IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
ROBERT BIEHL and MICHELLE No. 83414-2-I BIEHL, DIVISION ONE Appellants,
v.
JOSEPH L. OSTHELLER, individually and on behalf of his marital community, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Respondent,
RUTH JEAN OSTHELLER, n/k/a TAYLOR, individually and on behalf of her marital community,
Defendant.
BOWMAN, J. — Landlords of residential property appeal from an order on
summary judgment, findings and conclusions after a subsequent bench trial, and
findings in support of an award of attorney fees. We conclude that genuine issues
of material fact precluded summary judgment. We reverse, vacate the findings
and conclusions as far as they relate to the erroneous summary judgment ruling,
and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
FACTS
Robert and Michelle Biehl (Landlords) owned a residence in Gig Harbor. In
February 2015, they executed an agreement with Joseph Ostheller and his then-
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material. No. 83414-2-I/2
spouse Ruth Taylor1 (Tenants) to lease the property.2 The lease provided for a
security deposit of $4,200, rental payments of $2,650 due the first of each month,
and a late fee of $200.3 The lease also included provisions requiring the Tenants
to maintain the premises and its landscaping.
The original one-year lease expired on January 31, 2016. After that date,
tenancy continued on a month-to-month basis. But, unbeknownst to the
Landlords, the Tenants separated on August 21, 2016, and Ostheller moved out of
the home that day. Still, he was often at the Gig Harbor residence visiting his
children, discussing matters with Taylor, and removing personal property.
Ostheller also continued to pay the rent4 and communicate with the Landlords
about the lease and maintenance issues.
That winter, Robert5 “heard” that the Tenants were having marital trouble
and, on December 3, 2016, asked Ostheller about his living arrangements.
Ostheller responded, “I’m not sure if we will go through with the divorce. I’m here
at the house a lot. But officially living with my dad in Poulsbo.”
By this time, Tenants had repeatedly requested reimbursement for repairs
they claimed to have paid for without the Landlords’ permission. Because of these
unauthorized repairs, the failure to produce receipts for those repairs, not paying
1 The 2015 lease refers to Taylor by her former name, Ruth Ostheller. 2 According to the lease, the couple rented the property as a residence for themselves,
their two teenaged children, and Taylor’s mother. 3 Tenants owed a late fee if the Landlords did not receive rent within five days of the due date. 4 According to the Landlords, the Tenants regularly paid rent late but “never paid the late fees.” 5 We refer to Robert and Michelle Biehl by their first names when necessary for clarity and
intend no disrespect by doing so.
2 No. 83414-2-I/3
late fees, and then failing to pay rent in December, the Landlords started eviction
proceedings. On December 10, 2016, they arranged for service of a 20-day notice
of termination of tenancy posted on the front door of the home, addressed to both
Tenants.6 Ostheller was at the house at the time of service and received the
termination notice.
Ostheller texted Robert that he received the notice, and the two began a
series of text messages over the next several days about appliance and water
pressure issues. The Landlords repeatedly refused to waive the overdue
December rent or reimburse the Tenants for alleged repair bills without receipts.
Eventually, on December 13, 2016, Ostheller agreed to pay December rent and
asked, “Would you like me to overnight the check or is it simply good enough that I
send the payment from my bank system.” Then, on New Year’s Eve, Ostheller
sent Robert the following message with a screenshot to show his bank had
processed the December rent payment:
My wife is anxious about a text received from you about someone picking up the keys[.] As though we didn’t pay the rent this month. But, [I] did pay it, so, . . . [.] Please explain. I thought we were good. However, [I] [h]aven[’]t sent the rent for Jan[uary] yet. Are you expecting us to move out right now?
Robert told him, “The lease is up as of Midnight. No rent has been received for
January. The rate will be [$]3500 for holdover rent prepaid 3 months at a time.”
