In the United States Court of Federal Claims
JEROME NATHAN RIVERS,
Plaintiff, No. 25-128C v. (Filed March 5, 2025) THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
Jerome Nathan Rivers, New Hampton, New York, pro se.
Thomas J. Adair, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC.
OPINION AND ORDER Dismissing the Complaint for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
SILFEN, Judge.
Jerome Nathan Rivers filed a complaint in this court seeking damages from the “police
union department” for violating his constitutional rights. This court does not have jurisdiction over
Mr. Rivers’s claim against the New York City Police Department or any city or state police union,
as it only has jurisdiction over claims against the federal government. Nor does the court have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Mr. Rivers’s complaint. Thus, the court dismisses Mr. Riv-
ers’s complaint sua sponte. The court grants Mr. Rivers’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
I. Background
On January 22, 2025, Mr. Rivers, representing himself, filed a complaint in this court al-
leging that the “police union department” violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in
the course of investigating, trying, and convicting him in a criminal case. ECF No. 1 at 1-2. Mr.
1 Rivers alleges that the police improperly questioned him and, as a result, he was unjustly convicted.
Id. Mr. Rivers was previously incarcerated at the George R. Vierno Center on Rikers Island, which
is owned and operated by the New York City Department of Corrections. Id. at 2; ECF No. 1-1;
https://www.nyc.gov/site/doc/about/facilities.page. He is no longer incarcerated. ECF No. 16;
ECF No. 18 at 6. Mr. Rivers requests twenty-two billion dollars for the injustice he has experi-
enced. ECF No. 1 at 3.
II. Discussion
This court’s jurisdiction is primarily defined by the Tucker Act, which provides the court
with exclusive jurisdiction to decide specific types of monetary claims against the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); Kanemoto v. Reno, 41 F.3d 641, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The Tucker Act
provides this court with jurisdiction to decide “actions pursuant to contracts with the United States,
actions to recover illegal exactions of money by the United States, and actions brought pursuant
to money-mandating statutes, regulations, executive orders, or constitutional provisions.” Roth v.
United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
A “plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance
of the evidence.” Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014). This
court has traditionally held the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff to a less stringent standard than those
of a litigant represented by counsel. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (stating that pro se
complaints “however inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers” (marks omitted)). The court has therefore exercised its discretion in this case
to examine the pleadings “to see if [the pro se] plaintiff has a cause of action somewhere dis-
played.” Ruderer v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 456, 468 (1969). Regardless, pro se plaintiffs still
have the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See
2 Landreth v. United States, 797 F. App’x 521, 523 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Kelley v. Secretary of
the Department of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
Under this court’s rule 12(h)(3), the court must dismiss an action if it “determines at any
time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Rules of the Court of Federal Claims, Rule 12(h)(3);
see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“Jurisdiction is
power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is
that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” (quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, even
if not disputed by a party, the court may challenge subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Folden
v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1. This court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Rivers’s complaint
Even liberally construed, this court does not have jurisdiction over Mr. Rivers’s complaint.
Mr. Rivers’s allegations are against New York City police officers and the police union. ECF No.
1 at 1 (naming the “police union department” as the defendant); id. at 2 (calling the police union a
“state ‘union’”). This court only has jurisdiction over claims against the federal government; it
does not have jurisdiction over city or state entities. 28 U.S.C. § 1491; United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (“[I]f the relief sought is against others than the United States the suit as
to them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the court.” (citations omitted)); Curry v.
United States, 787 F. App’x 720, 722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims
lacks jurisdiction to hear cases asserted against states, localities, and employees of those govern-
ments in both their official and personal capacities). Because Mr. Rivers has not brought a claim
against the federal government, this court does not have the authority to hear his case.
