1 2 3 4
5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 ROBERT ALLEN REED et al., CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05228-DGE 11 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING 12 v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND 13 COMMUNITY HEALTH CARE et al., AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR STATE LAW DAMAGES (DKT. 14 Defendants. NO. 31) 15
16 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 31) 17 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 20). Plaintiffs filed a response to Defendants’ 18 motion on August 5, 2025. (Dkt. No. 33.) Defendants filed a reply on August 13, 2025. (Dkt. 19 No. 34.) Upon thorough review of the briefing provided by the Parties, the Court GRANTS 20 Defendants’ motion and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ claims. 21 I PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 22 This case arises out of a messy procedural history. Plaintiffs Robert Allen Reed (“Mr. 23 Reed”) and Trenna Cenise Reed (“Ms. Reed”) filed a complaint in federal court (“Reed 1”) 24 1 against Defendants Community Health Care (“CHC”) and Dr. Janelle1 Harro (“Harro”) on 2 March 31, 2025. (Dkt. No. 5.) Plaintiffs filed a separate complaint against Defendants in state 3 court (“Reed 2”) that was ordered removed; on June 10, 2025, the cases were consolidated. 4 (Dkt. No. 18.)
5 After consolidation, Plaintiffs filed a new complaint entitled “Second Amended 6 Complaint for state law damages.” (Dkt. No. 20.) Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint for 7 state law damages asserts eleven causes of action. (Dkt. No. 20.) The first cause of action 8 asserted is common law fraud for “knowingly falsif[ying] medical records” after a February 13, 9 2025, litigation hold. (Id. at 11.) The second cause of action asserted is for spoilation and record 10 falsification. (Id. at 11–12.) Plaintiffs’ third cause of action asserts violations of the Washington 11 Consumer Protection Act, Washington Revised Code § 19.86, for falsely billing for a non- 12 existent urine test, billing under improper Medicaid classifications, and falsifying lab tests and 13 vaccine administrations. (Id. at 12–13.) Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action asserts denial of 14 medical access under Washington Revised Code § 70.02. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of
15 action asserts defamation per se, based on Harro’s communications to the Washington State 16 Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) that were later referenced in 17 communications with law enforcement. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action asserts 18 reckless misrepresentation and abuse of position for Harro’s allegations of abuse by Mr. Reed 19 toward his children. (Id. at 16–17.) Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action asserts obstruction and 20 record fraud under Washington Revised Code § 70.02.170. (Id. at 17.) Plaintiffs’ eighth cause 21 of action asserts a right to a forensic audit of CHC’s records for post-litigation tampering and 22 concealment. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action asserts an intentional infliction of 23
1 Dr. Harro’s name is spelled both Janelle and Janell in briefings. 24 1 emotional distress claim. (Id. at 18–19.) Plaintiffs’ tenth cause of action asserts corporate 2 mismanagement and breach of administrative duties. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiffs’ eleventh cause of 3 action asserts abuse of process by CHC. (Id. at 20.) Plaintiffs asserted this new complaint “does 4 not supersede or amend” their pending federal civil rights complaint. (Id. at 1.)
