STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION YORK, ss. DOCKET NO. CV-04-151 \/'. ' ! . ,I .
CHARLES A. ROBBINS, JR., et al.,
Plaintiffs
v. ORDERS ON PENDING MOTIONS
RANJINI, et al., DONALD L. GARBRECHT LAW LIBRARY Defendants DEC 0 8 2006
The first motion is the motion of the hrd-party defendant Prarnodh Koshy for
summary judgment on the plaintiffs' third-party complaint and the second amended
third-party complaint of Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston. The motion as to
the plaintiffs is granted without objection. Whle Mr. Koshy was not the operator of a
vehicle involved in this incident and is not responsible as an employer of the defendant
Ranjini, he does have potential liability under 29-A M.R.S.A. §1652(1) as the renter
based on the negligence of a person operating the vehicle with h s permission. Whle it
is a closer question the Renter's Indemnity Provision in paragraph 16 of the Rental
Agreement: Terms and Conditions is unambiguous and sufficiently conspicuous. Mr.
Koshy is liable if Ranjini is.
The second motion is the motion of Enterprise for summary judgment against
the plaintiffs, defendant Scandent Group, Inc. and the Thrd-Party defendant Koshy.
The t h r d motion is the related cross-motion of plaintiff Charles A. Robbins, Jr. for
summary judgment.
Defendant Ranjini was the operator of a vehicle rented by Defendant Koshy from
Enterprise, a Massachusetts corporation, in New Hampshre. It appears that Ranjini's negligent operation of the motor vehcle in Maine caused personal injuries to several
Maine residents. Maine law would impose liability on Enterprise as a rental company
while New Hampshire law would not. Both motions require the application of choice
of law principles based on the Maine choice of law test of whch state has the most
significant contacts and relationshp.
I have reviewed Flaherty v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2003 ME 72, 822 A.2d 1159,
Stathis v. National Car Rental Systems, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 55, (D. Mass. 2000) and Piche
v. Nugent 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22275 by Magistrate Judge Kravchuk of the District of Maine.
Here the injuries took place in Maine where the car accidents causing the injury
occurred. The plaintiffs are residents of Maine w h l e Ranjini is a resident of India and
Koshy is a resident of New Hampshire. Enterprise is a Massachusetts company that did
business in New Hampshire. The case as a whole is clearly centered in Massachusetts
while the rental transaction viewed entirely separately is clearly based in New
Hampshire.
Maine law, which has since been preempted by the federal Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub.L.No. 109-59, 119
Stat. 1144., and see 49 U.S.C. §30106(c), was designed to provide additional protection
for individuals who are injured by motorists operating rental vehicles. Since the New
Hampshire interest in t h s case is so minimal and the contacts and relationshps with
Maine are so strong, and none are stronger, Maine Law, as it predated the federal law
whch overrides laws like Maine's, should be applied.
The motion of Enterprise as it relates to the plaintiff will be denied and the cross-
motion of Plaintiff Charles A. Robbins will be granted to the extent that Enterprise will
be jointly and severally liable. Included in these motions are the issues of whether the Scandent Group, Inc.,
Scandent India or Pramodh Koshy are potentially liable. The driver Ranjini and the
renter Mr. Koshy were both employed by a Scandent company. While Mr. Koshy is
liable either by statute or by the indemnity provision contained in the rental contract
none of the Scandent companies are. The Maine statute does not apply to them as the
employers of the renter or operator, the indemnification provisions do not bind them
and despite an expansive majority opinion in Spencer v. V.I.P., lnc., 2006 ME 120,
Scandent, in its various forms, has no vicarious liability for an accident which took
place when Ranjini was not at work. The accident was not within the course of her
employment and she was not even commuting to and from work at the time of the
accident.
The entries are:
Motion of the third-party defendant Prarnodh Koshy for summary judgment is granted as to the third-party complaint of the plaintiffs. The motion is denied as to the second amended hrd-party complaint of Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston.
Motion of Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston for summary judgment against the plaintiffs and defendant Scandent Group, Inc. is denied. The motion of Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston for summary judgment against third-party defendant Koshy is granted. Summary judgment is entered against Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston on its claims against Scandent Group, Inc., Scandent India or against any Scandent defendant.
