NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
RUSSELL ROBBINS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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v. :
:
:
NOREEN ROBBINS :
:
Appellant : No. 1746 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered November 24, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Snyder County Civil Division at No(s):
CV-0171-2017
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 9, 2026 Noreen Robbins (Mother) appeals from the order entered by the Snyder County Court of Common Pleas, related to custody of the three now sixteen- year-old children she shares with Russell Robbins (Father). The Children are triplets: a son, B.R., and two daughters, O.R. and E.R. (collectively, the Children). The order modified the parties’ legal custody arrangement by awarding Father sole legal custody of the Children. The order also reduced Mother’s physical custody of B.R. and modified various other custody provisions. Mother challenges these modifications and the trial court’s decision to permit her counsel to withdraw before the custody hearing; Mother then proceeded pro se. After review, we affirm.
The trial court provided the following factual and procedural history in its opinion.
The parties are married but have been separated since, at least, 2017. They have three children, 15-year old triplets, a son, B.R., and two daughters, O.R. and E.R. Their most recent custody order, dated July 9, and filed on July 10, 2024, provided for Father to have sole legal and primary physical custody of B.R. with Mother having partial physical custody of B.R. on alternate weekends from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m.; and for the parties to share [physical] custody of O.R. and E.R. [] on an alternate weekon /week-off basis [and for Mother to have sole legal custody of them].
Trial Court Opinion, 11/24/25, at 1-2.
On May 29, 2025, Mother filed a contempt petition, alleging that Father withheld B.R. from her for one of her weekends of partial physical custody in April 2025. On August 14, Father filed a Petition for Special Relief/Modification of Limited Provisions of Custody requesting that: B.R.’s counseling be held without Mother present; Father be permitted to schedule counseling for the family and the Children without Mother’s interference; Father be permitted to provide B.R.’s medication for Mother’s custodial time in a pill organizer rather than the prescription bottles; Mother’s contact with B.R. be limited to the court’s order and for her to not have any contact with him while he was attending school; and the prohibition on the Children having contact with Father’s girlfriend’s child be lifted. On October 7, Father filed an addendum to his previous petition, requesting that the court eliminate Mother’s partial physical custody of B.R. and reduce her custodial time with O.R. and E.R.
On October 20, Mother’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw. On November 5, Mother responded to her counsel’s motion, requesting that the
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motion be denied. On November 10, Mother requested a continuance of the upcoming custody hearing.
On November 12, the trial court held a hearing on the above filings. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court addressed counsel’s request to withdraw and Mother’s opposition. After hearing from Mother’s counsel, Mother, and Father’s counsel, the court granted Mother’s counsel’s request to withdraw. The court denied Mother’s continuance request, and the hearing proceeded that day.
After the hearing, the court dismissed Mother’s contempt petition. The court entered a new custody order, which awarded Father sole legal custody of the Children and adjusted Mother’s partial physical custody of B.R. to be at least one weekend each month selected by Mother, Father, and B.R. The order also modified other provisions related to the Children’s medications, property, and counseling, and permitted the Children to have limited, supervised contact with Father’s girlfriend’s son.
Mother timely filed this appeal. She raises the following five issues for our review:
1. Whether a blanket rule that the trial court will grant counsel leave to withdraw where counsel alleges the client has accused counsel of an ethical violation violates the First Amendment rights of the clients.
2. Whether a withdrawal motion can be based (solely, primarily, or at all) on an attorney’s conclusory assertion of “unethical conduct” by the client, where the attorney refused to disclose any factual details regarding
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Appellant’s request, despite express and implicit waivers of confidentiality.
3. Whether it is an abuse of discretion or error of law to allow an attorney to withdraw, based only on an allegation by the attorney that (1) the client requested they engage in unethical behavior and/or (2) the client accused the attorney of engaging in unethical behavior, especially over the client’s objection, on the day of trial.
4. Whether the trial court violated Appellant’s constitutional rights and committed an abuse of discretion by permitting withdrawal based on Appellant’s disagreement with counsel’s refusal to subpoena witnesses relevant to custody issues.
5. Whether the Custody Order reducing Appellant’s Custody must be vacated where it is unsupported by any sufficient evidence in the record.
Mother’s Brief at 3-4 (unnumbered).
Before addressing the merits of Mother’s issues, we must determine whether she has properly preserved them, and whether her failure to comply with our Appellate Rules has substantially impeded our appellate review.
