OSCN Found Document:RIVERBEND LAND v. STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA TURNPIKE AUTHORITY
DEBORAH B. BARNES, PRESIDING JUDGE:
¶1 In this quiet title action, Riverbend Land, LLC (Riverbend) appeals from an order of the district court granting summary judgment to State of Oklahoma, ex rel. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority (OTA). Based on our review of the summary judgment record and the applicable law, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Mamosa Properties, L.L.C. and Shana, L.L.C. (collectively, Mamosa) acquired title to certain tracts of land by warranty deed on December 30, 1997, from Property Enterprises Corporation. This property was subsequently conveyed to Expert SWC Rockwell Memorial, LLC (Expert) in 2007.1 On November 6, 2009, by special warranty deed and corrected warranty deed, Riverbend acquired certain real property from Expert that had been conveyed to Expert by Mamosa. Two tracts of land were conveyed to Riverbend, but only one tract, consisting of approximately 7.34 acres, is the subject of Riverbend's quiet title action.2
¶3 Prior to Expert's and Riverbend's acquisition of the subject property, in November 1998, Mamosa conveyed to OTA by general warranty deed the following described property "together with abutter's rights, if any, to wit:"
A tract of land in the NE¼ of Section 17, T-13-N, R-4-W, I.M., Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, being more particularly described as;
Beginning in the NE Corner of said NE¼ (NE Corner being a PK Nail w/Tag); Thence S 00°19'07" E on the East Line of said NE¼, a distance of 886.72 feet to a point; Thence S 89°40'53" W, a distance of 33.00 feet to a point; Thence N 03°30'05" W, a distance of 725.53 feet to a point; Thence N 86°07'52" W, a distance of 2000.02 feet to a point; Thence N 00°08'41" E, a distance of 33.00 feet to a point; Thence S 89°51'19" E, a distance of 2067.76 feet to the Point or Place of Beginning.
Containing 245,748.76 square feet or 5.64 acres more or less, of new right-of-way, the area included in the above description being right-of-way occupied by the present turnpike, together with all abutters rights, including access from the remaining portion of the grantors land onto the LIMITED ACCESS TURNPIKE to be constructed on the above described property, except that the grantors, their heirs, successors or assigns, shall have the right of access to the Section Line Road, along the East side of the above described property, beginning at a point on the East Line of the NE¼ a distance of 486.70 feet South of the NE Corner of said NE¼ and extending South, also except that the grantors, their heirs, successors or assigns, shall have the right of access from the West 1673.95 feet of the NE¼ onto the frontage road to be constructed between said property and the LIMITED ACCESS TURNPIKE, also except that the grantors, their heirs, successors or assigns, shall not have the right of access onto a frontage road to be constructed between said property and the LIMITED ACCESS TURNPIKE beginning at the NE Corner of said NE¼ and extending West 1071.09 feet on the North Line of said NE¼ and beginning at the NE Corner of said NE¼ and extending South 412.22 feet on the East Line of said NE¼[.]3
¶4 Riverbend initiated the present action because OTA claims the abutters rights to portions of the 7.34 acre tract through the 1998 OTA/Mamosa Deed. In 2016 Riverbend attempted to sell the subject land to a third party, but that sale did not occur because of OTA's claim. It is undisputed that the title insurance companies used by Expert, Riverbend, and the prospective purchaser did not disclose OTA's claim to the abutters rights. Riverbend filed a motion for summary judgment in which, among other arguments, it claims it is a bona fide purchaser for value and had no notice ( actual or constructive ( of the OTA/Mamosa Deed.
¶5 Riverbend argues nothing in the deeds or in its chain of title states the grantors' "Express Reservation of the Riverbend Lands Abutters Rights."4 It argues, neither Mamosa nor Expert "reserved" the abutters rights in the Mamosa/Expert Deed or the Expert/Riverbend Deed. Riverbend argues the abutters rights are a part of the fee simple title it acquired through the Property/Mamosa Deed, Mamosa/Expert Deed (and correction deed) and Expert/Riverbend Deed (and correction deed), and "such . . . Riverbend Lands Abutters Rights were neither expressly reserved by Riverbend's predecessors in title (i.e., Property, [Mamosa], and Expert), nor conveyed of record to the OTA." Consequently, it argues, Riverbend acquired the entire fee simple interest in the subject property including the abutters rights.5 Riverbend further contends that unless OTA can "show a conveyance to it including the specific legal description . . . describing (the remaining portion of the grantors land) . . . that would have covered the related Riverbend Lands Abutters Rights . . . such rights were not conveyed to OTA."