Shortly after this exchange, in a group text message between the Tenants
and Robert, Taylor explained that her mother was on hospice and that she could
not move her or vacate the property “today, tomorrow[,] or next week.” Ostheller
6 See RCW 59.18.200(1)(a) (landlord my terminate month-to-month tenancy by 20-day
written notice).
3 No. 83414-2-I/4
asked if they could extend the lease for one month, or “[p]ossibly two,” under these
circumstances. Robert reiterated his offer to extend the lease if the Tenants
prepaid three months’ rent at an increased monthly rate of $3,500.
Taylor said she would not agree to a rent increase. Robert responded, “We
will not be renting it for [$]2650 again.” He also said they were not willing to lease
the property solely to Taylor “[b]ecause [Ostheller] is who we leased to and [he] is
who we will go after to collect from. We rented to a married couple not a single
un[ ]employed woman.”
A few hours later, only Ostheller texted another proposal to Robert:
I just talked to [Taylor] on the phone. She sounds like she is getting a cold or flu, and she asked me to communicate with you about the rent. She would like to have me pay you for the rent for Jan[uary], and then on the first for the first 15 days of Feb[ruary]. She promises to be out by [F]eb[ruary] 15.
Robert responded, “You’ll need to wire it in the morning.”
The Tenants’ divorce became final on January 4, 2017.7 On January 12,
Robert texted both Tenants, stating that he had not heard from them since New
Year’s Eve, received January rent, or received confirmation that they had moved
out. He offered them “one last chance” to pay the rent owed and provide a
“concrete” date to move out before he would proceed with an unlawful detainer
action. A few days later, Ostheller told Robert that the house Taylor planned to
rent was no longer available and that she was “back to square one.” He said he
would pay February rent by the first of the month and asked, “Is that agreeable.”
Robert responded, “Still haven’t received January rent check.”
7 Nothing in the record indicates that either Tenant informed the Landlords of the divorce.
4 No. 83414-2-I/5
Again, in February 2017, Robert texted Ostheller about the late rent and
Taylor’s plans. Ostheller told him that the rent payment was “scheduled to go out”
in a couple of days. After what appears to be no communication for two months,
Robert texted Ostheller again in May about the rent for that month. Ostheller
explained that he mailed a check, but the post office returned it, and he promised
to resend it promptly with the “address modification per [Robert’s] instruction.”
Taylor moved out of the home in July 2017. At that time, Ostheller sent
Robert a message stating the property was nearly ready to turn over, but he still
planned to “sweep out the garage and make another run to the dump.” Ostheller
told Robert that a moving truck was still parked in the driveway.
On July 20, Michelle and Ostheller8 inspected the vacant house. She
prepared a “Move Out Inspection Report” detailing the condition of the property.
Ostheller signed the report, acknowledging that he was present, but wrote at the
bottom of each page, “I don’t agree with all findings.” A few weeks later, the
Landlords sent the Tenants a statement, providing the basis for retaining their
damage deposit and an estimate of the additional damages owed. The Tenants
did not respond.
The Landlords sued the Tenants in November 2017. They filed an
amended complaint in September 2018, alleging breach of the lease, seeking
unpaid rent, late fees, costs to restore the property to its prerental condition, and
lost rent while they restored the property. They also alleged timber trespass and
waste under chapter 64.12 RCW, seeking treble damages. Finally, the Landlords
8 According to the Landlords, Taylor refused to be present.
5 No. 83414-2-I/6
alleged diminution in value, seeking damages plus prejudgment interest. They
also requested attorney fees and costs as authorized by the lease.
Ostheller moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that his tenancy
terminated on December 31, 2016—20 days after the Landlords served the
termination notice—and that he did not enter into a new rental agreement. He
argued he was not liable for any unpaid rent or damages that accrued after
December 31, 2016. He also claimed there was no evidence to support the timber
trespass claim.
The Landlords sought partial summary judgment as to Ostheller’s liability.
They argued that Ostheller remained a month-to-month tenant until July 2017 and
was therefore jointly liable with Taylor for $11,444 in unpaid rent, late fees, and
additional damages during the tenancy.