5 Mr. Reed also filed an additional complaint entitled “First Amended Complaint for 6 Damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” suing new Defendants Antonio Edwards, Ross Hiranaga, and 7 Cristina Tzintzun. (Dkt. No. 24.)2 Mr. Reed’s allegations include a claim Edwards retaliated 8 against him for declining entry by writing a false report, a claim Hiranaga and Tzintzun 9 unlawfully disseminated photographs of his daughter without legal or medical basis, and a claim 10 all three improperly identified him as a danger to staff on a DCYF watchlist. (Id.) Mr. Reed 11 asserted this complaint “supersedes only the [original] civil rights complaint” but not the Second 12 Amended Complaint for state law damages. (Id. at 1.) 13 The Court held a status conference with Parties on July 10, 2025 to address the fact the 14 case had two operative complaints. (Dkt. No. 29.) The Court instructed Defendants to respond
15 to Plaintiffs’ complaint for state law damages first while noting eventually this matter would 16 need to have only one operative complaint. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 17 complaint for state law damages on all counts. (Dkt. No. 31.) 18 II JURISDICTION 19 Plaintiffs first assert this Court has no jurisdiction over their Second Amended Complaint 20 for state law damages. (Dkt. No. 33.) Plaintiffs cite Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 21 604 U.S. 22 (2025) for the proposition “once a plaintiff’s operative complaint no longer asserts 22 any federal-law claims, a federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction and must remand any 23
2 Ms. Reed is not a plaintiff in this complaint. 24 1 remaining state-law claims.” (Id. at 1.) Plaintiffs, however, misapply Royal Canin. Plaintiffs’ 2 case is not one where there are only state-law claims. 3 Instead, Harro is a “public health service employee” under 42 U.S.C. § 233 and was 4 acting as an employee of the United States of America during the alleged incidents. This statute
5 therefore is what gives this Court the right, and in fact the obligation, to hear this case. See 42 6 US.C. § 233(c) (“Upon a certification by the Attorney General that the defendant was acting in 7 the scope of his employment at the time of the incident out of which the suit arose, any such civil 8 action or proceeding commenced in a State court shall be removed without bond at any time 9 before trial by the Attorney General to the district court of the United States of the district and 10 division embracing the place where it is pending.”). 11 Plaintiffs cite a “decision” that does not exist, “Flores v. United States, 189 F.3d 477, 481 12 (9th Cir. 1999),” for the proposition § 233 does not create independent federal jurisdiction. (Dkt. 13 No. 33 at 4.) Plaintiffs have a significant pattern of using fictitious cases and have previously 14 been warned this misconduct can and will lead to sanctions. (See Dt. No. 18 at 4, n.4.) In fact,
15 this is not the first time Plaintiffs have had an issue with this very citation. Plaintiffs previously 16 informed the Court that this case, while allegedly not fictitious, is irrelevant. (Reed et al. v. 17 United States of America, 3:25-cv-05435-DGE, Dkt. No. 27 at 2.) 18 It is undisputed, therefore, that Plaintiffs provide no support for their claim § 233 does 19 not create independent federal jurisdiction. More importantly, Plaintiffs’ assertion is inconsistent 20 with the plain text of § 233. 42 U.S.C. § 233(c) authorizes removal upon certification that “the 21 defendant was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the incident out of which the 22 suit arose.” Defendants provided this certification. (Dkt. No. 18 at 4.) Accordingly, Royal 23 Canin is inapplicable. This Court has jurisdiction under § 233.
24 1 Plaintiffs also request, in the alternative, the Court sever their fifth, sixth, ninth, and 2 eleventh claims. (Dkt. No. 33 at 4–5.) Plaintiffs cite two decisions that do not exist, “Abbey v. 3 United States, 953 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1991),” and “Urrutia, 44 F.3d at 1265,” for the 4 proposition 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) requires remand of these counts. (Id.) Plaintiffs provide no
5 other support for this proposition. It is thus clear severance and remand of certain claims is not 6 required. This Court can exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ entire Second Amended Complaint 7 for state law damages and all related motions. 8 III FACTUAL BACKGROUND 9 Mr. Reed is the father of I.R. as well as three other minor children. (Dkt. No. 20 at 4, 6.) 10 Ms. Reed resides with Mr. Reed.3 (Id. at 5.) Harro is a licensed physician who was employed 11 by CHC during the relevant period. (Id.) The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ Second 12 Amended Complaint for state law damages (Dkt. No. 20) and are accepted as true for the 13 purposes of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 14 a. CHC’s Provision of Medical Services
15 This dispute originates from I.R.’s January 5, 2023 doctor visit with Harro at CHC. (Id.) 16 Harro saw I.R. for a rash in the gluteal region. (Id.) Harro described the rash as being 17 “nonspecific” and “not appearing infectious.” (Id.) The visit was not a child abuse evaluation: 18 Plaintiffs assert it was billed as a routine office visit and neither Harro nor anyone else at CHC 19 included any abuse-related documentation. (Id. at 5–6.) Harro, however, identified evidence of 20 21
22 3 Ms. Reed “brings this action solely for injuries she personally sustained. She is not asserting claims on behalf of any other party.” (Dkt. No. 20 at 5.) While it remains unclear if Ms. Reed 23 has standing, the Court declines further analysis as all claims by all Plaintiffs have been dismissed. 24 1 “nonaccidental trauma.” (Id. at 5.) Harro further noted a “prior history of physical abuse of 2 children (via burns) by father.” (Id. at 6.) 3 Plaintiffs assert Harro did not communicate with Mr. Reed or seek his informed consent. 4 (Id.) Harro made referrals to Mary Bridge Children’s Hospital and DCYF with references to Mr.
