NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 5 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LIBARDO RIVEROS LEON; EDNA No. 24-4131 BRIGITTE DIAZ VARGAS; S. J. R. D.; Y. Agency Nos. R. D., A240-055-295 A240-493-797 Petitioners, A240-493-798 A240-493-799 v.
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted November 13, 2025 San Francisco, California
Before: FRIEDLAND and SUNG, Circuit Judges, and PITTS, District Judge.** Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge FRIEDLAND. Libardo Riveros Leon, his wife, and their children, natives and citizens of
Colombia, petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable P. Casey Pitts, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of
their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(1). We grant the petition in part and remand for further proceedings.
Because the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, citing Matter of
Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994), we review both the IJ’s and BIA’s
decisions. Cruz v. Bondi, 146 F.4th 730, 737 (9th Cir. 2025). We review the
agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence, Cordoba v. Barr, 962 F.3d 479,
481 (9th Cir. 2020), and we review legal questions de novo, Perez-Portillo v.
Garland, 56 F.4th 788, 792 (9th Cir. 2022).
The agency denied Riveros Leon’s asylum claim on two grounds, both of
which Riveros Leon challenges. First, it concluded that he did not establish that his
political opinion was “one central reason” that FARC agents harmed him. Second,
it concluded that he did not show that FARC agents were private actors that the
government was unwilling or unable to control.
1. The agency erred in concluding that Riveros Leon’s anti-FARC political
opinion was not “a central reason” that FARC harmed him. The agency concluded
that his political opinion did not qualify as “one central reason” because: (1) the
unprotected motive—his automotive skills—was the “primary motivation,” and (2)
the protected motive—his political opinion—was not a “but for” cause of the
2 24-4131 persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). The agency’s reasoning was legally
erroneous.
First, when the agency determined there was no nexus to Riveros Leon’s
political opinion because FARC’s “primary motivation” was the unprotected
motive, the agency implied that there can be only one primary reason, or that
Riveros Leon must show that the protected reason is the dominant reason. Both
implications are incorrect. There can be more than one “primary” reason. Manzano
v. Garland, 104 F.4th 1202, 1211 (9th Cir. 2024) (“We have repeatedly
acknowledged a persecutor may have more than one central reason so long as both
are of primary importance.”). Further, a petitioner “need not prove which reason is
dominant.” Id. at 1207 (quoting Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th
Cir. 2009)).
Second, the agency’s reasoning assumes that, if a motive is not the exclusive
or dominant “primary motivation,” then it must be a “but-for cause” to qualify as
“one central reason.” That is also incorrect. “We have acknowledged at least two
ways to demonstrate the causal link required to meet the ‘one central reason’
standard in a mixed-motives case.” Id. First, a motive qualifies as a central reason
if it is a “but-for cause” that is more than incidental or tangential. Id. Second, a
motive qualifies as a central reason if that motive, standing alone, would have led
the persecutor to harm the applicant—even if it is not a but-for cause. Id. at 1207-
3 24-4131 09. In other words, a motive may qualify as “a central reason” so long as it was
“sufficient to cause the harm”—even if it was (1) not the only primary reason, (2)
not the dominant primary reason, and (3) not a “but-for cause.” Id. Here, the
agency failed to consider whether Riveros Leon’s political opinion was a sufficient
reason for the harm, even if it was neither the dominant reason nor a but-for cause.
Additionally, “we have explicitly recognized the viability of an ‘extortion-
plus’ claim” “[a]s a subset of these mixed-motive cases.” Id. at 1207. “A petitioner
who has been the victim of extortion may satisfy the nexus requirement if the
petitioner was independently targeted, not just for money, but also because of a
protected ground.” Id. (cleaned up).
