NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0437n.06
Case No. 24-1985
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Sep 25, 2025 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR v. ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ) MICHIGAN JOCELYN BENSON, in her official capacity as Michigan Secretary of State, et al., ) ) OPINION Defendants-Appellees. )
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; GIBBONS and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. The Republican National Committee alleges that Michigan’s failure to
remove ineligible individuals from its voter rolls violates the National Voter Registration Act. The
district court dismissed its claims for lack of standing. We agree.
I.
As relevant to today’s case, the National Voter Registration Act requires each State to
“conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible
voters,” such as those who have left the State. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4). At the same time, the Act
imposes several procedural hurdles that States must satisfy before removing registered voters. See
id. § 20507(d)(1). “A person who is aggrieved by a violation” may sue state officials for
declaratory or injunctive relief so long as they provide “written notice of the violation to the chief No. 24-1985, RNC et al. v. Benson et al.
election official of the State involved” and give the official an opportunity to fix the problem. Id.
§ 20510(b)(1)–(2). If the violation occurs within 30 days of a federal election, an aggrieved person
may sue without providing notice to the State. Id. § 20510(b)(3).
In March 2024, the Republican National Committee (the RNC for short) sued Michigan
Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson and Bureau of Elections Director Jonathan Brater seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief under the Act. It alleged that the officials did not make a
“reasonable effort to remove” ineligible nonresidents from the voter rolls. R.1 at 10–17. It based
this claim mainly on the apparent oddity that, in most Michigan counties, the number of active
registered voters exceeds the voting-age population. The state officials responded by challenging
the RNC’s calculations and explaining that the delay in removing voters from the rolls arose from
their efforts to comply with the Act’s procedural restraints.
The state officials moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the RNC lacked standing
under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court agreed and
dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing.
II.
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the “judicial Power” of the federal courts
by permitting them to decide only “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. A “Case”
or “Controversy” exists if a plaintiff has a “personal stake” in the case, what we have come to call
standing to bring a claim. FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 379 (2024) (quotation
omitted). Standing has three elements: (1) an actual injury (2) caused by the defendants (3) that
a favorable decision would redress. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). These
same principles apply to organizational standing, in which an organization “sue[s] on [its] own
behalf for injuries [it] ha[s] sustained.” All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 393–94 (quotation
2 No. 24-1985, RNC et al. v. Benson et al.
omitted). The RNC, as the claimant, bears the burden of establishing standing to bring this claim.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
In this injunction action, we need not go beyond injury. Monetary losses often count as
traditional injuries. But there is a difference between past and future losses of money. While a
direct monetary loss from the implementation of a law readily suffices in the context of a
backward-looking money-damages claim, the same is not true for forward-looking injunction
actions. In the injunction setting, the claimant must plead an “imminent” loss, one that is “certainly
impending.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158–59 (2014) (quoting Clapper
v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)).
III.
In its complaint, the RNC raises two theories of organizational standing. It asserts that
these inaccurate lists cause voter fraud, harming its ability to elect Republicans. And it asserts that
it relies on the registered-voters lists to determine its allocation of resources and that Michigan’s
inaccurate lists may cause it to waste money on efforts to reach ineligible voters and on efforts to
investigate the officials’ list-maintenance failures. Perhaps recognizing the weakness of its fraud
argument, the RNC does not advance it on appeal in any significant way, and we need not address
it. Kuhn v. Washtenaw County, 709 F.3d 612, 624 (6th Cir. 2013) (“This court has consistently
held that arguments not raised in a party’s opening brief, as well as arguments adverted to in only
a perfunctory manner, are waived.”).
The RNC’s diversion-of-resources theory fails to satisfy the imminence requirements of
Article III and is unduly speculative. The reason turns on the language of the complaint. The
RNC alleges that, in responding to the Michigan election officials’ actions, it “may spend more on
resources,” and “may misallocate its scarce resources” if voter registration lists “include names of
3 No. 24-1985, RNC et al. v. Benson et al.
voters who should no longer be on the list.” R.1 at 4 (emphases added). The RNC’s allegations
of past economic injury—like expenditures of “time and resources,” R.1 at 5, 6—are conclusory
and the complaint fails to link them to “certainly impending” or imminent future harm. Driehaus,
573 U.S. at 158 (quotation omitted). The complaint-driven uncertainty over whether the RNC’s
expenditures will change in light of the officials’ actions does not satisfy the “certainly impending”
requirement for stating a constitutional injury. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409 (“‘[A]llegations of
possible future injury’ are not sufficient.” (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158
(1990))).