5 Reed’s history of “burning the children.” (Id.) Plaintiffs assert Harro made these claims based 6 only on the hearsay of Mr. Reed’s ex-wife and I.R.’s mother, Melissa Reed. (Id.) According to 7 Plaintiffs, Harro’s comments were inconsistent with both prior records and her communication 8 with the child. (Id.) 9 As a result of Harro’s communications, I.R.’s case was escalated through DCYF. (Id. at 10 6–7.) CHC alleges Harro spoke to DCYF caseworker Cristina Tzintzun by phone on January 10, 11 2023. (Id. at 7.) However, Plaintiffs assert there is no record of this call on DCYF’s call logs. 12 (Id.) On January 10, 2023, Tzintzun emailed law enforcement offering to send a photograph of 13 I.R.’s genital area. (Id. at 6–7.) Plaintiffs assert there had been no disclosure of sexual abuse or 14 a documented law enforcement referral at this point. (Id. at 7.) On January 16, 2023, Plaintiffs
15 assert Mary Bridge Children’s Hospital cleared Mr. Reed of child abuse concerns. (Id. at 6.) 16 CHC did not note this clearance in I.R.’s chart. (Id. at 7.) On January 19, 2023, the Federal Way 17 Police Department opened an investigation into Mr. Reed. (Id.) 18 Mr. Reed also asserts he received several other inconsistent medical records from CHC. 19 For example, on November 27, 2023, CHC reported they had collected a urine sample from 20 another one of his children, N.R., despite the fact Mr. Reed was with the child that day and had 21 not taken the child for a visit. (Id. at 9.) Additionally, on February 27, 2024, LabCorp provided 22 23
24 1 N.R.’s blood test results.4 (Id.) However, Plaintiffs assert CHC’s records showed no evidence a 2 blood draw occurred. (Id.) Finally, on March 13, 2025, CHC reported I.R. received an E. coli 3 swab. (Id.) However, LabCorp records identify this collection as occurring on March 14, 2025. 4 (Id.)
5 Plaintiffs also assert CHC also incorrectly billed I.R. and N.R.’s visits. CHC used 6 diagnostic billing codes associated with the “Blind and Disabled” Medicaid classification 7 although neither child qualified for such a classification. (Id. at 10.) 8 b. CHC’s Provision of Medical Records 9 On February 13, 2025, Mr. Reed informed CHC of his intent to sue for defamation, 10 HIPAA violations, and medical record tampering. (Id. at 7.) CHC acknowledged receipt of the 11 potential claim on February 18, 2025. (Id.) However, Plaintiffs assert on February 20, 2025, 12 CHC staff generated new vaccine administration entries and revised lab history reports for I.R. 13 and N.R. (Id. at 8.) These new entries lack standard NextGen electronic health record (“EHR”) 14 watermarks. (Id.) The last known person to touch I.R.’s records was Mary Moore (“Moore”) on
15 February 20, 2025 at 5:25 in the evening. (Id.) Plaintiffs assert CHC has refused to provide a 16 complete audit trail. (Id.) 17 Then, on March 11, 2025, CHC attorneys communicated that all records had been 18 produced to Mr. Reed. (Id.) The following day, on March 12, 2025, Moore stated Provider 19 Treatment Agreements (“PTA”) for the children had been dropped from the “original email.” 20 (Id.) However, Mr. Reed received records by certified mail, not via email. (Id.) The next day, 21 on March 13, 2025, Moore followed up and stated she had “forgotten to include” the PTAs in the 22
4 Plaintiffs do not allege the specific relationship between LabCorp and CHC. However, 23 LabCorp appears to be the company responsible for running the laboratory tests CHC orders. (Dkt. No. 20 at 9.) 24 1 original email. (Id.) Plaintiffs assert the metadata for these PTA documents identified the 2 documents as being created on March 13, 2025 using Adobe Distiller. (Id. at 9.) These 3 documents also lacked EHR watermarks and were absent from the audit log. (Id.) Additionally, 4 both documents were dated January 10, 2023 despite one having headers and footers labelled
5 January 5, 2023. (Id. at 8.) 6 Finally, on April 8, 2025, CHC attorneys directed all legal communications to the U.S. 7 Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). (Id. at 10.) HHS attorneys stated they had 8 not yet assumed representation or taken a position on the claims. (Id.) However, on April 28, 9 2025, CHC attorneys stated they would not produce the audit logs. (Id.) 10 IV DISCUSSION 11 A. Legal Framework 12 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint for state law 13 damages (Dkt. No. 20) for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 31.) “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does
15 not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his 16 entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a 17 cause of action’s elements will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) 18 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, “only a complaint that states a plausible 19 claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 20 (2009). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 21 possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader 22 is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2)); see also id. at 678–79 23 (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime
24 1 of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing 2 more than conclusions.”). 3 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept as true all well- 4 pleaded factual allegations and construe the allegations in favor of the non-moving party. See
