RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0146-24
R.M.K.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
S.S.L.,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted September 9, 2025 – Decided September 26, 2025
Before Judges Gilson and Perez Friscia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket No. FV-15-2481-24.
S.S.L., appellant pro se.
R.M.K., respondent pro se.
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from a final restraining order (FRO) entered under the
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, based on a predicate act of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. We affirm because the trial
court's factual findings are supported by substantial credible evidence, and it
correctly applied the law. 1
I.
We discern the facts from the record developed at a one-day trial
conducted on July 30, 2024. Plaintiff was represented by counsel and defendant
represented herself. Both parties testified and no other witnesses were called.
The parties also submitted several exhibits into evidence.
The parties had been in a relationship for over twenty years, and they had
two children, daughters who were born in 2012 and 2018. They had lived
together for many years, but several years ago they separated. In 2022,
defendant obtained an FRO against plaintiff and since that time defendant has
repeatedly claimed that plaintiff violated her FRO.
Plaintiff's claims against defendant relate to events that occurred during a
weekend in June 2024, when he had parenting time with his daughters. Plaintiff
testified that over the course of approximately thirty-six hours defendant had
called the police three times. To put those calls in context, plaintiff explained
1 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this domestic violence matter. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). A-0146-24 2 that just a few days before his parenting time, he had dismissed a temporary
restraining order against defendant and had entered a consent order containing
civil restraints that prohibited defendant from harassing him.
The evidence showed that defendant first called the police approximately
an hour after plaintiff had picked up the daughters at 6:00 p.m. on June 21, 2024.
Defendant had listened to a phone conversation between plaintiff and the oldest
daughter, who was then twelve years old. Defendant called the police alleging
that plaintiff had violated her FRO by making negative comments about her.
The second call to the police was made at approximately 2:00 a.m. on June
22, 2024. Plaintiff explained that the police called him sometime after 2:00 a.m.
while he was sleeping. The police informed plaintiff that defendant had called
claiming that he was communicating with her by sending her text messages.
Plaintiff told the police that he was not texting with defendant and the officers
then spoke with plaintiff's mother, who apparently explained that she had been
texting with defendant.
The third call to the police was made later on June 22, 2024. Plaintiff
testified that two police officers came to his apartment to conduct a welfare
check on the children. Defendant acknowledged that she had called the police
to conduct a welfare check because she had spoken with her daughter who was
A-0146-24 3 upset, the conversation had abruptly ended, and when she tried to contact
plaintiff through a parenting app, he did not immediately respond.
Plaintiff also testified that defendant had a history of calling the police
and claiming that he had violated the FRO. Plaintiff stated that he was
concerned that defendant was trying to get him arrested and he feared that she
would continue to use her FRO to try to get him arrested. He gave several
examples of how he felt defendant was using her FRO as a weapon against him.
One example involved plaintiff notifying defendant that he was going to a
certain bar on a particular evening. Plaintiff explained that under defendant's
FRO, he was to give her such notice so that they would not come into contact.
Defendant admitted on cross-examination, however, that after plaintiff had
given her notice, she had gone to the bar the same night, forcing plaintiff to
leave so that he could avoid being charged with a violation of defendant's FRO.
Defendant further admitted on cross-examination, that on another occasion she
had asked a woman to set plaintiff up during a date so that he would violate
defendant's FRO.
After hearing the testimony from both parties, and after considering the
exhibits that had been entered into evidence, the trial court made oral findings
A-0146-24 4 of facts and conclusions of law on the record. Thereafter, the court submitted
an October 3, 2024 letter amplifying its decision.
The trial court found plaintiff's testimony to be credible and defendant's
testimony to be incredible. The court then found that defendant had no valid
justification for contacting the police on any of the three occasions and that she
made the contacts with the purpose of harassing plaintiff. Specifically, the trial
court found that defendant had violated subsection (a) of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.
The trial court also found that plaintiff needed an FRO to protect him
against future acts of harassment. In that regard, the trial court determined that
defendant had engaged in a series of prior misuses of her FRO and that she was
using that FRO to harass plaintiff.
Finally, the court found that defendant had engaged in a series of actions
that demonstrated that she was trying to coercively control plaintiff in violation
of the Act. See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(7)(e). The trial court reasoned that
defendant's reports to the police were her attempts to try to control plaintiff by
setting him up so that it appeared he was violating her FRO.
II.
