R.M., a Minor v. STATE OF ALASKA

Opinion

2026 WL 2208504

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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.

Court of Appeals of Alaska.

R.M., a minor, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. A-14716

July 31, 2026

Trial Court No. 3PA-24-00018 DL

Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Palmer, John C. Cagle, Judge.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Appearances: Megan R. Webb (briefing) and Emily Jura (oral argument), Assistant Public Defenders, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Ann B. Black, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Stephen J. Cox, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.

OPINION

Judge WOLLENBERG.

Star page 1*1 When a court is considering the appropriate disposition for a juvenile who has been adjudicated a delinquent minor, the court must impose a disposition that is “no more restrictive than is, in the judgment of the court, most conducive to the minor's rehabilitation taking into consideration the interests of the public.”¹ Consonant with this statutory language, there is no question that one of the paramount goals of the juvenile justice system is rehabilitation of the minor. The question we must confront in this appeal is whether a court may, upon consideration of “the interests of the public,” issue a disposition order authorizing detention of a juvenile for reasons outside of rehabilitation and public safety alone, such as seriousness of the crime, culpability, and accountability for the minor's delinquent act. Having reviewed the legislative history of the relevant juvenile delinquency statutes, we conclude that the answer to this question is “yes.”

When R.M. was fourteen years old, he was involved in a fistfight among a group of teenagers in a movie theater. R.M. had a knife with him, and he stabbed another teenager, L.S., who died later that day.

Based on this incident, the State filed a petition for adjudication of delinquency alleging that R.M. committed second-degree murder and manslaughter.² R.M. subsequently admitted to, and was adjudicated a delinquent minor for, committing manslaughter, and the State dismissed the remaining allegation.

The court later imposed an order under AS 47.12.120(b)(1) committing R.M. to the custody of the Department of Family and Community Services (Department) for up to two years, weighing as factors in its decision the seriousness of R.M.’s offense, R.M.’s culpability in killing another person, and the deterrent effect of detention on R.M.’s future conduct.³

R.M. now appeals this disposition order, arguing that the court erred in imposing an order authorizing detention instead of a less restrictive probationary order. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we affirm the disposition order.

Background facts and prior proceedings

On April 12, 2024, Wasilla police officers responded to a report of a stabbing at a local movie theater. Fourteen-year-old R.M. and six of his friends, including D.M., had been watching a movie when they began harassing and teasing a couple sitting near them — H.A. and his girlfriend. The couple and their friend left the theater and returned with two additional friends, one of whom was L.S. The groups engaged in verbal challenges to fight, and a fistfight then broke out.

Witness accounts of the fight varied slightly, but it was generally reported that after the fight broke out, D.M. and L.S. started fighting, and D.M. punched L.S., who fell to the ground. D.M. then turned to go up the theater stairs after H.A. when he heard someone (later identified as L.S.) shout, “He stabbed me.” At that, everyone scattered and left the theater.

Star page 2*2 R.M. ran out to the parking lot and hid under a vehicle, where he called his mother and told her that he had stabbed someone. He also texted a group chat entitled “Lil [R.] Farmer's Slaves,” stating, “I stabbed someone” and “my teeth hurt really fucking bad and I got knocked out.”⁴ Two of the people in the group chat replied that he should turn himself in. R.M. called 911.

R.M.’s mother arrived at the movie theater. With his mother present, R.M. gave the police a statement that differed from statements other witnesses gave. R.M. told an officer that D.M. was on the ground and being attacked by four people at once. R.M. said that, in an effort to protect D.M., he came up behind a person who was punching D.M. and stabbed him in the back.

L.S. was taken to the hospital for emergency medical attention. Later that night, L.S. died from his stab wound.

Because R.M. was only fourteen years old at the time of the offense, he was subject to the juvenile delinquency laws set out in AS 47.12.⁵ The State filed a petition for delinquency alleging that R.M. had engaged in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would amount to (1) second-degree murder under an extreme indifference theory and (2) manslaughter.⁶

R.M. was detained for a month at the Mat-Su Youth Facility. After a month of detention, the court released R.M. on a conduct agreement that required him to remain in the sight and sound supervision of his parents or grandparents. R.M. was homeschooled for the school year, and he remained on release without incident for ten months until his disposition hearing.

While R.M. was still detained, a psychologist retained by the defense, Dr. Allen Blair, conducted intelligence, personality, and risk assessments of R.M. and summarized his conclusions in a report. Dr. Blair assessed R.M. as presenting a low risk for future violent reoffending. Dr. Blair diagnosed R.M. with social anxiety disorder and adjustment disorder with anxiety but did not find that he suffered from any conduct disorders, major mental health challenges, or substance abuse issues.

In November 2024, R.M. entered into an agreement with the State in which he admitted to manslaughter, and the State dismissed the second-degree murder allegation. The superior court adjudicated R.M. a delinquent minor and ordered a disposition hearing.

Before the hearing, the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) submitted a predisposition report. In the report, DJJ recommended that R.M. be committed to the custody of the Department for two years, that he be placed in a detention facility, and that he actively participate in treatment.⁷ DJJ acknowledged that R.M. was assessed as low risk overall for future violent reoffending, that he had no prior juvenile history, and that he had not violated any conditions of his conduct agreement since his release from detention. But DJJ noted that, just two weeks prior to the incident in this case, R.M. had been suspended from school for “a physical altercation with another student.”⁸ DJJ also stressed the importance of accountability in light of the seriousness of the offense in this case.

Star page 3*3 The State filed a disposition memorandum in which it similarly requested that the court order that R.M. be committed to Department custody for two years, during which time DJJ would provide counseling to R.M. to address impulse control issues, anger management, and the impacts of having taken another person's life.⁹ The State emphasized the serious nature of the offense and the importance of continued close supervision, noting that R.M.’s prior fight and suspension from school had not deterred him from engaging in a future fight.

R.M. filed a predisposition report requesting probation, a less restrictive placement under which he would remain in the community under the supervision of DJJ and continue counseling.¹⁰ R.M. provided an updated letter from Dr. Blair, in which Dr. Blair stated that R.M. and his mother had been actively participating in treatment with him since the incident. R.M. emphasized that he had been performing well under his release conditions at home and that he posed a low risk to himself and to the public.

At the disposition hearing, the State presented one witness: R.M.’s Juvenile Probation Officer, Paul Caldentey. The State introduced a twelve-second cell phone video of a portion of the fight — a video which, Caldentey testified, undermined R.M.’s assertion that his friend, D.M., was on the ground and under attack by several others when R.M. stabbed L.S. The video did not show that D.M. was under attack by four people but instead showed that D.M. punched L.S. before L.S. collapsed to the ground. The video — which is dark and difficult to see — did not show the stabbing itself, though Caldentey expressed his belief that by the time D.M. punched L.S., L.S. had already been stabbed by R.M.

R.M. presented two witnesses: Dr. Blair and R.M.’s mother. Dr. Blair testified to the results of the testing he had conducted of R.M., which showed that R.M. was at low risk of reoffending and, although he suffered from social anxiety, he had no major psychiatric disorders or substance abuse issues. Dr. Blair testified that he believed that R.M. could be safely treated in the community and opined that for a low-risk minor like R.M., detention in a youth facility may actually increase their risk for future violence.

R.M.’s mother testified that R.M. had previously been suspended from school for fighting; she testified that R.M. “hit somebody who had been bullying him” and that the principal had apologized to her for being unaware of the bullying. On cross-examination, R.M.’s mother acknowledged that R.M. had not reported the bullying to her. R.M.’s mother also testified that she was aware that R.M. carried a folding knife and that he took it hiking and camping.