5 Wood v. City of San Diego, 678 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012). However, “the tenet that a 6 court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal 7 conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Complaints filed pro se are “to be liberally construed”; “a 8 pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 9 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. 10 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) 11 (“Iqbal incorporated the Twombly pleading standard and Twombly did not alter courts’ treatment 12 of pro se filings; accordingly, we continue to construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating 13 them under Iqbal.”). “Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect, [] a 14 pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend
15 prior to dismissal of the action.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 16 1995). However, leave to amend is properly denied if amendment would be futile. See Ventress 17 v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2010); Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 18 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002). 19 B. Analysis 20 a. Plaintiffs’ first cause of action asserting common law fraud does not show the 21 required elements. 22 Plaintiffs’ first cause of action alleges common law fraud by Defendants for “knowingly 23 falsif[ying] medical records.” (Dkt. No. 20 at 11.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege Defendants
24 1 modified documents on March 13, 2025 to make them appear as if they were created in January 2 and February 2023. (Id.) 3 Common law fraud requires nine elements: (1) misrepresentation of an existing fact, (2) 4 materiality of the representation, (3) falsity of the representation, (4) the speaker’s knowledge of
5 the falsity, (5) the speaker’s intent that the information be acted upon by the plaintiff, (6) 6 plaintiff’s ignorance of the falsity, (7) plaintiff’s reliance on the truth of the representation, (8) 7 plaintiff’s right to rely on the truth of the representation, and (9) damages. BP West Coast 8 Products LLC v SKR Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1119–1120 (W.D. Wash. 2013). Plaintiffs fail 9 to show they were ignorant of the falsities or relied on any misrepresentation. Plaintiffs make 10 only the conclusory statement they “did rely on these documents and were misled to their 11 detriment.” (Dkt. No. 20 at 11.) But Plaintiffs do not identify any alleged facts showing how 12 they were misled. There is no allegation at any point they were not aware of the alleged 13 inconsistencies with the metadata and inconsistent dates on the PTA documents. (Id.) 14 Plaintiffs also fails to identify how they suffered damages. In conclusory fashion,
15 Plaintiffs assert that the alleged falsified documents “caused reputational harm, obstructed access 16 to care, and impaired Plaintiffs’ ability to advocate for their family’s medical and legal rights.” 17 (Id.) But no facts are alleged to support these conclusory assertions. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ 18 first cause of action is dismissed without prejudice. 19 b. Plaintiffs’ second cause of action asserting spoliation and record falsification fails 20 because spoliation is not an independent cause of action under Washington law. 21 Plaintiffs’ second cause of action asserts a claim for spoliation and record falsification 22 alleging Defendants “intentionally falsified records using Adobe Distiller to generate fraudulent 23 ‘Provider Treatment Agreement’ (PTA) documents.” (Dkt. No. 20 at 12.) This cause of action
24 1 fails as a matter of law because Washington does not recognize an independent cause of action 2 for spoliation. See Gordon v. Dep’t of Social & Health Servs., No. CV-09-05069RBL, 2010 WL 3 11685266, at *9 –10 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 2010); Roe v. City of Spokane, No. CV-06-0357- 4 FVS, 2008 WL 2705142, at *11 (W.D. Wash. July 9, 2008). Plaintiffs themselves concede
5 “Washington does not recognize an independent tort for spoliation” and request only 6 “appropriate evidentiary sanctions, adverse inferences, and damages under the applicable state- 7 law theories.” (Dkt. No. 20 at 12.) These requests for punitive remedies are improper in a 8 complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ second cause of action is dismissed with prejudice. 9 c. Plaintiffs’ third cause of action fails to state a cognizable claim under the 10 Washington Consumer Protection Act. 11 Plaintiffs assert a cause of action under the Washington Consumer Protection Act 12 (WCPA) for improper billing. (Id. at 12–13.) Plaintiffs cite “State v. Kaiser, 198 Wn. App. 142 13 (2017)” for the proposition “a violation of [Washington Revised Code § 74.09.210] constitutes a 14 per se unfair or deceptive act under the Consumer Protection Act.” (Id.) This case does not
15 exist. 16 The proper requirement under the WCPA requires a plaintiff to assert a prima facie case 17 showing: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) occurring in trade or commerce, (3) public 18 interest impact, (4) injury to their business or property, and (5) causation. Ambach v. French, 19 216 P.3d 405, 407 (Wash. 2009) (en banc). Plaintiffs fail to show injury to their business or 20 property. To the extent Plaintiffs allege any type of injury, it is personal injury. (See Dkt. No. 21 20 at 13.) Personal injury damages are not compensable damages under the Washington 22 Consumer Protection Act and do not constitute injury to business or property. Ambach, 216 P.3d 23 at 408. Nothing in Plaintiffs’ briefing alleges any damages other than personal injury damages.
