Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-24-00043-CR
Robert Brian Hendrickson, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
On appeal from the 440th District Court of Coryell County, Texas Judge Grant Kinsey, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 20-26445
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found Appellant, Robert Brian Hendrickson, guilty of the felony
offense of indecency with a child sexual contact. The jury assessed his
punishment at thirty years confinement. The trial court sentenced
Hendrickson accordingly. This appeal ensued. We will affirm. A. Background Facts
In 2020, eleven-year-old I.H. made an outcry to her mother that her
father molested her. During the investigation, I.H. disclosed that when she
was nine years old, she and Hendrickson were sitting on the couch together
watching television when Hendrickson moved his hand under I.H.’s waistband
and undergarment and started a rubbing motion between her legs for a few
minutes.
During trial, the State sponsored Rachel Hodgdon, a licensed
professional counselor associate who had treated I.H., as an expert witness.
Hendrickson challenged Hodgdon’s qualifications under Rule 702. Following
the hearing, Hendrickson argued that Hodgdon’s testimony on the grounds
would bolster another witness’s testimony and that the diagnoses process was
not reliable. The trial court allowed Hodgdon to testify as an expert. Hodgdon
testified about the process for diagnosing I.H. with PTSD using a diagnostic
tool called the Child and Adolescent Trauma Screen (CATS) and about the
treatment goals following the diagnosis.
B. Issue One
In his first issue, Hendrickson argues that the trial court erred in its
duty as the gatekeeper in admitting unqualified expert testimony pursuant to
Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence.
Hendrickson v. State Page 2 1. Preservation of Error
As a threshold issue, the State argues that Hendrickson has not properly
preserved his complaint on appeal. Specifically, the State claims that while
the complaint concerning Hodgdon’s general qualifications under Rule 702 and
the bolstering argument have been preserved, Hendrickson’s argument on
appeal, which challenges whether the administrative rules were complied
with, was not properly preserved. We assume without deciding that
Hendrickson properly preserved his complaint.
2. Authority
An expert’s qualifications and the admissibility of expert testimony are
subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Lagrone v. State, 942
S.W.2d 602, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We will not disturb the ruling if it
falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Wolfe v. State, 509 S.W.3d
325, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). A trial court abuses its discretion when it
acts unreasonably or arbitrarily without reference to any guiding rules or
principles. State v. Hill, 499 S.W.3d 853, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. TEX. R. EVID.
Hendrickson v. State Page 3 702. A trial judge makes three separate inquiries, which must all be met before
admitting expert testimony: “(1) the witness qualifies as an expert by reason
of his knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the subject
matter of the testimony is an appropriate one for expert testimony; and
(3) admitting the expert testimony will actually assist the fact-finder in
deciding the case.” Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
These conditions are commonly referred to as (1) qualification, (2) reliability,
and (3) relevance. Id.
3. Analysis
Hendrickson argues that “no testimony was heard by the trial court”
concerning Hodgdon’s appropriate training and experience to administer and
interpret the tests as required by the administrative code. See 22 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 681.43 (“a licensee must not administer any test without the
appropriate training and experience to administer and interpret the test.”). He
acknowledges that Hodgdon did testify that once she had her license, she was
allowed to diagnose, but he argues that “such a bare statement can hardly be
allowed to demonstrate that Ms. Hodgdon met the administrative code
requirements.” However, Hodgdon also testified that she uses the CATS
diagnostic tool with many of her patients, that she first learned about it in
Hendrickson v. State Page 4 graduate school, and that she had continuing training with the tool after
graduate school, both in her current job and when getting her license.
Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial court could reasonably have
determined that the State established that Hodgdon had experience and
training in the area of administering and interpreting the CATS diagnostic
tool. See Beatley v. State, No. 10-02-118-CR, 2003 WL 21780952, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Waco July 30, 2003, pet. ref’d). Therefore, we cannot say that the trial
court abused its discretion in allowing Hodgdon to testify as an expert.
We overrule Hendrickson’s first issue.