Several members of L.S.’s family gave victim impact statements that reflected the deep loss they felt from the death of L.S. DJJ also submitted letters from L.S.’s family members and the parents of L.S.’s friends, including some friends who were present at the movie theater. These parents detailed the significant ongoing mental health and behavioral effects on their children from L.S.’s death and the events in the movie theater.

The court then heard arguments from the parties. The prosecutor argued that the interests of the public were broader than simply an assessment of public safety risk and that — taking into account the seriousness of R.M.’s conduct and the harms caused by his conduct — supervision at McLaughlin Youth Center, where the Department could oversee R.M.’s treatment, was the least restrictive disposition. The prosecutor acknowledged that Dr. Blair concluded that R.M. did not present a high risk of future harm but asserted that this did not change the fact that R.M. had made poor decisions and had not provided an explanation for why he used a knife in response to a fistfight. The prosecutor noted that other juveniles at the theater had left and called for help, while R.M. remained and engaged in deadly force. The prosecutor reasoned that because there was no clear indication of why R.M. committed the act, there was uncertainty as to whether R.M. would continue to make poor decisions when confronted with fighting.

Star page 4*4 R.M.’s attorney argued that R.M. was a low-risk offender and that his rehabilitation would be best served by remaining on probation and being treated in the community. R.M.’s attorney argued that R.M. perceived the need to intervene to defend his friend and acted impulsively in a dark theater without thinking of the consequences. The attorney noted that R.M. had been on release for almost a year without any issues, and he contested the notion that a more restrictive disposition was warranted because of the seriousness of the offense.

When R.M.’s attorney argued that R.M. had been carrying only a pocketknife, the court interjected to ask whether it was a pocketknife or a single folding blade. R.M. introduced a photograph of the knife next to a ruler for scale, which showed a folding blade that was over three inches long. The court remarked, “This is not in my definition a pocketknife. This is different.” The court noted that the knife was unlike a Swiss Army knife that would be carried for daily use, and instead was the type of knife it would anticipate would be stored securely, such as in a gun safe.

R.M. gave a statement to the court. In the statement, R.M. said that he “didn't really think before [he] acted,” he regretted his actions, and he wished he could have done things differently. He apologized to the victims. R.M.’s parents spoke, both stating that R.M. was “a good kid” and apologizing to L.S.’s family. R.M.’s mother added that R.M. was “genuinely remorseful,” “fully committed to learning from his mistakes,” and aware “that the weight of this event is something that he will carry forever.”

Three weeks later, the court reconvened to render its oral ruling. The court recognized that there was a presumption against removal of a juvenile from the home — i.e., that the State bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that removal from the home was the least restrictive disposition.¹¹ The court also stated that a paramount goal of the juvenile justice system is rehabilitation and found that R.M. had several factors weighing in his favor, making the decision an extremely difficult one.

But the court emphasized that R.M.’s conduct was the most serious a juvenile could commit. The court found that R.M. and his friends had instigated the situation at the movie theater and that R.M.’s response to what had been a fistfight was to use deadly force. The court underscored that R.M. had carried a “single-bladed folding knife” as a defensive weapon to the theater — a knife that he apparently carried regularly.¹² The court found that R.M.’s statement to the police that he had stabbed L.S. while he was coming to the aid of a friend who was on the ground and being attacked by a group of four was clearly inaccurate; the court was concerned that it did not have any other explanation from R.M. for his conduct. The court further found that, while R.M.’s parents were remorseful, R.M. himself “lacked emotion” and appeared “stoic” before the court. The court noted that R.M. had engaged in two violent acts close in time to one another and, in both instances, R.M. had resorted to violence instead of going to an appropriate authority for help.

Star page 5*5 After reviewing and weighing each of the eight statutory factors set out in AS 47.12.140(1), the court found that the State had proved that a (b)(1) order was the least restrictive alternative disposition conducive to R.M.’s rehabilitation, taking into consideration the interests of the public.¹³ The court acknowledged that R.M. was young, that he had no prior juvenile record and had been successful while on release, and that he presented a low risk for future harm to the public.¹⁴ But the court found that the seriousness of R.M.’s offense and R.M.’s attitude toward it, R.M.’s culpability, and deterrence weighed heavily in favor of a (b)(1) order.¹⁵

For these reasons, the court committed R.M. to the custody of the Department and authorized the Department to place R.M. in a detention center for up to two years. The court noted that the Department had the discretion to “step [the disposition] down” and release R.M. if necessary.¹⁶

R.M. filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied. R.M. now appeals.

Why we uphold the superior court's imposition of a (b)(1) order

On appeal, R.M. challenges the superior court's imposition of a detention order under AS 47.12.120(b)(1). R.M. argues that the State did not establish that a (b)(1) order was the least restrictive alternative disposition, given the evidence that R.M. was succeeding in his current placement at home and that he posed a low risk to the public. R.M. maintains that the court's imposition of the (b)(1) order was based impermissibly on the seriousness of the offense and deterrence, rather than on rehabilitation and protection of the public.¹⁷

Star page 6*6 But R.M.’s contention is predicated on an overly narrow view of “protection of the public” that does not account for the broader interests of the public that the Alaska Legislature has required courts to consider when deciding on the least restrictive disposition in a juvenile case. In order to explain why, we must further examine the law regarding juvenile dispositions, the language and legislative history of the juvenile delinquency statutes and rules, and prior cases of this Court addressing this question.¹⁸

The legal framework applicable to dispositions in juvenile delinquency cases

The juvenile justice system is “specifically designed to address the unique attributes of minors and their needs”¹⁹ by providing “individually focused treatment” rather than “the more societally oriented prosecution and punishment of the adult criminal justice system.”²⁰ It is based on the “parens patriae theory — the concept that the State takes a benevolent attitude toward more youthful offenders because, generally, a person under eighteen years of age does not have mature judgment and may not fully realize the consequences of their acts.”²¹

Alaska Statute 47.12.010 sets out the goals and purposes of the juvenile delinquency system. The statute specifies that the goal of the juvenile delinquency statutes is to “promote a balanced juvenile justice system” in order to “protect the community, impose accountability for violations of law, and equip juvenile offenders with the skills needed to live responsibly and productively.”²² The statute sets out fourteen purposes; these purposes include “respond[ing] to a juvenile offender's needs” and “provid[ing] swift and consistent consequences for crimes committed by juveniles.”²³

Star page 7*7 After a juvenile has been adjudicated a delinquent minor — as R.M. was here — the court must consider an appropriate disposition. Under AS 47.12.120, there are essentially three types of disposition orders available if the court decides to subject the minor to some level of ongoing supervision.²⁴ The least restrictive disposition, set out in subsection (b)(2), is a probation order under which the minor is released to the custody of a parent, guardian, or other suitable person and supervised by the Department on probation for up to two years.²⁵ This is the disposition order R.M. requested.

The next level of restriction, set out in subsection (b)(3), is an order committing the minor to the custody of the Department with authorization to release the minor to the custody of a parent, guardian, other suitable person, or any suitable non-detention residential facility, such as a foster home.²⁶

Finally, the most restrictive disposition is an order under subsection (b)(1), in which the minor is committed to the custody of the Department, and the Department is authorized to make any placement it deems appropriate — including placement in a detention facility.²⁷ This is the order requested by the State and imposed by the superior court.

