IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED MARCH SESSION , 1998 May 15, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson ROBERT C. BELLAFANT, ) Appellate Court Clerk C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9705-CC-00183 ) Appe llant, ) ) ) MAURY COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. JIM T. HAMILTON STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE ) Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MAURY COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
DANIEL J. RUNDE JOHN KNOX WALKUP Assistant Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter P.O. Box 1208 Pulaski, TN 38478 PETER M. COUGHLAN Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Avenu e North Nashville, TN 37243
MIKE BOTTOMS District Attorney General P.O. Box 459 Lawrenceburg, TN 38464
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE OPINION
The Petitioner, Robert Carroll Bellafant, appeals pursuant to Rule 3 of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure from the trial court’s denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief. He argues (1) That the reasonable doubt
instruction administered at his trial is constitutionally infirm; and (2) that trial and
appellate couns el rende red ineffec tive assista nce. We affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
The Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder by a Maury C ounty jury
on Augus t 27, 1986 . The S tate had sough t the death penalty, bu t in a sepa rate
sentencing proceeding, the jury sentenced him to life imprisonment. The
Petitioner filed a direct appe al to this Court and his conviction was affirmed on
November 12, 198 7. State v. Robert C. Bellafant, C.C.A. No. 8 7-102-III, Maury
Coun ty (Tenn. Crim. App, Nashville, Nov. 12, 1987). The Petitioner filed a pro
se petition for p ost-con viction relief on Octob er 24, 19 90. With the assistance of
coun sel, the Petitioner filed an amended petit ion for post-conviction relief on
August 18, 1995. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on December 11,
1996, the trial cour t denied re lief in an orde r entered on Janu ary 8, 1 997. It is
from the trial court’s de nial that the Petitioner n ow app eals.
The facts of the case as summ arized by a panel of this Court on the direct
appeal are as follows:
On the evening of January 4, 1986, both the victim and the defendant visited Du mp's C afe in Co lumbia , Tenn essee . No words were
-2- exchanged between them or hostilities exhibited while they were in the cafe. Shortly after the parties left the cafe the defendant was seen standing next to the v ictim's truck with a shotgu n. As the victim began to back his truck at a rather rapid rate of speed, the defendant fired the shotgu n at the victim , and left.
The defendant e ventually surrendered himself to the police. He revealed to several people, including members of law enforcement, that he shot and killed the victim. He also admitted that the shotgun shells found at the scene of the homicide belonged to him.
It was established that the shotgun was fired in close proximity to the victim. The blast created a large hole in the victim's neck. The actual cause of death was exsanguination, or loss of blood.
The defendant testified the victim had th reaten ed him earlier in the evening with a weapon. The defendant, tired of being threatened and running from the victim, went to the home of his cousin, obtained a shotgun, and returned to the situs of the homicide. The defendant placed the weapo n betwe en two cars and waited for the v ictim. T he victim event ually appro ache d his truck. W hen he stoppe d, the defe ndant ra n to the victim's truck and shot the victim.
Id.
I.
The Petitioner first argues that the use of the term “m oral c ertainty” as
used in the jury instruction on reasonable doubt impermissibly lowered the
burden of proof constitutionally required in criminal cases, thus d enying his right
to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth, S ixth, and F ourteen th
Ame ndme nts to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the
Tennessee Constitution. The Petitioner recognizes that this Court has upheld the
constitution ality of such an instruction, nevertheless, he asserts that we shou ld
reexamine our consideration of this issue.
The jury instruction used at the Petitioner’s trial is as follows:
-3- Rea sona ble doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability, after such investigation to let the mind rest ea sily as to the ce rtainty o f guilt. Reasonable doubt does not mean a capricious, possible, or imagina ry doubt. Abso lute ce rtainty o f guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense.
Our supre me c ourt ha s uph eld the use of jury instructions including
the phrase “m oral certainty,” Carter v. S tate, 958 S.W.2d 620 (Tenn. 1997);
State v. Nich ols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 734 (Tenn.1994), and this Court has
considered and approved the same ins truction on a num ber of occ asions.
Pettyjohn v. State, 885 S.W .2d 364 , 365 (T enn. C rim. App . 1994); State v.