C. Issue Two
In his second issue, Hendrickson argues the unqualified expert
testimony unlawfully bolstered I.H.’s guilt phase testimony.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed skepticism as to
whether “bolstering” remains viable as an independent ground of objection.
See Rivas v. State, 275 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Specifically,
the Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that “a fundamental problem
with an objection to ‘bolstering’ is its inherent ambiguity.” Id. “Bolstering”
could refer to several evidentiary rules. See id. Because of the multifarious
origins of “bolstering,” courts have found concern with it as an objection on its
face. Id. In Rivas, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Rivas had
Hendrickson v. State Page 5 made more specific objections other than a general “bolstering” objection and
“thus had preserved error with respect to those specific objections.” See id
(emphasis added).
Error is preserved if a complaint is made to the trial court by a timely
request, objection, or motion that states the grounds for the ruling that the
complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to
make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were
apparent from the context. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). Additionally, a
party’s “point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial.”
Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
At trial, Hendrickson objected that “it’s pretty clear that based on the
notes and the information gathered in the therapy sessions it’s going to help to
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Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-24-00043-CR
Robert Brian Hendrickson, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
On appeal from the 440th District Court of Coryell County, Texas Judge Grant Kinsey, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 20-26445
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found Appellant, Robert Brian Hendrickson, guilty of the felony
offense of indecency with a child sexual contact. The jury assessed his
punishment at thirty years confinement. The trial court sentenced
Hendrickson accordingly. This appeal ensued. We will affirm. A. Background Facts
In 2020, eleven-year-old I.H. made an outcry to her mother that her
father molested her. During the investigation, I.H. disclosed that when she
was nine years old, she and Hendrickson were sitting on the couch together
watching television when Hendrickson moved his hand under I.H.’s waistband
and undergarment and started a rubbing motion between her legs for a few
minutes.
During trial, the State sponsored Rachel Hodgdon, a licensed
professional counselor associate who had treated I.H., as an expert witness.
Hendrickson challenged Hodgdon’s qualifications under Rule 702. Following
the hearing, Hendrickson argued that Hodgdon’s testimony on the grounds
would bolster another witness’s testimony and that the diagnoses process was
not reliable. The trial court allowed Hodgdon to testify as an expert. Hodgdon
testified about the process for diagnosing I.H. with PTSD using a diagnostic
tool called the Child and Adolescent Trauma Screen (CATS) and about the
treatment goals following the diagnosis.
B. Issue One
In his first issue, Hendrickson argues that the trial court erred in its
duty as the gatekeeper in admitting unqualified expert testimony pursuant to
Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence.
Hendrickson v. State Page 2 1. Preservation of Error
As a threshold issue, the State argues that Hendrickson has not properly
preserved his complaint on appeal. Specifically, the State claims that while
the complaint concerning Hodgdon’s general qualifications under Rule 702 and
the bolstering argument have been preserved, Hendrickson’s argument on
appeal, which challenges whether the administrative rules were complied
with, was not properly preserved. We assume without deciding that
Hendrickson properly preserved his complaint.
2. Authority
An expert’s qualifications and the admissibility of expert testimony are
subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Lagrone v. State, 942
S.W.2d 602, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We will not disturb the ruling if it
falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Wolfe v. State, 509 S.W.3d
325, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). A trial court abuses its discretion when it
acts unreasonably or arbitrarily without reference to any guiding rules or
principles. State v. Hill, 499 S.W.3d 853, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. TEX. R. EVID.
Hendrickson v. State Page 3 702. A trial judge makes three separate inquiries, which must all be met before
admitting expert testimony: “(1) the witness qualifies as an expert by reason
of his knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the subject
matter of the testimony is an appropriate one for expert testimony; and
(3) admitting the expert testimony will actually assist the fact-finder in
deciding the case.” Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
These conditions are commonly referred to as (1) qualification, (2) reliability,
and (3) relevance. Id.