Here, the record compels the conclusion that FARC independently targeted
Riveros Leon, not just because of his automotive skills, but also because of his
anti-FARC political opinion. The first time FARC threatened to harm Riveros
Leon, it was only to stop him from supporting former-FARC youth—it did not
attempt to recruit Riveros Leon. When FARC members later attempted to recruit
Riveros Leon, they said they would harm him and his family because of his work
with youth unless he helped FARC’s cause. While FARC members repeatedly
stated that, to avoid additional harm, Riveros Leon needed to help them, they also
repeatedly stated that he needed to stop his anti-FARC activities, including
working with youth and attending Democratic Center political meetings. And
4 24-4131 Riveros Leon repeatedly told FARC he would not help them because he did not
agree with their political ideology. Because the record compels the conclusion that
FARC would not have targeted Riveros Leon but for his political opinion, and that
this but-for cause played more than a minor role in the harm he suffered, we
conclude that his political opinion was “a central reason” for the harm. Therefore,
Riveros Leon established the nexus required for his asylum claim.
2. The agency also erred when it concluded that Riveros Leon did not
establish that the government was unwilling or unable to protect him from private
persecutors. The IJ concluded that Riveros Leon did not meet his burden to
establish that the Colombian government was unable or unwilling to control the
men who harmed him, citing Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th
Cir. 2005), and noting that a “failure to report non-governmental persecution due
to [a] belief that [the] police would do nothing” does not meet that burden. The IJ
erred by applying the evidentiary standard we apply when petitioners fail to report
to the police at all because the record compels the finding that Riveros Leon
reported that FARC kidnapped and threatened him to the police.
Indeed, the IJ acknowledged that Riveros Leon and his wife reported FARC
to the police but the police “did not want to take [his] complaint,” and Riveros
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 5 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LIBARDO RIVEROS LEON; EDNA No. 24-4131 BRIGITTE DIAZ VARGAS; S. J. R. D.; Y. Agency Nos. R. D., A240-055-295 A240-493-797 Petitioners, A240-493-798 A240-493-799 v.
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted November 13, 2025 San Francisco, California
Before: FRIEDLAND and SUNG, Circuit Judges, and PITTS, District Judge.** Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge FRIEDLAND. Libardo Riveros Leon, his wife, and their children, natives and citizens of
Colombia, petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable P. Casey Pitts, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of
their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(1). We grant the petition in part and remand for further proceedings.
Because the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, citing Matter of
Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994), we review both the IJ’s and BIA’s
decisions. Cruz v. Bondi, 146 F.4th 730, 737 (9th Cir. 2025). We review the
agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence, Cordoba v. Barr, 962 F.3d 479,
481 (9th Cir. 2020), and we review legal questions de novo, Perez-Portillo v.
Garland, 56 F.4th 788, 792 (9th Cir. 2022).
The agency denied Riveros Leon’s asylum claim on two grounds, both of
which Riveros Leon challenges. First, it concluded that he did not establish that his
political opinion was “one central reason” that FARC agents harmed him. Second,
it concluded that he did not show that FARC agents were private actors that the
government was unwilling or unable to control.
1. The agency erred in concluding that Riveros Leon’s anti-FARC political
opinion was not “a central reason” that FARC harmed him. The agency concluded
that his political opinion did not qualify as “one central reason” because: (1) the
unprotected motive—his automotive skills—was the “primary motivation,” and (2)
the protected motive—his political opinion—was not a “but for” cause of the
2 24-4131 persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). The agency’s reasoning was legally
erroneous.
First, when the agency determined there was no nexus to Riveros Leon’s
political opinion because FARC’s “primary motivation” was the unprotected
motive, the agency implied that there can be only one primary reason, or that
Riveros Leon must show that the protected reason is the dominant reason. Both
implications are incorrect. There can be more than one “primary” reason. Manzano
v. Garland, 104 F.4th 1202, 1211 (9th Cir. 2024) (“We have repeatedly
acknowledged a persecutor may have more than one central reason so long as both
are of primary importance.”). Further, a petitioner “need not prove which reason is
dominant.” Id. at 1207 (quoting Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th
Cir. 2009)).
