Roberky Berancourt Molina v. Warden, Glades County Detention Center, U.S. Attorney General

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

ROBERKY BERANCOURT

MOLINA, Case No. 2:26-cv-2009-KCD-KRH

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN, GLADES COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondents, /

ORDER Petitioner Roberky Berancourt Molina is a non-citizen currently detained by immigration authorities. He has filed a habeas corpus petition (Doc. 1) and four emergency motions (Docs. 3, 4, 5, 6).1 Boiled down, he seeks a temporary restraining order preventing the Government from removing him from the United States and his immediate release. (Id.) To obtain a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, the movant must establish: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that entry of the relief would serve the public

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations. interest.” Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005). Immediate injunctive relief is an “extraordinary and drastic

remedy, and [the movant] bears the burden of persuasion to clearly establish all four of these prerequisites.” Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2016). A. Removal

Molina’s underlying habeas petition raises several substantive claims. But having a meritorious claim is not alone enough for a TRO—you must also seek a remedy that the Court can give. See, e.g., Sekona v. Perez, No. 1:19- CV-00400-JLT-HBK, 2025 WL 2140093, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2025) (“The

injunctive relief an applicant requests must relate to the claims brought in the complaint.”). The fundamental stumbling block here is the relief Molina now requests. Molina asks the Court to intervene and stay his removal from the

United States. But the Immigration and Nationality Act contains a jurisdiction-stripping provision that is as clear as it is potent. It states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to

commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). This provision is designed to protect the Government’s discretion in three specific areas: commencing proceedings, adjudicating cases, and—

crucially for Molina—executing removal orders. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti- Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). When a claimant seeks an injunction to stay his removal, he is asking the court to do exactly what the statute forbids: interfere with the Government’s decision to execute a removal

order. See Camarena v. Dir., Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 988 F.3d 1268, 1271 (11th Cir. 2021). “Courts across the country have thus found that they are barred from staying removal, even when the court might otherwise have jurisdiction over the [underlying] claims presented.” Edwin M.-N. v. Green,

No. CV 19-6096 (KM), 2019 WL 13299141, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 19, 2019); see also Rivera-Amador v. Rhoden, No. 3:25-CV-1460-WWB-SJH, 2025 WL 3687452, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2025); Lopez v. Warden, Stewart Det. Ctr., No. 4:18-CV-134-CDL-MSH, 2018 WL 7051097, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 26,

2018). Because § 1252(g) removes this Court’s power to act, Molina’s request to enjoin removal from the United States must be denied. See, e.g., Torres- Mejia v. Trump, No. 1:25-CV-1623, 2025 WL 3684258, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Dec.

19, 2025) (“Because a general request for a stay of removal would concern a decision or action by the Attorney General to . . . execute removal orders, the Court finds that § 1252(g) precludes [its] jurisdiction over such claims.”). B. Immediate Release Molina’s request for immediate release also fails. (Doc. 3.) He asks this

Court to disturb the status quo—his current detention—and grant him essentially the full measure of relief he seeks in the habeas petition, all before the Government has even had an opportunity to be heard. The Court declines the invitation.

C. Expedite Lastly, Molina requests that the Court expedite his habeas petition. Federal district courts possess the inherent authority to manage “the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for

litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). At present, this Court is experiencing a substantial influx of habeas corpus litigation— matters that directly implicate core liberty interests and, by law, demand immediate judicial priority. To be sure, the Court does not doubt the very real

personal and financial frustrations Molina has experienced. But accelerating this case would simply mean pushing an equally deserving litigant further back in the queue, a reordering that is not justified. Because Molina has not otherwise shown that his circumstances entitle him to bypass the standard

procedural order, the request to expedite is denied. While the Court takes Molina’s underlying liberty claims seriously, the specific stopgap measures he requests are either beyond our reach or not appropriate. Accordingly, his Emergency Motions (Docs. 3, 4, 5, 6) are DENIED, and the case will proceed to a review of the merits of the habeas petition. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on June 17, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek United States District Judge