3. Analysis
Hendrickson argues that “no testimony was heard by the trial court”
concerning Hodgdon’s appropriate training and experience to administer and
interpret the tests as required by the administrative code. See 22 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 681.43 (“a licensee must not administer any test without the
appropriate training and experience to administer and interpret the test.”). He
acknowledges that Hodgdon did testify that once she had her license, she was
allowed to diagnose, but he argues that “such a bare statement can hardly be
allowed to demonstrate that Ms. Hodgdon met the administrative code
requirements.” However, Hodgdon also testified that she uses the CATS
diagnostic tool with many of her patients, that she first learned about it in
Hendrickson v. State Page 4 graduate school, and that she had continuing training with the tool after
graduate school, both in her current job and when getting her license.
Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial court could reasonably have
determined that the State established that Hodgdon had experience and
training in the area of administering and interpreting the CATS diagnostic
tool. See Beatley v. State, No. 10-02-118-CR, 2003 WL 21780952, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Waco July 30, 2003, pet. ref’d). Therefore, we cannot say that the trial
court abused its discretion in allowing Hodgdon to testify as an expert.
We overrule Hendrickson’s first issue.
C. Issue Two
In his second issue, Hendrickson argues the unqualified expert
testimony unlawfully bolstered I.H.’s guilt phase testimony.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed skepticism as to
whether “bolstering” remains viable as an independent ground of objection.
See Rivas v. State, 275 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Specifically,
the Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that “a fundamental problem
with an objection to ‘bolstering’ is its inherent ambiguity.” Id. “Bolstering”
could refer to several evidentiary rules. See id. Because of the multifarious
origins of “bolstering,” courts have found concern with it as an objection on its
face. Id. In Rivas, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Rivas had
Hendrickson v. State Page 5 made more specific objections other than a general “bolstering” objection and
“thus had preserved error with respect to those specific objections.” See id
(emphasis added).
Error is preserved if a complaint is made to the trial court by a timely
request, objection, or motion that states the grounds for the ruling that the
complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to
make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were
apparent from the context. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). Additionally, a
party’s “point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial.”
Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
At trial, Hendrickson objected that “it’s pretty clear that based on the
notes and the information gathered in the therapy sessions it’s going to help to
obviously bolster [I.H.], but [I.H.] is available to testify.” He later objected that
“it is obvious…that we are just going to bolster the testimony of the witness
who is available.” As best we can, we construe Hendrickson’s general
“bolstering” objection with the specific language that “[I.H.] is available to
testify” as a Rule 804 objection regarding exceptions to the rule against
hearsay when the declarant is unavailable as a witness.
On appeal, Hendrickson makes three main arguments to support his
claim of “bolstering.” First, he claims that the sole purpose of the evidence is
Hendrickson v. State Page 6 to convince the fact finder that a particular witness or source of evidence is
worthy of credit. This language relates to the definition of bolstering set forth
in Cohn and encompasses Rule 613(c). See Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 819–
21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); see also Rivas, 275 S.W.3d at 886 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009) (Rule 613(c) seems to be covered under the “bolstering” objection “to the
extent it prevents the use of prior consistent statements of a witness for the
sole purpose of enhancing his credibility.”). Second, Hendrickson argues that
the credibility of the witness or source has not been attacked. This language
comports with a Rule 608(a) objection. See id. (Rule 608(a), which allows
opinion or reputation evidence as to the character of a party’s own witness for
truthfulness, but only after the witness’s character for truthfulness has
already been attacked by the opposing party). Finally, Hendrickson argues the
testimony does not make the existence of a consequential fact more or less
probable than it would be without the testimony. This language tracks with
relevance as defined in Rule 401. See TEX. R. EVID. 401.
Insofar as “bolstering” remains a viable, independent ground of
objection, Hendrickson’s appellate arguments do not comport with the
objection made at trial. See Wilson, 71 S.W, 3d at 349; See also Rivas, 275
S.W.3d at 886. Therefore, his arguments were not properly preserved for
appeal.
Hendrickson v. State Page 7 We overrule Hendrickson’s second issue.
D. Conclusion
Having overruled both Hendrickson’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
MATT JOHNSON Chief Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: March 26, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed Do Not Publish CRPM
Hendrickson v. State Page 8