¶6 Further, Riverbend argues, it cannot be held to have had constructive notice of the OTA/Mamosa Deed because neither the legal description for the entirety of Mamosa's "remaining portion" of land nor the legal description for Riverbend's 7.34 acre tract was specifically described in the OTA/Mamosa Deed. It argues 16 O.S. 2011 § 166 and 19 O.S. 2011 § 2987 require a specific legal description to impose constructive knowledge on a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value. Further, 16 O.S. § 15 provides in pertinent part: "no deed . . . or other instrument relating to real estate . . . shall be valid as against third persons unless acknowledged and recorded as herein provided." (Emphasis added.)
¶7 Riverbend argues that what was conveyed by the OTA/Mamosa Deed was the 5.64 acre tract of land described by a specific legal description in what it labels as "Tract 1" and set forth in the first paragraph of that deed.8 Riverbend asserts that in the second paragraph of that deed there is some further description of Tract 1 in the first clause of the first sentence, but further argues that the rest of that sentence references what it labels as "Tract 2" through the following language:
together with all abutters rights, including access from the remaining portion of the grantors land onto the LIMITED ACCESS TURNPIKE to be constructed on the above described property[.]9
¶8 It is Tract 2, Riverbend argues, that has no legal description of "the remaining portion of the grantors land" but is alleged by OTA to be the real property from which some of the "bundle of rights" of that real property -- that is, the abutters rights -- have been conveyed to OTA in the OTA/Mamosa Deed.
¶9 Riverbend does not deny that it and Expert have some "common owner." "[B]ut," it argues, "such fact is irrelevant and immaterial to the issue in front of this court: Did the indefinite phrase[] 'remaining portion of the grantors land' give a third party notice of a specific claim of real property interest? The vague description would be impossible to locate and is invalid." It further argues, "What is at issue is the adequacy of the [OTA/Mamosa Deed's] language concerning the land whose abutter's rights are at issue" -- "vague legal descriptions are inadequate to give constructive notice to third parties."
¶10 Thus, Riverbend argues it did not have constructive notice even though the OTA/Mamosa Deed was filed of record and predates the Expert/Riverbend Deed. "[T]he existence and the recording of [the OTA/Mamosa Deed] is irrelevant and immaterial," it argues, because the OTA/Mamosa Deed "fails to adequately describe the lands being stripped of such abutter's rights." "Again, the only question in front of this court . . . is whether the 'remaining portion of the grantors land' phrase is specific enough to constitute constructive notice."
¶11 In its response in opposition to Riverbend's motion, OTA argues, among other things, that Riverbend had constructive notice presumed in law pursuant to 16 O.S. 2011 § 16.10 OTA argues the OTA/Mamosa Deed was accepted for recording by the county clerk and was filed of record for more than ten years prior to the Expert/Riverbend Deed. It asserts that deed describes both "the 5.64 acres of real property purchased by OTA" and "describes that OTA, together with real property purchased, also acquired the grantor's abutters rights, including access from the 'remaining portion of the grantor's land' onto the limited access turnpike[.]" OTA argues that deed also contained exceptions such that "grantors were given access at specifically described areas along Rockwell and what is now Memorial Road[.]" The OTA/Mamosa Deed also excluded from OTA limits of no access certain "remaining portions of the grantors land," including along the east side of the right of way conveyed to OTA "beginning at a point on the East Line of the NE¼ a distance of 486.70 feet South of the NE Corner of said NE¼ and extending South" -- land that encompasses part of the subject property later conveyed to Riverbend. Thus, OTA argues it is "absurd to suggest that you can't figure out where the property that is going to be blocked access here from [the OTA/Mamosa Deed]." OTA, therefore, contends Riverbend is presumed in law to have constructive knowledge of the OTA/Mamosa Deed and its provisions pursuant to 16 O.S. 2011 § 16.