After a hearing on December 7, 2018, the court entered a written order,
ruling:
Defendant Joseph Ostheller’s motion is granted in part. Dr.[9] Ostheller is not liable for rent that accrued after December 31, 2016. However, the issue of whether Dr. Ostheller is liable for damages or claims other than rent are reserved for trial.[10]
9 Ostheller is a dentist. The written order directly conflicts with the court’s oral ruling immediately following the 10
hearing. The court stated: I’m going to deny summary judgment for rent after December 31, 2016, because I think there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether there was a contract between Ostheller and the [Landlords]. So that’ll be something that will have to go to trial. With respect to damages and other claims, I am going to deny summary judgment because, again, I think there are issues of fact as to when things occurred, whether or not . . . Ostheller actually was a tenant. I think those will need to be fleshed out at trial. Between the trial court’s written order and its conflicting oral ruling, the written order controls. See Lang Pham v. Corbett, 187 Wn. App. 816, 830-31, 351 P.3d 214 (2015) (“A written order controls over any apparent inconsistency with the court’s earlier oral ruling.”). Neither party argues otherwise.
6 No. 83414-2-I/7
The court determined that Ostheller was liable for late fees of $750 incurred as of
December 31, 2016 and denied his motion as to the timber trespass claim,
reserving the issue for trial.11 Finally, the court denied in part and granted in part
the Landlords’ motion “for the same reasons.”
Taylor died in June 2019, and the case proceeded against only Ostheller.12
A bench trial took place over two days in June 2020. The judge who presided over
the bench trial was not the same judge who ruled on the summary judgment
motions. The court heard testimony from the Landlords, Ostheller, Ostheller’s
current spouse, and a former tenant. The court considered more than 70 exhibits.
During closing argument, the Landlords claimed that Ostheller’s tenancy
was continuous through July 2017. But Ostheller, consistent with the order on
summary judgment, argued that the Landlords terminated his tenancy on
December 31, 2016 and that he did not enter into a new agreement with them.
The trial court pointed to the apparent “inconsistent” ruling on summary
judgment and asked, “How is it that there is not a factual question with regard to
rent, but there is a factual question with regard to ongoing obligation for damages.”
The court observed that before reaching the damages issue, it needed to resolve
whether liability for damages would align with the prior court’s legal ruling. The
The court denied reconsideration of Ostheller’s motion on the timber trespass claim, and 11
a commissioner of Division Two of this court later denied discretionary review of the court’s ruling. 12 The Landlords served Taylor’s estate with notice of a creditor’s claim and their motion to
substitute, and the court allowed substitution of Taylor’s estate on the first day of trial. But it does not appear that any party joined the estate in the proceedings.
7 No. 83414-2-I/8
trial court considered supplemental briefing on that issue and the “impact” of the
summary judgment ruling.13
In a letter ruling, the trial court stated that the summary judgment order was
revisable under CR 54(b).14 But because neither party requested modification, it
would “respect” the summary judgment ruling and “let it inform” the court’s
resolution of the remaining issues. The court determined that “the only logical”
interpretation of the summary judgment ruling was that Ostheller’s month-to-month
tenancy terminated on December 31, 2016 and that he was “no longer a ‘tenant’ ”
after that date.
The court found that Ostheller admitted to incidents during his tenancy that
supported some of the claimed damages, including pet damage to the carpets and
water damage to the kitchen and laundry room. But as to others, the court
concluded that “[e]vidence of damage seven months after termination of the
tenancy does not support a finding that the damage was caused by Dr. Ostheller.”
The court also found that some claims failed for other reasons, including failing to
establish certain conditions existed on the property when Ostheller took
possession in 2015 and failing to establish damage beyond normal “wear and
tear.”
