RENDERED: FEBRUARY 6, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1189-MR
ROBERT ARNOLD APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE ANN BAILEY SMITH, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-007723
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, INC. D/B/A U OF L HEALTH; EC OPCO MOUNT WASHINGTON, LLC, D/B/A INSPIRATION OF MOUNT WASHINGTON, A/K/A ELMCROFT OF MOUNT WASHINGTON; JEFFREY A. BAKER, MD; LOUISVILLE ALZHEIMER’S INVESTORS, LLC, D/B/A THE LANTERN AT MORNING POINTE OF LOUISVILLE; TARYN MORAN, RN, SANE; TYLER BAYERS, MD; AND UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS WHO ARE AGENTS/EMPLOYEES OF ELMCROFT APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES. CALDWELL, JUDGE: Robert Arnold (“Dr. Arnold”) appeals from the dismissal
of his claims against the Appellees on grounds including the statute of limitations.
We affirm.
FACTS
On December 14, 2023, Dr. Arnold filed a lawsuit against Appellees:
1) EC Opco Mount Washington, LLC, d/b/a Inspirations of Mount Washington,
a/k/a Elmcroft of Mount Washington (“Elmcroft”), 2) Louisville Alzheimer’s
Investors, LLC d/b/a The Lantern at Morning Pointe of Louisville (“The Lantern”),
and 3) University Medical Center, d/b/a UofL Health—University of Louisville
Hospital and Jeffrey A. Baker, MD; Tyler Bayers, MD; and Taryn Moran, RN,
SANE (collectively, “the U of L Defendants”).
Dr. Arnold’s complaint1 asserted claims relating to investigations of
allegations that Dr. Arnold had abused or assaulted his wife, Betty Arnold (“Mrs.
Arnold”), while she resided at Elmcroft and then The Lantern. He alleged that
Mrs. Arnold was diagnosed with dementia in early to mid-2021 and was placed at
Elmcroft. He further alleged the Cabinet for Health and Family Services
(“Cabinet”) had investigated allegations of abuse made while he was visiting his
wife at Elmcroft, but the Cabinet determined that these allegations were
1 Dr. Arnold amended his complaint twice. Like the parties and the trial court, we focus our attention on the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, which we refer to simply as “the complaint” in this Opinion.
-2- unsubstantiated. The complaint provided no specific dates regarding the Cabinet’s
investigation.
Dr. Arnold also alleged that in late March 2022, Mrs. Arnold had been
transferred to The Lantern and she was seen at the University Hospital emergency
room due to suspicions that she had been physically or sexually assaulted by her
husband. He further alleged that following Mrs. Arnold’s late March 2022
emergency room visit, the Arnolds’ adult daughters had reported their suspicions
of abuse to Louisville police. He stated that the criminal investigation concluded,
with no charges filed against Dr. Arnold, on December 16, 2022.
Elmcroft, The Lantern, and the U of L Defendants (collectively, “the
Appellees”) all filed motions to dismiss based on the statute of limitations and
other grounds.
The circuit court granted the motions to dismiss in an opinion and
order. It concluded that a one-year statute of limitations applied to all of Dr.
Arnold’s claims against the Appellees—including claims for personal injury and
medical negligence as well as any defamation claims. It rejected Dr. Arnold’s
argument that his lawsuit was timely filed because he did not know the full extent
of his damages until the criminal investigation concluded.
Dr. Arnold filed a timely appeal. Further facts will be set forth as
needed in our analysis.
-3- First, we consider the effect of his appellant brief’s lack of compliance
with the Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) in several respects.
ANALYSIS
Dr. Arnold’s Brief Fails to Fully Comply with Appellate Briefing Rules
As noted in the U of L Defendants’ appellee brief, Dr. Arnold’s
appellant brief does not fully comply with RAP. For instance, the appellant brief
provides no specific citations to pages of the written record or to any portion of a
hearing videorecording. See RAP 32(A)(3)-(4); RAP 31(E)(3)-(4). Also, the
opinion and order of dismissal from which the appeal stems was not placed
“immediately after the appendix list so that it is most readily available to the
court.” RAP 32(E)(1)(a). And the index to the appendix to appellant’s brief does
not state where the appended items may be found in the record. RAP 32(E)(1)(d).
Moreover, the appellant brief does not “contain at the beginning of the
argument a statement with reference to the record showing whether the issue was
properly preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.” RAP 32(A)(4). And
despite at least some RAP violations being pointed out in an appellee brief, Dr.