A second statute, AS 47.12.140, provides guidance to courts on determining the appropriate disposition. Subsection (1) requires courts to consider “both the best interests of the minor and the interests of the public” and outlines eight factors that the court “shall take into account” in evaluating the appropriate disposition.²⁸ These eight factors — which were evaluated by the superior court in R.M.’s case — are:

(A) the seriousness of the minor's delinquent act and the attitude of the minor and the minor's parents toward that act;

(B) the minor's culpability as indicated by the circumstances of the particular case;

(C) the age of the minor;

(D) the minor's prior criminal or juvenile record and the success or failure of any previous orders, dispositions, or placements imposed on the minor;

(E) the effect of the dispositional order to be imposed in deterring the minor from committing other delinquent acts;

(F) the need to commit the minor to the department's custody or to detain the minor in a juvenile treatment facility, juvenile detention facility, secure residential psychiatric treatment center, or other suitable place in order to prevent further harm to the public;

(G) the interest of the public in securing the minor's rehabilitation; and

(H) the ability of the state to take custody of and to care for the minor[.]^[29]

These factors are tied to the “least restrictive alternative disposition” finding in subsection (2) of AS 47.12.140. Subsection (2) requires a court to order the “least restrictive alternative disposition.” The “least restrictive alternative disposition” is defined as the “disposition that is no more restrictive than is, in the judgment of the court, most conducive to the minor's rehabilitation taking into consideration the interests of the public.”³⁰ These overarching goals — rehabilitation and the interests of the public — mirror those governing the eight factors in subsection (1) (“the best interests of the minor and the interests of the public”).

Star page 8*8 Under Alaska Delinquency Rule 11 — the rule governing the burden and standards of proof in juvenile delinquency proceedings — the Department must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the disposition is “the least restrictive alternative appropriate to the needs of the juvenile and the protection of the community.”³¹ Under Delinquency Rule 23 — the rule governing dispositions — a court must enter a disposition order “taking into account the considerations set out in AS 47.12.140”³² (the statute requiring the court to order the disposition “most conducive to the minor's rehabilitation taking into consideration the interests of the public”).³³

R.M.’s argument that the State failed to establish that a (b)(1) order was the least restrictive alternative disposition presumes a narrow view of “protection of the community” that is predicated on the language of Delinquency Rule 11(e) but fails to account for the “interests of the public” as used in AS 47.12.140 (and, by extension, Delinquency Rule 23(d)).

The legislative history of AS 47.12.140 and our interpretation of the phrase “interests of the public”

In previous cases, we have relied on the language of Delinquency Rule 11(e) to describe the twin goals of a dispositional order as “the rehabilitative needs of the juvenile and the protection of the community.”³⁴ But we had no need in those cases to analyze whether the phrase “interests of the public,” as used in AS 47.12.140, was measurably different than the phrase “protection of the community.” R.M.’s argument requires us to interpret the meaning of the “interests of the public,” as used in AS 47.12.140, and determine how this statute interacts with Delinquency Rules 11(e) and 23(d).

This is a legal question which we review on appeal de novo.³⁵ We interpret statutes in light of their plain language, legislative history, and purpose in order to arrive at the rule of law most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.³⁶

Before 1996, the statutes concerning children in need of aid (CINA) and delinquent minors were joined together in former AS 47.10.³⁷ The only statutory guidance for courts entering dispositional orders in CINA and delinquency cases was found in former AS 47.10.082 (pre-1996 version), which instructed courts to consider “the best interest of the child and the public” and the ability of the state to take custody of the child.

Recognizing that this statute provided little guidance to courts in selecting an appropriate disposition, this Court, in R.P. v. State, adopted a burden of proof and a standard to guide courts in making delinquency dispositions.³⁸ In doing so, we looked to the standards promulgated by the Institute of Judicial Administration and ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project and set out the following procedures:

[T]he court must consider and reject less restrictive alternatives prior to imposition of more restrictive alternatives. Further, the state has the burden of proving that less restrictive alternatives are inappropriate by a preponderance of the evidence. The court must enter specific written findings why the less restrictive alternatives are inappropriate in a given case, and those findings must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.^[39]

Star page 9*9 We recognized in R.P. that, in considering the appropriateness of less restrictive alternatives, the court should consider the “seriousness of the offense,” as well as “a juvenile's degree of culpability, the circumstances of a given case, and the age and prior record of the juvenile.”⁴⁰

We also noted in a footnote that, unlike in adult criminal sentencing proceedings, where the goals of sentencing are on equal footing, “the goal of rehabilitation [was] of paramount importance” in juvenile dispositions.⁴¹ We held that, to further this goal, the new standards “create[d] a presumption against coercively removing a child from his or her home in all but extreme cases.”⁴²

The following year (1987), to align the Delinquency Rules with our holding in R.P., the Alaska Supreme Court enacted Delinquency Rule 11(e).⁴³ Upon enactment, Delinquency Rule 11(e) provided: “In order to support a particular disposition, the Department must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the disposition is the least restrictive alternative appropriate to the needs of the juvenile and the protection of the community.”⁴⁴

This remained the state of the law on juvenile dispositions until 1996. That year, in House Bill 387, the legislature separated the provisions of the Alaska Statutes relating to CINA cases and to delinquent minors into different chapters.⁴⁵ Notably, in adopting the new delinquency chapter, the legislature added a statement of general purpose as well as the statute described above, AS 47.12.140, which guides courts on their dispositional decisions.⁴⁶

Representative Pete Kelly, one of the main sponsors of the bill, repeatedly explained to legislative committees that these provisions were intended to provide more guidance and flexibility to courts in juvenile cases and to allow for the imposition of “sanctions” on a delinquent minor when appropriate. When presenting the bill to the House Health, Education, and Social Services (HESS) Committee in February 1996, Representative Kelly explained that the new statutes were intended to establish “a little more policy direction” for courts regarding juvenile dispositions,⁴⁷ and that “the policy of the state will be that we can require some form of sanction on delinquent children.”⁴⁸ He further stated that the existing statute on dispositional orders did not provide adequate guidance to judges, making dispositional orders inconsistent across the state, and he explained that House Bill 387 created criteria to guide judges in making dispositional orders.⁴⁹

Star page 10*10 Early drafts of the bill defined the “least restrictive alternative disposition” as that which was “most conducive to the minor's rehabilitation,” without including the “interests of the public.”⁵⁰ Instead, the drafts included only a list of factors for courts to consider (similar to the factors in the current statute). By the time Representative Kelly presented the bill to the House Judiciary Committee in March 1996 — one month after his presentations to the House HESS Committee — the definition of “least restrictive alternative disposition” had expanded to be that “most conducive to the minor's rehabilitation taking into consideration the interests of the public.”⁵¹

The following month, at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Representative Kelly again explained that the new bill would authorize courts to “sanction delinquent behavior.”⁵² According to Representative Kelly, “one of the most significant changes” was the addition, in AS 47.12.140, of a list of criteria (such as the seriousness of the delinquent act and culpability) to help guide courts in evaluating the best interests of the minor and the interests of the public.⁵³ He asserted that the “least restrictive alternative disposition” requirement, which was not then defined under Alaska statute, had been “a real detriment to actually providing consequences to ... minors,” and he explained that the adoption of a statutory definition of “least restrictive alternative disposition” was intended to “give[ ] the judge a little more flexibility in what to do.”⁵⁴ He declared that the new sections setting out the purposes of the juvenile delinquency laws and providing guidance on juvenile dispositions were “probably the most important” parts of the rewrite of the delinquency code.⁵⁵

With this background, the legislature ultimately adopted AS 47.12.140. Although Delinquency Rule 11(e) contained language that the legislature might have adopted, the legislature instead introduced the criteria in AS 47.12.140(1) as the means for taking into account “both the best interests of the minor and the interests of the public.”⁵⁶ In comparison, the statement of general purpose, codified in former AS 47.12.010, enumerated three purposes of the new delinquent minors chapter, beginning with “to protect the public and to reform juvenile offenders.”⁵⁷

