Rivera v. Sloane

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Rivera v. Sloane

133 A.D.3d 838, 19 N.Y.S.3d 440

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 25, 2015

Docket2015-02025

StatusPublished

This text of 133 A.D.3d 838 (Rivera v. Sloane) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rivera v. Sloane, 133 A.D.3d 838, 19 N.Y.S.3d 440 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff Alberto J. Rivera appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaughan, J.), dated December 4, 2014, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by him on the ground that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiff Alberto J. Rivera is denied.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff Alberto J. Rivera did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the lumbar region of Rivera’s spine did not constitute a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, however, Rivera raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury to the lumbar region of his spine (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]). Since Rivera raised a triable issue of fact with respect to the injury to the lumbar region of his spine, it is not necessary to determine whether the evidence he submitted raised a triable issue of fact as to whether his other alleged injuries meet the “no fault” threshold (see Linton v Nawaz, 14 NY3d 821, 822 [2010]; Rivera v Ramos, 132 AD3d 655 [2015]).

Therefore, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the *839 complaint insofar as asserted by Rivera. Mastro, J.R, Hall, Sgroi and Duffy, JJ., concur.

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In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff Alberto J. Rivera appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaughan, J.), dated December 4, 2014, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by him on the ground that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiff Alberto J. Rivera is denied.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff Alberto J. Rivera did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the lumbar region of Rivera’s spine did not constitute a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, however, Rivera raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury to the lumbar region of his spine (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]). Since Rivera raised a triable issue of fact with respect to the injury to the lumbar region of his spine, it is not necessary to determine whether the evidence he submitted raised a triable issue of fact as to whether his other alleged injuries meet the “no fault” threshold (see Linton v Nawaz, 14 NY3d 821, 822 [2010]; Rivera v Ramos, 132 AD3d 655 [2015]).

Therefore, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the *839 complaint insofar as asserted by Rivera. Mastro, J.R, Hall, Sgroi and Duffy, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

133 A.D.3d 838, 19 N.Y.S.3d 440, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rivera-v-sloane-nyappdiv-2015.

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