Arnold did not file a reply brief correcting the deficiencies of his appellant brief.
Failure to comply with appellate briefing rules can result in serious
consequences. For example, this Court has discretion to strike a brief and dismiss
the appeal for substantial failure to comply with appellate briefing rules. RAP
-4- 10(B); RAP 31(H); J.P.T. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 689 S.W.3d
149, 153 (Ky. App. 2024).
Despite the failure to fully comply with our appellate briefing rules,
we decline to strike the appellant brief or to dismiss the appeal. However, to the
extent that Dr. Arnold’s brief fails to show if and how the issues he raises on
appeal were raised to the trial court and thus preserved for our review, we may
review such issues solely for palpable error resulting in manifest injustice. See id.
(citing Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Ky. 2021)).2
Standards of Review
We review de novo (without deference) the trial court’s granting
Appellees’ motions to dismiss based on failure to state a claim for which relief can
be granted, see CR3 12.02(f), and on failure to timely file suit within the statute of
limitations. Shaw v. Handy, 588 S.W.3d 459, 461 (Ky. App. 2019). Moreover, we
keep in mind that CR 12.02(f) motions may be properly granted only if, accepting
all of the plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the
2 Based upon a Westlaw search, Kentucky appellate courts have not previously, explicitly found that Dr. Arnold’s counsel failed to substantially comply with appellate briefing rules. Nonetheless, though we leniently decline to formally impose sanctions for the lack of full compliance with appellate briefing rules in this instance, we remind counsel that we are not obligated to be so lenient in the future. We direct counsel’s attention to the Rules of Appellate Procedure and helpful resources, such as briefing checklists and a basic appellate handbook which may be accessed via our Court’s website, https://www.kycourts.gov/Courts/Court-of- Appeals (last viewed Sep. 19, 2025). 3 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-5- plaintiff’s favor, “the pleading party would not be entitled to relief under any set of
facts which could be proved in support of his claim[.]” Id. (quoting James v.
Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 883 (Ky. App. 2002)).
In other words, when ruling upon a CR 12.02(f) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim: “the circuit court is not required to make any factual
determination; rather, the question is purely a matter of law. Stated another way,
the court must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be proved, would the
plaintiff be entitled to relief?” James, 95 S.W.3d at 883-84.
With these standards in mind, we consider Dr. Arnold’s argument on
appeal that his claims were not time-barred because he did not know the full extent
of his damages until the criminal investigation against him concluded. Although
Dr. Arnold raises other arguments for challenging the trial court’s dismissal of his
claims against Appellees, we need not reach these additional arguments because
the trial court properly dismissed his claims against Appellees as time-barred.
Trial Court Properly Concluded that Dr. Arnold’s Claims Against the Appellees were Time-Barred
The trial court concluded that Dr. Arnold’s claims against all
Appellees were time-barred. First, it determined that the one-year statute of
limitations set forth in KRS4 413.140 applied. See generally KRS 413.140(1)(a)
4 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-6- (personal injury); KRS 413.140(1)(d) (libel or slander); KRS 413.140(1)(e)
(professional negligence including that of physicians and hospitals). Dr. Arnold
has not challenged the trial court’s determination that the one-year statute of
limitations applied to all his claims against the defendants. However, he contends
that his claims against the Appellees did not accrue until December 16, 2022 (the
date the criminal investigation concluded).5
Specifically, he argues that he did not sustain an “irrevocable non-
speculative injury” until the criminal investigation against him concluded. He
quotes Queensway Financial Holdings Ltd. v. Cotton & Allen, P.S.C., 237 S.W.3d
141, 147 (Ky. 2007):
The “occurrence” limitation period begins to run upon the accrual of the cause of action. Id. The accrual rule is relatively simple: “‘[A] cause of action is deemed to accrue in Kentucky where negligence and damages have both occurred. . . . [T]he use of the word “occurrence” in KRS 413.245 indicates a legislative policy that there should be some definable, readily ascertainable event which triggers the statute.’” Id. at 730 (quoting Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v. Osborne, 610 F. Supp. 126, 128 (E.D. Ky. 1985)) (alterations in original). Basically, “a ‘wrong’ requires both a negligent act and resulting injury. Damnum absque injuria, harm without injury, does not give rise to an action for damages against the person causing it.” Id. at 731. The difficult question
5 Dr. Arnold’s brief fails to provide a proper preservation statement with references to the record showing if and how this issue was preserved for our review as required by RAP 32(A)(4). However, it is evident that he raised this issue about when his claims accrued to the trial court based on its discussion of this issue in its opinion and order of dismissal.