Star page 11*11 The legislature also adopted an accompanying change to Delinquency Rule 23, the court rule governing dispositions.⁵⁸ Before 1996, Delinquency Rule 23(d) required a court to order “the least restrictive alternative disposition ... that addresses the juvenile's treatment needs and protects the public.”⁵⁹ The legislature deleted the direct reference to a “juvenile's treatment needs and protect[ion of] the public” and instead adopted the following language cross-referencing the broader criteria in AS 47.12.140: “The court shall enter its disposition order taking into account the considerations set out in AS 47.12.140.”⁶⁰

In 1998, two years after the separation of the CINA and delinquency chapters, the legislature repealed and reenacted the general purposes section of the delinquency chapter to (essentially) its current form.⁶¹ House Bill 16 made several substantive changes to the juvenile justice system, such as incorporating dual sentencing for certain serious crimes, and it also expanded the statement of the goals and purpose of the juvenile justice system set out in AS 47.12.010.⁶² This revised “goal and purposes” statute explained that the goal of the chapter was “to promote a balanced juvenile justice system in the state to protect the community, impose accountability for violations of law, and equip juvenile offenders with the skills needed to live responsibly and productively,” and it listed fourteen purposes of the chapter, including to “hold each juvenile offender directly accountable for the offender's conduct.”⁶³

Sectional analyses of House Bill 16 explaining this change indicated that the legislature intended to expand the goals and purposes of the delinquency chapter to “[i]ncorporate[ ] elements of the ‘restorative justice model’ into Alaska's goals for juveniles.”⁶⁴ According to Representative Kelly, many of the changes in House Bill 16 were derived from the 1996 Governor's Conference on Youth and Justice, a conference established to review the juvenile code and implement changes to solve the “growing problem” of “juvenile crime.”⁶⁵ The language of the new purposes section came directly from the conference's final report, which stated that one of the “problem[s]” to be solved was that “[u]nder Alaska's current juvenile justice system, not all juvenile offenders are held accountable to their victims, to their communities, or to the state.”⁶⁶ The report proposed amending the purposes section of the delinquency chapter to its current language, including the language about accountability for juvenile offenses.⁶⁷

Star page 12*12 In 2010, following these legislative changes, we recognized in B.F.L. v. State that the policies behind the juvenile justice system had changed.⁶⁸ Although in R.P., we had stated that rehabilitation of the juvenile was of “paramount” importance, in B.F.L., we acknowledged that there were now two goals of juvenile dispositions: “Both AS 47.12.140(2) and Delinquency Rule 11(e) declare that there are two primary goals when choosing the proper disposition in a delinquency proceeding: the rehabilitative needs of the juvenile and the protection of the community.”⁶⁹

As this quote makes clear, however, we continued to cite the language of the rule rather than the language of the statute, notwithstanding the fact that the language of the rule is different than the language of the statute. The rule lists only protection of the community (along with “the needs of the juvenile”); the statute, however, enumerates eight public interests, including but not limited to, “prevent[ing] further harm to the public.”⁷⁰

As we explained above, Delinquency Rule 11(e) was adopted in response to R.P. v. State in 1987, earlier in time than AS 47.12.140. In 1996, the legislature enacted AS 47.12.140, which had the effect of repealing and superseding our dispositional standard from R.P.⁷¹ It is therefore the statute, emphasizing the eight enumerated interests of the public, that governs a court's selection of a least restrictive alternative disposition, and not the potentially more limited requirement from Delinquency Rule 11(e), emphasizing only protection of the community. To the extent our prior decision in B.F.L. conflated these terms, we now clarify that it is the language of the statute and the interests of the public that must guide a court making a juvenile disposition.

Indeed, while Delinquency Rule 11 governs the burden and standards of proof in delinquency proceedings, Delinquency Rule 23(d), which was amended in 1996 at the same time the legislature adopted AS 47.12.140, expressly provides that the court's dispositional order must take into account “the considerations set out in AS 47.12.140.”⁷²

(We note that it is not clear that “protection of the community,” as used in Delinquency Rule 11(e) and B.F.L., is as narrow as R.M.’s argument implies (i.e., that it refers only to public safety or prevention of future crime). Delinquency Rule 11(e) was modeled on R.P., and R.P. itself was clear that, in determining the least restrictive alternative, courts should consider the seriousness of the offense, the minor's degree of culpability, the circumstances of a given case, and the age and prior record of the minor.⁷³ We also note that some states employ a broader meaning of “protection of the public” that is more coextensive with the interests of the public enumerated in AS 47.12.140(1), including factors such as the juvenile's risk of future reoffending, the need for treatment in an institutional setting, and the seriousness of the offense.⁷⁴)

Star page 13*13 In sum, as we recognized in B.F.L., under the statutory scheme that has been in place since 1996, rehabilitation is not the only paramount goal of the juvenile justice system in Alaska.⁷⁵ And since the reenactment of the purposes section of the chapter in 1998, the juvenile justice system has been aimed at, among other things, holding juveniles accountable for their actions.⁷⁶ There remains a presumption against involuntary removal of a minor from their home.⁷⁷ But ultimately, juvenile dispositions are intended to further the rehabilitation of the minor and the interests of the public, which requires courts to consider eight statutory factors, including the seriousness of the minor's delinquent act and the minor's culpability, within the context of each individual case.

We conclude that this scheme allows a court to impose a more restrictive disposition order based on a finding that the interests of public — e.g., seriousness of the minor's delinquent act, the minor's culpability, and deterrence — so require, even when the disposition most conducive to the minor's rehabilitation might be less restrictive. Making such a finding requires a fact-specific inquiry, and our conclusion should not be read to imply that the minor's rehabilitation and the interests of the public necessarily conflict in all cases.⁷⁸

With this framework in mind, we turn to the court's ruling in this case.

Why we conclude that substantial evidence supports the superior court's conclusion that a (b)(1) order is the disposition no more restrictive than is most conducive to R.M.’s rehabilitation in light of the interests of the public

R.M. argues that the State failed to prove that a (b)(1) order was the “least restrictive alternative disposition” — i.e., the disposition that is “no more restrictive than is, in the judgment of the court, most conducive to the minor's rehabilitation taking into consideration the interests of the public.”⁷⁹

We review a superior court's juvenile disposition order to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence.⁸⁰ As we recently clarified in I.J. v. State, we will “affirm the superior court's conclusion that a (b)(1) disposition is the least restrictive alternative if the conclusion is supported by substantial evidence, although what constitutes ‘substantial evidence’ in this context is a question of law that we review de novo using our independent judgment.”⁸¹ Substantial evidence is “evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the challenged conclusion.”⁸²

Star page 14*14 We conclude that the record provides substantial evidence to support the superior court's disposition order. The court began its disposition decision by recognizing that there was a presumption against removing minors from their homes and that the State had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed disposition was the least restrictive alternative.⁸³ The court explained that it had given substantial consideration to the disposition decision, which it described as one of the most difficult in its career. The court then weighed the eight statutory factors as required by AS 47.12.140(1).

On appeal, R.M.’s argument focuses on what he claims are the two goals of a disposition order as set out in AS 47.12.140 and Delinquency Rule 11(e): rehabilitation of the minor and protection of the public. He argues that the State failed to prove that a (b)(1) order would further either of these two goals.

