COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges O’Brien, Causey and Frucci UNPUBLISHED
ROBERT CHARLES COPLEY, JR. MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 1237-24-1 PER CURIAM OCTOBER 21, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY Holly B. Smith, Judge
(Ivan D. Fehrenbach; Dansby & Fehrenbach, on briefs), for appellant.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Timothy J. Huffstutter, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Following a conditional guilty plea, Robert Charles Copley, Jr., was convicted of possession
of a Schedule I or II controlled substance. On appeal, Copley challenges the circuit court’s denial of
his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his vehicle. For the
following reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.1
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1‑403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). BACKGROUND2
On January 23, 2023, James City County Police Detective Rochard received a phone call
from a known “reliable source.” Detective Rochard previously had received reliable information
from this informant. The informant was not working off any criminal charges. In 2008, the
informant provided information to Detective Rochard which eventually led to federal drug charges
and a conviction. Since that time, Detective Rochard “periodically” worked with the informant and
had passed on information he received from the informant to investigators in other jurisdictions, and
he found the information given to always be “credible.”
The informant advised Detective Rochard that Copley would be driving a small blue pickup
truck in James City County. The informant stated that Copley, who had warrants out for his arrest
from Hanover and Henrico Counties, would pick up Paul Dunn at Dunn’s residence and drive him
to the courthouse. The informant believed that Copley “potentially” possessed a quantity of
methamphetamine or another narcotic. Detective Rochard was aware that the informant knew both
Copley and Dunn. The detective also was aware that Copley was a known user and manufacturer of
methamphetamine. Detective Rochard verified the existence of the warrants, and then police set up
surveillance at Dunn’s house.
Around 1:00 p.m., the police saw Copley driving a small blue truck near Dunn’s James City
County residence. Copley stopped at Dunn’s house for less than five minutes and then drove off
with Dunn. The police initiated a traffic stop and, based on the outstanding warrants, arrested
Copley. After, York County Police Sergeant Schultz ran his police dog around Copley’s truck. The
2 On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we recite and “review[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below.” Bagley v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 1, 8 n.1 (2021). Doing so requires us to “discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)). -2- dog alerted to the presence of narcotics. The dog alerted within six or seven minutes of Copley’s
arrest. The police then searched Copley’s truck. In the driver’s door pocket, Detective Rochard
found an open cigarette box containing a crystalline substance which he suspected was
methamphetamine.3
In argument on his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the vehicle,
Copley asserted that the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement was inapplicable
because the recovered evidence was unrelated to his outstanding warrants. He also argued that the
drug dog alert did not provide probable cause to search the truck because the basis for the stop
concluded upon his arrest on the warrants, before the dog’s alert. Finally, he contended that the
informant was not reliable and the information the informant provided, therefore, could not form the
basis of a finding of probable cause to search the truck.
The circuit court found that the Commonwealth demonstrated the reliability of the informant
and held the informant provided a sufficient basis of knowledge to support a probable cause finding.
Alternatively, the circuit court found that the result of the drug dog alert also supported the search of
the pickup truck. The circuit court denied Copley’s motion to suppress. Following, Copley
entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance that
preserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. This appeal follows.
ANALYSIS
“The law regarding appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress is
well settled. The appellant bears the burden of establishing that reversible error occurred.”
Williams v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 462, 474 (2020). “[A]n appellate court must give
deference to the factual findings of the circuit court and give due weight to the inferences drawn
from those factual findings; however, the appellate court must determine independently whether
3 Later testing confirmed that the substance was methamphetamine. -3- the manner in which the evidence was obtained meets the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.” Moore v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 30, 36 (2018) (alteration in original)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Robertson, 275 Va. 559, 563 (2008)). “On appeal, a ‘defendant’s
claim that evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question
of law and fact that we review de novo.’” Cole v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 342, 354 (2017)
(quoting Cost v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 246, 250 (2008)).
“The Commonwealth carries the burden of showing that a warrantless search and seizure
was constitutionally permissible.” Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 673 (2004).
“However, a defendant must show, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, that the denial of the motion to suppress evidence was reversible error.” Id.
Copley does not contest his initial stop or his arrest; instead, he argues that the police lacked
probable cause to search his car following his arrest. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The Fourth Amendment prohibits only
unreasonable searches and seizures.” Thompson v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 1, 7 (2009).
“Reasonableness is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene allowing for the
need of split-second decisions and without regard to the officer’s intent or motivation.” Id. (quoting
Scott v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 725, 727 (1995)).
“In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act . . . .” Boyd v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App.
179, 186-87 (1991) (alterations in original) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges O’Brien, Causey and Frucci UNPUBLISHED
ROBERT CHARLES COPLEY, JR. MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 1237-24-1 PER CURIAM OCTOBER 21, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY Holly B. Smith, Judge
(Ivan D. Fehrenbach; Dansby & Fehrenbach, on briefs), for appellant.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Timothy J. Huffstutter, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Following a conditional guilty plea, Robert Charles Copley, Jr., was convicted of possession
of a Schedule I or II controlled substance. On appeal, Copley challenges the circuit court’s denial of
his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his vehicle. For the
following reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.1
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1‑403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). BACKGROUND2
On January 23, 2023, James City County Police Detective Rochard received a phone call
from a known “reliable source.” Detective Rochard previously had received reliable information
from this informant. The informant was not working off any criminal charges. In 2008, the
informant provided information to Detective Rochard which eventually led to federal drug charges
and a conviction. Since that time, Detective Rochard “periodically” worked with the informant and
had passed on information he received from the informant to investigators in other jurisdictions, and
he found the information given to always be “credible.”
