
fire to 911 despite the fact that the fire was significant enough to spread from the
stove to a kitchen cabinet and cause a sore throat from smoke inhalation. Second,
the jury heard and saw Schiele admit in the interview that he left the home and did
9 not return, even after hearing sirens approach. The reason he proffered for not
returning to the scene was that he did not want to “deal with” Henderson. Third,
the jury could have rationally inferred that Schiele attempted to conceal his
whereabouts on the day of the fire based on evidence that his electronic monitor
was unplugged shortly after 8:00 a.m. See Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (attempts to conceal incriminating evidence and
implausible explanations to the police are probative of wrongful conduct and are
circumstances of guilt); Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Tex. Crim. App.
1983) (conduct of a defendant subsequent to the alleged commission of a crime
that indicates a consciousness of guilt is a circumstance tending to prove that the
defendant committed the act with which he is charged); Ramirez v. State, No. 14-
07-00060-CR, 2008 WL 3931403, at *4 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
Aug. 21, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Leaving the
scene of a crime indicates a consciousness of guilt.”).
The jury likewise rationally could have inferred intent from some of
Schiele’s words. In his interview with Childers, Schiele admitted that he falsely
told Philps that the fire started in the morning, before Schiele purported to have left
for Huntsville for his 10:00 a.m. meeting with Philp. Schiele admitted to Childers
that this was false, because, according to the account that Schiele gave Childers,
the fire started at lunch time. Schiele also made a key admission about the reason
10 he told Philp this lie: he was trying to use the fire as an excuse for failing to report
to her in Huntsville. This admission could have been damaging in the jury’s eyes
because it dovetailed with the State’s theory of motive: Schiele intentionally set
the fire to avoid having to report to Philp because he knew that reporting to Philp
would result in his failing a drug test (because he had used methamphetamine on
February 6) and having his probation revoked. See Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 526
(while not an element, motive can be a circumstance indicative of guilt); Temple v.
State, 342 S.W.3d 572, 588 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) (lying is a
circumstance of guilt), aff’d, 390 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Finally, Schiele’s account of when he left the home likewise could have
been viewed by the jury as words tending to show intent. Schiele told Childers
that approximately one hour passed between the time he and his family left home
and the time he heard sirens. But his monitor showed that he left only 14 minutes
before Ray reported the fire, and the evidence showed that authorities responded to
the scene within 9 minutes of Ray’s report. Based on this evidence, the jury
rationally could have inferred that Schiele was untruthful and attempting to conceal
his whereabouts at the time of the fire. See Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 527
(considering evidence that appellant’s recollection of activities on evening of arson
was contradicted by other evidence in sufficiency analysis).
11 Schiele argues that the evidence was insufficient because Barbee testified
that he could not determine whether the fire was set intentionally, the State’s case
was based only upon circumstantial evidence, and there was some evidence that he
started the fire accidentally. But circumstantial evidence is just as probative as
direct evidence and, in circumstantial cases, “it is not necessary that every fact and
circumstance ‘point directly and independently to the defendant’s guilt; it is
enough if the conclusion is warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all
the incriminating circumstances.’” See Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 359 (quoting
Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). Likewise, while
Schiele correctly points out that there is some evidence that the fire was accidental,
we rely on the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and this is especially so in
the context of credibility determinations. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699,
705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (we afford almost complete deference to jury’s
determinations of credibility); Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000) (appellate courts resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of
the verdict).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, as we must,
we conclude that a rational jury could have convicted Schiele of arson.
Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the
judgment. See Orr v. State, 306 S.W.3d 380, 394 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010,
12 no pet.) (evidence sufficient to support conviction for arson where appellant had
motive, was present at the time of the fire, and gave implausible explanations about
fire); Fitts v. State, 982 S.W.2d 175, 186 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998,
pet. ref’d) (presence at the scene before the fire coupled with motive and
opportunity is evidence tending to establish arson); Krebsbach v. State, 962
S.W.2d 728, 734 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. ref’d) (evidence sufficient to
support murder conviction where appellant had motive to set the fire, was present
in home as fire began, and made inconsistent statements about how she discovered
fire).
We overrule Schiele’s first issue.
Evidentiary Issues in Guilt/Innocence
In his second through ninth issues, Schiele contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting evidence of several of Schiele’s bad acts.
