Robbins 048696 v. Ryan

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMay 29, 2020
Docket2:18-cv-02343
StatusUnknown

This text of Robbins 048696 v. Ryan (Robbins 048696 v. Ryan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robbins 048696 v. Ryan, (D. Ariz. 2020).

Opinion

Case 2:18-cv-02343-MTL-DMF Document 124 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 39

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2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Greg Robbins, No. CV 18-02343-PHX-MTL (DMF) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Charles L. Ryan, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiff Greg Robbins, who is currently confined in the Arizona State Prison 16 Complex (ASPC)-Lewis, brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 17 1983. (Doc. 1.) Defendants move for summary judgment, and Plaintiff opposes.1 (Docs. 18 91, 105.) Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief, which 19 he filed as a part of a Motion for Reconsideration. (Doc. 109.) 20 The Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in part and deny 21 it in part and will deny Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. 22 I. Background 23 Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he seriously injured his knee in 2013 and that 24 a specialist ordered knee replacement surgery, but Defendants refused to provide the 25 surgery or effective pain management. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff seeks damages and costs, as well 26 27 28 1 The Court provided notice to Plaintiff pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), regarding the requirements of a response. (Doc. 94.) Case 2:18-cv-02343-MTL-DMF Document 124 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 39

1 as declaratory and injunctive relief, specifically, that Defendants send Plaintiff to an 2 orthopedic specialist and follow that specialist’s assessment. (Id. at 20.) 3 Upon screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff 4 stated an Eighth Amendment medical care claim against Defendants former Arizona 5 Department of Corrections (ADC) Director Charles Ryan and Interim Division Director of 6 Health Services Richard Pratt in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief; 7 against Corizon Health Incorporated (“Corizon”); and against healthcare providers Dr. 8 Itoro Elijah and Nurse Practitioners (NP) Curtis Bass and Lawrence Ende in their 9 individual capacities. (Doc. 7.) The Court required those Defendants to answer the claims 10 against them and dismissed the remaining Defendant and Plaintiff’s claim for monetary 11 damages against Ryan and Pratt.2 (Id.) 12 II. Summary Judgment Standard 13 A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 14 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The 16 movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 17 those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 18 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 19 If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 20 produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 21 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts 22 23 2 On July 1, 2019, Centurion of Arizona, LLC (“Centurion”) replaced Corizon as 24 the contracted medical care provider for ADC prisoners. Because Corizon is no longer the medical provider for ADC prisoners, and Plaintiff may not seek injunctive relief against it, 25 the Court, in an October 8, 2019 Order, added Centurion as a Defendant and service was 26 completed on Centurion on October 25, 2019. (Docs. 84, 86.) Also, because Defendant Ryan is no longer the ADC Director and is being sued in his official capacity for injunctive 27 relief, the Court substituted current ADC Director David Shinn as to Plaintiff’s claim for 28 injunctive relief. (Doc. 108.)

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1 to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in 2 contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 3 governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 4 jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 5 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th 6 Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its 7 favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, 8 it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 9 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal 10 citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 11 At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 12 determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 13 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw 14 all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited 15 materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 16 III. Relevant Facts 17 Plaintiff entered ADC custody in July 2007; in the fall of 2009, he was transferred 18 to the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODC) as part of the Interstate Compact. 19 (Doc. 89 (Defs.’ Statement of Facts) ¶ 1.) Corizon did not provide health services at the 20 ODC when Plaintiff was housed there, and, under the Interstate Compact, ADC was 21 responsible for payment of any “extraordinary” health expenses for ADC prisoners at ODC 22 that were “beyond the scope of services a primary physician could provide[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 75, 23 76.) 24 In early 2013, while in Oklahoma, Plaintiff injured his left knee while playing 25 basketball. (Doc. 106 at 217 (Pl. Decl.) ¶ 2.) In 2014, Plaintiff saw a specialist who 26 “scra[]ped scar tissue” from his left knee. (Id. ¶ 3.) The following day, Plaintiff fell and 27 re-injured his left knee. (Id.) 28

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1 An ODC medical record shows that on October 29, 2014, Plaintiff began “aftercare 2 following surgery for injury and trauma for left knee arthroscopic surgery.” (Doc. 89 ¶ 2.) 3 On December 2, 2014, Plaintiff was seen at Lindsay Municipal Hospital for a left-knee 4 follow-up; he reported he had fallen and still had swelling but his knee was getting stronger. 5 (Id. ¶ 3.) 6 On June 3, 2015, Plaintiff was seen at ODC for complaints of an unstable left knee; 7 it was noted that his left knee failed despite surgery and Plaintiff would “return to ortho.” 8 (Id.

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Robbins 048696 v. Ryan, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robbins-048696-v-ryan-azd-2020.