RoadRunner Recycling, Inc. v. Recycle Track Systems, Inc.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided August 28, 2024·No. 3:23-cv-04804·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6

9 Plaintiff, No. C 23-04804 WHA

10 v.

11 RECYCLE TRACK SYSTEMS, INC. and ORDER RE MOTIONS TO SEAL RECYCLESMART SOLUTIONS, INC., 12 Defendants. 13

14 15 This order addresses all pending motions to seal and supporting declarations (Dkt. 16 Nos. 46, 47, 52, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65). 17 1. THE LEGAL STANDARD. 18 There is a strong public policy in favor of openness in our court system and the public is 19 entitled to know to whom we are providing relief (or not). See Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of 20 Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178–80 (9th Cir. 2006). Consequently, access to motions and their 21 attachments that are “more than tangentially related to the merits of a case” may be sealed only 22 upon a showing of “compelling reasons.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 23 1092, 1101–02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 580 U.S. 815 (2016). Filings that are only tangentially 24 related to the merits may be sealed upon a lesser showing of “good cause.” Id. at 1097. 25 Evidentiary motions, like motions in limine and Daubert motions, can correlate with the 26 merits. Id. at 1098–1100. Indeed, the “‘compelling reasons’ standard applies to most judicial 27 records.” Id. at 1098 (quoting Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 677–78 (9th Cir. 1 Additionally, parties in this district must ensure their sealing motions meet basic 2 adequacy requirements. Above all, they must “narrowly tailor” requests “to seal only the 3 sealable material.” Civil L.R. 79-5(c). And they must list each document or passage to be 4 sealed together with its rationale for sealing. Ibid. For each listed, they must specifically state: 5 (1) the legitimate private or public interests that warrant sealing; (2) the injury that will result 6 should sealing be denied; and (3) why a less restrictive alternative to sealing is not sufficient. 7 Ibid. They must provide evidentiary support where necessary, such as by sworn declaration. 8 Ibid. And, for pleadings, parties must file both redacted and unredacted copies (or ensure 9 another party does), and include in the unredacted copies highlighting to show proposed 10 redactions. Id. at (d)–(e). Failure to follow the rules suggests a lack of cause or interest to 11 seal, and risks summary denial. See id. at (f)(6), (g)(2). 12 Redaction may be appropriate where publication “could result in infringement upon trade 13 secrets.” Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 14 U.S. 986 (2012). So too where publishing “business information” might “harm a litigant’s 15 competitive standing,” particularly where the public has “minimal interest” in that information. 16 See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). And, in general, redaction 17 will be appropriate where publication would turn “court files [into] a vehicle for improper 18 purposes,” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598), such as “to gratify 19 private spite, promote public scandal, [or] circulate libelous statements,” ibid. But “vague 20 boilerplate language or nebulous assertions of potential harm” will not suffice to support 21 redaction. Bronson v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 2019 WL 7810811, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 22 2019) (citing Civil L.R. 79-5). Nor will mere “[r]eference to a stipulation or protective order.” 23 Civil L.R. 79-5(c); see also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180. “A party seeking to seal a judicial 24 record [ultimately] bears the burden of overcoming th[e] strong presumption” of public access. 25 Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178. The final determination is “left to the sound discretion of the 26 trial court.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1097 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599).

27 2. MOTION TO SEAL STEMMING FROM ROADRUNNER’S IDENTIFICATION OF 2 RoadRunner Recycling, Inc. filed its identification of trade secrets (Dkt. Nos. 46, 46-4). 3 RoadRunner also filed seventy-two pages of exhibits (Dkt. No. 47). It moved to seal all (Dkt. 4 No. 46-1 ¶¶ 3–4). To substantiate these redactions, RoadRunner in one paragraph attested that 5 they contained trade secrets, and in a second attested that because they contained only trade 6 secrets they must be sealed in toto (ibid.). RoadRunner has since proposed narrower redactions 7 of other documents that it at first had sought to seal in entirety (infra). And the Court has since 8 rejected RoadRunner’s broadest trade secrets claims (Dkt. No. 71). Still, RoadRunner has not 9 proposed narrowed redactions as to its trade secrets identification. 10 RoadRunner’s initial, overbroad redactions as to these filings must be rejected. Passages 11 in the documents proposed to be sealed include:

12  marketing puffery, such as “RoadRunner is a pioneer in waste and recycling metering technology” (Dkt. No. 46-4 at 2); 13  boilerplate assertions, such as “RoadRunner kept its 14 confidential and proprietary information secret from all third parties in part by restricting access from all third parties” (id. at 15 4);

16  statements from legal treatises, such as “[A]s long as a competitor would have to incur considerable expense to 17 recreate the combination, generally the combination will be found to have independent economic value” (id. at 22 (quoting 18 1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 (2020)); and,

19  high-level descriptions of case contentions, including concepts elsewhere disclosed, such as that the case concerns in part a 20 “smart camera apparatus” (cf. Tr. Feb. 29, 2024 at 14). 21 And that is to say nothing of the purported trade secrets proposed for redaction, which the 22 Court has warned started out overbroad (Dkt. No. 43) and may still be due for sacking (Dkt. 23 No. 71). Where proposed redactions are facially overbroad, as here, they may be rejected 24 facially. See Civil L.R. 79-5(f)(6), (g)(2). 25 Nonetheless, RoadRunner will be given a renewed chance to propose redactions for its 26 trade secrets identification and exhibits. That is because the logic of the Court’s last 27 substantive order on RoadRunner’s trade secrets claims — that RoadRunner “has plausibly 1 subsequent motion practice” might “par[e] down” (Dkt. No. 71) — applies equally to 2 RoadRunner’s sealing requests. The same logic also means that RoadRunner’s proposed 3 redactions must, if they are to survive, be narrowed significantly. Nearly nine months have 4 passed since RoadRunner’s initial trade secrets identification filings. Six months have passed 5 since the Court’s order stating that discovery should narrow the contentions. RoadRunner 6 should now have a firmer grasp of what secrets it purports to claim. And the public monitoring 7 the case must be given in fact what the public already enjoys in law: presumed access to all 8 information in the case, except for good or compelling cause otherwise. 9 Thus, RoadRunner’s administrative motion to seal (Dkt. No. 46) is DENIED WITH LEAVE 10 TO AMEND (as further described infra Part 4). 11 3. MOTIONS TO SEAL STEMMING FROM ROADRUNNER’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 13 RoadRunner’s other pending sealing motions stem from its motion for leave to amend its 14 first amended complaint, specifically the opposition and reply. 15 A. OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND. 16 Recycle Track Systems, Inc. and RecycleSmart Solutions Inc. (“Systems-and-Solutions”) 17 opposed RoadRunner’s motion for leave to amend (Dkt. No. 52-2; Dkt. No. 53). At the same 18 time, they moved to consider whether RoadRunner’s material therein should be sealed (Dkt. 19 No. 52). RoadRunner at first filed a declaration to support sealing all (Dkt. No. 59).

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RoadRunner Recycling, Inc. v. Recycle Track Systems, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2024).

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Bucci v. United States
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