24 1 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ third cause of action for a violation of the Washington Consumer 2 Protection Act is dismissed without prejudice. 3 d. Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action fails to state a claim under Washington Revised 4 Code § 70.02.
5 Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action asserts a claim under Uniform Health Care Information 6 Act for “delay[ing] or [refus]ing access to medical records in a calculated effort to obscure 7 liability, mislead regulators, and hinder timely correction of patient files.” (Dkt. No. 20 at 13– 8 14.) Washington Revised Code § 70.02.080 identifies the requirements for providers who 9 receive a written request from a patient to examine or copy their health care information. It 10 appears Plaintiffs submitted a written request and Defendants allegedly denied at least their 11 request for access to audit logs. (Dkt. No. 20 at 10.) 12 Even assuming Plaintiffs submitted a proper request and Defendants denied access to 13 information covered by the Uniform Health Care Information Act, Plaintiffs fail to show 14 Defendants violated the law. Washington Revised Code § 70.02.090 permits health care
15 providers to deny access to health care information if “the health care provider reasonably 16 concludes” the knowledge would “be injurious to the health of the patient,” “could reasonably be 17 expected to” violate patient confidentiality rules, “could reasonably be expected to cause danger 18 to the life or safety of any individual,” “was compiled and is used solely for litigation, quality 19 assurance, peer review, or administrative purposes,” or is “otherwise prohibited by law.” Wash. 20 Rev. Code. § 70.02.090(1). Only where the information “would be injurious to the health of the 21 patient” or “could reasonably be expected to cause danger to the life or safety of any individual,” 22 must the provider take additional steps: namely, “permit[ting] examination and copying of the 23 record by another health care provider” and “inform[ing] the patient of the patient’s right to
24 1 select another health care provider.” Wash. Rev. Code. § 70.02.090(3). Because Plaintiffs do 2 not assert with any specificity under what provision of the statute they were denied access and 3 what errors they believe Defendants made, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action. 4 The Court must liberally construe Plaintiffs’ complaint, but it may not allege information not
5 provided by the Plaintiffs. 6 Moreover, Plaintiffs’ claim also fails because the purpose of Washington Revised Code 7 § 70.02 writ large is to “serve the interests of the patient, not the patient’s representative.” Neel 8 v. Luther Child Center, 989 P.2d 600, 603 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). A hospital that fails to 9 comply with Washington Revised Code § 70.02.080 owes no duty to provide documents if a 10 nonpatient requesting the documents is only doing so for their own interests. Id. Parents seeking 11 to defend themselves against allegations of child abuse are acting only in their own interest and 12 not of their child. Id. Plaintiffs here concede they were seeking the children’s medical records 13 to “respond to prior false allegations and clarify the medical record.” (Dkt. No. 20 at 14.) 14 Plaintiffs make no allegations these attempts were to make informed decisions about their
15 children’s health care. Even if Plaintiffs asserted plausible errors by Defendants, this would bar 16 recovery. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action is dismissed without prejudice. 17 e. Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action for defamation per se is dismissed because the 18 only remedy for the alleged misconduct is through the FTCA. 19 Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action asserts a per se defamation claim against Harro for her 20 communications about Mr. Reed submitted to Tzintzun and eventually the Federal Way Police 21 Department. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiffs cite two cases to support their claim: “Right v. Breen, 128 22 Wn. App. 104 (2005)” and Caruso v. Local Union No. 690, 107 Wn.2d 524, 529 (1987). (Id. at 23 16.) “Right v. Breen” does not exist. And while Caruso does identify the four elements of
