Robbins (Melissa) v. State

• Court: Nevada Supreme Court
• Decided: May 12, 2014
• Docket: 61743
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

requirements, see NRS 52.260(3); NRS 53.045 (use of unsworn declaration in lieu of affidavit), and admitted the telephone records into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, see NRS 51.135. We conclude that Robbins has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in this regard. 1 Robbins further contends that insufficient evidence supports her convictions because the jury could not have found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without Stephanie Kerns' telephone records. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis omitted); Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. 807, 816, 192 P.3d 721, 727 (2008). Moreover, when "assessing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, [we] must consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial court, regardless whether that evidence was admitted erroneously." Stephans v. State, 127 Nev. „ 262 P.3d 727, 734 (2011) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Here, the jury heard testimony that Robbins previously worked for Dr. Pejamin Bady as a medical assistant and had access to his prescription pads. On August 14, 2006, she met with Kerns in a parking lot. She produced one of Dr. Bady's

'Robbins did not provide a copy of the declaration for our review, and she suggests that the district court erred by not making the declaration part of the record. However, "[t]he burden to make a proper appellate record rests on appellant." Greene v. State, 96 Nev. 555, 558, 612 P.2d 686, 688 (1980); see also Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 43 n.4, 83 P.3d 818, 822 n.4 (2004) ("Appellant has the ultimate responsibility to provide this court with 'portions of the record essential to determination of issues raised in appellant's appeal." (quoting NRAP 30(b)(3))).

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A prescription pads, drafted a prescription for Lortab in Kerns' name, and forged Dr. Bady's signature to the prescription. Kerns delivered the prescription to a pharmacy and later called the pharmacy to see if the prescription had been filled. When the pharmacy informed Kerns that there was a problem, she called Robbins and told her that the pharmacy knew that the prescription was forged. Dr. Bady testified that the signature on the prescription was not his and that Lortab is a controlled narcotic that is normally prescribed for pain. The State entered the forged prescription and Kerns' telephone records into evidence. We conclude that a rational juror could reasonably infer from this evidence that Robbins committed an unlawful act relating to the distribution of certain controlled substances, conspired to violate the uniform controlled substance act, and committed forgery. See NRS 205.090; NRS 453.331(1)(d); NRS 453.401(1). It is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to give conflicting testimony, and the jury's verdict will not be disturbed on appeal where, as here, substantial evidence supports the verdict. See Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981). Having determined that Robbins is not entitled to relief, we ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Hardesty

, J.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A 4g,BED cc: Hon. Kimberly A. Wanker, District Judge Gibson Law Group Nye County District Attorney Attorney General/Carson City Nye County Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) 1947A