Hallock, 875 S.W.2d 285, 294 (Tenn . Crim. A pp. 199 3); State v. Rodney Corley,
C.C.A. No. 01C01-9608-CR-00336, Davidson County (Tenn. Crim. A pp.,
Nashville, Sept. 2, 1997 ); Kenn eth Culp v. S tate, C.C.A. No.
02C01-9608-CC-00268, Laude rdale Co unty (Te nn. Crim . App., Jackson, July 24,
1997); Terry Sha nnon Kim ery v. State, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9512-CC-00412,
Greene Coun ty (Ten n. Crim . App., Knoxville, Jan. 28, 199 7) perm. to appeal
denied (Tenn. 1997). Although the Petitioner argues that we should “fear not the
flood” but rather should “look to the light and the clear dawn of a ne w day in
jurisprude nce,” we de cline to recon sider th e issue in accord ance w ith our existing
law. This issue ha s no m erit.
II.
As his second issue, the Petitioner contends that counsel rendered
ineffective a ssistanc e for seve ral reaso ns: (A) T hat app ellate cou nsel failed to
-4- brief an issue raised on direct appeal regarding the trial court’s prejudicial
comm ents, resu lting in a wa iver; (B) that trial c ounse l failed to requ est a
continuance to secure the testimony of Ronald Rone; (C) that trial counsel
failed to su ppress the Petition er’s statem ent abo ut throwin g his wea pon into
the Duck River; (D) that trial counsel failed to request an investigator and an
indep ende nt psyc holog ical eva luation ; and (E ) that tria l coun sel ina dequ ately
investigated and prepared the Petitioner’s case.
In determining whether counsel provided effective assistance at trial, the
court must decide whether counsel’s performance was within the range of
competence dema nded o f attorneys in crimina l cases. Baxter v. Rose, 523
S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). To succeed on a claim that his counsel was
ineffective at trial, a petitioner bears the burden of showing that his counsel made
errors so serious that he was not functioning as counsel as guaranteed under the
Sixth Amendment and that the deficient representation prejudiced the petitioner
resulting in a failure to produce a reliable res ult. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 68 7, reh’g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984); Coop er v. State , 849 S.W.2d
744, 74 7 (Ten n. 1993 ); Butler v. State, 789 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990). To
satisfy the seco nd pron g the pe titioner mu st show a reaso nable p robability tha t,
but for counsel’s unreasonable error, the fact find er wou ld have had re ason able
doubt regardin g petitione r’s guilt. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. This re ason able
probab ility must be “su fficient to undermine confidence in the outcome .” Harris
v. State, 875 S.W .2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 199 4).
When reviewing trial couns el’s actions , this court sh ould no t use the benefit
of hinds ight to s econ d-gue ss trial st rategy and c riticize c ouns el’s tactics. Hellard
-5- v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982). Counsel’s alleged errors should be
judged at the time they were made in light of all facts and circumstances.
Strickland, 466 U.S . at 690; see Cooper 849 S.W.2d at 746.
The hearing on the post-conviction pe tition was held on D ecemb er 11,
1996. One of the Petitioner’s trial attorneys, George Lovell, testified, and the
Petitioner testified. In a post-conviction procee ding un der the A ct applica ble to
this case, a petitioner m ust prove the allegations in the petition by a
preponderance of the evide nce. Davis v. S tate, 912 S.W.2d 689, (Tenn. 199 5);
Adkins v. State, 911 S.W .2d 334 , 341 (T enn. Crim. A pp. 1994). In ap pellate
review of post-conviction proceedings, the trial court’s findings of fact are
conclusive unless the evidence in the record preponderates against the findings.
Cooper v. State, 849 S.W .2d 744 , 746 (T enn. 19 93); Butler v. Sta te, 789 S.W.2d
898, 899 (T enn. 1990 ).
A. Comments by the Trial Judge
The Petitioner first argues that appe llate counsel wa s inadequa te for failure
to brief an issue on appeal properly. In his direct appeal, the Petitioner asserted
that the trial court comm itted reversible error by instructing the jury in a manner
that sugges ted they would h ave to conclud e the case the next day:
THE COURT: All right. The jury has all returned to the courtroom. Ladies and Gentlemen, it's 4 o'clock and I had hopes that we could finish all of the proof in this case today with the exception of one witness that was going to take about a few minutes acco rding to the law yers, b ut that's not going to be po ssible so I'm going to let you go on to the m otel a little early today. Remember what I said--but tomorrow--this is your last night at the m otel. No w, I'm just giving you fair warning tha t tomorrow w e're going to finish this case. And if we're sitting up here tomorrow night at midnig ht, then that's too bad. Okay? Rem embe r what I said, don't discuss
-6- this case among yourselves. There's still some evidenc e to he ar. Do n't look in the newsp aper ab out it, and don't watch any television or listen to any radio acc ounts o f it. See you in the morning a t 9 o'clock. Have a good evening.