The cross-motion of plaintiff Charles A. Robbins, Jr. for summary judgment is granted in part. To the extent that Ranjini is liable, Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston is jointly and severally liable.
Dated: November 27,2006 @$fd ?; I@z~PY&. E_s%L -- C&aunryes rc William McKinley, Esq. -PL - Tammy E. Robbins Walter McKee, Esq. - PLS - Kenneth & Anna Dixon Brett J. Harpster, Esq. DEF - Ranjini r. gd'f* 118a% ?n,f).JCharle bins, Jr.
Paul A. Fritzsche John Veilleux, Esq. - DEF - Scandent Group, Inc. Justice, Superior Court Sidney St. Thaxter, Esq. - DEF-Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company - - Kenneth Pierce, Esq. - T/P Def. - Pramodh Koshy Thomas Mundhenk, Esq. - DEF - One Beacon Insurance Company J. William Druary, Jr., Esq. - DEF - S b t e Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION YORK, ss. DO.CKE.T NO. fV;04-151 PAf - 'ID(),~ q(d.'1 ~OID CHARLES A. ROBBINS, JR., et al.,
RANJINI, et a1.,
Defendants
On May 9, 2007 an attachment in the amount of $200,000.00 in favor of Enterprise
Rent-A-Car Company of Boston, Inc., now Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston,
LLC was granted against the property of Pramodh Koshy. The attachment was
modified by order of August 31, 2007 to be limited to $200,000.00 cash to be deposited
in an escrow account with Monaghan Leahy, LLP, which has been done. The amount of
the attachment was increased by order of September 22, 2008 to $1,096,438.50 on all of
Mr. Koshy's property though the cash on deposit has not been increased.
On May 25, 2010 the Law Court decided State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company v. Koshy, 2010 ME 44 which resolved multiple issues in a comprehensive 37
page decision. The Law Court determined, at Cf[18, that to the extent that Mr. Koshy
bears any fiscal responsibility to Enterprise pursuant to the indemnification provisions
in the automobile rental agreement that he signed that his employer Scandent Group,
Inc. is in turn responsible. Left unanswered and remanded for potential trial was the
question of whether the rental agreement's indemnification provisions are enforceable
as an unconscionable contract of adhesion. See Cf[Cf[ 19, 45, 54 and 60 among others. Following remand Mr. Koshy has moved to dissolve the attachment as modified
arguing that Enterprise can no longer demonstrate that it is more likely than not to
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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION YORK, ss. DOCKET NO. CV-04-151 \/'. ' ! . ,I .
CHARLES A. ROBBINS, JR., et al.,
Plaintiffs
v. ORDERS ON PENDING MOTIONS
RANJINI, et al., DONALD L. GARBRECHT LAW LIBRARY Defendants DEC 0 8 2006
The first motion is the motion of the hrd-party defendant Prarnodh Koshy for
summary judgment on the plaintiffs' third-party complaint and the second amended
third-party complaint of Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston. The motion as to
the plaintiffs is granted without objection. Whle Mr. Koshy was not the operator of a
vehicle involved in this incident and is not responsible as an employer of the defendant
Ranjini, he does have potential liability under 29-A M.R.S.A. §1652(1) as the renter
based on the negligence of a person operating the vehicle with h s permission. Whle it
is a closer question the Renter's Indemnity Provision in paragraph 16 of the Rental
Agreement: Terms and Conditions is unambiguous and sufficiently conspicuous. Mr.
Koshy is liable if Ranjini is.
The second motion is the motion of Enterprise for summary judgment against
the plaintiffs, defendant Scandent Group, Inc. and the Thrd-Party defendant Koshy.
The t h r d motion is the related cross-motion of plaintiff Charles A. Robbins, Jr. for
summary judgment.
Defendant Ranjini was the operator of a vehicle rented by Defendant Koshy from
Enterprise, a Massachusetts corporation, in New Hampshre. It appears that Ranjini's negligent operation of the motor vehcle in Maine caused personal injuries to several
Maine residents. Maine law would impose liability on Enterprise as a rental company
while New Hampshire law would not. Both motions require the application of choice
of law principles based on the Maine choice of law test of whch state has the most
significant contacts and relationshp.