On August 19, 2020, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions
of law consistent with its oral ruling. Based on the summary judgment rulings, it
13 The trial court also asked for briefing on whether the independent duty doctrine affected the Landlords’ ability to recover under both contract and tort theories. 14 CR 54(b) provides that absent written findings, the trial court may revise a decision that
adjudicates fewer than all claims or does not decide the rights and liabilities of all parties before entry of final judgment.
8 No. 83414-2-I/9
issued conclusions of law stating that no contract existed between Ostheller and
the Landlords after December 31, 2016 and that Ostheller was not liable for
unpaid rent or late fees accrued after that date.15 The court also concluded that
Ostheller was liable for damages of $8,693.78 to replace carpets and repair
flooring but that he was not liable for damages related to walls, baseboards,
landscaping, kitchen cabinets, the driveway, septic issues, or smoking. The court
determined that Ostheller was entitled to an offset of half of the $4,200.00 security
deposit. Finally, the court rejected the Landlords’ claims for lost rent, timber
trespass, waste, and recovery based on their personal labor to restore the
property.
Both parties sought attorney fees under a provision of the lease which
provides for “reasonable attorney fees and costs” to the “prevailing party” in any
action arising out of the lease. Following a hearing, the court determined that
Ostheller prevailed on most of the issues and entered an order on October 20,
2020 granting his petition.16 The court also found that Ostheller’s September 2019
offer of judgment for $60,000.00 was greater than the Landlords’ damages, costs,
and fees as of the date of the offer. So the court calculated the parties’ awardable
fees as of the date of the offer of judgment and awarded total judgment of
$18,674.59 to Ostheller.
15 Consistent with the summary judgment ruling, the court found that Ostheller was liable for late fees accrued before 2017, and that he had satisfied that debt before trial. 16 The record on appeal includes neither the transcript of this hearing nor the additional
briefing and documents the parties submitted at the court’s direction.
9 No. 83414-2-I/10
The Landlords appeal.17
ANALYSIS
The Landlords contend the court erred at summary judgment by concluding
as a matter of law that they had no contractual relationship with Ostheller in 2017.
They point to evidence in the record of “explicit and voluntary actions” showing
that Ostheller remained a cotenant with Taylor after December 31, 2016. We
agree.
Whether a court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law
that we review de novo.18 In re Kelly & Moesslang, 170 Wn. App. 722, 731, 287
P.3d 12 (2012). In considering summary judgment, a court must consider all facts
submitted and all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party; here, the Landlords. Vasquez v. Hawthorne,
145 Wn.2d 103, 106, 33 P.3d 735 (2001). A court properly grants a summary
judgment motion only if the evidence before it shows no genuine issues of material
17Ostheller asks us to dismiss the Landlords’ appeal because their briefing does not include proper assignments of error and issues pertaining to those assignments. See RAP 10.3(a)(4). But the Landlords’ assignments of error along with the list of “issues raised” and the appendices to their brief, which include brackets to designate challenged findings and conclusions, are enough to apprise us of the substance of their claims. We are unpersuaded by Ostheller’s assertion that it was “exceedingly difficult” to discern the Landlords’ claims, and decline to resolve this appeal based on noncompliance with the rules or impose sanctions. See RAP 1.2(a) (“Cases and issues will not be determined on the basis of compliance or noncompliance with these rules except in compelling circumstances where justice demands.”); RAP 18.9(a) (providing authority to impose sanctions on a party or counsel who violates the rules). 18 Ostheller argues we should review the trial court’s finding that his tenancy terminated in
December 2016 for substantial evidence because the court weighed the evidence at trial and independently reached that conclusion. See Viking Bank v. Firgrove Commons 3, LLC, 183 Wn. App. 706, 712, 334 P.3d 116 (2014) (review of decision following a bench trial considers whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether those findings support the conclusions of law). But in its letter ruling, the trial court determined that “the only logical conclusion that can be drawn from [the summary judgment court]’s Order of December 7, 2018” is that Ostheller’s tenancy terminated on December 31, 2016, and that it would “respect” that order. As a result, we review the summary judgment order that decided the issue as a matter of law, not the trial court’s finding.