Specifically, Schiele argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that
Schiele (1) was on parole, (2) failed to report to his parole officer the day before
the fire and the day of the fire, (3) violated his parole by using a controlled
substance the day before the fire and by disconnecting his electronic monitoring
device the day of the fire, (4) lied to his parole officer about why he failed to report
the day before the fire and the day of the fire, (5) was required to attend anger
13 management classes, and (6) had violated parole obligations and had his parole
revoked before February 6, 2012.
We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. De
La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We will not reverse
a trial court’s ruling on evidentiary matters unless the decision was outside the
zone of reasonable disagreement. Winegarner v. State, 235 S.W.3d 787, 790 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007). If the trial court’s ruling can be justified on any theory of law
applicable to that ruling, the ruling will not be disturbed. De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d
at 344 (citing Sewell v. State, 629 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (“When a
trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence is correct, although giving a
wrong or insufficient reason, this Court will not reverse if the evidence is
admissible for any reason.”)).
Evidence of extraneous crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible at the guilt-
innocence phase “to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith” but is admissible to prove other matters, such as “motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident” if the accused is given reasonable notice of the State’s intent to
introduce the evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b) (extraneous evidence must have
14 probative value beyond character conformity to be admissible). The Court of
Criminal Appeals has held that evidence of an appellant’s parole status is properly
admitted under Rule 404(b) to show motive. Powell v. State, 189 S.W.3d 285, 289
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (evidence defendant was on parole was admissible under
Rule 404(b) for purpose of establishing defendant’s motive for evading arrest).
Further, rebuttal of a defensive theory is also “one of the permissible purposes for
which relevant evidence may be admitted under Rule 404(b).” Moses v. State, 105
S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
“However, even if the evidence is relevant, and the purpose for which it is
being offered is permissible under Rule 404(b), it may still be excluded by the trial
court under Rule 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387
(Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc)). Under a Rule 403 analysis, we consider:
(1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along with (2) the
proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of the evidence to
suggest decision on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse
or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be
given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative
force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will
consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already
15 admitted.” Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006). The trial court is presumed to have conducted the proper balancing test if it
overrules a 403 objection, regardless of whether it conducted the test on the record.
See Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Here, the State offered the challenged evidence to prove that Schiele had a
motive to and did set the fire intentionally. The fact that Schiele was on parole,
failed to report to his parole officer on February 6 and February 7, was not truthful
about why he failed to report, tested positive for methamphetamine on February 9,
which he admitted to using on February 6, and disconnected his electronic monitor
on February 7 are all circumstances that demonstrate that Schiele had a motive to
set the fire. See Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 527 (while not an element, motive can be a
circumstance indicative of guilt). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
concluding that this evidence was probative and admissible under Rule 404(b).
See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); Powell, 189 S.W.3d at 289 (evidence of appellant’s
parole was admissible to show motive for evading arrest);
Valdez v. State, 776 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (evidence of an
outstanding federal parole warrant was admissible on the issue of defendant’s
motive for shooting a police officer).
16 We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
overruling Schiele’s Rule 403 objection with respect to some of the challenged
evidence. Specifically, evidence that Schiele was on parole, failed to report to
Philp on February 6 and February 7, used methamphetamine on February 6,
disconnected his electronic monitor on February 7, and lied to Philp about why he
failed to report was admissible under Gigliobianco.
The first two factors—the probative value of the evidence and the State’s
need for the evidence—weigh strongly in favor of admissibility. The evidence that
Schiele was on parole at the time of the offense, failed to report, used
methamphetamine on February 6, disconnected his electronic monitor, and lied
about why he failed to report on February 6 is probative of motive and intent. The
State needed the evidence to demonstrate why Schiele would have deliberately set
his home on fire. See Powell, 189 S.W.3d at 289 (“there was reason to believe that
the State had a significant need for the evidence” that appellant was on parole to
show motive and contradict other evidence).
Under the third factor, we examine the unfair prejudice, that is, the tendency
of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis. Gigliobianco, 210
S.W.3d at 641. Evidence might have this tendency “if it arouses the jury’s hostility
or sympathy for one side without regard to the logical probative force of the
evidence.” Id. Here, the evidence about Schiele’s parole likely harmed Schiele,
17 but the risk of unfair prejudice was minimized somewhat because the jury did not
learn the offense for which Schiele was on parole. See Powell, 189 S.W.3d at 289
(risk of undue prejudice was minimized by the fact that jury was not told what
crime led to parole status). This factor weighs against admissibility.