I have reviewed Flaherty v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2003 ME 72, 822 A.2d 1159,
Stathis v. National Car Rental Systems, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 55, (D. Mass. 2000) and Piche
v. Nugent 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22275 by Magistrate Judge Kravchuk of the District of Maine.
Here the injuries took place in Maine where the car accidents causing the injury
occurred. The plaintiffs are residents of Maine w h l e Ranjini is a resident of India and
Koshy is a resident of New Hampshire. Enterprise is a Massachusetts company that did
business in New Hampshire. The case as a whole is clearly centered in Massachusetts
while the rental transaction viewed entirely separately is clearly based in New
Hampshire.
Maine law, which has since been preempted by the federal Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub.L.No. 109-59, 119
Stat. 1144., and see 49 U.S.C. §30106(c), was designed to provide additional protection
for individuals who are injured by motorists operating rental vehicles. Since the New
Hampshire interest in t h s case is so minimal and the contacts and relationshps with
Maine are so strong, and none are stronger, Maine Law, as it predated the federal law
whch overrides laws like Maine's, should be applied.
The motion of Enterprise as it relates to the plaintiff will be denied and the cross-
motion of Plaintiff Charles A. Robbins will be granted to the extent that Enterprise will
be jointly and severally liable. Included in these motions are the issues of whether the Scandent Group, Inc.,
Scandent India or Pramodh Koshy are potentially liable. The driver Ranjini and the
renter Mr. Koshy were both employed by a Scandent company. While Mr. Koshy is
liable either by statute or by the indemnity provision contained in the rental contract
none of the Scandent companies are. The Maine statute does not apply to them as the
employers of the renter or operator, the indemnification provisions do not bind them
and despite an expansive majority opinion in Spencer v. V.I.P., lnc., 2006 ME 120,
Scandent, in its various forms, has no vicarious liability for an accident which took
place when Ranjini was not at work. The accident was not within the course of her
employment and she was not even commuting to and from work at the time of the
accident.
The entries are:
Motion of the third-party defendant Prarnodh Koshy for summary judgment is granted as to the third-party complaint of the plaintiffs. The motion is denied as to the second amended hrd-party complaint of Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston.
Motion of Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston for summary judgment against the plaintiffs and defendant Scandent Group, Inc. is denied. The motion of Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston for summary judgment against third-party defendant Koshy is granted. Summary judgment is entered against Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston on its claims against Scandent Group, Inc., Scandent India or against any Scandent defendant.
The cross-motion of plaintiff Charles A. Robbins, Jr. for summary judgment is granted in part. To the extent that Ranjini is liable, Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston is jointly and severally liable.
Dated: November 27,2006 @$fd ?; I@z~PY&. E_s%L -- C&aunryes rc William McKinley, Esq. -PL - Tammy E. Robbins Walter McKee, Esq. - PLS - Kenneth & Anna Dixon Brett J. Harpster, Esq. DEF - Ranjini r. gd'f* 118a% ?n,f).JCharle bins, Jr.
Paul A. Fritzsche John Veilleux, Esq. - DEF - Scandent Group, Inc. Justice, Superior Court Sidney St. Thaxter, Esq. - DEF-Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company - - Kenneth Pierce, Esq. - T/P Def. - Pramodh Koshy Thomas Mundhenk, Esq. - DEF - One Beacon Insurance Company J. William Druary, Jr., Esq. - DEF - S b t e Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION YORK, ss. DO.CKE.T NO. fV;04-151 PAf - 'ID(),~ q(d.'1 ~OID CHARLES A. ROBBINS, JR., et al.,
RANJINI, et a1.,
Defendants
On May 9, 2007 an attachment in the amount of $200,000.00 in favor of Enterprise
Rent-A-Car Company of Boston, Inc., now Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston,
LLC was granted against the property of Pramodh Koshy. The attachment was
modified by order of August 31, 2007 to be limited to $200,000.00 cash to be deposited
in an escrow account with Monaghan Leahy, LLP, which has been done. The amount of
the attachment was increased by order of September 22, 2008 to $1,096,438.50 on all of
Mr. Koshy's property though the cash on deposit has not been increased.
