Robert Boardman v. Charlie Coy
This text of Robert Boardman v. Charlie Coy (Robert Boardman v. Charlie Coy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROBERT BOARDMAN, Case No. 24-cv-10685 Plaintiff, Honorable Brandy R. McMillion Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford v.
CHARLIE COY,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO SUA SPONTE DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
I. Introduction Plaintiff Robert Boardman, a prisoner of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant Charlie Coy used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. ECF No. 1. The Honorable Brandy R. McMillion referred the case to the undersigned for all pretrial matters under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). ECF No. 13. The Court has entered several orders that were mailed to Boardman at the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility (ARF) and were returned as undeliverable. ECF No. 23; ECF No. 24; ECF No. 25; ECF No. 27. An offender search on the Michigan Department of Corrections website shows that Boardman was paroled on September 3, 2025.1 The Court ordered
Boardman to show cause by October 21, 2025, why his claims should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute, warning that failure to respond “may result in a recommendation to dismiss the case.” ECF No. 26. Boardman
did not respond. The record shows a discrepancy between Boardman’s address of record at ARF and the fact that he was released on parole in September. But Boardman did not notify the Court of his address change. Local Rule
11.2 requires parties to notify the Court of an address change and warns that failure to do so could result in the dismissal of their case. Boardman has failed to comply with that rule.
The Court thus RECOMMENDS that Boardman’s complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute. II. Analysis A.
If a plaintiff fails to prosecute an action, it can be dismissed either under the Court’s inherent power to control its docket or involuntarily under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S.
1https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/otis2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=857600. 626, 629-32 (1962) (“The authority of a federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff’s action with prejudice because of his failure to prosecute cannot
seriously be doubted.”). The authority to dismiss a plaintiff’s case for failure to prosecute is available to the district court “as a tool to effect management of its docket and avoidance of unnecessary burdens on the
tax-supported courts and opposing parties.” Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Dep’t, 529 F.3d 731, 736 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Knoll v. AT&T, 176 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 1999)). And this Court’s local rules provide that when “the parties have taken no action for a reasonable time, the court
may, on its own motion after reasonable notice or an application of a party, enter an order dismissing the case unless good cause is shown.” E.D. Mich. LR 41.2 (cleaned up). Dismissal for want of prosecution is ordinarily
with prejudice. Rule 41(b); Link, 370 U.S. at 629. The Sixth Circuit has set forth four factors to be used as guidance when deciding whether a case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b): “(1) whether the party’s failure is due to willfulness, bad
faith, or fault; (2) whether the adversary was prejudiced by the dismissed party’s conduct; (3) whether the dismissed party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4) whether less drastic sanctions
were imposed or considered before dismissal was ordered.” Knoll, 176 F.3d at 363. Although Boardman is proceeding pro se, and thus is held to less stringent standards, the leniency granted is not boundless. Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004). “Pro se litigants are not to be accorded any special consideration when they fail to adhere to readily- comprehended court deadlines.” Bunting v. Hansen, No. 05-10116-BC,
2007 WL 1582236, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 31, 2007) (citing Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991)) (cleaned up). Analysis of the Knoll factors supports dismissal. For the first factor, Boardman is at fault because he failed to respond to the Court’s show
cause order or provide the Court with an updated address, showing willfulness or fault on his part. After invoking the processes of this Court, Boardman had an affirmative duty to apprise the Court of his mailing
address. See Yeschick v. Mineta, 675 F.3d 622, 630 (6th Cir. 2012). Although there is no evidence that Coy was prejudiced by Boardman’s inaction, the third and fourth factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal. As to the third factor, Local Rule 11.2 warns that failure to notify
the Court of an address change could result in dismissal of an action. Boardman was twice notified of this requirement and of the consequences of noncompliance. ECF No. 6; ECF No. 26. A pro se litigant is required to
follow the Court’s procedural rules. See Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2001). And there is no less drastic sanction available because the Court has no means of
communicating with Boardman about the case given his failure to provide a new address. Boardman has failed to respond to Court orders, even after being warned that his failure to respond could lead to the dismissal of his
complaint. “[D]ismissal is the only appropriate remedy because [Boardman] has effectively abandoned the case.” Gomez v. Deangelo, No. 18-14080, 2020 WL 7038612, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 2, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 7024862 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 30, 2020) (cleaned up).
III. Conclusion The Court RECOMMENDS that this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
s/Elizabeth A. Stafford ELIZABETH A. STAFFORD United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: October 22, 2025
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES ABOUT OBJECTIONS
Within 14 days of being served with this report and recommendation, any party may serve and file specific written objections to this Court’s findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). If a party fails to timely file specific objections, any further appeal
is waived. Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991). And only the specific objections to this report and recommendation are preserved for appeal; all other objections are waived. Willis v. Secretary of
HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991). Each objection must be labeled as “Objection #1,” “Objection #2,” etc., and must specify precisely the provision of this report and recommendation to which it pertains. Within 14 days after service of
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