We have rejected similar claims before in the context of similar challenges to state officials’
obligations under the Act. In Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Benson, we rejected a nonprofit
organization’s lawsuit—under the same Act, against the same Secretary of State, about access to
the same records—because the purported harms to its “research, educational, and remedial
activities” were unduly speculative. 136 F.4th 613, 631–32 (6th Cir. 2025). The organization had
failed to identify any “specific projects, research papers, or educational outreach efforts that were
directly impacted by Secretary Benson’s failure to produce relevant records.” Id. at 631. Although
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0437n.06
Case No. 24-1985
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Sep 25, 2025 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR v. ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ) MICHIGAN JOCELYN BENSON, in her official capacity as Michigan Secretary of State, et al., ) ) OPINION Defendants-Appellees. )
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; GIBBONS and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. The Republican National Committee alleges that Michigan’s failure to
remove ineligible individuals from its voter rolls violates the National Voter Registration Act. The
district court dismissed its claims for lack of standing. We agree.
I.
As relevant to today’s case, the National Voter Registration Act requires each State to
“conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible
voters,” such as those who have left the State. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4). At the same time, the Act
imposes several procedural hurdles that States must satisfy before removing registered voters. See
id. § 20507(d)(1). “A person who is aggrieved by a violation” may sue state officials for
declaratory or injunctive relief so long as they provide “written notice of the violation to the chief No. 24-1985, RNC et al. v. Benson et al.
election official of the State involved” and give the official an opportunity to fix the problem. Id.
§ 20510(b)(1)–(2). If the violation occurs within 30 days of a federal election, an aggrieved person
may sue without providing notice to the State. Id. § 20510(b)(3).
In March 2024, the Republican National Committee (the RNC for short) sued Michigan
Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson and Bureau of Elections Director Jonathan Brater seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief under the Act. It alleged that the officials did not make a
“reasonable effort to remove” ineligible nonresidents from the voter rolls. R.1 at 10–17. It based
this claim mainly on the apparent oddity that, in most Michigan counties, the number of active
registered voters exceeds the voting-age population. The state officials responded by challenging
the RNC’s calculations and explaining that the delay in removing voters from the rolls arose from
their efforts to comply with the Act’s procedural restraints.
The state officials moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the RNC lacked standing
under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court agreed and
dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing.
II.
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the “judicial Power” of the federal courts
by permitting them to decide only “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. A “Case”
or “Controversy” exists if a plaintiff has a “personal stake” in the case, what we have come to call
standing to bring a claim. FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 379 (2024) (quotation
omitted). Standing has three elements: (1) an actual injury (2) caused by the defendants (3) that
a favorable decision would redress. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). These
same principles apply to organizational standing, in which an organization “sue[s] on [its] own
behalf for injuries [it] ha[s] sustained.” All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 393–94 (quotation
2 No. 24-1985, RNC et al. v. Benson et al.
omitted). The RNC, as the claimant, bears the burden of establishing standing to bring this claim.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
In this injunction action, we need not go beyond injury. Monetary losses often count as
traditional injuries. But there is a difference between past and future losses of money. While a
direct monetary loss from the implementation of a law readily suffices in the context of a
backward-looking money-damages claim, the same is not true for forward-looking injunction
actions. In the injunction setting, the claimant must plead an “imminent” loss, one that is “certainly
impending.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158–59 (2014) (quoting Clapper
v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)).
III.
In its complaint, the RNC raises two theories of organizational standing. It asserts that
these inaccurate lists cause voter fraud, harming its ability to elect Republicans. And it asserts that
it relies on the registered-voters lists to determine its allocation of resources and that Michigan’s
inaccurate lists may cause it to waste money on efforts to reach ineligible voters and on efforts to
investigate the officials’ list-maintenance failures. Perhaps recognizing the weakness of its fraud
argument, the RNC does not advance it on appeal in any significant way, and we need not address
it. Kuhn v. Washtenaw County, 709 F.3d 612, 624 (6th Cir. 2013) (“This court has consistently
held that arguments not raised in a party’s opening brief, as well as arguments adverted to in only
a perfunctory manner, are waived.”).
The RNC’s diversion-of-resources theory fails to satisfy the imminence requirements of
Article III and is unduly speculative. The reason turns on the language of the complaint. The
RNC alleges that, in responding to the Michigan election officials’ actions, it “may spend more on
resources,” and “may misallocate its scarce resources” if voter registration lists “include names of
3 No. 24-1985, RNC et al. v. Benson et al.
voters who should no longer be on the list.” R.1 at 4 (emphases added). The RNC’s allegations
of past economic injury—like expenditures of “time and resources,” R.1 at 5, 6—are conclusory
and the complaint fails to link them to “certainly impending” or imminent future harm. Driehaus,
573 U.S. at 158 (quotation omitted). The complaint-driven uncertainty over whether the RNC’s
expenditures will change in light of the officials’ actions does not satisfy the “certainly impending”
requirement for stating a constitutional injury. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409 (“‘[A]llegations of
possible future injury’ are not sufficient.” (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158
(1990))).