R.M. is correct to point out that neither of these two goals (at least a narrow view of “protection of the public”) would be furthered by a (b)(1) order in R.M.’s case; indeed, the superior court found that both of these goals weighed against a detention order. R.M. was assessed as low risk by Dr. Blair, and the State furnished no contrary evidence suggesting that R.M. was an ongoing danger to the community. R.M. had no prior juvenile record and no issues while on supervised release. Dr. Blair testified that R.M. was engaging in regular therapy while on release and that detention could potentially hinder R.M.’s prospects for rehabilitation.⁸⁴

Star page 15*15 But, as we explained above, R.M.’s argument is premised on the language of Delinquency Rule 11(e), which refers to “the needs of the juvenile and the protection of the community.” Under AS 47.12.140, the two paramount goals of a disposition decision are rehabilitation of the minor and the broader “interests of the public.” The legislature enumerated eight factors for a court to weigh in assessing the best interests of the minor and the interests of the public; preventing further harm to the public is only one of those factors.⁸⁵ Others include “the seriousness of the minor's delinquent act” and “the minor's culpability.”⁸⁶

The court here made its decision on the basis of the seriousness of the delinquent act, R.M.’s culpability, and deterrence. With respect to the seriousness of the offense, the court noted that taking the life of another was “the most serious conduct [that] a juvenile could face.” And the record shows that R.M.’s conduct has had significant and profound impacts not only for L.S.’s family, but also for the other children who were present at the theater or who knew L.S.⁸⁷

The court further found that R.M. was highly culpable for the delinquent act. The court noted that R.M. had admitted to committing manslaughter. The court found that R.M carried a “single bladed folding knife” as a defensive weapon, brought it with him to the theater, and then used it during the fight when no one else present escalated the incident to that level of violence. The court expressed concern about the fact that R.M. carried that type of knife to a theater — a knife that the court previously likened to one that would be kept in a gun safe, and not a pocketknife or a Swiss Army knife.

The court also noted that, within the weeks immediately preceding the offense, R.M. had been suspended from school for fighting. The court found that in both conflicts, R.M. had resorted to violence instead of seeking the help of an adult — and in this instance, had escalated a fistfight to deadly violence.⁸⁸ And as the State noted in its disposition memorandum, the prior school suspension had not deterred R.M. from engaging in a future (and more violent) fight.

The court also addressed R.M.’s attitude and insight toward his conduct.⁸⁹ The court noted that R.M. had provided little explanation to the court about why he had acted as he did.⁹⁰ Based on the information before it, the court found that R.M. had not taken full accountability for killing L.S. because he had given the police a statement after the incident that did not accurately reflect the circumstances of his conduct. R.M. claimed that he was acting to defend one of his friends who was on the ground being attacked by four people. But the court found that this account was undermined by the video recording. The court also found that R.M.’s “stoic” reading of his brief statement of apology in court lacked emotion and suggested he had not internalized the serious consequences of his conduct. These are factual findings for which we, as an appellate court, do not substitute our judgment.

Star page 16*16 We acknowledge that R.M. had been released to the custody of his parents and grandparents without incident during the pendency of the case. But a court's decision regarding a minor's release from detention prior to adjudication is distinct from the court's decision regarding the ultimate disposition of the case. Under the Delinquency Rules, prior to adjudication, the court “may not order detention unless there is no less restrictive alternative which would protect the juvenile and the public or ensure the juvenile's appearance at subsequent hearings.”⁹¹ In contrast, as we have discussed, the twin goals governing a disposition are broader. And it is clear from the legislative history of AS 47.12.140 (governing the court's dispositional order) and AS 47.12.010 (setting out the purposes of the juvenile justice system) that the legislature intended accountability to play a role in dispositions, particularly for more serious offenses.⁹²

This is not to minimize the very real differences that continue to exist between the juvenile justice system and the adult criminal justice system. Although rehabilitation is no longer the only paramount goal of the juvenile justice system, it remains a critical one, given the unique differences that exist between minors and adults.⁹³

But ultimately, when we review a juvenile disposition order, we examine whether the State presented substantial evidence that lesser measures would likely fail to meet the twin goals of disposition.⁹⁴ “Under the ‘substantial evidence’ test, we must uphold the superior court's decision ‘if the record contains evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the challenged conclusion.’ ”⁹⁵ “[O]ur task as an appellate court is not to reweigh the evidence or see if it could possibly be interpreted in a different fashion.”⁹⁶ In this homicide case, where the court expressed uncertainty about what motivated R.M. to escalate his conduct to a deadly level, it was not unreasonable for the court to conclude that a key part of R.M.’s reformation was accountability and that, given the seriousness of the offense, full accountability and deterrence could not be achieved without additional consequences.⁹⁷

Star page 17*17 Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the court's factual findings are supported by the record and that there was substantial evidence to support the imposition of a (b)(1) order.

We nonetheless remind the court and the parties that there are mechanisms in place for renewed court review of the disposition. In addition to the Department's discretion to release R.M. (which the superior court noted), R.M. is entitled to an annual review of the disposition order by the court, and the court “may review the order more frequently to determine if continued placement, probation, or supervision, as it is being provided, is in the best interest of the minor and the public.”⁹⁸ Although we conclude that the disposition decision is supported by substantial evidence, we trust that the court and the parties (including the Department) will continue to periodically review the propriety of a continued (b)(1) placement.

Conclusion

The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.

Footnotes

1

AS 47.12.140(2).

2

AS 11.41.110(a)(2) and AS 11.41.120(a)(1), respectively.

3

The Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), formerly a part of the Department of Health and Social Services, is now a division of the Department of Family and Community Services.

4

The “R.” was R.M.’s first name. R.M. was apparently hit inadvertently by D.M.

5

See AS 47.12.020 (addressing jurisdiction of juvenile delinquency laws). Given his age, R.M.’s case was not subject to automatic waiver into adult criminal court (which applies to minors who are at least sixteen years old at the time of the offense and commit certain serious crimes). See AS 47.12.030. The State did not seek an order for discretionary waiver into adult court. See AS 47.12.100(a).

6

AS 11.41.110(a)(2) and AS 11.41.120(a)(1), respectively.

7

See AS 47.12.120(b)(1).

8

Dr. Blair had also referenced this fight in his report. R.M. reported to Dr. Blair that he had fought a person at school who had been bullying him, and he received a three-day suspension. R.M. acknowledged that he should have reported the bullying to the school rather than engage in the fight.

9

See AS 47.12.120(b)(1).

10

See AS 47.12.120(b)(2).

11

See B.F.L. v. State, 233 P.3d 1118, 1123-24 (Alaska App. 2010) (recognizing that “[t]he presumption against involuntary removal [from the child's home] is simply the legal corollary of the rule that the State must affirmatively prove that the superior court's chosen disposition is the ‘least restrictive alternative’ ”).

12

Dr. Blair testified that R.M. told him he had carried a knife for personal protection.

13

See AS 47.12.140(2) (defining the “least restrictive alternative disposition”).

14

See AS 47.12.140(1)(C), (D), (F).

15

See AS 47.12.140(1)(A), (B), (E). The court found that two of the factors were neutral. See AS 47.12.140(1)(G)-(H).

16

See AS 47.12.120(b)(1) (providing that “the minor may be released from placement or detention and placed on probation on order of the court and may also be released by the department, in its discretion, under AS 47.12.260”); AS 47.12.260 (“A minor found to be a juvenile delinquent who by conduct gives sufficient evidence of having reformed may be released at any time under the conditions and regulations that the department considers proper, if it appears to the satisfaction of the department that there is a reasonable probability that the minor will remain at liberty without violating the law.”).