10 No. 83414-2-I/11
fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and “reasonable
persons could reach but one conclusion.” Vasquez, 145 Wn.2d at 106 (citing CR
56(c)). “[E]ven if the basic facts are not in dispute, if the facts are subject to
reasonable conflicting inferences, summary judgment is improper.” Southside
Tabernacle v. Pentecostal Church of God, 32 Wn. App. 814, 821, 650 P.2d 231
(1982); Sanders v. Day, 2 Wn. App. 393, 398, 468 P.2d 452 (1970) (summary
judgment not designed to resolve inferential disputes).
Paragraph 2B of the lease states the initial fixed-term lease expired January
31, 2016. That section also provides:
Tenant shall vacate the Premises upon termination of the Agreement, unless: (i) Landlord and Tenant have extended this Agreement in writing or signed a new agreement; (ii) mandated by local rent control law; or (iii) Landlord accepts Rent from Tenant (other than past due Rent), in which case a month-to-month tenancy shall be created which either party may terminate as specified in paragraph 2A. Rent shall be at a rate agreed to by Landlord and Tenant, or as allowed by law. All other terms and conditions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.[19]
It is undisputed that when the fixed-term lease expired on January 31,
2016, the Tenants continued to possess the property and the Landlords continued
to accept rent, so the tenancy converted to month-to-month. And although the
record on appeal does not include the notice itself, it is also undisputed that the
Landlords properly served the notice to terminate the month-to-month tenancy on
December 10, 2016 under RCW 59.18.200(1)(a), but did not proceed with eviction
by filing an unlawful detainer action. The question before the court on summary
judgment was whether the undisputed facts showed an agreement between the
19 Emphasis added.
11 No. 83414-2-I/12
Landlords and Ostheller to extend month-to-month tenancy after December 31,
2016.
“Leases are contracts, as well as conveyances.” Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v.
Westlake Park Assocs., 42 Wn. App. 269, 272, 711 P.2d 361 (1985). In the
context of a lease, as with contracts in general, mutual assent is required for the
formation of a valid agreement. Leda v. Whisnand, 150 Wn. App. 69, 78, 207 P.3d
468 (2009). To determine mutual assent, Washington follows the objective
manifestation theory of contracts. Multicare Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health
Servs., 114 Wn.2d 572, 586, 790 P.2d 124 (1990).20
[T]he unexpressed subjective intention of the parties is irrelevant; the mutual assent of the parties must be gleaned from their outward manifestations. To determine whether a party has manifested an intent to enter into a contract, we impute an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of a person’s words and acts.
Multicare, 114 Wn.2d at 587.21 The existence of mutual assent generally is a
question of fact but may be determined as a matter of law if reasonable minds
could not differ. Multicare, 114 Wn.2d at 586 n.24; P.E. Sys., LLC v. CPI Corp.,
176 Wn.2d 198, 207, 289 P.3d 638 (2012).
The evidence before the court at the time of the summary judgment ruling
showed the Landlords continued to accept month-to-month rent for the home
between January and May 2017 and expected rent for June and July. While
Taylor continued to live at the property in 2017, Ostheller negotiated and
communicated with the Landlords about the rent, and he made most, if not all, of
20 Overruled in part by statute on other grounds as stated in Neah Bay Chamber of Commerce v. Dep’t of Fisheries, 119 Wn.2d 464, 832 P.2d 1310 (1992). 21 Citations omitted.
12 No. 83414-2-I/13
the payments. And when Taylor moved out in July 2017, Ostheller prepared the
property for turnover, he alone returned the property to the possession of the
Landlords by accompanying Michelle during her inspection of the property, and he
signed the Move Out Inspection Report. While Ostheller did not live at the
residence between January and July 2017, this fact may not be dispositive since
his tenancy undisputedly continued for several months after he moved out in
August 2016. Because the evidence at summary judgment showed there were
genuine issues of fact as to whether the Landlords had an agreement with
Ostheller to continue his tenancy after December 31, 2016, the court erred by
granting summary judgment on that issue.