The informant advised Detective Rochard that Copley would be driving a small blue pickup
truck in James City County. The informant stated that Copley, who had warrants out for his arrest
from Hanover and Henrico Counties, would pick up Paul Dunn at Dunn’s residence and drive him
to the courthouse. The informant believed that Copley “potentially” possessed a quantity of
methamphetamine or another narcotic. Detective Rochard was aware that the informant knew both
Copley and Dunn. The detective also was aware that Copley was a known user and manufacturer of
methamphetamine. Detective Rochard verified the existence of the warrants, and then police set up
surveillance at Dunn’s house.
Around 1:00 p.m., the police saw Copley driving a small blue truck near Dunn’s James City
County residence. Copley stopped at Dunn’s house for less than five minutes and then drove off
with Dunn. The police initiated a traffic stop and, based on the outstanding warrants, arrested
Copley. After, York County Police Sergeant Schultz ran his police dog around Copley’s truck. The
2 On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we recite and “review[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below.” Bagley v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 1, 8 n.1 (2021). Doing so requires us to “discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)). -2- dog alerted to the presence of narcotics. The dog alerted within six or seven minutes of Copley’s
arrest. The police then searched Copley’s truck. In the driver’s door pocket, Detective Rochard
found an open cigarette box containing a crystalline substance which he suspected was
methamphetamine.3
In argument on his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the vehicle,
Copley asserted that the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement was inapplicable
because the recovered evidence was unrelated to his outstanding warrants. He also argued that the
drug dog alert did not provide probable cause to search the truck because the basis for the stop
concluded upon his arrest on the warrants, before the dog’s alert. Finally, he contended that the
informant was not reliable and the information the informant provided, therefore, could not form the
basis of a finding of probable cause to search the truck.
The circuit court found that the Commonwealth demonstrated the reliability of the informant
and held the informant provided a sufficient basis of knowledge to support a probable cause finding.
Alternatively, the circuit court found that the result of the drug dog alert also supported the search of
the pickup truck. The circuit court denied Copley’s motion to suppress. Following, Copley
entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance that
preserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. This appeal follows.
ANALYSIS
“The law regarding appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress is
well settled. The appellant bears the burden of establishing that reversible error occurred.”
Williams v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 462, 474 (2020). “[A]n appellate court must give
deference to the factual findings of the circuit court and give due weight to the inferences drawn
from those factual findings; however, the appellate court must determine independently whether
3 Later testing confirmed that the substance was methamphetamine. -3- the manner in which the evidence was obtained meets the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.” Moore v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 30, 36 (2018) (alteration in original)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Robertson, 275 Va. 559, 563 (2008)). “On appeal, a ‘defendant’s
claim that evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question
of law and fact that we review de novo.’” Cole v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 342, 354 (2017)
(quoting Cost v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 246, 250 (2008)).
“The Commonwealth carries the burden of showing that a warrantless search and seizure
was constitutionally permissible.” Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 673 (2004).
“However, a defendant must show, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, that the denial of the motion to suppress evidence was reversible error.” Id.
Copley does not contest his initial stop or his arrest; instead, he argues that the police lacked
probable cause to search his car following his arrest. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The Fourth Amendment prohibits only
unreasonable searches and seizures.” Thompson v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 1, 7 (2009).
“Reasonableness is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene allowing for the
need of split-second decisions and without regard to the officer’s intent or motivation.” Id. (quoting
Scott v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 725, 727 (1995)).
“In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act . . . .” Boyd v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App.
179, 186-87 (1991) (alterations in original) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)).
“An informant’s ‘veracity,’ ‘reliability,’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ are all highly relevant in
determining the value of his report . . . [but] should [not] be understood as entirely separate and
-4- independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case . . . .” Id. at 187 (alterations in
original) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230). “Rather . . . they should be understood simply as closely
intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there
is ‘probable cause’ to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230).
“When, as here, an informant has a record of furnishing reliable reports, an officer is
justified in crediting a new report without engaging in a statistical balancing act.” Wright v.
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 188, 191 (1981). “An important element in establishing the reliability of
an [informant’s report] is the predictive nature of the information. The information provided by the
informant must describe not just easily obtained facts, but future third party actions not easily
predicted.” Hardy v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 433, 435 (1990). “[I]f the information supplied
is sufficiently detailed, it may support an inference that it was . . . reliably acquired . . . .” Wright,
222 Va. at 192.
Here, the informant’s reliability was established with police before the search and seizure at
issue. The informant’s report was predictive and verified by police in every material detail,
including the description of the vehicle, the identity of its occupants, and the time and place of the
alleged drug activity, thereby “reduc[ing] the chances [that the information was] a reckless or
prevaricating tale.” Boyd, 12 Va. App. at 189 (second alteration in original). The informant
previously had provided information leading to an arrest and conviction and Detective Rochard was
confident enough in the reliability of the tipster’s information to share it with police from other
jurisdictions, as he did here. Detective Rochard knew that the informant knew both Copley and
Dunn. Even though Copley did not drive to the courthouse, the informant accurately predicted
Copley’s whereabouts and actions. Such circumstances, together with Detective Rochard’s prior
knowledge of Copley’s involvement in narcotics and the known reliability of the informant,
-5- sufficiently supported probable cause for the warrantless search. Accordingly, we find no error with
the circuit court’s denial of Copley’s motion to suppress the drugs found in his truck.4
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
Affirmed.
4 Because we find the informant’s tip provided sufficient probable cause supporting the search of Copley’s vehicle, we need not decide if the drug dog’s alert provided a separate basis for probable cause to search the truck. See Butcher v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 392, 396 (2020) (stating that “the doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available’” (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017))). -6-