Robert Earl Jones v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided July 3, 2014·No. 10-13-00130-CR·Published

Opinion

IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-13-00130-CR

ROBERT EARL JONES, Appellant v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

From the 85th District Court Brazos County, Texas Trial Court No. 11-03851-CRF-85

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found Appellant Robert Jones guilty of theft of property valued at more

than $1,500 but less than $20,000 and assessed his punishment, enhanced by prior

felony convictions, at twenty years’ imprisonment. The trial court ordered that the

sentence run consecutively to the sentence in his prior Harris County conviction. This

appeal ensued.

On May 26, 2011, Matthew Shane Huggins, the general manager at College

Station Pawn, received information that an individual who might commit a theft would be coming into the store. Huggins told employee Phillip Ross to have the phone ready

to contact the police if a theft did occur. In preparation, Huggins and Ross also left the

jewelry case open and took pictures of some of the inventory.

Huggins notified Ross when the individual matching the description they had

been given for the potential thief, later identified as Jones, entered the store. Ross went

into the back of the store behind a two-way mirror overlooking the jewelry area and

had the telephone ready to call law enforcement. Ross observed Jones walk over to the

jewelry cases, open a case, and remove rings along with the ring holders. Jones reached

into the case a second time and then made his way out the front door of the store

without attempting to pay for the property.

Ross had called the police and was reporting what he was observing. College

Station Police Officer Gary Southerland responded and saw Jones’s vehicle hurriedly

leaving the pawn shop parking lot such that Jones almost had an accident. Officer

Southerland turned on his lights, and Jones stopped. When more law enforcement had

arrived, Officer Southerland got Jones out of the car, and when Jones then buried his

hands in his pockets, Officer Southerland patted him down. Officer Southerland

observed a large lump in Jones’s right front pocket. When Officer Southerland asked

Jones what was in the pocket, Jones pulled out several rings that had price tags on

them. Officer Southerland also discovered a ring display holder under the driver’s seat

of the vehicle and one in the glove box that still had a gold ring on it. In total, twelve

rings were found in Jones’s possession. Jones was arrested, and the rings were returned

to College Station Pawn.

Jones v. State Page 2 Donna Ruiz, the district manager for College Station Pawn, testified that twelve

rings were taken on May 26, 2011. She said that if the store had sold all twelve rings,

the total price would have been $4,499.91, which is the loss the store would have

suffered because of the theft. Ruiz stated that even if the rings did not sell, however,

and had to be sold for scrap, the gold from the rings alone was worth $1,700. Ruiz later

explained that she had miscalculated and that the gold from the rings was worth $1,832

on May 26, 2011 even if the rings were scrapped. Ruiz also said that the diamonds from

the rings have value apart from the gold. Ruiz testified:

Q [By Prosecutor] Is there any conceivable way, based on your 13 years in this industry, that College Station Pawn would have been out less than $1,500 if those rings had been lost and never recovered?

A No, sir, there’s no way. It would be over 1500.

Q And at least $1,832 on May 26th, 2011?

A Minimal, yes, sir.

In his sole issue, Jones contends that the trial court erred in denying his request

for an instruction on the lesser-included offense of theft of property valued at $500 or

more but less than $1,500.

We use a two-step analysis to determine whether an appellant was entitled to a

lesser-included-offense instruction. Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007); Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). First, the lesser

offense must be a lesser-included offense of the charged offense as defined by article

37.09 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1998); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09 (West 2006). Article 37.09

Jones v. State Page 3 provides:

An offense is a lesser included offense if:

(1) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged;

(2) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest suffices to establish its commission;

(3) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less culpable mental state suffices to establish its commission; or

(4) it consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an otherwise included offense.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09.

The State concedes, and we agree, that the first step of the lesser-included-offense

analysis is satisfied. The distinction between the offense for which Jones was charged

(state jail felony theft) and theft of property valued at $500 or more but less than $1,500

(Class A misdemeanor theft) is merely the value of the property stolen. Compare TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e)(3) (West Supp. 2013) with id. § 31.03(e)(4)(A). Class A

misdemeanor theft is therefore a lesser-included offense of state-jail-felony theft.

Franklin v. State, 219 S.W.3d 92, 96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see

The second step of the analysis requires that there must be some evidence in the

record that would permit a jury to rationally find that if the appellant is guilty, he is

guilty only of the lesser offense. Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 536; Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734,

741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Rousseau, 855 S.W.2d at 672-73. The evidence must be

Jones v. State Page 4 evaluated in the context of the entire record. Moore, 969 S.W.2d at 8. There must be

some evidence from which a rational jury could acquit the appellant of the greater

offense while convicting him of the lesser-included offense. Id. The court may not

consider whether the evidence is credible, controverted, or whether it conflicts with

other evidence. Id. Anything more than a scintilla of evidence may be sufficient to

entitle a defendant to a lesser charge. Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 536.

Jones argues that the second step of the lesser-included-offense analysis is

satisfied because “there is a scintilla of evidence [sic] that the number of rings taken was

less than twelve, and based on the testimony and common sense, if the jury believed

that fewer than twelve rings were taken, the value would have been $1,500.00 or less.”

Jones states:

Specifically, there was evidence that the number of rings taken was eight, based on State’s exhibits three and four, and there was evidence that the number of rings taken was five or six, based on the testimony of Southerland and the recovery of the rings.

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Related

Franklin v. State
219 S.W.3d 92 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2006)
Moore v. State
969 S.W.2d 4 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1998)
Rousseau v. State
855 S.W.2d 666 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1993)
Salinas v. State
163 S.W.3d 734 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Hampton v. State
109 S.W.3d 437 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2003)
Hall v. State
225 S.W.3d 524 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2007)
Dobbins v. State
228 S.W.3d 761 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2007)