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial which the trial judge overruled. The
trial judge made the following curative instruc tion the following day:
THE COU RT: I go t to thinking a bout it last nig ht after I got home, and I told you all yesterday that we'd finish this case today, and I hope we do. But I don't want you to think that that just means that without a doubt you've got to rend er a verdic t today. I don 't think that you though t I meant that, but I didn't m ean th at, and , certain ly, if you w ant to d elibera te all night tonight, then that's certainly your privilege. So I hope yo u didn't think that. I didn't mean it that wa y.
On direct appeal, the issue was waived because of couns el’s failure to c ite
authority or cite to the record. T he Petition er conte nds tha t this amo unts to
ineffective assistance and cites Garton v. State, 555 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Tenn.
Crim. App . 1976). “Wh ile this Court strongly disap proves of failure to cite
authority in support of argument in a brief, as Rule 15 of the Tennessee Supreme
Court Rules makes clear, we are unwilling to say that such failure constitutes
ineffective assistance o f counsel per se . “ Id. In Garton, this Court noted that
counsel had vigorously argued other issues and that the evidence against Garton
was overwhelming. Id. We find the situation in the case sub judice akin to that
in the cited case. Here, counsel argued several issues on appeal and the
evidence was clear that the Defendant committed the crime. Therefore, we
cannot conclude that co unse l’s perfor man ce wa s ineffe ctive. T his is pa rticularly
true in light of the c onteste d argum ent. The trial court issued a curative
instruction making it clear tha t the jury did not have to reach a verdict as in a
“dynam ite charge.” Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1975). Furthermore,
trial counsel testified that he felt no pressure from the trial court to conclude the
case prematurely. The post-conviction court held that the curative instruction
-7- rendered any error b y the trial cou rt harmle ss. W e cann ot conclu de that the
evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings or that his conc lusion is
erroneo us. The refore, we find this issu e to be w ithout me rit.
B.
Next, the Petitioner con tends that trial couns el rendered ine ffective
assistance by failing to req uest a continuance to secure the testim ony of R onald
Rone, a defense witness. Counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing that he
interviewed Rone prior to trial and that his expected testimony was that he had
seen or knew that William Hill, the victim in this case, carried a pistol. T he victim
was found with eight .38 calibe r bullets in his pants pocket. When it was time for
Rone to testify, he arrived at the courthouse drunk. At that point, trial counsel
chose not to have Rone testify. Trial counsel was also aware of Rone’s criminal
record. Counsel did not request a continuance because it was well into the trial
and he did not believe that Rone co uld necess arily be presentab le the next day
even if he had preserved him as a witness.
The Petitioner notes that, although bullets were found on the victim, no
pistol was recovered. He contends that his self-defense theory was ques tionab le
because of this and that witnesses who saw Hill with a gun would subs tantiate
his theory of defense. The defense did call another witness, Bobby Armstrong,
who testified that he had seen a .38 caliber pistol in Hill’s home a few days before
the murde r.
The Petitioner correctly points out that trial counsel has a duty to use
witnesses who may be of assistan ce to the d efense . State v. Zimmerman, 823
-8- S.W.2d 220, 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). However, in Zimmerman, this Court
noted that trial counsel failed to pres ent a valid reason to change trial strategy
and not ca ll his defen se witnes ses. Id. Here , coun sel inve stigate d the vic tim’s
background and pro duced witnesse s to support the self-defense theory. When
one of those w itnesses appea red drun k, we believe this was sufficient justification
not to present the witness. With knowledge of the witness’ background, counsel
had reason to believe h e would not be re liable. Clearly, his p ositive value to the
defense was tenuous and his drunken state c onvinc ed trial c ouns el to fore go his
testimony. We cannot conclude that counsel’s decision amounts to an error
implicating his level of co mpete ncy. This issue is with out me rit.