This court also lacks jurisdiction over the constitutional claims Mr. Rivers alleges. The
Tucker Act authorizes this court to hear constitutional claims only “when the constitutional provi-
sion … expressly creates a substantive right enforceable against the federal government for money 3 damages.” LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995). It is well established
that the Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment “do not mandate payment of money by
the government” and, therefore, neither independently provides “a sufficient basis for jurisdiction”
in this court. Id. (holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over claims arising under either
the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); Vuolo v. United
States, No. 2006-5136, 2006 WL 3913417, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 29, 2006) (summarily affirming
that the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over Sixth Amendment claims because the
amendment “do[es] not mandate the payment of money” as required by the Tucker Act); Mercer
v. United States, 668 F. App’x 362, 363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that this court lacks jurisdiction
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In the United States Court of Federal Claims
JEROME NATHAN RIVERS,
Plaintiff, No. 25-128C v. (Filed March 5, 2025) THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
Jerome Nathan Rivers, New Hampton, New York, pro se.
Thomas J. Adair, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC.
OPINION AND ORDER Dismissing the Complaint for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
SILFEN, Judge.
Jerome Nathan Rivers filed a complaint in this court seeking damages from the “police
union department” for violating his constitutional rights. This court does not have jurisdiction over
Mr. Rivers’s claim against the New York City Police Department or any city or state police union,
as it only has jurisdiction over claims against the federal government. Nor does the court have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Mr. Rivers’s complaint. Thus, the court dismisses Mr. Riv-
ers’s complaint sua sponte. The court grants Mr. Rivers’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
I. Background
On January 22, 2025, Mr. Rivers, representing himself, filed a complaint in this court al-
leging that the “police union department” violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in
the course of investigating, trying, and convicting him in a criminal case. ECF No. 1 at 1-2. Mr.
1 Rivers alleges that the police improperly questioned him and, as a result, he was unjustly convicted.
Id. Mr. Rivers was previously incarcerated at the George R. Vierno Center on Rikers Island, which
is owned and operated by the New York City Department of Corrections. Id. at 2; ECF No. 1-1;
https://www.nyc.gov/site/doc/about/facilities.page. He is no longer incarcerated. ECF No. 16;
ECF No. 18 at 6. Mr. Rivers requests twenty-two billion dollars for the injustice he has experi-
enced. ECF No. 1 at 3.
II. Discussion
This court’s jurisdiction is primarily defined by the Tucker Act, which provides the court
with exclusive jurisdiction to decide specific types of monetary claims against the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); Kanemoto v. Reno, 41 F.3d 641, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The Tucker Act
provides this court with jurisdiction to decide “actions pursuant to contracts with the United States,
actions to recover illegal exactions of money by the United States, and actions brought pursuant
to money-mandating statutes, regulations, executive orders, or constitutional provisions.” Roth v.
United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
A “plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance
of the evidence.” Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014). This
court has traditionally held the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff to a less stringent standard than those
of a litigant represented by counsel. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (stating that pro se
complaints “however inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers” (marks omitted)). The court has therefore exercised its discretion in this case
to examine the pleadings “to see if [the pro se] plaintiff has a cause of action somewhere dis-
played.” Ruderer v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 456, 468 (1969). Regardless, pro se plaintiffs still
have the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See
2 Landreth v. United States, 797 F. App’x 521, 523 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Kelley v. Secretary of
the Department of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
Under this court’s rule 12(h)(3), the court must dismiss an action if it “determines at any
time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Rules of the Court of Federal Claims, Rule 12(h)(3);
see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“Jurisdiction is
power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is
that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” (quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, even
if not disputed by a party, the court may challenge subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Folden
v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1. This court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Rivers’s complaint
Even liberally construed, this court does not have jurisdiction over Mr. Rivers’s complaint.
Mr. Rivers’s allegations are against New York City police officers and the police union. ECF No.
1 at 1 (naming the “police union department” as the defendant); id. at 2 (calling the police union a
“state ‘union’”). This court only has jurisdiction over claims against the federal government; it
does not have jurisdiction over city or state entities. 28 U.S.C. § 1491; United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (“[I]f the relief sought is against others than the United States the suit as
to them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the court.” (citations omitted)); Curry v.