To begin, none of Mother’s issues in her statement of the questions involved in her brief match the issues raised in her Appellate Rule 1925(b) concise statement. Although Mother raised issues in her concise statement challenging the trial court’s decision to permit her counsel to withdraw, she framed the issues differently than the four issues she raises on appeal. Moreover, in her fifth issue, Mother challenges the underlying custody order, but she failed to raise any issue related to the custody order in her concise statement.
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It is well-settled that issues not included in a concise statement are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). Thus, we would typically find Mother
waived all her issues by failing to include them in her concise statement.1 Id.
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1 In the criminal and civil contexts, this Court has declined to find waiver when
the trial court’s order requiring the appellant to file a concise statement was defective. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bush, 197 A.3d 285, 287 (Pa. Super. 2018); Imbrenda v. Imbrenda, 350 A.3d 1061, 1068-70 (Pa. Super. 2026), appeal denied, 2026 WL 2166855 (Pa. July 28, 2026). However, for a children’s fast track (CFT) case, Rule 1925 requires an appellant to file and serve their concise statement with their notice of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). Thus, the appellant is required to file a concise statement regardless of whether the trial court orders the appellant to do so, and it is not the trial court’s order that triggers this obligation; it is our Appellate Rules. See In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“We note that untimely concise statements filed in civil and criminal cases pursuant to rule 1925(b) result in the waiver of all issues. However, the filing of a concise statement under that rule is mandated by trial court order. In children’s fast track cases, however, the concise statement is mandated by a rule of appellate procedure. Accordingly, we do not extend the waiver rule [], which was articulated specifically in [the] context of court-ordered concise statements, to the instant case.” (internal citations omitted)). If an appellant fails to file a concise statement with the notice of appeal in a CFT case, it results in a defective notice of appeal that is handled on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 747.
Here, Mother failed to file her concise statement with her notice of appeal, rendering her notice of appeal defective. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i); K.T.E.L., supra. Thereafter, the trial court ordered her to file a concise statement. This order did not follow the requirements of Rule 1925(b)(3) because the trial court, among other things, did not inform Mother that failure to include issues in her concise statement would result in waiver. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iv). However, the court’s order was superfluous because Mother was already required to file a concise statement pursuant to Rule 1925(a)(2)(i), regardless of the court’s order. Nevertheless, based on our prior precedent, we will not find Mother’s issues waived based solely on her concise statement. See Brady v. Mitchell, 291 EDA 2026, 2026 WL 2018733, *2-*3 (Pa. Super. July 13, 2026) (non-precedential decision) (declining to find waiver based on Rule 1925 in the context of a CFT because of the trial court’s defective 1925(b) order); J.P. v. S.P., 991 A.2d 904, 908 (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Even if we overlook Mother’s failure to include her appellate claims in her concise statement, our review is also hampered by Mother’s failure to ensure the trial transcript is part of the certified record. The transcript of the November 12 custody hearing is not present in the certified record. We only have a copy of the transcript because Father included it in his reproduced record. Yet, it is well settled that the burden is ultimately on the appellant to ensure that the record is complete on appeal, and this Court may review and consider only items that are part of the certified record. See Pa.R.A.P. 1921, Note; see also, e.g., Mazzarese v. Mazzarese, 319 A.3d 586, 596 (Pa. Super. 2024). Because all five of Mother’s issues require us to review the transcript of the custody hearing, she arguably waived those issues by failing to ensure the transcript was included in the certified record. See Pa.R.A.P. 1921, Note; Mazzarese, supra.
Nevertheless, we can consider the transcript in the reproduced record since neither party appears to dispute its accuracy. See Commonwealth v. Holston, 211 A.3d 1264, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (“[W]here the accuracy of a document is undisputed and contained in the reproduced record, we may consider it.” (citation omitted)); Pa.R.A.P. 1921, Note. Here, the transcript does not indicate that Mother raised any of her first four issues to the trial court. These issues all challenge the trial court’s decision to grant
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(Pa. Super. 2010) (explaining that an appellant’s failure to comply with a court’s order to file a Rule 1925(b) statement in a timely manner constitutes waiver in family law cases).
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Mother’s counsel leave to withdraw before the custody hearing, forcing Mother to proceed pro se. On appeal, Mother makes various claims related to counsel’s withdrawal. We will address these issues together. Generally, Mother alleges that counsel based her withdrawal on a claim that Mother made an “unethical” request of counsel, and that counsel refused to subpoena a witness.
