Robert Bohinski v. Department of the Navy

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMay 31, 2024
DocketPH-300A-20-0013-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Robert Bohinski v. Department of the Navy (Robert Bohinski v. Department of the Navy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robert Bohinski v. Department of the Navy, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ROBERT BOHINSKI, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-300A-20-0013-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: May 31, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Robert Bohinski , Mount Laurel, New Jersey, pro se.

Kimberly M. Engel , Esquire, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his employment practices appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On petition for review, the appellant argues that the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) use of a “closing date” for a vacancy announcement on the Federal employment website, USAJOBS.gov, constitutes an “employment practice” and that the agency failed to comply with it. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

at 4-5. He also argues that the initial decision contains incorrect statements of fact and that the OPM audits concerning the irregularities with the closing date of the vacancy announcement are incorrect, unfair, and need to be corrected. Id. at 5. He appears to reassert his claim that the agency violated the merit system principles by questioning whether “preference or advantage” was given to the selected applicant when the agency failed to comply with OPM’s “rules” for the closing date. Id. He also argues, for the first time, that the agency engaged in reprisal, and he submits emails between him and an agency official regarding the OPM audits for the first time. Id. at 6, 8-12. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to articulate any employment practice that was applied to him that is appealable to the Board and, thus, that he failed to establish Board jurisdiction over his appeal. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10, Initial Decision (ID) at 8-9; see 5 C.F.R. § 300.101 (partially defining “employment practices”). To the extent that he failed to address the appellant’s other claims of harmful procedural error and a violation of the merit system principles, the appellant’s rights were not prejudiced 3

because, absent an otherwise appealable action, the Board is without jurisdiction to consider these claims. See Penna v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 355, ¶ 13 (2012) (stating that the Board lacks jurisdiction over an appellant’s harmful error claim absent an otherwise appealable action); Neal v. Department of Health & Human Services, 46 M.S.P.R. 26, 28 (1990) (stating that an appellant’s reference to the merit system principles does not establish jurisdiction because they are intended to furnish guidance to Federal agencies and do not constitute an independent basis for legal action); Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (finding that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision); Wren v. Department of the Army, 2 M.S.P.R. 1, 2 (1980), aff’d, 681 F.2d 867, 871-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The appellant argues for the first time on review that the agency engaged in reprisal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. Generally, the Board will not consider an argument raised for the first time on review absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due diligence. Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016). The appellant has neither asserted nor proven as much. Moreover, the Board is without jurisdiction to consider a reprisal claim absent an otherwise appealable action. See Winns v. U.S. Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶ 19 (2017) (reaffirming the Board’s lack of jurisdiction to consider reprisal claims absent an otherwise appealable action), aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 892 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2018). If the appellant wishes to pursue an individual right of action appeal on the basis of whistleblower reprisal, he should first exhaust his administrative remedy with the Office of Special Counsel before coming to the Board with that claim. The appellant also submitted with his petition for review several emails between him and an agency official concerning follow-up inquiries he had about the OPM audits. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-12. The appellant did not submit these 4

emails below. IAF, Tabs 1, 6, 9. Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115, the Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first time with a petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record closed before the administrative judge despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 213-14 (1980). The emails submitted by the appellant are dated between September 26, 2019, and October 2, 2019. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-12. The record below closed on or around November 4, 2019. IAF, Tab 2 at 1, 5. The appellant has not explained why he was unable to submit these emails prior to the close of the record, nor has he shown that they are of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 1. Accordingly, we have not considered them. See Avansino, 3 M.S.P.R. at 213-14; Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980).

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C.

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Celia A. Wren v. Merit Systems Protection Board
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Williams v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.
892 F.3d 1156 (Federal Circuit, 2018)

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Robert Bohinski v. Department of the Navy, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robert-bohinski-v-department-of-the-navy-mspb-2024.