Rob Lear v. Seattle Housing Authority

616 F. App'x 299
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 8, 2015
Docket14-35276
StatusUnpublished

This text of 616 F. App'x 299 (Rob Lear v. Seattle Housing Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rob Lear v. Seattle Housing Authority, 616 F. App'x 299 (9th Cir. 2015).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Rob Lear appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants conspired to harm him and deprive him of his property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 436 (9th Cir.2002). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lear’s conspiracy claims because Lear failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants had an agreement to violate his constitutional rights. See id. at 441 (elements of § 1983 conspiracy); see also Caf-asso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics Ck Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir.2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping con-clusory allegations.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lear’s request for an injunction in his state eviction proceedings because the proceedings were unrelated to the instant action. See Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir.2011) (setting forth standard of review and factors for evaluating an injunction request).

The district court did. not abuse its discretion by denying Lear’s discovery requests because they were untimely. See Childress v. Darby Lumber, Inc., 357 F.3d 1000, 1009-10 (9th Cir.2004) (setting forth standard of review for discovery issues).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lear’s motion for recu-sal because the judge’s impartiality could not reasonably be questioned. See United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir.2010) (setting forth standard of review and discussing grounds for recusal).

We reject Lear’s arguments that the district court held Lear’s pleadings to a heightened standard, and failed to address his motion for summary judgment.

We do not consider issues or. arguments not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is. not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.

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Related

United States v. Johnson
610 F.3d 1138 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc.
637 F.3d 1047 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Thalheimer v. City of San Diego
645 F.3d 1109 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Childress v. Darby Lumber, Inc.
357 F.3d 1000 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Padgett v. Wright
587 F.3d 983 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
616 F. App'x 299, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rob-lear-v-seattle-housing-authority-ca9-2015.