Rivera v. Ostad

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Rivera v. Ostad

37 A.D.3d 374, 829 N.Y.S.2d 901

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 27, 2007

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 37 A.D.3d 374 (Rivera v. Ostad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rivera v. Ostad, 37 A.D.3d 374, 829 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2007).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mary Ann Brigantti-Hughes, J.), entered on or about December 21, 2005, which denied appellant’s motion to dismiss the complaint and granted plaintiff’s cross motion for an order extending the 120-day period in which to serve appellant and to deem the second service on appellant timely, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Appellant did in fact receive a complaint, retain counsel and serve an answer with five affirmative defenses. As the motion court held, proper service was effected only 42 days after the end of the statutory 120-day period (CPLR 306-b). The court providently exercised its discretion, in the interest of justice, in granting plaintiff an extension of time to serve the summons and complaint (see Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d 95 [2001]). Concur—Saxe, J.P, Nardelli, Buckley, Gonzalez and Sweeny, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mary Ann Brigantti-Hughes, J.), entered on or about December 21, 2005, which denied appellant’s motion to dismiss the complaint and granted plaintiff’s cross motion for an order extending the 120-day period in which to serve appellant and to deem the second service on appellant timely, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Appellant did in fact receive a complaint, retain counsel and serve an answer with five affirmative defenses. As the motion court held, proper service was effected only 42 days after the end of the statutory 120-day period (CPLR 306-b). The court providently exercised its discretion, in the interest of justice, in granting plaintiff an extension of time to serve the summons and complaint (see Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d 95 [2001]). Concur—Saxe, J.P, Nardelli, Buckley, Gonzalez and Sweeny, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

37 A.D.3d 374, 829 N.Y.S.2d 901, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rivera-v-ostad-nyappdiv-2007.

Opinion

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