Rivera v. Department of Canyon County Jail

CourtDistrict Court, D. Idaho
DecidedFebruary 3, 2025
Docket1:23-cv-00462
StatusUnknown

This text of Rivera v. Department of Canyon County Jail (Rivera v. Department of Canyon County Jail) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Idaho primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rivera v. Department of Canyon County Jail, (D. Idaho 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

JOHN I. RIVERA, Case No. 1:23-cv-00462-BLW Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER v. BY SCREENING JUDGE

DEPARTMENT OF CANYON COUNTY JAIL and DEPARTMENT OF CANYON COUNTY STAFF,

Defendants.

The Court must review complaints filed by paupers and prisoners seeking relief against state actors to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Having reviewed the Complaint of Plaintiff John Rivera (“Plaintiff”), the Court concludes that he must amend his Complaint if he desires to proceed. REVIEW OF COMPLAINT 1. Background Plaintiff asserts that, when he was housed at the Canyon County Jail, he became suddenly and seriously ill, but, despite knocking on his cell door, pressing the emergency response button several times, and asking staff to summon medical help (because he also had an underlying serious heart problem—prior heart surgery and a pacemaker), nothing was done. Dkts. 1 & 1-1. Based on this incident, Plaintiff alleges that the failure to respond has “caused more heart failure.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff was in jail at the time he filed his lawsuit, but he was released from jail in October 2024. 2. Standard of Law for Screening

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed. Under Rule 8 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court may dismiss some or all of the claims in a complaint for providing insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). There must be enough for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to pretrial detainees and

is violated when a detainee’s conditions of confinement amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Pretrial detainees have a due process right to adequate health care while detained. See Sanchez v. Young County, Texas, 956 F.3d 785, 791-92 (5th Cir. 2020). Detainees’ conditions-of-confinement claims are analyzed using an objective deliberate indifference standard. Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018). Under that standard, a detainee must establish the following elements:

“(1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to [the medical treatment of the plaintiff]; (2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries.” Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 669 (9th Cir.) (quoting Gordon, 888 F.3d

at 1125), cert. denied sub nom. San Diego Cnty. v. Sandoval, 142 S. Ct. 711 (2021). To satisfy the third element, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actions were “objectively unreasonable,” which requires a showing of “more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Id. (citation omitted). The application of this standard “will necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Plaintiff has not provided any facts about whether he eventually received a

diagnosis for the health issues that arose in the emergency incident. He must provide facts about the diagnosis and recovery period. Was he eventually treated at the jail or taken to the hospital? And what did health care providers conclude, if anything, about the delay in obtaining health care for that incident? Plaintiff states that the delay caused him to have additional heart problems, but he does not cite to any health care provider who gave this opinion. Plaintiff will be given leave to obtain his health care records from the jail and/or

the hospital so that he can determine whether he has sufficient facts to state a claim. He must file an amended complaint to provide additional facts showing that officers and providers acted in a manner that equates to objective deliberate indifference, and that their actions caused serious harm to Plaintiff. Here, in particular, Plaintiff must show that he had a serious medical need. That will be documented in his health care records. In addition, Plaintiff must name the personnel who were directly involved in denying or delaying medical care, information that will be contained in his medical records.

If Plaintiff desires to sue county entities, he must provide additional facts. A county may be considered a “person” that can be sued under § 1983 if the claim alleges that a government policy or custom inflicted the injury of which a plaintiff complains. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To proceed on such a claim, the plaintiff must state facts in the complaint alleging the following: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the county had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional

right; and (4) the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Mabe v. San Bernardino County, Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and punctuation omitted)). A plaintiff may also establish liability by demonstrating that the alleged constitutional violation was caused by the county’s failure to train its employees adequately. See City of Canton, Ohio v.

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Related

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Bell v. Wolfish
441 U.S. 520 (Supreme Court, 1979)
City of Canton v. Harris
489 U.S. 378 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Robert S. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
749 F.2d 530 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Tyrone Merritt v. County of Los Angeles
875 F.2d 765 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)
Mabe v. San Bernardino County
237 F.3d 1101 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Mary Gordon v. County of Orange
888 F.3d 1118 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
Nichole Sanchez v. Young County, Texas, et
956 F.3d 785 (Fifth Circuit, 2020)
Ana Sandoval v. County of San Diego
985 F.3d 657 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)

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Rivera v. Department of Canyon County Jail, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rivera-v-department-of-canyon-county-jail-idd-2025.