Still, Ostheller suggests that he was entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law, regardless of any competing inferences, because his month-to-
month tenancy could not continue once the Landlords served the termination
notice. But Ostheller provides no authority to support his argument.22 We are also
unpersuaded by Ostheller’s reliance on out-of-state authority and an unpublished
decision of this court to argue that “one tenant cannot be involuntarily bound to a
new tenancy by the acts of another.” See Bockelmann v. Marynick, 788 S.W.2d
569, 572 (Tex. 1990) (presumption that one cotenant’s holding over binds another
cotenant is contrary to general principles of Texas law); Fin. Assistance, Inc. v.
Slack, No. 72361-8-I, slip. op. at 9-10 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2014)
(unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/723618.pdf (cosigner of
original fixed-term lease stopped being a tenant when the lease expired because
22 We need not consider arguments unsupported by citation to authority. Cowiche Canyon
Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992); see RAP 10.3(a)(6).
13 No. 83414-2-I/14
he took no acts to bind himself as lessee in subsequent month-to-month tenancy,
did not possess the premises or pay rent, and had no communication with the
landlord or other tenants).
Construing the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the Landlords, there is evidence in the record of words and
conduct manifesting an intent to continue Ostheller’s joint tenancy after December
31, 2016. As a result, the court erred by granting summary judgment on that issue
as a matter of law. And because the trial court’s findings and conclusions flowed
from the summary judgment ruling that “[n]o tenancy or contractual agreement
existed” between Ostheller and the Landlords after that date, we reverse and
vacate the findings and conclusions as far as they relate to the erroneous ruling on
summary judgment. We remand for trial on the issue of when Ostheller’s tenancy
ended, as well as the issues that flow therefrom.23 The trial court may then revisit
its decision on attorney fees.
23 Because we reverse and vacate the trial court’s findings and conclusions implicated by
the summary judgment order, we need not address the Landlords’ challenges to specific findings and conclusions. But we address several issues the Landlords raised that may resurface on remand. Specifically, the Landlords contend (1) the court improperly placed the burden of proof on them to show that Ostheller caused damages during their contractual relationship; (2) the trial court erred by denying claims for some damages because the Landlords chose not make repairs; and (3) the trial court erred when, for purposes of attorney fees, it separated their breach of contract claim into eight distinct claims involving different aspects of the property. The Landlords fail to establish reversible error with respect to any of these claims. First, as plaintiffs, the Landlords bore the burden to establish the elements of their claim, including a valid contractual relationship at the time of the alleged breach and damages. See Citoli v. City of Seattle, 115 Wn. App. 459, 476, 61 P.3d 1165 (2002) (a breach of contract cause of action requires plaintiff to prove a valid and enforceable contract, the rights of the plaintiff and obligations of the defendant under the contract, violation of the contract by the defendant, and damages to the plaintiff). Second, no authority supports the Landlords’ position that they had a right to recover the estimated costs of unperformed repairs unless Ostheller could show that “the diminution in value was somehow less than the cost of remediation.” And finally, because several different areas and aspects of the property needed separate repairs, ample evidence supported segregating the Landlords’ claims.
14 No. 83414-2-I/15
Reversed, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.24
WE CONCUR:
24 Both parties request an award of attorney fees under RAP 18.1 and the attorney fee provision in the lease. RAP 18.1(a) authorizes an award of attorney fees and costs from appeal when authorized by law. We deny both requests as premature. The Landlords’ partial success on appeal does not equate to actual relief because the claim that survived summary judgment is not yet resolved. But if the Landlords are ultimately entitled to additional relief on remand and the trial court concludes fees and costs are appropriate, the trial court may award reasonable fees and costs for this appeal. See RAP 18.1(i) (trial courts may determine amount of appellate fees on remand).