24 1 defamation (falsity, an unprivileged communication, fault, and damages), it does not address a 2 claim for defamation per se. 3 Ultimately, however, the standard for defamation per se is irrelevant. The FTCA is 4 “exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by reason of the same subject-matter against
5 the officer or employer (or his estate) whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” 42 U.S.C. 6 § 233(a). The FTCA is the exclusive remedy for actions “aris[ing] out of the defendant’s 7 performance of” medical functions, even if the specific misconduct did not occur “during the 8 provision of services.” Friedenberg v. Lane County, 68 F.4th 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2023). A 9 claim for defamation is not permitted under the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); Kaiser v. Blue 10 Cross of California, 347 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2003). 11 Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, Harro’s communications relating to Mr. Reed 12 arise out of her performance of her medical functions and a defamation claim based on such 13 conduct is barred by the FTCA. (Dkt. No. 31 at 8–9.) Washington law requires medical 14 practitioners with “reasonable cause to believe that a child has suffered abuse or neglect” to
15 report such incident. Wash. Rev. Code. § 26.44.030.5 The Ninth Circuit cited Teresa T. v. 16 Ragaglia, 154 F. Supp. 2d 290, 293, 300 (D. Conn. Jul. 16, 2001) for the proposition that a 17 “doctor’s failure to report [] suspected child abuse was a ‘related function’ to the provision of 18 medical services” because “the duty to report was ‘triggered’ during a medical examination of 19 the child.” Friedenberg, 68 F.4th at 1129. The same would be true in reverse: a medical 20
21 5 Plaintiffs allege CHC did not make a “mandated report under [Washington Revised Code § 26.44.030] but rather a discretionary referral used for an ulterior purpose.” (Dkt. No. 20 at 20.) 22 However, Plaintiffs appear to limit this claim only to CHC and not Harro specifically as they limit this claim to their discussion under count eleven and do not discuss it under counts five or 23 six. Moreover, this is a conclusory allegation without any factual basis identified as support for such allegation. 24 1 professional’s decision to report also arises out of their status as a medical professional. 2 Plaintiffs’ suit is therefore required to be brought as an FTCA suit, which bars claims for 3 defamation. 4 Plaintiffs’ defamation claim is dismissed with prejudice.
5 f. Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action for reckless misrepresentation and abuse of 6 position is also barred by the FTCA. 7 Plaintiffs’ sixth claim asserts reckless misrepresentation and abuse of position for Harro’s 8 “intentional misrepresentations and reckless escalation of child abuse allegations.” (Dkt. No. 20 9 at 16.) Plaintiffs try to separate this claim from “medical malpractice or standard-of-care 10 deviation” claims. (Id. at 17.) Plaintiffs’ efforts are unsuccessful. For the reasons discussed 11 dismissing Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action, Harro’s action arose out of her duty as a medical 12 professional. The FTCA is Plaintiffs’ only remedy and any claims based on misrepresentation 13 are barred. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action is dismissed with 14 prejudice.
15 g. Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action alleging obstruction and record fraud fails to 16 state a claim under Washington Revised Code § 70.02.170. 17 Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action asserts obstruction and record fraud in violation of 18 Washington Revised Code § 70.02.170 for “intentionally obstructing Plaintiffs’ lawful right to 19 access medical records.” (Dkt. No. 20 at 17.) § 70.02.170 only provides civil remedies for 20 violations of the Washington Uniform Health Care Information Act. This is not in and of itself 21 an independent cause of action. Rather, Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action is simply a 22 restatement of Plaintiffs’ fourth of cause of action. (Id. at 13–14.) Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of 23
24 1 action has been dismissed. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of actions is dismissed with 2 prejudice as duplicative. 3 h. Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action demanding a forensic audit and evidence 4 preservation is an improper spoliation claim.