We have rejected similar claims before in the context of similar challenges to state officials’
obligations under the Act. In Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Benson, we rejected a nonprofit
organization’s lawsuit—under the same Act, against the same Secretary of State, about access to
the same records—because the purported harms to its “research, educational, and remedial
activities” were unduly speculative. 136 F.4th 613, 631–32 (6th Cir. 2025). The organization had
failed to identify any “specific projects, research papers, or educational outreach efforts that were
directly impacted by Secretary Benson’s failure to produce relevant records.” Id. at 631. Although
that case was at the summary-judgment stage, a similar conclusion applies here because the RNC
has failed even to plead specific, certainly impending injuries.
In resisting this conclusion, the RNC argues that the officials’ improper list management
damages its “core organizational mission,” Appellant’s Br. 16–17, and claims that such an injury
suffices for standing under Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). Havens, we
appreciate, permitted a housing counseling organization to sue the owner of an apartment complex
under the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 368, 378–79. The organization was “not only” an “issue
advocacy organization,” the Court reasoned, but it “also operated a housing counseling service.”
4 No. 24-1985, RNC et al. v. Benson et al.
All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 395. And it collected money to operate that service. When
an apartment complex lied to one of the organization’s employees about housing availability, it
suffered concrete damages, giving it a cognizable injury to stand on. Id.
The RNC’s reliance on Havens Realty is flawed, however, because the RNC’s alleged
injury is more indirect than the one in Havens Realty, as it identifies speculative costs that the RNC
“may” or may not incur. R.1 at 4. To be sure, the second-to-last sentence on the final page of the
complaint states that “Plaintiffs will be injured by Defendants’ violations of the NVRA until the
Defendants are enjoined from violating the law.” R.1 at 20. But this summary of the RNC’s claim
amounts to a conclusory allegation that the RNC “will continue to be injured.” R.1 at 20; see
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (“At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury . . . may
suffice,” but a mere assertion of legal “injury” does not.). If the RNC’s injury turns solely on the
possibility of incurring expenses, the claim that it “will continue” to be injured means only that “it
will continue” to “may[be] spend more” or “may[be] misallocate its scarce resources.” R.1 at 4,
20. The RNC’s allegations of such a “conjectural [and] hypothetical” injury fall short of the
pleadings required by Article III. See Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 158 (quotation omitted).
The RNC’s allegations of prior economic injury face similar headwinds. Its complaint
describes organizational expenditures because of the defendants’ alleged noncompliance, but only
vaguely refers to spending “time and resources,” and suffering “economic, financial, and political
injury” while misallocating “scarce resources.” R.1 at 5, 6, 19. These allegations are too
conclusory to constitute injury in fact, even under the lighter standard to establish standing at the
pleading stage. See Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 158; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
These allegations also fail to establish injury in the injunction context. Regardless of
whether Havens and Hippocratic Medicine provide a pathway to standing for the RNC, its “generic
5 No. 24-1985, RNC et al. v. Benson et al.
allegations of past harm can serve only as ‘a launching pad for a showing of imminent future
injury.’” Tenn. Conf. of the NAACP v. Lee, 139 F.4th 557, 567 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Murthy
v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 59 (2024)). But RNC fails to show how its allegations of prior injury or
other past exposure to economic harms from the defendants led to “imminent . . . future injury.”
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409 (quotation omitted); see also Lee, 139 F.4th at 567. All the RNC alleges
regarding future harm is the possibility of misallocated resources that “may” occur. R.1 at 4. That
fails to sufficiently plead “a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” Lee, 139 F.4th at 567
(quoting Murthy, 603 U.S. at 58).
IV.
The RNC separately argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to give it
a chance to amend its complaint after that court’s order dismissing its case. No abuse of discretion
occurred. Leave to amend a complaint, it is true, is generally given freely. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a);
see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). But a district court does not abuse its discretion
in denying a request to amend when, as here, the plaintiff had “an opportunity to amend of which
[it] failed to take advantage.” Mellentine v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 515 F. App’x 419, 425 (6th
Cir. 2013).
The RNC at all events will not suffer any prejudice from the district court’s decision. It
dismissed the case under Civil Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Such
dismissals, by definition, are without prejudice, permitting the RNC to refile its complaint. Bowles
v. Whitmer, 120 F.4th 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 2024).
We affirm.