In the written motion to withdraw, Mother’s counsel did not mention unethical conduct. See Motion to Withdraw, 10/20/25, at 1-2 (unnumbered) (noting that Mother indicated she was looking for new counsel before later indicating she wished to continue representation, and that counsel believed Mother “indicated a lack of trust in undersigned counsel’s ability to represent” Mother’s best interest). Likewise, in Mother’s response to counsel’s motion to withdraw, Mother did not mention anything related to unethical conduct or a disagreement over a subpoena. She simply requested that counsel not be granted permission to withdraw and that the court schedule a hearing on the matter. See Mother’s Response, 11/5/25. Also, in Mother’s request for a continuance of the hearing, she merely stated that she had not spoken to counsel pertaining to the custody hearing, and she would not receive a “fair and just defense” if the continuance was denied. See Request for Continuance, 11/10/25. Thus, neither of these filings mentioned unethical conduct or a subpoena.
At the oral argument on the motion to withdraw, Mother’s counsel also did not mention unethical conduct. Counsel did not claim that Mother had
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accused her of engaging in unethical conduct, nor did counsel claim that Mother herself had engaged in unethical conduct. Instead, Mother’s counsel stated that she and Mother had irreconcilable differences, and there had been a breakdown of communication. See N.T., 11/12/25, at 8, 10. Counsel also mentioned outstanding legal fees, but stated that she did not want to embarrass Mother. See id. at 9-10.
In arguing against counsel’s request to withdraw, Mother did not make any claims related to unethical conduct or a disagreement over a subpoena. Instead, Mother stated that she did not want counsel to withdraw because it would delay the case and harm her because she did not have money to retain another attorney. See id. at 11-12. Mother also stated that she did not think she did anything wrong, and she “spoke with [her] attorney about something that was bothering” her. Id. at 12. According to Mother, when she brought “other things” up to counsel, counsel told her she was “on [her] own.” Id. Mother also claimed that her counsel had “lost her love for the law.” Id. at 13. Mother never mentioned anything about unethical conduct, subpoenas, or any of the other bald allegations she now makes in her first four issues on appeal.
Because Mother did not raise to the trial court any of the issues that she now raises on appeal, there is no record about those issues for us to review. Tellingly, Mother does not cite the record anywhere in her brief, in contravention of our Appellate Rules. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c). Thus, she fails to point us to where she preserved those issues below. Id.; see also
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Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e). Because Mother failed to raise her first four issues in the trial court, she cannot raise them for the first time on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Mother’s first four issues are waived.2 Id.
In her fifth issue, Mother challenges the trial court’s custody order, claiming it is “unsupported by any sufficient evidence in the record.” We begin with our well-settled standard of review for custody matters:
In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of record, as our role does not include making independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.
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2 Even if Mother properly preserved her challenge to counsel’s withdrawal, we
would find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision. The trial court heard arguments from counsel and Mother and believed there was a breakdown in the attorney/client relationship. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/31/25, at 2. Therefore, on the merits, Mother’s first four issues would warrant no relief. Additionally, the court denied the continuance because Mother had ample opportunity to obtain new counsel and testified that she could not afford another attorney. See id. We note that although Mother proceeded pro se at the custody hearing, she located pro bono counsel for this appeal.
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Wilson v. Smyers, 284 A.3d 509, 515 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). Importantly, it is not this Court’s role to “re-find facts, re-weigh evidence, and re-assess credibility.” Id. at 520 (citation omitted). Further, the “evidentiary record of a custody appeal will often support a conclusion different than the one reached by the lower court.” White v. Malecki, 296 A.3d 1210, 1215 (Pa. Super. 2023); see also Carrero v. Lopez, 300 A.3d 494, 501 (Pa. Super. 2023) (“In a custody appeal, the sheer fact that a trial court could have found for the appellant is not a sufficient basis to reverse the court’s decision.”).
In a custody-related matter, the court’s “paramount concern is the best interests of the children involved.” A.L.B. v. M.D.L., 239 A.3d 142, 148 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). When ordering any form of custody, a court must determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant factors, giving substantial weighted consideration to specific factors that affect the safety of the child.3 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).