On appeal, defendant makes two arguments, contending that the trial court
erred in (1) allowing hearsay evidence to be introduced by plaintiff; and (2)
A-0146-24 5 making erroneous findings of fact that were not supported by the record. The
record and law do not support either of defendant's arguments.
Our scope of review of an FRO is limited. C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super.
419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). We accord substantial deference to family courts'
findings of fact because of their special expertise in family matters. N.J. Div.
of Youth and Fam. Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010) (quoting Cesare
v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). That deference is particularly strong when
the evidence is largely testimonial and rests on a court's credibility findings. See
Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015). We will "not disturb the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the trial [court] unless we are convinced that
they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,
relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice."
Balducci v. Cige, 456 N.J. Super. 219, 233 (App. Div.
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RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0146-24
R.M.K.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
S.S.L.,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted September 9, 2025 – Decided September 26, 2025
Before Judges Gilson and Perez Friscia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket No. FV-15-2481-24.
S.S.L., appellant pro se.
R.M.K., respondent pro se.
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from a final restraining order (FRO) entered under the
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, based on a predicate act of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. We affirm because the trial
court's factual findings are supported by substantial credible evidence, and it
correctly applied the law. 1
I.
We discern the facts from the record developed at a one-day trial
conducted on July 30, 2024. Plaintiff was represented by counsel and defendant
represented herself. Both parties testified and no other witnesses were called.
The parties also submitted several exhibits into evidence.
The parties had been in a relationship for over twenty years, and they had
two children, daughters who were born in 2012 and 2018. They had lived
together for many years, but several years ago they separated. In 2022,
defendant obtained an FRO against plaintiff and since that time defendant has
repeatedly claimed that plaintiff violated her FRO.
Plaintiff's claims against defendant relate to events that occurred during a
weekend in June 2024, when he had parenting time with his daughters. Plaintiff
testified that over the course of approximately thirty-six hours defendant had
called the police three times. To put those calls in context, plaintiff explained
1 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this domestic violence matter. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). A-0146-24 2 that just a few days before his parenting time, he had dismissed a temporary
restraining order against defendant and had entered a consent order containing
civil restraints that prohibited defendant from harassing him.
The evidence showed that defendant first called the police approximately
an hour after plaintiff had picked up the daughters at 6:00 p.m. on June 21, 2024.
Defendant had listened to a phone conversation between plaintiff and the oldest
daughter, who was then twelve years old. Defendant called the police alleging
that plaintiff had violated her FRO by making negative comments about her.
The second call to the police was made at approximately 2:00 a.m. on June
22, 2024. Plaintiff explained that the police called him sometime after 2:00 a.m.
while he was sleeping. The police informed plaintiff that defendant had called
claiming that he was communicating with her by sending her text messages.
Plaintiff told the police that he was not texting with defendant and the officers
then spoke with plaintiff's mother, who apparently explained that she had been
texting with defendant.
The third call to the police was made later on June 22, 2024. Plaintiff
testified that two police officers came to his apartment to conduct a welfare
check on the children. Defendant acknowledged that she had called the police
to conduct a welfare check because she had spoken with her daughter who was
A-0146-24 3 upset, the conversation had abruptly ended, and when she tried to contact
plaintiff through a parenting app, he did not immediately respond.
Plaintiff also testified that defendant had a history of calling the police
and claiming that he had violated the FRO. Plaintiff stated that he was
concerned that defendant was trying to get him arrested and he feared that she
would continue to use her FRO to try to get him arrested. He gave several
examples of how he felt defendant was using her FRO as a weapon against him.
One example involved plaintiff notifying defendant that he was going to a
certain bar on a particular evening. Plaintiff explained that under defendant's
FRO, he was to give her such notice so that they would not come into contact.
Defendant admitted on cross-examination, however, that after plaintiff had
given her notice, she had gone to the bar the same night, forcing plaintiff to
leave so that he could avoid being charged with a violation of defendant's FRO.
Defendant further admitted on cross-examination, that on another occasion she
had asked a woman to set plaintiff up during a date so that he would violate
defendant's FRO.
After hearing the testimony from both parties, and after considering the
exhibits that had been entered into evidence, the trial court made oral findings
A-0146-24 4 of facts and conclusions of law on the record. Thereafter, the court submitted
an October 3, 2024 letter amplifying its decision.
The trial court found plaintiff's testimony to be credible and defendant's
testimony to be incredible. The court then found that defendant had no valid
justification for contacting the police on any of the three occasions and that she
made the contacts with the purpose of harassing plaintiff. Specifically, the trial
court found that defendant had violated subsection (a) of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.