17

R.M. also raises an additional claim, which requires only minimal discussion. Specifically, R.M. argues that the superior court impermissibly relied on documents that were not formally introduced into evidence — i.e., the petition for delinquency and the predisposition report — to support its “least restrictive alternative disposition” finding.

But at disposition, the court repeatedly stated that it had limited information about the underlying events in the case and announced its intent to rely on the petition and predisposition report in addition to the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing. R.M. did not object. Indeed, on more than one occasion, R.M.’s attorney himself directly acknowledged, without objection, the court's reliance on the petition. And notably, the information contained in the petition was all largely contained in the predisposition report, to which R.M. similarly did not object, and Dr. Blair's report, which the defense itself submitted.

Moreover, predisposition reports are required by statute and court rule and are akin to criminal presentence reports, which are not admitted into evidence although their contents may be challenged. Compare AS 47.12.130(a), and Alaska Delinq. R. 22(a), 23(a) (juvenile predisposition report), with Alaska R. Crim. P. 32.1(b) (presentence report). See also Alaska Delinq. R. 2(g) (defining a “[d]isposition hearing” as “analogous to a sentencing hearing in a criminal case”); cf. Ulak v. State, 238 P.3d 1254, 1256-57 (Alaska App. 2010) (describing the processes for challenging assertions in a presentence report). R.M. had advance notice of all the information in the predisposition report and an opportunity to object to that information, but he did not dispute the contents of the report, which included a description of the underlying events. Cf. J.C.W. v. State, 880 P.2d 1067, 1071 (Alaska App. 1994) (recognizing the broad discretion of a court at a disposition hearing to consider relevant materials so long as the parties have notice and an opportunity to object); Diego K. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Children's Servs., 411 P.3d 622, 628-29 (Alaska 2018) (distinguishing, in the context of a child in need of aid case, the court's impermissible reliance in its removal decision on unsworn statements from earlier status hearings with a court's permissible reliance on unsworn statements in predisposition reports, which must be provided to the parties in advance of the relevant hearing). Because R.M. did not object to the contents of the predisposition report, the State was not on notice of the need to adduce evidence to meet any challenge. We find no plain error as to this claim.

18

See Bowen v. State, 533 P.3d 935, 937 (Alaska App. 2023) (“When we interpret a statute, we ‘consider its language, its purpose, and its legislative history, in an attempt to give effect to the legislature's intent, with due regard for the meaning the statutory language conveys to others.’ ” (quoting Cleveland v. State, 241 P.3d 504, 506 (Alaska App. 2010))).

19

I.J. v. State, 553 P.3d 1263, 1272 (Alaska App. 2024).

20

Waterman v. State, 342 P.3d 1261, 1267 (Alaska App. 2015).

21

Id. (quoting State v. Morgan, 111 P.3d 360, 365 (Alaska App. 2005) (Mannheimer, J., dissenting)).

22

AS 47.12.010(a).

23

AS 47.12.010(b). This subsection provides in full:

(b) The purposes of this chapter are to

(1) respond to a juvenile offender's needs in a manner that is consistent with

(A) prevention of repeated criminal behavior;

(B) restoration of the community and victim;

(C) protection of the public; and

(D) development of the juvenile into a productive citizen;

(2) protect citizens from juvenile crime;

(3) hold each juvenile offender directly accountable for the offender's conduct;

(4)provide swift and consistent consequences for crimes committed by juveniles;

(5)make the juvenile justice system more open, accessible, and accountable to the public;

(6) require parental or guardian participation in the juvenile justice process;

(7)create an expectation that parents will be held responsible for the conduct and needs of their children;

(8)ensure that victims, witnesses, parents, foster parents, guardians, juvenile offenders, and all other interested parties are treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, and sensitivity throughout all legal proceedings;

(9) provide due process through which juvenile offenders, victims, parents, and guardians are assured fair legal proceedings during which constitutional and other legal rights are recognized and enforced;

(10) divert juveniles from the formal juvenile justice process through early intervention as warranted when consistent with the protection of the public;

(11) provide an early, individualized assessment and action plan for each juvenile offender in order to prevent further criminal behavior through the development of appropriate skills in the juvenile offender so that the juvenile is more capable of living productively and responsibly in the community;

(12) ensure that victims and witnesses of crimes committed by juveniles are afforded the same rights as victims and witnesses of crimes committed by adults;

(13) encourage and provide opportunities for local communities and groups to play an active role in the juvenile justice process in ways that are culturally relevant; and

(14) review and evaluate regularly and independently the effectiveness of programs and services under this chapter.

24

B.F.L. v. State, 233 P.3d 1118, 1119 (Alaska App. 2010). The court may also order the minor and the minor's parent to make suitable restitution or order the minor committed to the Department for placement in an adventure-based education program. AS 47.12.120(b)(4)-(5).

25

This two-year period can be extended under certain specified circumstances. AS 47.12.120(b)(2).

26

AS 47.12.120(b)(3); B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1119.

27

AS 47.12.140(b)(1); B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1119.

28

AS 47.12.140(1).

29

Id.

30

AS 47.12.140(2).

31

Alaska Delinq. R. 11(e).

32

Alaska Delinq. R. 23(d); see AS 47.12.140(1) (setting out the factors a court must evaluate in determining the appropriate disposition).

33

AS 47.12.140(2).

34

See B.F.L. v. State, 233 P.3d 1118, 1124 (Alaska App. 2010) (“Both AS 47.12.140(2) and Delinquency Rule 11(e) declare that there are two primary goals when choosing the proper disposition in a delinquency proceeding: the rehabilitative needs of the juvenile and the protection of the community.”); I.J. v. State, 553 P.3d 1263, 1268 n.8 (Alaska App. 2024) (stating that the two goals of a dispositional order are “the rehabilitative needs of the juvenile and the protection of the community” (quoting B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1124)).

35

See Baker v. Duffus, 542 P.3d 1153, 1155 (Alaska 2024).

36

Id. at 1156

37

See SLA 1996, ch. 59.

38

R.P. v. State, 718 P.2d 168, 169 (Alaska App. 1986), superseded by statute, AS 47.12.140, as recognized in B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1122-24.

39

Id. at 169 (citing Institute of Judicial Administration & American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice Standards Project: Standards Relating to Dispositions § 2.1, at 34-38 (Tent. Draft 1977)).

40

Id. at 169-70. We remanded R.P.’s case to the superior court for further proceedings since the court predicated its decision to place R.P. in an institution almost entirely on the seriousness of the offense, without considering R.P.’s level of culpability in the crime or the circumstances under which the crime arose. Id. at 170.

41

Id. at 169 n.1.

42

Id.

43

SCO 845 (effective Aug. 15, 1987). We have reviewed the rule history of SCO 845, which indicates that Delinquency Rule 11(e) was intended to respond to the rule announced in R.P.

44

SCO 845 (effective Aug. 15, 1987). In 1998, the language of the rule was slightly modified to include a reference to dual sentencing. SCO 1349 (effective Dec. 1, 1998). The rule currently provides: “In order to support a particular disposition, including a disposition ordered as part of a dual sentence, the Department must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the disposition is the least restrictive alternative appropriate to the needs of the juvenile and the protection of the community.”

45

SLA 1996, ch. 59.

46

SLA 1996, ch. 59, § 46.

47

Audio of House HESS Committee, H.B. 387, statement of Representative Pete Kelly, at 20:04 - 20:06 (Feb. 22, 1996).