-7- when applying the rule is usually not whether negligence has occurred but whether an “‘irrevocable non- speculative injury’” has arisen. Id. at 730 (quoting Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v. Osborne, 610 F. Supp. 126, 128 (E.D. Ky. 1985)).
We disagree with Dr. Arnold’s argument that his claims did not
accrue and that he suffered no “irrevocable non-speculative injury” until the
criminal investigation concluded. Even assuming arguendo that the discovery rule
applies to all his claims against the Appellees,6 the trial court correctly rejected Dr.
Arnold’s argument that his claims did not accrue until he was able to determine the
full extent of his damages, including fees for attorneys and expert witnesses, upon
the conclusion of the criminal investigation.
6 The discovery rule set forth at KRS 413.245 explicitly applies only to civil actions “arising out of any act or omission in rendering, or failing to render, professional services for others[.]” And it further requires that such actions “be brought within one (1) year from the date of the occurrence or from the date when the cause of action was, or reasonably should have been, discovered by the party injured.”
As noted by the trial court, Kentucky law generally holds that a cause of action accrues upon the occurrence of an injury. Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Ky. App. 1998). Moreover, “it is the publication of the alleged libelous matter that causes the defamation or injury thus commencing the running of the one year statute of limitations[.]” Caslin v. General Elec. Co., 608 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Ky. App. 1980). Assuming the discovery rule applies: “A cause of action will not accrue under the discovery rule until the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered not only that he has been injured but also that his injury may have been caused by the defendant’s conduct.” Combs v. Albert Kahn Associates, Inc., 183 S.W.3d 190, 194-95 (Ky. App. 2006) (discussing application of discovery rule to cases involving exposure to toxic substances).
-8- As the trial court aptly noted, binding precedent from our Supreme
Court makes clear that “a final measure of damages” is not necessary for accrual of
a claim. (Page 6 Opinion and Order Granting Motions to Dismiss, attached as
Exhibit 2 to Appendix to appellant brief, citing Wolfe v. Kimmel, 681 S.W.3d 7
(Ky. 2023)). In Wolfe, a legal malpractice case, our Supreme Court overruled prior
precedent “insofar as they hold that damages are irrevocable and non-speculative
when a claimant knows the exact dollar amount in damages they incurred due to a
defendant’s negligence.” 681 S.W.3d at 25.
Our Supreme Court clarified that, henceforth, for non-litigation legal
malpractice claims, “the occurrence date limitation begins to run when negligence
and damages have both occurred.” Id. at 26. After having earlier noted that KRS
413.245 did not distinguish between legal malpractice claims and other
professional malpractice claims, id. at 25, the court further stated: “for such a
claim damages are considered irrevocable and non-speculative when the claimant
is reasonably certain that damages will indeed flow from the defendant’s
negligence.” Id. at 26.
For example, our Supreme Court held that the statute of limitation on
plaintiff Wolfe’s legal malpractice claims against defendant Kimmel began to run
on the date that another attorney advised Wolfe of Kimmel’s malpractice. Id. Our
Supreme Court further explained that Wolfe’s damages were irrevocable and non-
-9- speculative as of that date because, according to the complaint, she had already
received a cease and desist letter and had been sued, resulting in her incurring
expenses and suffering emotional distress, when the other attorney advised her to
settle the suit quickly since she would owe a lot of money due to Kimmel’s
incorrect advice. So, our Supreme Court concluded Wolfe “was therefore
reasonably certain at that time that damages would indeed flow from Kimmel’s
negligence.” Id. It further stated: “The discovery date limitation is not applicable
in this case because there are no circumstances suggesting that the cause of action
was not reasonably discoverable.” Id. Therefore, Wolfe’s action, filed eighteen
months after the other attorney advised her of Kimmel’s malpractice, was untimely
filed. Id.
Plaintiff Wolfe had argued that her legal malpractice cause of action
against Kimmel did not accrue and the statute of limitations did not start running
until she settled the lawsuit against her and thus knew the full extent of her
damages from attorney Kimmel’s malpractice. Id. at 11. Attorney Kimmel
disputed this assertion, arguing Kentucky law had never required full
ascertainment of one’s final damages before the statute of limitations started to run.