C. Petitioner’s Statement
The Petitioner next contends that counsel erred by failing to suppress an
incriminating statement he made. Counsel testified that when the Petitioner was
in custody, he made a statement to the police and that he told them he thre w his
gun into the Duck River. Counsel obtained copies of the Petitioner’s statements.
It was his understanding that the Petitioner was Mirandized and refused to make
a statement but talk ed with his attorney, Billy Jack. Subsequently, the Petitioner
was approa ched b y the police and ga ve a state ment a fter bein g Mirandized.
Counsel was not aware of the content of the conversation between the Petitioner
and Billy Jack. Counsel also testified that the Petitioner had turned himself in and
stated his name and that he was the one who shot William Hill. Counsel testified
that, in light of the Petitioner’s admission, the statement that he threw the gun into
the river was o nly a sm all factor in light o f the entire c ase. As such, counsel
stated that he con centrate d on state ments by the Petitioner an d others that we re
-9- far more incriminating. Counsel concluded that the statement was essentially de
minimus in the context of the entire case. Counsel did agree that he had a
hearing to redact some information about the Petitioner during the testimony of
a police officer. The officer testified that the Petitioner admitted that the shotgun
he used he ha d borro wed a nd retu rned to his rela tive, rath er than throwin g it
away.
The Petitioner testified that he refused to make a statement until he called
his lawyer. He stated that Mr. Jack told him to refrain from making any
statements. The Petitioner denied being Mirandized and stated that defense
counsel never discussed the prospect of a motion to suppress his statement
because his rights might have been viola ted. T he Pe titioner te stified th at his
credibility was at issue and that this statement, which was contradictory to the
actual disposition of the murder weap on, m ade h im appear to be a liar and that
this pre judice d the re sult of th e trial.
Counsel testified that he assessed the nature of the statement in light of
the facts and circumstances of the case and determined that the incriminating
nature of the statement was of minor significance. In most circumstances,
however, advocacy demands that an attorney attempt to suppress any
incriminating evidence if arguable grounds exist. Nevertheless, on the record
before us, we are hesitant to find counsel ineffective. Even if counsel’s action
was de ficient, no pre judice ha s been shown . This issu e is withou t merit.
-10- D. Failure to Request Expert Assistance
The Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to request
an investigato r and a p sycholo gical or ps ychiatric eva luation. The Petitioner
points out that counsel requested and received a contin uanc e, citing “difficulty in
the investigation and preparation for the trial.” Defense coun sel arg ued in their
brief that the victim was a well-known member of the black community and that
they had difficulty getting potential witnesses to coopera te because they were
white. Counse l also stated that they w ere gaining some trust and new leads and
needed more time to investigate them. Counsel testified that he did no t seek to
obtain an investigator, although it would have been helpful, because it was not
the practice at the time. Counsel stated that he interviewed family membe rs
regarding potential witnesses, located them, but had trouble finding witnesses
who had testimony that was favorable for the Petitioner. Counsel also
investigated the victim’s p ropens ity for violence. On cross-examination, counsel
stated that the bulk o f the witn esse s saw the victim attem pting to leave in his
truck when th e Petitioner shot him. The Petitioner testified that Joe Hill was a
potential witness who saw the crime who defense counsel did not contact. The
Petitioner denie d that a ll of the witnesses at trial testified that they did not see the
victim with a gun. The Petitioner could not say what Joe Hill’s tes timon y would
have been.
In support of this contention, the Petitioner cites Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-14-207(b), which was in effect when he was tried and
provides:
-11- In capital cases where the defendant has been found to be indigent by the court of record having juris diction of the cas e, such c ourt in an e x parte hearing may in its discretion determine that investigative or expert services or other similar services are necessary to ensure that the constitutional rights of the defenda nt are properly protec ted. If su ch de termin ation is made, the court may grant prior authorization for these necessary services in a reaso nable amount to be determined by the court. The authorization shall be evidence d by a signed o rder of the court. The order shall provide for the reimbursement of reasonable and necessary expenses by the executive secretary of the Suprem e Court as authorized by this part, and rules pro mulga ted there under b y the Sup reme C ourt.
The trial court found that getting an investigator was not the routine
practice when the Petitioner was tried. The Petitioner correctly points out that
statutory law provided for investigative services. However, the Petitioner has
presented no evidence of witnesses or exculpatory evidence that would suggest
that counsel’s performance in investiga ting the case was deficient. This issue
has no merit.