¶12 Additionally, OTA argues Riverbend had record notice of the OTA/Mamosa Deed because that deed is in the chain of title of Riverbend's 7.34 acre tract. It asserts "Riverbend erroneously here seeks to limit chain of title to only those conveyances made to the successive holders of record title, while ignoring conveyances by the holders to persons other than successors." OTA argues that while "a purchaser of real estate is not bound to take notice of registered liens or deeds created or executed by any person other than those through whom he is compelled to deraign his title,"11 a "purchaser (like Riverbend) is charged with notice of all deeds created or executed by the successive holders of record title through which the purchaser acquires his/her interest (like Mamosa)." Having such record notice, OTA contends, Riverbend is presumed to have had notice of the entirety of the deed's provisions and, thus, was on notice of the blocked access areas, or is at least on notice that further inquiry was needed.
¶13 The trial court granted summary judgment to OTA finding Riverbend was not a bona fide purchaser for value because it had constructive knowledge of OTA's rights in the subject property. The trial court's judgment implicitly determined the OTA/Mamosa Deed was within the chain of title in the Mamosa/Expert Deed and subsequent Expert/Riverbend Deed. The trial court found the 7.34 acre tract "acquired by Riverbend was previously owned by Mamosa from 1997 until 2007, and was a part of the NE/4 owned by Mamosa at the time of the [OTA/Mamosa Deed] and was adjacent to the 5.64 acre tract of real property . . . Mamosa conveyed to [OTA] in 1998 through the [OTA/Mamosa Deed]." The court determined "Riverbend was thus put on constructive notice of the rights and interests conveyed to [OTA] through the recording of the [OTA/Mamosa Deed], including, but not limited to, the abutter's rights described therein." The trial court evidently made this determination because the Mamosa/Expert Deed and the OTA/Mamosa Deed conveyed real property owned by Mamosa prior to the Expert/Riverbend Deed and conveyed real property within the same township, section and range, and because Mamosa was the common grantor among OTA, Expert, and Riverbend.
¶14 Riverbend appeals from the grant of summary judgment to OTA, specifically arguing the inadequacy of the description in the OTA/Mamosa Deed to give it or other third parties constructive notice of OTA's purported abutters rights "associated with an unspecified tract of land." It also argues the 5.64 tract of land conveyed to OTA, the legal description of which is set out in the OTA/Mamosa Deed, is "outside the chain of title to the subject [property.]"
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶15 "This appeal stems from a grant of summary judgment, which calls for de novo review." Woods v. Mercedes-Benz of Okla. City, 2014 OK 68, ¶ 4, 336 P.3d 457 (citations omitted). Under the de novo standard, this Court is afforded "plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority to examine the issues presented." Harmon v. Cradduck, 2012 OK 80, ¶ 10, 286 P.3d 643 (citation omitted). This appeal also concerns statutory construction, which is a question of law, State v. Tate, 2012 OK 31, ¶ 7, 276 P.3d 1017, and, consequently, requires a de novo review standard, Kluver v. Weatherford Hosp. Auth., 1993 OK 85, ¶ 14, 859 P.2d 1081.
ANALYSIS
¶16 Although OTA objected to Riverbend's motion for summary judgment on various grounds including what is termed inquiry notice,12 the only basis upon which the trial court granted summary judgment to OTA was on the ground of constructive notice presumed in law pursuant to 16 O.S. 2011 § 16.13 Because we conclude the OTA/Mamosa Deed does not contain the required legal description of "the remaining portion of the grantors land" and thus does not contain a legal description of the 7.34 acre tract at issue here, the mandate of 19 O.S. 2011 § 298(A) has not been met, and a third party, therefore, cannot be held to have had constructive notice of that deed pursuant to 16 O.S. 2011 § 16. We likewise conclude the OTA/Mamosa Deed did not give Riverbend constructive notice through OTA's chain-of-title argument with respect to the 7.34 acre tract because that deed does not comply with the recording statutes.