Id. at 12.
Ultimately, our Supreme Court determined that the statute began
running on Wolfe’s legal malpractice claim against Kimmel on the date the other
-10- attorney advised her of Kimmel’s malpractice rather than the date—almost a year
later—when she settled the lawsuit against her, thus ascertaining her the final
measure of her damages. See id. at 25-26.
By analogy, Dr. Arnold was similarly not entitled to wait until he
knew the full extent of his damages in defending against the criminal investigation
before filing suit. His complaint alleges this criminal investigation was prompted
by his daughters’ reporting his suspected abuse of his wife to the police following
her late March 2022 emergency room visit. And his complaint does not allege any
circumstances which prevented him from discovering his causes of action against
Appellees.
Moreover, even accepting the allegations of the complaint as true and
construing the record in the manner most favorable to him, he did not allege, in the
complaint, any wrongful conduct by any of the Appellees which occurred after late
March 2022. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing his claims against the
Appellees as barred by the statute of limitations—as we more specifically discuss
regarding Elmcroft, The Lantern, and the U of L Defendants, respectively.
No Reversible Error in Holding Claims Against Elmcroft to be Time-Barred
Elmcroft points out that the complaint alleges that the criminal
investigation stemmed from reports following Mrs. Arnold’s visit to the emergency
room during her residence at The Lantern—not from the Cabinet investigating
-11- abuse allegations stemming from Dr. Arnold’s visiting Mrs. Arnold at Elmcroft
and finding these allegations unsubstantiated. Elmcroft also points out that the
complaint itself does not provide any specific dates about the Cabinet investigation
and simply alleges Dr. Arnold did not know the full extent of his damages until the
criminal investigation concluded.
Like Elmcroft, the trial court took note of the lack of specific dates
provided in the complaint regarding the Cabinet’s investigation of allegations of
abuse at Elmcroft and construed the complaint as indicating that abuse allegations
were made during Mrs. Arnold’s residency at Elmcroft. The trial court noted that
Elmcroft stated Mrs. Arnold lived there from September 21, 2021, until December
3, 2021, in its motion to dismiss. The court also noted that Dr. Arnold did not
dispute that his wife lived at Elmcroft only during this date range in his response to
Elmcroft’s motion to dismiss.7
Dr. Arnold did not argue in his appellant brief that the trial court erred
in regarding Mrs. Arnold’s residency dates at Elmcroft as undisputed. Nor did he
file a reply brief to respond to the assertion in Elmcroft’s appellee brief that any
claims against it should have accrued, at the latest, by December 3, 2021, meaning
7 Dr. Arnold has not argued that the trial court considered any matters outside the pleadings and thereby converted the motion for dismissal to a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Netherwood v. Fifth Third Bank, Inc., 514 S.W.3d 558, 563 (Ky. App. 2017). Moreover, we decline to research or make any additional arguments for reversal on his behalf. See generally Hadley v. Citizen Deposit Bank, 186 S.W.3d 754, 759 (Ky. App. 2005).
-12- that Dr. Arnold’s lawsuit was time-barred since it was not filed within one year of
this date but was instead filed over two years after Mrs. Arnold left Elmcroft.
Instead, he has solely argued that the statute of limitations did not start
running on his claims against all Appellees because he was not fully aware of all
his damages until the criminal investigation against him concluded on December
16, 2022. Especially since he has not argued with citations to supporting legal
authority that the trial court erred in its specific discussion of how his claims
against Elmcroft were time-barred due to Mrs. Arnold’s undisputably leaving
Elmcroft in early December 2021,8 we discern no reversible error in the trial
court’s dismissing his claims against Elmcroft as time-barred.
Even accepting as true the allegations in the complaint and construing
the record in the light most favorable to Dr. Arnold, the trial court correctly
determined that Dr. Arnold failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted against Elmcroft because he could not prove any set of facts in which his
claims against Elmcroft were not time-barred given that the original complaint was
filed in mid-December 2023—two years after Mrs. Arnold left Elmcroft.
8 See generally Hadley, 186 S.W.3d at 759 (noting alleged errors may be waived by failing to argue them with appropriate citations to supporting legal authority and further stating: “It is not our function as an appellate court to research and construct a party’s legal arguments, and we decline to do so here.”).