In considering the fourth and sixth factors, we examine the tendency of the
evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues and the time required
to develop the evidence. Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641. “Evidence that
consumes an inordinate amount of time to present or answer, for example, might
tend to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues.” Casey v. State, 215
S.W.3d 870, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Here, the amount of time the State
devoted to developing the evidence was not insignificant. The State presented the
evidence through the live testimony of four witnesses—Schiele’s parole officers,
Booker and Philp, the Polk County Sheriff’s Office dispatcher, Terry Valka, and
the officer who conducted Schiele’s interview, Captain Childers. The witnesses’
testimony about Schiele’s parole spanned approximately 50 pages of the 118-page
reporter’s record of the guilt and innocence phase of the trial. The State also
presented a recording of Schiele’s eight-minute phone call with Philp and the
interview by Childers. The interview video lasted approximately 24 minutes and
the portions related to the parole lasted less than five minutes. Because a
significant portion of the evidence related to the challenged evidence regarding
18 parole, we conclude that the fourth and sixth factors weigh against admissibility.
Cf. Blackwell v. State, 193 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006,
pet. ref’d) (factor neutral and favored neither admissibility nor exclusion of
evidence where four witnesses’ testimony of extraneous offenses was not “unduly
lengthy”).
Under the fifth factor, we weigh any tendency of the evidence to be given
undue weight by a jury that has not been properly equipped to evaluate the
probative force of the evidence. Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641. Here, the
charge contained a limiting instruction.2 Absent evidence to the contrary, a jury is
presumed to follow the instruction set forth in the court’s charge. Herrera v. State,
11 S.W.3d 412, 415–16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d).
Further, the testimony relating to Schiele’s parole, interview video, and phone call
recording were not scientific or technical in nature. Thus, “nothing suggests that
the jury was not equipped to evaluate the probative force” of the evidence, and we
conclude this factor weighs in favor of admissibility. See Moreno v. State, 409
S.W.3d 723, 731 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (fifth factor
2 The charge instructed: “[E]ven if you find that the State has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant’s guilt of these other offenses, wrongs, or acts, if any, you may only consider such evidence as evidence of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, in relation to the offense for which defendant is on trial or to rebut a defensive theory of the case, and you may not consider these offenses, wrongs, or acts, if any, for any other purpose.”
19 weighs in favor of admissibility where evidence was not technical or scientific in
nature and was “comprehensible by laypeople”).
In support of his argument that the probative value of this evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403, Schiele
cites Powell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 646, 650–54 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004), rev’d,
189 S.W.3d 285. But the Court of Criminal appeals reversed that Waco Court of
Appeals decision as to the Rule 403 balancing test and held that the probative
value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. See Powell, 189 S.W.3d at 287–90. Accordingly, Powell does not
support Schiele’s argument. See id.
We conclude that three of the Gigliobianco factors weigh in favor of
admissibility while three weigh against it. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the following challenged evidence:
that Schiele was on parole, failed to report to Philp on February 6 and February 7,
used methamphetamine on February 6, disconnected his electronic monitoring
device on February 7, and lied to Philp about why he failed to report on February 6
and February 7. See Powell, 189 S.W.3d at 289 (probative value of evidence was
not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice where jury was not
informed of crime for which appellant was on parole and State had significant need
20 for evidence); Moses, 105 S.W.3d at 627 (trial court’s admission of extraneous
offense evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion).
Our analysis of the remaining challenged evidence—that Schiele missed an
anger management class on February 6 and had his parole revoked before February
6, 2012—is different. With respect to this evidence, we conclude that even if it
was error to admit it, the error would have been harmless in light of the other
admissible evidence relating to parole discussed above.
The jury considered evidence that Schiele was on parole at the time of the
fire, failed to report to Philp on February 6 and February 7, used methamphetamine
on February 6, disconnected his electronic monitoring device on February 7, and
lied to Philp about why he failed to report on February 6 and February 7. We have
held that the admission of this evidence was not an abuse of discretion. In light of
this other properly admitted evidence relating to parole, it is unlikely that the
additional fact that Schiele missed an anger management class and previously had
his parole revoked would impact the jury’s decision. This is particularly true in
light of Philp’s direct testimony that she warned Philp on February 6 that failing to
report on February 7 would lead her to request an arrest warrant. See Davis v.