On May 25, 2010 the Law Court decided State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company v. Koshy, 2010 ME 44 which resolved multiple issues in a comprehensive 37
page decision. The Law Court determined, at Cf[18, that to the extent that Mr. Koshy
bears any fiscal responsibility to Enterprise pursuant to the indemnification provisions
in the automobile rental agreement that he signed that his employer Scandent Group,
Inc. is in turn responsible. Left unanswered and remanded for potential trial was the
question of whether the rental agreement's indemnification provisions are enforceable
as an unconscionable contract of adhesion. See Cf[Cf[ 19, 45, 54 and 60 among others. Following remand Mr. Koshy has moved to dissolve the attachment as modified
arguing that Enterprise can no longer demonstrate that it is more likely than not to
recover judgment against him. That motion and a companion motion of Enterprise to
modify the attachment and trustee process to include Scandent have been briefed and
argued. For a long time this case fit Winston Churchill's 1939 description of Russia as
"a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." The Law Court decision resolved
most of the issues but, while hinting at the potential outcome, left unresolved the
question of whether the indemnification provision was enforceable.
I must now decide whether an attachment should remain and against which
parties. This decision is based on the current record and is not necessarily determinative
of a decision on summary judgment or after trial.
As the Law Court indicated at 9[58, a contract is unconscionable under the
common law of New Hampshire if it "contains terms that unreasonably favor one
party, and ... the other party lacked a meaningful choice." /I A party lacks a meaningful
choice if there is overreaching by the other party or a gross inequality in bargaining
power."
In this case Mr. Koshy signed a "pre-drafted agreement with Enterprise", 9[60,
which contained indemnification clauses "written in small print on the back of the
agreement." The materials submitted by the parties on the current motions indicate
that Enterprise did not trick Mr. Koshy or commit fraud, that it neither encouraged nor
discouraged Mr. Koshy from reading the back of the rental agreement, that insurance
was available for an additional cost which would have protected Mr. Koshy and
Scandent, that the insurance was declined and that Mr. Koshy is a well educated
individual working for a sophisticated company. Lastly, the decision to decline
coverage was a deliberate decision made at a corporate level.
2 While it is a close question I will allow the attachment to stand with a significant
modification as there is persuasive evidence, sufficient to meet the attachment standard,
that Scandent had a meaningful choice and that there was not an inequality of
bargaining power or overreaching. Any liability of Mr. Koshy will be assumed by
Scandent. Both Scandent and Enterprise have recognized that fact and graciously
agreed to structure the attachment to reduce the burden on Mr. Koshy if an attachment
was to remain.
(1) Defendant Pramodh Koshy's motion to dissolve attachment is granted in part, denied in part. The attachment against Pramodh Koshy, including attachment on trustee process, is limited to the $200,000.00 held in escrow at Monaghan Leahy, LLP of Portland, Maine. No additional attachment or attachment on trustee process against Pramodh Koshy is authorized and any attachment or attachment on trustee process against him in excess of $200,000.00 or on any property, other than the $200,000.00 in escrow, is dissolved.
(2) Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston, LLC's motion to modify this Court's order approving attachment and trustee process is granted. Attachment and attachment on trustee process is granted to Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston, LLC against Scandent Group, Inc. in the amount of $896,438.50.
Dated: September 24,2010
Paul A. Fritzsche Justice, Superior Court
3 ATTORNEY FOR THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT PRAMODH KOSHY: KENNETH PIERCE, ESQ. NAGHAN LEAHY PO BOX 7046 PORTLAND ME 04112-7046
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT ENTERPRISE RENT A CAR COMPANY: SIDNEY THAXTER, ESQ. DAVID SILK, ESQ. CURTIS THAXTER STEVENS BRODER & MICOLEAU PO BOX 7320 PORTLAND ME 04112-7320
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT ONE BEACON INSURANCE COMPANY: THOMAS G MUNDHENK, ESQ. ROBINSON KRIGER & MCCALLUM PO BOX 568 PORTLAND ME 04112-0568
ATTORNEY FOR THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT SCANDENT GROUP LTD: JOHN R VEILLEUX, ESQ. NORMAN HANSON & DETROY PO BOX 4600 PORTLAND ME 04112-4600
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT XXX RANJINI: DAVID SAM ANDERSON, ESQ. BERNSTEIN SHUR SAWYER & NELSON PO BOX 9729 PORTLAND ME 04104-5029