48

Id. at 19:37 - 19:44 (statement of Representative Pete Kelly); see also id. at 20:06 - 20:13 (statement of Representative Pete Kelly) (stating that, “regarding delinquent children, in fact we may provide sanctions for misbehavior”); Audio of House HESS Committee, H.B. 387, statement of Representative Pete Kelly, at 8:17 - 9:10 (Feb. 29, 1996) (stating that, under the new statute, sanctions may be appropriate in addressing delinquent conduct).

49

Audio of House HESS Committee, H.B. 387, statement of Representative Pete Kelly, at 29:40 - 30:28 (Feb. 22, 1996).

50

See S.S.H.B. 387, 19th Legislature, 2d Session, Version B (as introduced Jan. 19, 1996); C.S.S.S.H.B. 387, 19th Legislature, 2d Session, Version C (as introduced by the HESS Committee Mar. 8, 1996).

51

C.S.S.S.H.B. 387, 19th Legislature, 2d Session, Version D (as introduced by the House Judiciary Committee Mar. 21, 1996) (emphasis added); see also Audio of House Judiciary Committee, H.B. 387, statement of Representative Pete Kelly, at 24:48 - 26:35 (Mar. 20, 1996).

52

Audio of Senate Judiciary Committee, H.B. 387, statement of Representative Pete Kelly, at 21:55 - 22:32 (Apr. 15, 1996).

53

Id. at 23:15 - 24:00 (statement of Representative Pete Kelly).

54

Id. at 24:12 - 25:11 (statement of Representative Pete Kelly). Representative Kelly explained that the new definition of “least restrictive” was intended to provide criteria for how to evaluate the minor's best interests rather than just having courts assume that the least restrictive alternative disposition in fact (e.g., a home placement versus an institutional placement) was always in the minor's best interests. Id. at 24:51 - 25:30 (statement of Representative Pete Kelly).

55

Id. at 25:30 - 25:50 (statement of Representative Pete Kelly); see also id. at 23:15 (statement of Representative Pete Kelly) (describing proposed AS 47.12.140 as “one of the most significant changes” in the bill).

56

SLA 1996, ch. 59, § 46.

57

Id. (emphasis added). The second identified purpose provided that, for the most common offenses committed by minors, misdemeanor offenses, “resolution should require some form of sanction, that the form of the sanction should be certain, [and] that the imposition of the sanction should be swift,” and the third purpose was to include the minor's parent or guardian in the minor's counseling and treatment if appropriate. Id. This statement of purpose was repealed and reenacted with modified language in 1998. SLA 1998, ch. 107, § 15.

58

SLA 1996, ch. 59, § 56.

59

SCO 845 (effective Aug. 15, 1987).

60

SLA 1996, ch. 59, § 56; see also SCO 1269 (effective July 15, 1997) (amending Delinquency Rule 23(d) to conform to the statutory change).

61

See SLA 1998, ch. 107, § 15. Representative Kelly was again one of the sponsors of this bill, House Bill 16.

62

See SLA 1998, ch. 107, §§ 15, 19 (expanding goals and purposes of the chapter and adding dual sentencing provisions).

63

AS 47.12.010(a)-(b); SLA 1998, ch. 107, § 15. This section has been amended only once since 1998, to include foster parents. SLA 1999, ch. 40, § 1; AS 47.12.010(b)(8).

64

Commentary and Sectional Analysis for H.B. 16, prepared for the House Finance Committee (Feb. 26, 1998) at 71; Commentary and Sectional Analysis for H.B. 16, prepared for the Senate Finance Committee (Apr. 29, 1998), at 31.

65

Audio of House HESS Committee, H.B. 16, statement of Representative Pete Kelly, at 0:37 - 1:50 (Apr. 25, 1997).

66

State of Alaska, The Governor's Conference on Youth and Justice, Final Report, at 217 (Oct. 1996).

67

Id. at 217, 219, 221.

68

B.F.L. v. State, 233 P.3d 1118, 1121 n.1, 1124 (Alaska App. 2010).

69

Id. (noting that, in R.P., we were “exercising our common-law power to declare the law in the absence of a governing statute or court rule,” but AS 47.12.140 “replaced any contrary common-law rule that this Court announced in R.P.”).

70

Compare Alaska Delinq. R. 11(e), with AS 47.12.140(1).

71

See B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1124.

72

SLA 1996, ch. 59, § 56.

73

R.P. v. State, 718 P.2d 168, 169-70 (Alaska App. 1986); see also In re J.H., 758 P.2d 1287, 1292 (Alaska App. 1988) (stating that “[n]either the seriousness of J.H.’s offense nor her prior record establishe[d] a need for institutionalization as opposed to residential treatment” and thus implying that seriousness of the offense might be a sufficient ground in extreme circumstances), superseded by statute, AS 47.12.140, as recognized in B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1122-24.

Indeed, the ABA standard on which R.P. relied identified the seriousness of the offense as a primary factor for courts to consider in evaluating the least restrictive alternative disposition. This standard provided, in part:

2.1 Least restrictive alternative. In choosing among statutorily permissible dispositions, the court should employ the least restrictive category and duration of disposition that is appropriate to the seriousness of the offense, as modified by the degree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case, and by the age and prior record of the juvenile.

Institute of Judicial Administration & American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice Standards Project: Standards Relating to Dispositions § 2.1, at 34 (Tent. Draft 1977).

74

See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3313 (2026) (setting out the criteria for imposing an institutional disposition); see also, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2501(c) (2026) (listing five factors to weigh in evaluating which disposition will “protect the public” and “meet the needs and best interests of the juvenile,” including the seriousness of the offense, accountability, public safety, culpability, and the rehabilitative and treatment needs of the juvenile); cf. State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970) (stating that, in adult criminal sentencing, “[m]ultiple goals are encompassed” within “the principles of reformation and necessity of protecting the public”).

75

B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1124. During oral argument, R.M. referenced a post-1996 case of the Alaska Supreme Court, State v. Sandsness, that recognized rehabilitation as the paramount goal of the juvenile justice system and suggested that this case binds this Court. State v. Sandsness, 72 P.3d 299 (Alaska 2003). But Sandsness was a civil case, which involved the Department's tort liability to the family of a gunshot victim of a juvenile who had been released from its custody. Id. at 300. The supreme court's statement that rehabilitation is the express purpose of juvenile jurisdiction was not essential (and therefore dicta) to its larger holding that the Department owed no duty of care to the victim. Id. at 302-03. Moreover, the court did not recognize or engage in any legislative history analysis of the 1996 statutory changes, instead relying for that proposition on Rust v. State, a much earlier, and now outdated, 1978 opinion. Id. (citing Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134, 140 n.21 (Alaska 1978)).

76

AS 47.12.010.

77

B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1118, 1123-24 (Alaska App. 2010) (recognizing that “Delinquency Rule 11(e) and AS 47.12.140 still embody a presumption against the involuntary removal of a minor from their home,” as this “is simply the legal corollary of the rule that the State must affirmatively prove that the superior court's chosen disposition is the ‘least restrictive alternative’ ”).

78

Cf. In re T.J.L., 558 P.3d 855, 860 (Or. App. 2024) (recognizing that the term “accountability” can be used in different ways, including “to express the idea that taking personal responsibility for wrongdoing is important to personal growth and reformation, which is in line with the goal of rehabilitation” set out in the juvenile justice system).

79

AS 47.12.140(2).

80

I.J. v. State, 553 P.3d 1263, 1270 (Alaska App. 2024).

81

Id.

82

Id. at 1268 (quoting B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1124).