5 Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action requests “the Court order a forensic audit of CHC’s 6 Electronic Health Records (EHR) system.” (Id. at 18.) This is best construed as Plaintiffs’ 7 requested remedy for their allegations of spoliation asserted in their second cause of action. 8 However, spoliation is not an independent cause of action, and this cause of action is not 9 cognizable. It is at most a request that can be made in the litigation process, not a claim on its 10 own. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action for an audit request is dismissed with 11 prejudice. 12 i. Plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action fails to show the required elements for an 13 intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 14 Plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)
15 from Defendants’ “falsification of medical records, knowingly false reports of child abuse, 16 concealment of exculpatory findings, and obstruction of parental access.” (Id. at 18.) Even 17 assuming these allegations are not arising out of Harro’s status as a medical professional and 18 required to be brought under the FCTA, the claim is unsuccessful. 19 Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, 20 (2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3) actual result to plaintiff of 21 severe emotional distress. Trujillo v. Northwest Trustee Services, Inc., 355 P.3d 1100, 1110 22 (Wash. 2015). This Court has previously held making a false report to police or social 23 workers—even when it leads to children being removed from the home—is not extreme and
24 1 outrageous conduct as required to constitute an IIED claim. Bergman v. Moto, No. 22-cv-00161- 2 RAJ, 2023 WL 4297656, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 30, 2023) ( “falsely reporting sexual assault” to 3 law enforcement, even with malicious intent, did not support claim for intentional infliction of 4 emotional distress); Monaco v. Locke, No. C05-178Z, 2006 WL 851249, at *5 (W.D. Wash.
5 Mar. 31, 2006) (intentional infliction of emotion distress claim dismissed where maternal 6 grandparents alleged social worker improperly relied on unfounded claims of abuse and neglect 7 to deny placement of children with grandparents). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action 8 for intentional infliction of emotional distress is dismissed without prejudice. 9 j. Plaintiffs’ tenth cause of action fails to state a cognizable claim for corporate 10 mismanagement and breach of administration duties. 11 Plaintiffs’ tenth claim asserts a cause of action for corporate mismanagement and breach 12 of administrative duties. (Dkt. No. 20 at 19.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege CHC “permit[ed] 13 non-clinical personnel . . . to generate medical documents that were backdated and untraceable 14 via audit log,” “fail[ed] to preserve electronic health records” despite “receipt of a legal notice,”
15 “allow[ed] legal counsel to certify record completeness on March 11, 2025, despite internal 16 knowledge of omitted or altered files,” and “obstruct[ed] access to GAP insurance contacts and 17 audit logs.” (Id. at 19–20.) 18 Even assuming these allegations do not arise out of CHC’s status as a public health 19 service employee, the claim fails as a matter of law.6 “A cause of action for mismanagement 20 belongs to the corporation. Shareholders and creditors can bring a suit for mismanagement only 21 derivatively, on behalf of the corporation.” Biltmore Associates, LLC v. Twin City Fires Ins. Co., 22
23 6 There is also a separate issue that Plaintiffs do not assert who at CHC permitted this alleged misconduct. 24 1 572 F.3d 663, 669 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs are suing on their own behalf, not on behalf of any 2 corporation. 3 Moreover, Plaintiffs had no right to medical records in this case. Plaintiffs sought 4 medical records to “respond to prior false allegations and clarify the medical record” (Dkt. No.
5 20 at 14), which means there was no obligation to provide their children’s medical records to 6 them. See Neel, 989 P.2d at 603. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ tenth cause of action for corporate 7 mismanagement and breach of administrative duties is dismissed with prejudice. 8 k. Plaintiffs’ eleventh cause of action fails to state a cognizable claim for abuse of 9 process. 10 Plaintiffs’ eleventh claim asserts abuse of process by CHC for “misus[ing] the child 11 protection reporting process to retaliate against [Mr. Reed] following his protected legal actions.” 12 (Dkt. No. 20 at 20.) Plaintiffs allege the report was not a “mandated report under [Washington 13 Revised Code § 26.44.030] but rather a discretionary referral used for an ulterior purpose.” (Id.) 14 Plaintiffs further allege this referral “relied solely on hearsay” and “was contradicted by
15 subsequent findings from Mary Bridge Children’s Hospital.” (Id.) Plaintiffs cite Gem Trading 16 Co. v. Cudahy Corp., 603 P.2d 828 (Wash. 1979) for the proposition this “use of state 17 authority . . . absent clinical basis or urgent concern” constitutes abuse of process. (Id.) 18 But an abuse of process claim requires the abuse of judicial process. See Gem 19 Trading¸603 P.2d at 832 n.2 (“In abuse of process cases, the crucial inquiry is whether the 20 judicial system's process, made available to insure the presence of the defendant or his property 21 in court, has been misused to achieve another, inappropriate end.”); Anderson v. City of Bellevue, 22 Anderson v. City of Bellevue, 862 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1109 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (identifying the 23 requirements for an abuse of process claim as being (1) the existence of an ulterior purpose to