-13- The factual allegations about Elmcroft in the complaint were that: 1)
Mrs. Arnold was diagnosed with dementia in early to mid-2021 and went to live at
Elmcroft, 2) that Dr. Arnold frequently visited her at Elmcroft, 3) that allegations
of abuse were made against Dr. Arnold during a visit with his wife at Elmcroft
resulting in a Cabinet investigation which ultimately found these allegations
unsubstantiated, and 4) that Elmcroft employees (along with the Arnolds’
daughters) “conspired to make these false accusations of abuse against Dr. Arnold”
to tarnish his reputation. (Second Amended Complaint, Paragraphs 19-23, Record
on Appeal (“R.”), p. 209.)
Next, the complaint alleged that Mrs. Arnold was transferred to The
Lantern, where allegations of abuse were made in late March 2022.
The section of the complaint entitled “Claims Against Elmcroft”
provided no other dates and generally asserted that Elmcroft had, acting through its
employees and/or agents, failed to properly investigate allegations that Mrs.
Arnold was assaulted, failed to properly obtain her medication history (including
the dates of prescriptions for medications), failed to properly examine Mrs.
Arnold’s alleged injuries, failed to properly diagnose Mrs. Arnold’s condition, and
falsely accused Dr. Arnold of physically or sexually assaulting his wife. (Second
Amended Complaint, Paragraphs 110-113, R., p. 222.) Obviously, Elmcroft was
not responsible for Mrs. Arnold’s care after she moved out, and the complaint
-14- specifically alleges in Paragraph 22 that allegations of abuse were made while Dr.
Arnold was visiting his wife at Elmcroft. (R., p. 209.) In short, all allegations
against Elmcroft plainly stem from the period when Mrs. Arnold resided at that
facility.
In sum, even accepting the allegations of the complaint as true and
reviewing the record in the light most favorable to Dr. Arnold, there are no
allegations of any misconduct by Elmcroft after Mrs. Arnold departed from
Elmcroft on December 3, 2021—much less any allegations of wrongdoing by
Elmcroft after Mrs. Arnold’s late March 2022 emergency room visit.
Therefore, the trial court properly determined that, even accepting the
allegations of the complaint as true and construing the record in Dr. Arnold’s
favor, his claims against Elmcroft had accrued by early December 2021 and Dr.
Arnold could not prove any set of facts showing that his claims against Elmcroft
were not time-barred given his failure to file suit prior to mid-December 2023.
Next, we address the dismissal of claims against The Lantern based
upon the statute of limitations.
No Reversible Error in Holding Claims Against The Lantern to be Time-Barred
Regarding The Lantern, the complaint alleged that Mrs. Arnold had
been transferred there on an unspecified date and remained there at present. The
complaint further alleged that on March 25, 2022, Dr. Arnold picked her up from
-15- The Lantern to go to lunch with family, and 2) that the Arnolds’ adult daughters
put a tracking device in Mrs. Arnold’s purse that day which led them to allege that
Dr. Arnold took Mrs. Arnold to a motel after lunch that day. The factual
allegations also stated that 1) during Dr. Arnold’s visit to see Mrs. Arnold at The
Lantern the next day (March 26, 2022), 2) the adult daughters were waiting in the
parking lot (unbeknownst to Dr. Arnold) and saw red spots on Mrs. Arnold’s arms,
face, and neck after Dr. Arnold left, 3) that the daughters made baseless allegations
to The Lantern’s staff that Dr. Arnold had physically or sexually assaulted Mrs.
Arnold, 4) that The Lantern’s staff “went along” with these allegations, and 5) that
the daughters took Mrs. Arnold to the emergency room on March 26, 2022 after
The Lantern’s staff instructed them to do so. (Second Amended Complaint,
Paragraphs 24-40, R., pp. 209-11.) The complaint further alleged that after the
daughters took Mrs. Arnold to the emergency room on March 26, 2022, the
daughters contacted police, resulting in a criminal investigation of Dr. Arnold.
The section of the complaint setting forth the claims against The
Lantern stated that The Lantern, acting through its agents and employees, had
failed to properly investigate allegations of assault, failed to obtain a thorough
medication history, failed to properly examine Mrs. Arnold’s alleged injuries,
failed to properly diagnose her condition, and falsely accused Dr. Arnold of
-16- physically or sexually assaulting Mrs. Arnold. (Paragraphs 114-17 of Second
Amended Complaint, R., pp. 222-23.)