R.M. asks us to revisit this standard of review. R.M. likens a juvenile disposition order to a civil commitment order and notes that the Alaska Supreme Court treats its review of civil commitment orders as a mixed question of fact and law. See In re Danielle B., 453 P.3d 200, 202-03 (Alaska 2019). But civil commitment cases do not provide an apt analogy to juvenile dispositions. When we review a disposition in a juvenile delinquency case, we are reviewing a disposition after an adjudication for criminal conduct has already occurred. In that respect, a juvenile disposition hearing is more akin procedurally to a sentencing hearing in an adult criminal case, and the Alaska Delinquency Rules directly analogize a juvenile disposition hearing to a sentencing hearing. See Alaska Delinq. R. 2(g).

When we review whether an adult criminal sentence is excessive, we apply a deferential “clearly mistaken” standard of review. McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974). As Judge Mannheimer noted in his concurring opinion in M.P.M. v. State, a juvenile disposition is “an exercise of discretion,” resting on “a judge's subjective evaluation of the historical facts of the case, on the judge's assessment of the probable success or failure of various treatment strategies, and on the judge's weighing of the major juvenile ‘sentencing’ goals specified by Alaska Delinquency Rule 11(e) and AS 47.12.140(2).” M.P.M. v. State, 1998 WL 317621, at *4 (Alaska App. June 17, 1998) (unpublished) (Mannheimer, J., concurring). This arguably calls for some measure of deference by this Court to the superior court. Indeed, the phrase “least restrictive alternative disposition,” as defined in the statute, refers expressly to that disposition which is “in the judgment of the court” most conducive to the minor's rehabilitation in light of the interests of the public. AS 47.12.140(2) (emphasis added).

We nonetheless think there is good reason to distinguish the standard of review applicable to an adult sentencing hearing from the standard of review applicable to a juvenile disposition, since in the adult sentencing context, we analyze whether the court's sentencing decision falls within “a permissible range of reasonable sentences.” Erickson v. State, 950 P.2d 580, 586 (Alaska App. 1997) (quoting State v. Wentz, 805 P.2d 962, 965 (Alaska 1991)). In contrast, in a juvenile disposition, we evaluate a court's decision that the chosen disposition is the “least restrictive alternative disposition.” AS 47.12.140(2).

We therefore conclude that there is no reason to revisit our reliance on the “substantial evidence” standard to review a superior court's determination of the least restrictive alternative disposition. In doing so, we note that many jurisdictions apply an even more deferential “abuse of discretion” standard of review when evaluating a superior court's imposition of a detention order. See, e.g., In re Amber S., 238 P.3d 632, 635 (Ariz. App. 2010); In re A.H., 338 Cal. Rptr. 3d 860, 867 (Cal. App. 2025); A.F. v. State, 247 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. App. 2024); State ex rel. C.H., 335 So.3d 451, 461 (La. App. 2022); People ex rel. J.A.D., 32 N.W.3d 673, 682 (S.D. 2026); State ex rel. J.G., 145 A.3d 1179, 1184 (Pa. Super. 2016); State v. J.S., 757 S.E.2d 622, 628 (W. Va. 2014). We will, of course, continue to review de novo any legal questions inherent in the selection of a particular disposition — such as the proper interpretation of the governing statute, as discussed in the previous section.

83

See B.F.L., 233 P.3d at 1123-24 (recognizing that “Delinquency Rule 11(e) and AS 47.12.140 still embody a presumption against the involuntary removal of a minor from their home,” which is “simply the legal corollary of the rule that the State must affirmatively prove that the superior court's chosen disposition is the ‘least restrictive alternative’ ”).

84

R.M. briefly argues that the court erroneously relied on its prior knowledge of the McLaughlin Youth Center and its ability to minimize R.M.’s risk of reoffending if he were placed there. Although the court's general knowledge of the facility is likely a prior experience that the court could reasonably rely on, we conclude, having reviewed the record, that this issue did not play a significant role in the court's analysis. See Jackson v. State, 2020 WL 3571770, at *3 (Alaska App. July 1, 2020) (unpublished) (recognizing that sentencing judges can generally rely on their past experiences, at least in part, to inform their decisions (citations omitted)). And in any event, the court accepted that institutionalization could increase a person's risk and ultimately weighed this possibility, together with R.M.’s low risk, as part of the prevention of future harm factor in favor of a (b)(2) order. We therefore conclude that any potential error from the court's reliance on its prior knowledge of the McLaughlin Youth Center was harmless.

85

AS 47.12.140(1)(A)-(H).

86

AS 47.12.140(1)(A)-(B).

87

According to letters filed with the court, these children have experienced a loss of safety and security as well as grief and trauma that has manifested itself in insomnia, depression, isolation, reduced grades, and significant mental health and behavioral issues.

88

R.M. contends that the court found that R.M. was the initial aggressor in the school fight and that there was no evidence to support this finding. But while the court appeared to question whether R.M. was truly standing up to a bully, the court ultimately concluded that the issue of who was at fault was unclear. Instead, the court's main concern with respect to the school fight was that R.M. had not reported the bullying to his parents or the school and had instead resorted to violence.

89

See AS 47.12.140(1)(A).

90

Cf. Hamilton v. State, 59 P.3d 760, 772 (Alaska App. 2002) (recognizing, in an adult sentencing proceeding, that, while “it is improper for a sentencing judge to penalize a defendant for remaining silent,” the sentencing court must nonetheless base their decision on the existing record).

91

Alaska Delinq. R. 12(b)(2).

92

On appeal, R.M. points to testimony by Probation Officer Caldentey in which Caldentey acknowledged that there was a less restrictive alternative to detention at McLaughlin Youth Center. But we interpret this testimony as simply a recognition that R.M.’s home was less restrictive than an institutional setting, not that Caldentey believed, as a legal matter, that there was a less restrictive alternative disposition under AS 47.12.140(2).

93

See Watson v. State, 487 P.3d 568, 575 (Alaska 2021) (recognizing that minors “do[ ] not have mature judgment and may not fully realize the consequences of [their] acts” and the State therefore has a strong interest in promoting the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders (quoting Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Alaska 1978))); I.J. v. State, 553 P.3d 1263 (Alaska App. 2024) (recognizing that the juvenile system is “specifically designed to address the unique attributes of minors and their needs”); Waterman v. State, 342 P.3d 1261, 1267 (Alaska App. 2015) (contrasting the “individually focused treatment” within the juvenile justice system with the “more societally oriented prosecution” in the adult criminal justice system); State v. Morgan, 111 P.3d 360, 365 (Alaska App. 2005) (Mannheimer, J., dissenting) (noting that the dispositions that can be imposed on juvenile offenders, including institutionalization, “are geared toward individual treatment and reformation, not toward general deterrence or community condemnation” (first citing State v. Sandsness, 72 P.3d 299, 302-03 (Alaska 2003); and then citing Nao v. State, 953 P.2d 522, 525 (Alaska App. 1998))); see generally Fletcher v. State, 532 P.3d 286, 290 (Alaska App. 2023) (discussing the key characteristics that distinguish children from adults).

94

B.F.L. v. State, 233 P.3d 1118, 1124 (Alaska App. 2010).

95

Id. at 1125 (quoting Y.J. v. State, 130 P.3d 954, 957 (Alaska App. 2006)).

96

G.A.D. v. State, 865 P.2d 100, 104 (Alaska App. 1993).

97

See State v. Silva, 247 A.3d 330, 334-35 (Me. 2021) (upholding court's institutional detention decision, even though the juvenile had complied with all of his conditions of release and had no prior record, where the court found that confinement was “necessary for the protection of the public because a lesser sentence [would] depreciate the seriousness of the juvenile's conduct” and the court fully considered the proper statutory factors and competing interests).

98

AS 47.12.120(d).

End of Document