24 1 accomplish an object not within the proper scope of the process and (2) an act in the use of legal 2 process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings). Plaintiffs provide no factual 3 allegation identifying any individual at CHC who could have had an ulterior purpose. Plaintiffs 4 also provide no facts alleging an abuse of judicial process. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ eleventh
5 cause of action for abuse of process is dismissed without prejudice. 6 V LEAVE TO AMEND 7 For any claims not dismissed with prejudice in this order, Plaintiffs are granted leave to 8 amend to attempt to cure the deficiencies identified in this order. To clean up the docket and 9 ensure there is only one operative complaint, the new amended complaint shall include ALL 10 remaining claims (except those dismissed with prejudice) Plaintiffs seek to assert against 11 Community Health Care and Dr. Janelle Harro, which pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 233(c) shall be 12 deemed a tort action brought against the United States if resulting from the performance of 13 medical or related functions. 14 The new amended complaint shall be filed no later than November 4, 2025. The failure
15 to file a new amended complaint by such date that addresses the deficiencies identified in this 16 order will result in the dismissal of this matter without further leave to amend (or dismissal of 17 particular claims without further leave to amend). Upon filing the new amended complaint, 18 Defendants may file a new motion to dismiss if they believe it appropriate. 19 VI PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES UNDER 42 20 U.S.C. § 1983 (DKT. NO. 24) IS DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE 21 On July 2, 2025, Plaintiff Mr. Reed filed a “First Amended Complaint for Damages 22 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” naming three Washington State child welfare officials. (Dkt. No. 24.) 23 The claims arise out of these officials’ investigation of possible child abuse by Mr. Reed.
24 1 Plaintiffs’ first cause of action, “First Amendment Retaliation,” is based on Edwards retaliating 2 against Plaintiff “by fabricating a false report” after Mr. Reed “assert[ed] his Fourth Amendment 3 rights and declin[ed] [a] warrantless entry” on January 7, 2023. (Id. at 3–4, 6-7.) Plaintiff’s 4 second cause of action, “Fourteenth Amendment Violations: Privacy and Familial Integrity,” is
5 based on allegedly unlawful “disseminat[ion] of explicit images of [Mr. Reed’s] daughter 6 without a medical or legal basis.” (Id. at 4–7.) The third cause of action, “Procedural Due 7 Process / ‘Stigma Plus,’” is based on Mr. Reed being placed “on a DCYF watchlist as a danger to 8 staff based on false allegations.” (Id. at 7–8.) 9 This additional complaint was filed after consolidation (Dkt. No. 18) and without leave to 10 amend. Moreover, the claims asserted are distinct and arise out of separate facts from the claims 11 previously asserted against Community Health Care and Dr. Janelle Harro. The Court finds no 12 basis to allow the claims against the state officials to be joined in this litigation. Accordingly, 13 Mr. Reed’s “First Amended Complaint for Damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” (Dkt. No. 24) is 14 STRICKEN and the claims asserted therein are DISMISSED without prejudice. To the extent
15 Mr. Reed seeks to assert claims against these three state officials, Mr. Reed is required to initiate 16 a separate lawsuit. 17 VII ORDER 18 Accordingly, and having considered Defendants’ motion, the briefing of the parties, and 19 the remainder of the record, the Court finds and ORDERS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss 20 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 31) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are granted leave 21 to amend as identified in Section VI supra. 22 Plaintiff Mr. Reed’s complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. No. 24) is STRICKEN and 23 DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to seek leave to amend and as involving distinct issues
24 1 from the present case. Mr. Reed may file separate litigation against those defendants as 2 identified in Section VII supra. 3 Lastly, to address Plaintiffs’ continued use of fictitious case law, Plaintiffs shall include 4 on the last page of all future filings made in this case a signed certification that states: “I have
5 reviewed each court decision cited in this filing. I certify that each decision cited is a valid 6 decision that does exist.” Any pleading Plaintiffs file that cites a court decision but does not 7 include this certification will be STRICKEN and not considered. 8 If Plaintiffs continue to cite to fictitious caselaw in any future pleadings, the Court will 9 issue an order to show cause why this matter should not be dismissed as a sanction for seeking to 10 mislead the Court. 11 Dated this 14th day of October, 2025. 12 a 13 David G. Estudillo 14 United States District Judge
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24