State, 203 S.W.3d 845, 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (appellate court must
determine whether erroneous admission of inadmissible hearsay “moved the jury
from a state of non-persuasion to one of persuasion of a particular issue”); Motilla
21 v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (harmless error if jury’s
decision likely was not adversely affected by the error); Wesbrook v. State, 29
S.W.3d 103, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (reviewing court considers probable
impact of error on jury in light of existence of other evidence).
We overrule Schiele’s second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and
ninth issues.
Admissibility of Prior Conviction in Punishment Phase
In his tenth issue, Schiele contends that the trial court erred in admitting,
during the punishment phase, evidence of a prior conviction for injury to a child
because the State failed to properly link the conviction to Schiele.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the prior conviction exists, and
(2) the defendant is linked to that conviction. Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919,
921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “No specific document or mode of proof is required
to prove these two elements.” Id. “There is no ‘best evidence’ rule in Texas that
requires the fact of a prior conviction be proven with any document, much less any
specific document.” Id. The State may prove these two elements by documentary
proof, such as a judgment, that contains sufficient information to establish both the
22 existence of a prior conviction and the defendant’s identity as the person convicted.
Id. at 922.
The trier of fact considers the totality of the evidence admitted and attempts
to fit the evidentiary pieces of the puzzle together, weighing each piece’s
credibility. Id. at 923. “Regardless of the type of evidentiary puzzle pieces the
State offers to establish the existence of a prior conviction and its link to a specific
defendant, the trier of fact determines if these pieces fit together sufficiently to
complete the puzzle.” Id. If the two necessary elements “can be found beyond a
reasonable doubt, then the various pieces used to complete the puzzle are
necessarily legally sufficient to prove a prior conviction.” Id.
B. Analysis
During the punishment phase, the State offered exhibits to prove its
enhancement allegations—a prior conviction for the felony offenses of burglary
and retaliation—as well as to prove Schiele’s prior conviction for injury to a child
in Oklahoma. In support of Schiele’s prior conviction for injury to a child, the
State offered: (1) a copy of the case summary, (2) a copy of the “plea of guilty
summary of facts,” and (3) a copy of the judgment.
Schiele objected and argued that the copy of the case summary did not
contain a fingerprint or thumbprint, the plea record was not a certified copy and
23 contained no thumbprint, and that the copy of the judgment was not a certified
copy, was not a public record, and contained no thumbprint.
But “[n]o specific document or mode of proof is required to prove these two
elements,” see Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921, and we conclude that the trial court did
not err in admitting the evidence about which Schiele complains. The copy of the
case summary for the injury to a child case contains Schiele’s name, date of arrest,
charged offense, judicial cause number, and disposition. The plea record contains
Schiele’s name, birth date, the same judicial cause number as the case summary,
and the last four digits of Schiele’s social security number. The judgment contains
Schiele’s name, birth date, the same judicial cause number as the case summary
and plea record, and the same last four digits of Schiele’s social security number as
the plea record. Further, Lucas, Schiele’s wife, testified that Schiele was arrested
for injury to a child in Oklahoma and that the plea record states the charged offense
and the date of the arrest, which matches the date on the case summary.
Additionally, the trial court admitted penitentiary packets (“pen packs”) containing
documents from the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The pen packs include
documents relating to Schiele’s other prior convictions and include Schiele’s name
and birth date, which match the case summary, plea record, and judgment for his
injury to a child conviction. Based on the totality of the evidence, we hold that the
State produced evidence from which the jury rationally could link Schiele to the
24 injury to a child conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. See Flowers, 220 S.W.3d
at 921 (certified copy of computer printout from county clerk setting out prior
conviction with cause number and appellant’s name, date of birth, address, and
social security number matching exhibit containing appellant’s official driver’s
license record was sufficient to prove existence of appellant’s prior conviction);
Orsag v. State, 312 S.W.3d 105, 115 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet.
ref’d) (factfinder considers totality of evidence to determine whether State proved
prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt). Accordingly, the evidence is legally
sufficient to prove the prior convictions and enhancement allegation.
We overrule Schiele’s tenth issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Rebeca Huddle Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Huddle.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).