Second, the agency’s reasoning assumes that, if a motive is not the exclusive
or dominant “primary motivation,” then it must be a “but-for cause” to qualify as
“one central reason.” That is also incorrect. “We have acknowledged at least two
ways to demonstrate the causal link required to meet the ‘one central reason’
standard in a mixed-motives case.” Id. First, a motive qualifies as a central reason
if it is a “but-for cause” that is more than incidental or tangential. Id. Second, a
motive qualifies as a central reason if that motive, standing alone, would have led
the persecutor to harm the applicant—even if it is not a but-for cause. Id. at 1207-
3 24-4131 09. In other words, a motive may qualify as “a central reason” so long as it was
“sufficient to cause the harm”—even if it was (1) not the only primary reason, (2)
not the dominant primary reason, and (3) not a “but-for cause.” Id. Here, the
agency failed to consider whether Riveros Leon’s political opinion was a sufficient
reason for the harm, even if it was neither the dominant reason nor a but-for cause.
Additionally, “we have explicitly recognized the viability of an ‘extortion-
plus’ claim” “[a]s a subset of these mixed-motive cases.” Id. at 1207. “A petitioner
who has been the victim of extortion may satisfy the nexus requirement if the
petitioner was independently targeted, not just for money, but also because of a
protected ground.” Id. (cleaned up).
Here, the record compels the conclusion that FARC independently targeted
Riveros Leon, not just because of his automotive skills, but also because of his
anti-FARC political opinion. The first time FARC threatened to harm Riveros
Leon, it was only to stop him from supporting former-FARC youth—it did not
attempt to recruit Riveros Leon. When FARC members later attempted to recruit
Riveros Leon, they said they would harm him and his family because of his work
with youth unless he helped FARC’s cause. While FARC members repeatedly
stated that, to avoid additional harm, Riveros Leon needed to help them, they also
repeatedly stated that he needed to stop his anti-FARC activities, including
working with youth and attending Democratic Center political meetings. And
4 24-4131 Riveros Leon repeatedly told FARC he would not help them because he did not
agree with their political ideology. Because the record compels the conclusion that
FARC would not have targeted Riveros Leon but for his political opinion, and that
this but-for cause played more than a minor role in the harm he suffered, we
conclude that his political opinion was “a central reason” for the harm. Therefore,
Riveros Leon established the nexus required for his asylum claim.
2. The agency also erred when it concluded that Riveros Leon did not
establish that the government was unwilling or unable to protect him from private
persecutors. The IJ concluded that Riveros Leon did not meet his burden to
establish that the Colombian government was unable or unwilling to control the
men who harmed him, citing Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th
Cir. 2005), and noting that a “failure to report non-governmental persecution due
to [a] belief that [the] police would do nothing” does not meet that burden. The IJ
erred by applying the evidentiary standard we apply when petitioners fail to report
to the police at all because the record compels the finding that Riveros Leon
reported that FARC kidnapped and threatened him to the police.
Indeed, the IJ acknowledged that Riveros Leon and his wife reported FARC
to the police but the police “did not want to take [his] complaint,” and Riveros
Leon did not “insist that [the police] initiate an investigation.” In the IJ’s view,
Riveros Leon’s experience with the police was “not probative of whether police
5 24-4131 were unable or unwilling to help him because he did not follow through on filing a
police report.” (Emphasis added.) That was error. The fact that Riveros Leon did
not “insist” that the police investigate—despite the police’s unwillingness to even
take his complaint—does not somehow negate the fact that Riveros Leon sought
help from the police and they refused to provide it.1 When a petitioner seeks police
help and the police refuse to take action, the petitioner is not required to “insist” on
police action to demonstrate that he sought help from the police. To the contrary,
evidence that the police did not want to take a complaint is highly probative of
police unwillingness or inability to help. See, e.g., Faruk v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 940,
942-44 (9th Cir. 2004) (petitioner called the police about repeated stone-throwing,
but police would not file a report). Viewed correctly, evidence that the police
responded to Riveros Leon’s request for help by indicating they could not or would
not help him and declining to file a formal report, coupled with his country
1 We disagree with the concurrence’s suggestion that the record is ambiguous about whether the police refused to take Riveros Leon’s complaint. After Riveros Leon described the kidnapping, the police officer said they needed “evidence that had happened to [him].” When Riveros Leon explained he did not have any physical evidence, the officer “stood up.” Riveros Leon’s wife started “begging [the officer] to please to help us and we were victims of kidnapping.” But the officer responded dismissively by pointing out that “really [Riveros Leon] was talking about kidnapping, but [he] was there.” Riveros Leon’s “wife got upset and told [the officer] that in our country that happens because they don’t pay attention to us, the people. The poor ones.” The fact that the police “did not want to take [Riveros Leon’s] complaint” despite their pleas for help compels the conclusion that Riveros Leon and his wife sought police assistance and the police were unwilling or unable to provide it.
