R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. Becerra

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO Case No.: 20-CV-1990-CAB-WVG COMPANY et al., 12 ORDER DISMISSING CASE FOR Plaintiffs, 13 LACK OF JURISDICTION v. 14 XAVIER BECERRA et al., [Doc. Nos. 6, 36, 38] 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 In this matter, Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare that California Senate Bill 793 19 (“S.B. 793”) is invalid and unenforceable because it is preempted by federal law and 20 violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. On the same day 21 they filed the complaint, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on enforcement of 22 S.B. 793. [Doc. No. 6.] Defendants have opposed Plaintiffs’ motion and moved to dismiss 23 the complaint for failure to state a claim. [Doc. Nos. 36, 38.] Upon review of the record,1 24 the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the constitutionality of S.B. 793 is not ripe for 25 26

27 1 The motions had been pending before another judge. The case was recently reassigned to the 28 1 resolution and that therefore the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the 2 motion for preliminary injunction is denied as moot, and this case is dismissed. 3 When the complaint was filed, S.B. 793 was set to go into effect on January 21, 4 2021. In the interim, however, the California Secretary of State certified that a referendum 5 challenging S.B. 793 has qualified to be on the ballot for the November 8, 2022 election. 6 See Doc. No. 48. The parties agree that “[t]he referendum has thus ‘suspend[ed] operation’ 7 of S.B. 793 unless and until ‘it is approved by a majority of voters.’” Id. (quoting Wilde v. 8 City of Dunsmuir, 9 Cal. 5th 1105, 1111 (2020)). In light of the referendum, Plaintiffs 9 concede that their motion for a preliminary injunction is moot. [Doc. No. 43 at 3 (“[I]f the 10 referendum qualifies, Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction will be moot. . . .”). 11 Accordingly, the motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. 12 Notwithstanding the foregoing, Plaintiffs still contend that the Court retains subject 13 matter jurisdiction over their case. The Court is not persuaded. “The Article III case or 14 controversy requirement limits federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction by requiring . . . 15 that claims be ‘ripe’ for adjudication.” Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 16 F.3d 1115, 1121–22 (9th Cir.2010) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 17 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). “[R]ipeness is a means by which federal courts may dispose 18 of matters that are premature for review because the plaintiff's purported injury is too 19 speculative and may never occur.” Id. “If a claim is unripe, federal courts lack subject 20 matter jurisdiction and the complaint must be dismissed.” S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of 21 Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir. 1990). 22 “The central concern of the ripeness inquiry is whether the case involves uncertain 23 or contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at 24 all.” Chandler, 598 F.3d at 1122-23. Here, although S.B. 793 has been passed by the 25 California legislature and signed by the Governor, S.B. 793 will never be enforceable 26 against Plaintiffs (or anyone) if it does not survive the referendum set to go forward on 27 November 8, 2022. In other words, any purported injury to Plaintiffs caused by 28 | |}enforcement of S.B. 793 is contingent on the outcome of the referendum and may not occur 2 all. 3 Plaintiffs argue that this case is ripe because there 1s a “realistic danger that SB793 4 || will go into effect,” citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289 5 ||(1979). Babbitt is distinguishable. Babbitt addressed whether a plaintiff who has not been 6 subject to injury from a statute’s operation or enforcement may challenge the statute. The 7 statute in question in Babbitt, however, was already in effect, and was in fact being 8 ||enforced. See Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 293 (noting that the lower court had determined that the 9 || case was justiciable ‘“‘on the basis of past instances of enforcement of the Act and in light 10 the imposition of criminal penalties for ‘violat[ion of] any provision of the Act.’’”’). The 11 |/issue being considered by the Court there was whether the plaintiffs had a ripe claim even 12 they had not personally been subject to a criminal enforcement action, with the Court 13 noting that “[w]hen contesting the constitutionality of a criminal statute, ‘it is not necessary 14 [the plaintiff] first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to 15 challenge [the] statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.’” Jd. 16 298 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974)). Plaintiffs face no such 17 ||risk of prosecution here. Unlike Babbitt, there currently is no “realistic danger” that 18 || Plaintiffs will be prosecuted for violation of S.B. 793, and there will not be any such 19 realistic danger until after November 8, 2022, if at all. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims are 20 || unripe, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 21 In light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED 22 || for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This case is CLOSED. 23 It is SO ORDERED. 24 Dated: August 6, 2021 € Z 25 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 26 United States District Judge 27 28