United States, 787 F. App’x 720, 722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims
lacks jurisdiction to hear cases asserted against states, localities, and employees of those govern-
ments in both their official and personal capacities). Because Mr. Rivers has not brought a claim
against the federal government, this court does not have the authority to hear his case.
This court also lacks jurisdiction over the constitutional claims Mr. Rivers alleges. The
Tucker Act authorizes this court to hear constitutional claims only “when the constitutional provi-
sion … expressly creates a substantive right enforceable against the federal government for money 3 damages.” LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995). It is well established
that the Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment “do not mandate payment of money by
the government” and, therefore, neither independently provides “a sufficient basis for jurisdiction”
in this court. Id. (holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over claims arising under either
the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); Vuolo v. United
States, No. 2006-5136, 2006 WL 3913417, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 29, 2006) (summarily affirming
that the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over Sixth Amendment claims because the
amendment “do[es] not mandate the payment of money” as required by the Tucker Act); Mercer
v. United States, 668 F. App’x 362, 363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that this court lacks jurisdiction
over “‘collateral attacks’ on criminal convictions” and over related Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment violations).
Furthermore, the “Court of Federal Claims does not have the power to review … the facts
surrounding a conviction or imprisonment.” Zakiya v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 231, 234-35
(2007), aff’d, 277 F. App’x 985 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see Kania v. United States, 650 F.2d 264, 269
(Ct. Cl. 1981) (“It is particularly unreasonable to suppose that Congress in enacting the Tucker
Act intended for this court to intervene in the delicate and sensitive business of conducting criminal
trials.”); see also Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Court of
Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of district courts or the clerks of
district courts relating to proceedings before those courts.”).
Finally, to the extent that Mr. Rivers alleges tortious conduct by the police, his claims must
also be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Jackson v. United States, 162 Fed. Cl. 282, 292-93
(2022) (explaining that the court lacks jurisdiction over law enforcement and prosecutorial mis-
conduct tort claims); see also Cochran v. United States, 250 F.3d 754 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (table)
4 (affirming that this court lacks jurisdiction over tort claims for malicious prosecution). The Tucker
Act expressly excludes tort claims from this court’s jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a).
For each of these independent reasons, the court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Rivers’s com-
plaint.
2. Mr. Rivers has shown that he is entitled to in forma pauperis status
Mr. Rivers requests to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 18. 1 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
a litigant may move to proceed in forma pauperis, entitling him to relief from the costs and fees
associated with initiating a lawsuit. The court has discretion to grant such motions whenever it
determines, based on the financial information submitted, that the plaintiff is unable to pay the
filing fee. Fourstar v. United States, 950 F.3d 856, 858 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Roberson v. United States,
115 Fed. Cl. 234, 239 (2014), appeal dismissed, 556 F. App’x 966 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The threshold
to establish the need to proceed in forma pauperis is not high. Fiebelkorn v. United States, 77 Fed.
Cl. 59, 62 (2007). “[P]auper status does not require absolute destitution, the question is whether
the court costs can be paid without undue hardship.” Chamberlain v. United States, 655 F. App’x
822, 825 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (marks omitted); see Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S.
331, 339-40 (1948). Mr. Rivers attests that he is not currently employed and does not receive any
income. ECF No. 18 at 1-2. He has demonstrated that paying the filing fee would impose an undue
hardship on him.
1 Mr. Rivers previously filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis that was incomplete. ECF Nos. 9, 13. Because he has now filed a complete application (ECF No. 18), the court will deny the earlier application as moot, which will not affect Mr. Rivers’s status, and will address the complete application. 5 III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, this court dismisses Mr. Rivers’s complaint for lack of sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction. The court grants Mr. Rivers’s application to proceed in forma pauperis
and denies as moot the earlier incomplete application. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment
accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Molly R. Silfen MOLLY R. SILFEN Judge