¶17 Section 298(A) "require[s] that the mandates of the Legislature be complied with, as expressed in Sections 287 and 291," and requires that the deed or other instrument "shall by its own terms describe the property by its specific legal description, and provide such information as is necessary for indexing as required in Sections 287 and 291 of this title[.]" (Emphasis added.) Therefore, to be "recorded as prescribed by law," 16 O.S. § 16, such that constructive notice of the deed is presumed in law as to third parties, § 298(A) clearly and unambiguously provides that a record of the deed must be made as required by both §§ 287 and 291 -- that is, in both the grantor/grantee index and the tract index, both of which require a description of the property -- and that a specific legal description of the property must be provided.14
¶18 We are not persuaded by OTA's apparent argument that the legal descriptions in the OTA/Mamosa Deed pertaining to the exceptions provide such notice. That argument rests upon a supposition that Riverbend had, in effect, a duty or obligation, to locate a filed deed that did not contain a specific legal description of real property Riverbend subsequently purchased, though arguably that deed affected interests in the real property Riverbend subsequently purchased. That is, the mere fact that a filed deed may contain information from which one could "figure out" what interest was restricted, is not, in our view, sufficient to impose constructive notice of the existence of that deed on a third party pursuant to 16 O.S. § 16.15
¶19 Though the issue presented was one principally concerned with the intent of the parties to an assignment of an interest in oil and gas, in Plano Petroleum, LLC v. GHK Exploration, L.P., 2011 OK 18, 250 P.3d 328, the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the infirmity of "an instrument which contains absolutely no legal description of the leased premises." Id. ¶ 9. The Supreme Court stated:
There is a long-standing black letter rule of law that "the description of the premises conveyed must be so certain and definite as to enable the land to be identified." Arbuckle Realty Trust v. Southern Rock Asphalt Co., 1941 OK 237, ¶ 8, 116 P.2d 912, 914. See also Key v. Key, 1963 OK 288, ¶ 22, 388 P.2d 505, 511. That requirement is more than a legal nicety, it is essential for recording in the county clerk's office and for establishing a chain of title. [Coley v. Williams, 1924 OK 323, ¶ 3, 224 P. 345, 346.]
Plano, ¶ 9 (emphasis added). The Court further explained: "[T]he want of an adequate and precise description of the premises tends to render [the] title unmarketable and objectionable to future purchasers; and . . . a conveyance, though admitted to record, is not notice to subsequent purchasers, unless the granted premises be therein so plainly and clearly described that a person reading the deed may locate and identify the property therefrom." Id. ¶ 9 n.4 (quoting Coley).16
¶20 Nor are we persuaded by OTA's argument that Riverbend had constructive notice of the OTA/Mamosa Deed because Mamosa is Riverbend and OTA's common grantor.17 OTA argues that its deed is in Riverbend's chain of title because of their common grantor, even though, as previously discussed, no legal description of Riverbend's 7.34 acre tract appears in OTA's deed. This chain-of-title argument stands in contravention of the recording statutes.
The general rule is that the record of an instrument entitled to be recorded will give constructive notice to persons bound to search for it. But constructive notice being a creature of statute, no record will give constructive notice unless such effect has been given to it by some statutory provision.
Crater v. Wallace, 1943 OK 250, ¶ 11, 140 P.2d 1018 (citation omitted). In Crater, the instrument at issue was not one entitled to be recorded so it could not be found to have given constructive notice to some third party. Thus, in the present case, the record of the OTA/Mamosa Deed will not give constructive notice to Riverbend "unless such effect has been given to it by some statutory provision." That statutory authority, as above discussed, is found in the recording statutes and they require a specific legal description of the property affected by the OTA/Mamosa Deed.18 OTA's argument would, in effect, defeat the express requirements of the recording statutes.
¶21 Consequently, on the summary judgment record herein, Riverbend's position as a bona fide purchaser for value cannot be defeated on the basis of constructive notice in law pursuant to 16 O.S. § 16 or under the chain-of-title argument offered by OTA.19
CONCLUSION
¶22 We conclude the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to OTA for the reasons herein discussed and, therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.
¶23 REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
RAPP, J., and GOODMAN, J., concur.