The trial court also found that plaintiff needed an FRO to protect him
against future acts of harassment. In that regard, the trial court determined that
defendant had engaged in a series of prior misuses of her FRO and that she was
using that FRO to harass plaintiff.
Finally, the court found that defendant had engaged in a series of actions
that demonstrated that she was trying to coercively control plaintiff in violation
of the Act. See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(7)(e). The trial court reasoned that
defendant's reports to the police were her attempts to try to control plaintiff by
setting him up so that it appeared he was violating her FRO.
II.
On appeal, defendant makes two arguments, contending that the trial court
erred in (1) allowing hearsay evidence to be introduced by plaintiff; and (2)
A-0146-24 5 making erroneous findings of fact that were not supported by the record. The
record and law do not support either of defendant's arguments.
Our scope of review of an FRO is limited. C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super.
419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). We accord substantial deference to family courts'
findings of fact because of their special expertise in family matters. N.J. Div.
of Youth and Fam. Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010) (quoting Cesare
v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). That deference is particularly strong when
the evidence is largely testimonial and rests on a court's credibility findings. See
Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015). We will "not disturb the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the trial [court] unless we are convinced that
they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,
relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice."
Balducci v. Cige, 456 N.J. Super. 219, 233 (App. Div. 2018) (alteration in
original) (quoting In re Forfeiture of Pers. Weapons & Firearms Identification
Card Belonging to F.M., 225 N.J. 487, 506 (2016)).
When determining whether to grant an FRO under the Act, a judge must
undertake a two-part analysis. Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27
(App. Div. 2006). "First, the judge must determine whether the plaintiff has
proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the
A-0146-24 6 predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125.
Second, the judge must determine whether a restraining order is necessary to
protect the plaintiff from immediate harm or further acts of violence. Id. at 126-
27.
The judge in this matter determined that defendant committed the
predicate act of harassment. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a),
a person commits a petty disorderly persons offense [of harassment,] if, with purpose to harass another, he [or she]:
a. Makes, or causes to be made, one or more communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm[.]
A "'finding of a purpose to harass may be inferred from the evidence presented,'
and [the Supreme Court has] observed that '[c]ommon sense and experience may
inform that determination.'" J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 477 (2011) (alteration
in original) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577 (1997)).
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that there was sufficient
credible evidence supporting the trial court's determination that defendant
committed the predicate act of harassment under subsection (a). The trial court
found that defendant had contacted the police three times in a relatively short
A-0146-24 7 period of time and that there was no good reason why defendant was contacting
the police to claim that plaintiff was violating her FRO. In that regard, the trial
court expressly rejected defendant's claim that she reasonably believed that
plaintiff was violating her FRO. Instead, the trial court found that defendant
was contacting the police without justification and with the purpose of harassing
plaintiff. Those findings are supported by the substantial credible evidence
presented at the trial. Moreover, those findings satisfy the elements of
harassment under subsection (a). See N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a).
We are also satisfied that there was credible evidence supporting the trial
court's finding that plaintiff needed a restraining order. The court credited
plaintiff's testimony concerning several prior instances where defendant had
misused her FRO in an improper attempt to set up plaintiff and to coercively
control him. Accordingly, the record demonstrates that the FRO in favor of
plaintiff was necessary to protect him from further abuses by defendant and there
was sufficient evidence in the record supporting both prongs needed for an FRO.
See Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-27.
Defendant's arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. First, defendant
argues that the trial court erred by allowing plaintiff to introduce hearsay
evidence. In that regard, defendant points to P2 through P5 and contends that
A-0146-24 8 those exhibits contained out-of-court statements made by people who were not
present in court to testify. In making its rulings, the trial court was careful to
consider when hearsay evidence was offered and pointed out that it would not
rely on that hearsay evidence. Accordingly, the record at trial and the court's
decision make it clear that the court was considering only admissible evidence
in making its findings of fact. Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied that
the trial court did not use hearsay in making any of its material findings of fact.
Indeed, most of the court's factual findings were based on defendant's testimony
and the admissions that she made concerning her repeated contacts with the
police.
Second, defendant argues that the trial court made erroneous findings and
abused its discretion. The record simply does not support that contention. The
trial court made specific and detailed findings of facts concerning defendant's
acts of harassment. As we have summarized, those findings are supported by
substantial credible evidence and are consistent with well-established law.
Defendant obviously disagrees with the trial court's findings, but her differing
views are not supported by the record.
Affirmed.
A-0146-24 9