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3 In 2024, the General Assembly enacted significant amendments to the custody factors “pursuant to Act of April 15, 2024, P.L. 24, No. 8 (known as ‘Kayden’s Law’).” Velasquez v. Miranda, 321 A.3d 876, 886 n.6 (Pa. 2024). Kayden’s Law expanded the factors to be considered in the court’s best interest analysis and required the court to give “substantial weighted consideration” to, inter alia, the “safety of the child.” Id. (citation omitted). These statutory amendments took legal effect on August 13, 2024. Our General Assembly then amended Section 5328(a) again on June 30, 2025, with an effective date of August 29, 2025. See 2025 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2025-11 (H.B. 378).
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“Upon petition, a court may modify a custody order to serve the best interest of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5338(a). When deciding a modification petition, a trial court must evaluate the Section 5328(a) custody factors. See E.D. v. M.P., 33 A.3d 73, 80 (Pa. Super. 2011).
On appeal, Mother argues that “the trial court failed to properly analyze, weigh, and support its findings as to each custody factor, resulting in a decision that is not grounded in the evidentiary record.” Mother’s Brief at 20 (unnumbered). Mother then lists the custody factors, devoting one paragraph of argument to each factor. Mother simply states for each factor that the trial court’s conclusion was unsupported by sufficient evidence, the court failed to properly evaluate or weigh the evidence, the court overlooked certain evidence, or the court’s analysis or explanation was insufficient, etc. See generally id. at 20-24 (unnumbered).
However, Mother does not include any citations to the record, in contravention of our Appellate Rules. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c). Thus, she fails to point us to any record evidence to support her arguments regarding the trial court’s analysis of the custody factors. Id. For example, Mother claims that the trial court failed to consider other evidence, but she does not cite what other evidence she is referring to.
It is well settled that this Court will not act as an advocate or develop arguments on behalf of an appellant, nor will we scour the record to find evidence to support an appellant’s argument. See Interest of R.H., 320 A.3d 706, 716 (Pa. Super. 2024); Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa.
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Super. 2018). Thus, we could find Mother’s fifth issue waived for lack of development. See B.S.G. v. D.M.C., 255 A.3d 528, 535 (Pa. Super. 2021).
Even on the merits, however, Mother’s fifth issue merits no relief. Here, the trial court listed all the custody factors and considered each one in its decision.4 See Trial Court Opinion, 11/24/25, at 2-5. The court explained when a factor favored one parent over the other or when no evidence was presented about a specific factor. We remind Mother that there is no requisite level of detail that a trial court is required to go into when explaining its decision based on the custody factors. See M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331,
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4 In its opinion, the trial court applied the sixteen Section 5328(a) custody factors that were in effect from August 13, 2024 to August 28, 2025. As noted in footnote 2, Section 5328(a) was amended again on June 30, 2025, with an effective date of August 29, 2025. This amendment deleted factors five, eight, nine, ten, and thirteen, while combining and rearranging some other factors. However, the substance of the factors largely remained the same.
Here, Father filed his initial petition on August 14, 2025, before the new custody factors took effect. Father then filed an addendum to his petition on October 7, the hearing occurred on November 12, and the court entered its new custody order on November 24. However, as noted above, the trial court’s opinion considered the factors in effect from August 13, 2024 to August 28, 2025, and the substance of those factors is largely the same as the factors in effect starting on August 29. Thus, the trial court examined the substance of the new factors, even though it listed the old factors. Moreover, Mother raised no issue with the set of custody factors that the trial court applied. In fact, it appears that Mother herself cited the custody factors in effect from August 13, 2024 to August 28, 2025 in the argument section of her brief. Thus, even if the trial court erred, Mother waived the issue by failing to raise it. See M.G. v. L.D., 155 A.3d 1083, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“Since [g]randfather did not assert these omissions [of the custody factors] as grounds to reverse the instant custody order, we do not raise them sua sponte in order to grant relief.”).
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336 (Pa. Super. 2013). All that is required is that the court considers the factors and bases its decision on those considerations. Id. The trial court found more than sufficient evidence to support modifying the prior custody order, given Mother’s lack of cooperation with Father concerning counseling for the Children, B.R.’s medication, and contact with Father’s girlfriend’s son. Essentially, Mother now asks this Court to reweigh the evidence in her favor, which we cannot do. See Wilson, supra. Mother’s fifth issue merits no relief.
In sum, Mother waived her issues related to her counsel’s withdrawal by failing to raise those issues below. Mother’s final issue related to the custody order merits no relief.
Order affirmed.5 Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/9/2026
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5 In his brief, Father argues that he is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees because Mother’s appeal is frivolous. See Father’s Brief at 25. Father requests that we remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses. See id. at 26. We decline to do so.