Even accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, the complaint
did not contain any specific allegations about any misconduct by The Lantern
(acting through its agents or employees) which occurred after the March 26, 2022,
emergency room visit—especially since the complaint clearly alleges that it was
the Arnolds’ daughters, not Elmcroft, that contacted police about suspicions of
abuse. Regarding The Lantern, the complaint alleges only that The Lantern’s staff
instructed the daughters to take their mother to the emergency room when the
daughters informed The Lantern of their suspicions that Dr. Arnold had abused
and/or assaulted Mrs. Arnold.
In sum, the complaint alleged nothing about the conduct of The
Lantern (acting through its agents and employees), which occurred after The
Lantern staff allegedly advised the Arnolds’ daughters to take Mrs. Arnold to the
emergency room on March 26, 2022. We discern no reversible error in the trial
court’s determination that Dr. Arnold’s claims against The Lantern were barred
under the one-year statute of limitations since the original complaint was not filed
until December 14, 2023. Next, we address the dismissal of claims against the U
of L Defendants as time-barred.
-17- No Reversible Error in Holding Claims Against the U of L Defendants Were Time-Barred
As the U of L Defendants point out in their brief, the complaint
alleges that it was the Arnold daughters, not the U of L Defendants, who contacted
police following Mrs. Arnold’s visit to the emergency room on March 26, 2022.
And the complaint does not specifically allege any wrongful conduct by the U of L
Defendants after this March 26, 2022, emergency room visit. Instead, the factual
allegations regarding the U of L Defendants simply state that U of L staff “went
along with the false allegations made against Dr. Arnold” by the Arnolds’
daughters, and that Mrs. Arnold was seen in the emergency room on March 26,
2022, and examined by Drs. Baker and Bayers and Nurse Moran, who all allegedly
wrongfully, mistakenly and/or falsely “determined that Betty Arnold had been
physically and sexually abused by Dr. Arnold.” (Second Amended Complaint,
Paragraphs 41-48, R., pp. 211-12.) The complaint also specifically alleged that Dr.
Baker, Dr. Bayers, and Nurse Moran’s diagnoses “lacked any basis in fact” and
were “utterly false and untrue” and fell below the acceptable standard of care for a
doctor or nurse acting under the same or similar circumstances. (Second Amended
Complaint, Paragraphs 43, 45, 48, R., p. 212.)
The complaint further alleged that each of the individual U of L
Defendants (Drs. Baker and Bayers and Nurse Moran) had failed to properly
investigate allegations of assault, failed to obtain a thorough medication history
-18- with dates of prescriptions, failed to properly examine Mrs. Arnold’s alleged
injuries, and failed to properly diagnose her condition. And it asserted that when
allegations of physical or sexual abuse had been raised, medical professionals
should foresee that failure to properly investigate or get a thorough medication
history as well as failure to properly examine and diagnose the patient could result
in dire consequences for the person accused of assaulting the patient. (Second
Amended Complaint, Paragraphs 98-109, R., pp. 220-22.) Moreover, it asserted
that U of L Health was liable for these individual defendants’ alleged actions
pursuant to the principle of respondeat superior, which is “[t]he doctrine holding
an employer or principal liable for the employee’s or agent’s wrongful acts
committed within the scope of the employment or agency.” Respondeat Superior,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). But the complaint does not allege that
any of the U of L Defendants had any contact with Dr. or Mrs. Arnold or engaged
in any misconduct after the March 26, 2022, emergency room visit.
In sum, like the allegations of the complaint against Elmcroft and The
Lantern, the complaint did not allege any conduct by the U of L defendants which
occurred after Mrs. Arnold’s March 26, 2022, emergency room visit. Thus, we
discern no reversible error in the trial court’s concluding that to the extent the
complaint may have stated claims against these defendants for malpractice or
personal injury or defamation, see KRS 413.140, such claims were time-barred
-19- since the original complaint was not filed until December 14, 2023, and therefore,
Dr. Arnold failed to state claims for which relief could be granted.
Further arguments raised in the briefs which are not discussed herein
have been determined to lack merit or relevancy to our resolution of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE THE LANTERN: Liddell Vaughn Louisville, Kentucky Paul A. Dzenitis Emily W. Newman Tomsen F. Leonard Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE ELMCROFT:
Jennifer M. Barbour M. Katherine Ison Louisville Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES U OF L DEFENDANTS:
Joseph A. Wright Louisville, Kentucky
-20-