6 24-4131 conditions evidence, compels the conclusion that the police were unwilling or
unable to control the FARC members who harmed Riveros Leon. See, e.g., Diaz v.
Bondi, 129 F.4th 546, 555 (9th Cir. 2025); Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1143
(9th Cir. 2020); Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th Cir.
2017) (in “instances of police failure to respond to a report of persecution,” a
noncitizen has met his burden of showing that the government was unable or
unwilling to control persecutors).2
Accordingly, we reverse the agency’s conclusion that Riveros Leon failed to
establish past persecution.
3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the harm
Riveros Leon and his family suffered did not rise to the level of torture for relief
under CAT. The record demonstrates that the abuse they suffered, while serious,
was not extreme enough to meet the definition of torture. The agency also
reasonably determined that Riveros Leon and his family did not establish that the
2 The government submitted a Rule 28(j) letter citing Matter of K-S-H-, 29 I&N Dec. 307 (BIA 2025), a BIA decision that post-dates the agency decision here. Riveros Leon argues that Matter of K-S-H- is not entitled to Skidmore deference. We need not resolve this issue because the agency did not rely on Matter of K-S-H- in this case. We also note that, in Matter of K-S-H-, unlike here, the BIA recognized that the police declining to take a report is material evidence of government unwillingness or inability to protect an applicant. K-S-H-, 29 I&N Dec. at 308-09. Further, Matter of K-S-H- is materially distinguishable because it addresses only whether a single such incident is sufficient to show government unwillingness or inability to protect an applicant, whereas here, Riveros Leon’s experience is corroborated by country conditions evidence.
7 24-4131 government would acquiesce to any future torture, based on a review of country
conditions evidence.
4. The agency’s errors in its past persecution analysis require remand on its
conclusions regarding all Petitioners’ claims other than the CAT claims. The
agency’s determinations that (1) Riveros Leon did not establish a well-founded
fear of future persecution; (2) he was not entitled to withholding of removal; (3)
his wife and children’s derivative claims failed; and (4) he did not qualify for
humanitarian asylum, all depended on the agency’s erroneous past persecution
analysis. Thus, we remand. Singh v. Garland, 97 F.4th 597, 607-09 (9th Cir. 2024)
(erroneously failing to find a presumption of past persecution results in improper
burden shifting on internal relocation, requiring remand); Corpeno-Romero v.
Garland, 120 F.4th 570, 581 (9th Cir. 2024) (a noncitizen who meets the “one
central reason” standard for asylum “necessarily satisfie[s] the weaker ‘a reason’
standard for withholding of removal”); Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626,
638 (9th Cir. 2022) (failure to properly assess past persecution requires remand on
humanitarian asylum).
We deny Riveros Leon’s petition as to the agency’s conclusion on CAT
relief. But we grant the petition on all other claims. We reverse the agency’s past
persecution conclusions on nexus and government unwillingness or inability to
protect Riveros Leon. We remand for reconsideration of Riveros Leon’s well-
8 24-4131 founded fear of future persecution, withholding of removal, and humanitarian
asylum claims. We remand for consideration of his wife and children’s derivative
claims. On remand, the agency must treat the nexus and government unwilling and
unable requirements for asylum and withholding of removal as satisfied.
PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;
REVERSED AND REMANDED.3
3 Each party shall bear its own costs. Fed. R. App. P. 39(a).
9 24-4131 FILED FEB 5 2026 Riveros Leon v. Bondi, No. 24-4131 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that, in denying Riveros Leon’s asylum claim, the
agency appears to have applied the wrong legal standards to assess nexus and the
government’s unwillingness or inability to protect him from harm. I disagree,
however, that the record compels the conclusion that Riveros Leon established
both of those elements for purposes of his asylum claim. I would therefore remand
for reconsideration using the proper legal standards, rather than requiring the
agency to treat both elements as satisfied. 1
With respect to nexus, I believe sufficient evidence supports the conclusion
that Riveros Leon’s political opinion was neither a sufficient nor a but-for cause of
his persecution. The record contains ample evidence that FARC targeted Riveros
Leon in an effort to exploit his skills in car assembly and repair. For instance,
Riveros Leon testified that when FARC kidnapped him the first time, Vladimir
asserted that he needed to “join” FARC because they “need[ed] [Riveros Leon] to
provide [them] with information about [his car] company, and also repair
(assemble) some cars, . . . that is all.” And when FARC kidnapped Riveros Leon
the second time, FARC took him to a warehouse full of cars, where they informed
1 Because I agree with the majority that the agency erred in its past persecution analysis, I also agree that a remand for reconsideration is warranted on the agency’s conclusions as to all other claims. 1 him that they wanted him to repair and modify certain trucks to hide illicit items,
such as “[g]uns, grenades[,] and drugs.” To be sure, FARC also took issue with
Riveros Leon’s anti-FARC political opinion. But in my view, it was not
unreasonable for the agency to conclude that even if Riveros Leon had not
harbored an anti-FARC political opinion, FARC’s desire to use Riveros Leon’s
unique skill set was strong enough that FARC would have targeted him anyway. 2
I believe sufficient evidence also supports the conclusion that Riveros Leon
did not establish that the government was unwilling or unable to protect him. The
majority maintains that the police declined to help Riveros Leon when he appeared
to report his kidnapping. But I do not understand Riveros Leon’s exchange with
the police to be so clear cut. The police did not expressly decline to help Riveros
Leon. Instead, when Riveros Leon reported the incident, the police requested
“evidence and [a] description of the route,” and Riveros Leon replied that he could
not provide that because was blindfolded. The exchange apparently ended there:
according to Riveros Leon, the police’s questions “gave [him] the impression” that
the police thought that his story was “not real,” so Riveros Leon “did not insist”
that the police “initiate an investigation.” Riveros Leon’s wife likewise attested
2 Although I do not believe that the record compels the conclusion that Riveros Leon satisfied the “central reason” nexus standard for his asylum claim, I agree with the majority that he satisfied the “less demanding” “a reason” nexus standard for his withholding of removal claim. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359-60 (9th Cir. 2017). 2 that they “did not insist” on an investigation based on the “expression of the
police,” so they left.
Riveros Leon and his wife undoubtedly subjectively believed that the police
were unwilling to help, but the IJ was not required to accept their subjective beliefs
about the officers’ state of mind as true. Cf. Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357,
365-66 (2021) (rejecting that reviewing courts “must assume that [the petitioner’s]
factual contentions are true” absent an adverse credibility determination). Rather,
as our cases recognize, whether the government is unwilling or unable to protect
the petitioner generally turns on objective evidence, such as the police’s express
refusal to help, or their promise to help but subsequent inaction. See, e.g., Diaz v.
Bondi, 129 F.4th 546, 555 (9th Cir. 2025) (concluding that the police were
unwilling or unable to help when “[t]he police allowed her to file a report but told
her that they could not further assist her and could not guarantee her safety”);
Antonio v. Garland, 58 F.4th 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2023) (“When the government
has promised future action but taken none, we have concluded the government was
either unable or unwilling to exercise such control.”). Here, the police neither
expressly refused to investigate, nor did they promise to help but fail to act. Given
this and the brevity of the exchange, as well as the country conditions evidence
indicating that the Colombian government had taken at least some action to combat
3 and prosecute FARC members, I do not think the record compels the conclusion
that the police were unwilling or unable to control FARC.
Because I believe there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the
agency’s original conclusions on the nexus element for asylum and on the
government’s unwillingness or inability to protect Riveros Leon, I would not
require the agency to treat those elements as satisfied on remand.