Robert Claude Beckett v. United States

Ninth Circuit

Robert Claude Beckett v. United States

379 F.2d 863, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 6313

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMay 19, 1967

Docket20272_1

StatusPublished

Cited by21 cases

This text of 379 F.2d 863 (Robert Claude Beckett v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Robert Claude Beckett v. United States, 379 F.2d 863, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 6313 (9th Cir. 1967).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The defendant Beckett appeals from a judgment of conviction on two counts of an indictment by which he was charged as the accomplice (18 U.S.C. § 2) of one Mathis in the unlawful sale and transportation of heroin (21 U.S.C. § 174). The ground of his appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction.

After the government had rested, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal. The court denied the motion. Defendant then introduced evidence. However, he did not renew his motion for acquittal at the conclusion of all the evidence, as required by Rule 29 (a). His failure to do so operates to waive the benefit of the motion. This court, however, may and frequently does review the sufficiency of the evidence to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. Robbins v. United States, 345 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1965).

Defendant’s sole point is that there was no proof of one of the essential elements common to the crimes charged against him, namely, his knowledge that the heroin was illegally imported into the United States. We agree.

The government’s evidence shows at most that Beckett introduced a Federal Bureau of Narcotics Agent to a peddler who three days later sold and delivered the agent heroin. There is no proof whatever that Beckett took any other part in the transaction or knew from whence the narcotic came.

Nor does the evidence in this record permit the operation of the statutory presumption of knowledge which arises from proof of possession, actual or constructive. The evidence shows nothing *865 beyond the fact that Beckett was (to use the language of the Second Circuit in United States v. Jones, 308 F.2d 26, 30 (1962)) “a casual facilitator of a sale, who knows a given principal possesses and trades in narcotics but who lacks the working relationship with that principal that enables an assurance of delivery * * Only recently this court in Hill v. United States, 379 F.2d 811, May 5, 1967, a case factually similar to this one, quoted with approval the statement of the Second Circuit appearing in United States v. Jones, supra, that such a “casual facilitator * * * may not be held to have dominion and control over the drug delivered and cannot be said to have possession of it.”

The judgment is reversed and the indictment is ordered dismissed.

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PER CURIAM.

The defendant Beckett appeals from a judgment of conviction on two counts of an indictment by which he was charged as the accomplice (18 U.S.C. § 2) of one Mathis in the unlawful sale and transportation of heroin (21 U.S.C. § 174). The ground of his appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction.

After the government had rested, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal. The court denied the motion. Defendant then introduced evidence. However, he did not renew his motion for acquittal at the conclusion of all the evidence, as required by Rule 29 (a). His failure to do so operates to waive the benefit of the motion. This court, however, may and frequently does review the sufficiency of the evidence to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. Robbins v. United States, 345 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1965).

Defendant’s sole point is that there was no proof of one of the essential elements common to the crimes charged against him, namely, his knowledge that the heroin was illegally imported into the United States. We agree.

The government’s evidence shows at most that Beckett introduced a Federal Bureau of Narcotics Agent to a peddler who three days later sold and delivered the agent heroin. There is no proof whatever that Beckett took any other part in the transaction or knew from whence the narcotic came.

Nor does the evidence in this record permit the operation of the statutory presumption of knowledge which arises from proof of possession, actual or constructive. The evidence shows nothing *865 beyond the fact that Beckett was (to use the language of the Second Circuit in United States v. Jones, 308 F.2d 26, 30 (1962)) “a casual facilitator of a sale, who knows a given principal possesses and trades in narcotics but who lacks the working relationship with that principal that enables an assurance of delivery * * Only recently this court in Hill v. United States, 379 F.2d 811, May 5, 1967, a case factually similar to this one, quoted with approval the statement of the Second Circuit appearing in United States v. Jones, supra, that such a “casual facilitator * * * may not be held to have dominion and control over the drug delivered and cannot be said to have possession of it.”

The judgment is reversed and the indictment is ordered dismissed.

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379 F.2d 863, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 6313, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robert-claude-beckett-v-united-states-ca9-1967.

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