In addition, the Petitioner a rgues that counsel failed to request an
independent psychological or psychiatric evaluation. Counsel did request a nd
receive an evaluation at a mental health center regarding the Petition er’s insanity
and competency to stand trial. Counsel admitted that the Petitioner’s state of
mind regardin g threats from the victim was at issue, but was for the jury to
determine. Coun sel did no t reques t an indep enden t psycho logical exp ert to
address how persons react to fear to validate that the Petitioner was acting
becau se of fear o f the victim.
The Petitioner argues that counsel could have, but did not request the
services of an exp ert. He relies upon Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct.
1087, 84 L.Ed .2d 53 (1 985). In tha t case, the Supreme Court held that an
-12- indigent defendant's right to due process had been violated by a denial of funds
to emplo y a psych iatrist. The C ourt held that when a defendant has made a
thresh old showing that his or her sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be
a significant factor at trial, the defend ant has a constitu tional right to a ccess to
psych iatric assistance. Ake, 470 U.S . at 83, 105 S.Ct. at 109 6. The holdin g in
Ake is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee of
fundamental fairness, assuring a criminal defend ant a fair op portunity to present
his defense.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that the Petitioner made a showing
that his mental competency was implicated at the time he committed the crime.
He underwent an initial evaluation at a mental health center from which we can
only surmise that the Petitioner’s mental state was not a viable issue. Ther e is
no evidence in the re cord before us that reflects th at the Pe titioner und erwent a
more extensive inpatient evaluation, which would suggest that insanity or mental
competency to stand trial was at issue. The Petitioner has merely indicated that
his menta l state was at issue in regards to his theory of self-defense. Without
more, it is not evident that trial couns el erred in fa iling to request a psychological
or psych iatric exp ert dur ing the guilt phase of the trial. See Coop er v. State , 847
S.W.2d 521, 529 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Therefore, we cannot conclude that
couns els’ perform ance w as deficie nt. This iss ue is witho ut merit.
E. Inadequate Investigation and Preparation
The Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to inve stigate and pre pare
prope rly for his capital trial. T he Pe titioner te stified th at cou nsel m et with h im
-13- abou t five time s befo re his trial for appro ximately th irty minutes each visit. The
Petitioner could not say what kind of investigation was conducted, how defense
counsel treated the victim’s propensity for violence and whether the victim carried
a pistol. The Petitioner testified that counsel never told him about c ontacting
witnesses concerning an incident prior to the shooting. The Petitioner stated that
the victim “made a play” for him with a gun when he was in his truck and that he
did not know if counse l investigate d witness es. The Petitioner a dmitted that
counsel discussed the victim’s prior criminal record and attempted to introduce
it at trial, albeit unsuccessfully.
Counsel testified that th ey obtain ed the P etitioner’s sta tements and
reviewed them. Counsel also investigated witnesses and leads for potential
witnesses, and even re ceived a con tinuance to pu rsue their investigation m ore
fully. Counsel obtained witnesses who would testify that the victim had a pistol
in support of the theory of self-defense, but unfortunately, Ronald Rone was
drunk when he was supposed to testify. Counsel could not recall the exact
number of meetings with the Petitioner, but maintained that he was in close
contact with the Petitioner’s moth er and exchanged information through her at
times. Couns el talked w ith family m embe rs and e nlisted the m to help find
witnesses. Counsel investigated the victim’s tendency for violence. They did not
go to the location of the prior altercation because the Petitioner stated the
incident h appen ed whe n no on e was p resent.
On cross-examination, counsel indicated he had been in private practice
for eleven years at the time of trial and that he had tried one p rior death penalty
-14- case. Counsel testified that the majority of the witnesses to the crime had
testimony un favorable to the P etitioner.
From the record before us, we cannot conclude that the evidence
preponderates again st the tria l court’s finding that co unse l com prehe nsively
prepared and thoroug hly investiga ted the P etitioner’s ca se. In fact, the trial judge
noted that the proof in the case was so me of th e strong est that he had se en to
support a first-degree murder conviction. Therefore, we find this issue to be
without m erit.
According ly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition
for post-co nviction relief.
____________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE
___________________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
-15-