UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Alejandro Rivera
v. Civil No. 17-cv-512-LM Opinion No. 2018 DNH 076 Body Armor Outlet, LLC, et al.
O R D E R
Before the court is plaintiff Alejandro Rivera’s motion
requesting that the substantive law of Nevada be deemed
“controlling” (doc. no. 58). Defendants Body Armor Outlet, LLC
(“Body Armor Outlet”) and Ace Welding Co., Inc. (“Ace”) object
and assert that the substantive law of New Hampshire should
apply. Finding the motion premature, the court declines to rule
on the question at this time, and therefore denies Rivera’s
motion without prejudice.1
For three reasons, the court concludes that the choice-of-
law issues presented in this case are better addressed at a
later juncture.
1 In its objection, Ace also cross-moved for an order that the substantive law of New Hampshire applies. The court declines to rule on this request, because under Local Rule 7.1(a)(1), “[o]bjections to pending motions and affirmative motions for relief shall not be combined in one filing.” Regardless, the cross-motion would be denied without prejudice for the reasons stated herein.
1 First, there appears to be a dispute of fact regarding
whether Rivera agreed to a New Hampshire choice-of-law provision
set forth in the “Conditions of Use” on Body Armor Outlet’s
website. Defendants allege that when Rivera purchased the steel
plates from Body Armor Outlet’s website, he checked a box
labeled “Yes, I agree,” next to the following statement:
With the confirmation of this purchase from Body Armor Outlet, LLC I am confirming that I have read the shipping and returns policy and fully understand the policy. By making this purchase I am agreeing to the terms described in this section for my order.
Doc. no. 60-2 at 2. Defendants assert that, by clicking the
checkbox, Rivera agreed to the website’s Conditions of Use.
Rivera appears to challenge the claim that he made such an
agreement, stating that the Conditions of Use were an “optional
link” at the bottom of Body Armor Outlet’s website. Doc. no. 66
at 3.
The court is not in a position to resolve this dispute.
The submissions before the court amount to screenshots of the
relevant webpages, along with unsworn factual statements of each
party’s counsel relating to the operation of the website and
Rivera’s purchase. The evidence is sparse and, more
importantly, unclear. In addition, Rivera appears to make a
claim that the Conditions of Use are unconscionable, which is
itself a “fact-laden” determination. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Koshy, 995 A.2d 651, 669 (Me. 2010) (discussing New
2 Hampshire law). Further discovery and development of the record
would help to clarify and resolve these disputes. See, e.g.,
Picone v. Shire PLC, No. 16-cv-12396, 2017 WL 4873506, at *15
(D. Mass. Oct. 20, 2017) (collecting cases for proposition that
“it is premature to conduct the choice-of-law analysis at the
motion to dismiss stage prior to discovery”).
Second, the parties have not fully addressed a threshold
legal question that relates to the Conditions of Use.
Specifically, there may be a question as to whether the choice-
of-law provision extends to a products liability claim, as
opposed to a contract claim. The choice-of-law provision merely
states that New Hampshire law applies to all “transactions,” a
term which could be interpreted to encompass only contract
claims. See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining
“transaction” as the “act or an instance of conducting business
. . . esp., the formation, performance, or discharge of a
contract”); see also Stonyfield Farm, Inc. v. Agro-Farma, Inc.,
No. 08-cv-488-JL, 2009 WL 3255218, at *4-5 (D.N.H. Oct. 7, 2009)
(discussing law on whether choice-of-law provisions extend to
tort claims). Only Ace addresses this issue.
Third, the parties have only explicitly identified one
relevant conflict between Nevada and New Hampshire law. See
Levin v. Dalva Brothers, Inc., 459 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir. 2006)
(“An initial task of a choice-of-law analysis is to determine
3 whether there is an actual conflict between the substantive law
of the interested jurisdictions.”). Specifically, in strict
products liability cases, New Hampshire recognizes a defense of
comparative fault—which permits the jury to reduce the
plaintiff’s damages by the percentage that the plaintiff’s
misconduct caused his injuries, if not greater than 50%—while
Nevada does not. Compare Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395
A.2d 843, 850 (N.H. 1978), with Young’s Mach. Co. v. Long, 692
P.2d 24, 25-26 (Nev. 1984). Instead, Nevada recognizes
traditional defenses like assumption of the risk and misuse of
the product, which, if proven, bar recovery by the plaintiff.
See Long, 692 P.2d at 25.
Although alluding to additional conflicts, the parties do
not fully explain how Nevada and New Hampshire law otherwise
conflict. In his motion, Rivera asserts that, in Nevada,
defendants are subject to joint and several liability, but he
does not describe how New Hampshire law differs. Rivera also
cites numerous Nevada strict-liability principles, but he does
not suggest that those differ from New Hampshire law. Also, Ace
notes that New Hampshire law allows for apportionment of
liability to unnamed parties, but does not cite any Nevada law
to demonstrate a conflict. Finally, while the parties assert
that their preferred state law should govern the case generally,
they do not identify any conflicts with respect to Rivera’s
4 other claims—misrepresentation and breach of express and implied
warranties. Thus, deferring consideration on the choice-of-law
question will not only allow the record to be further developed,
but it will give the parties an opportunity to elaborate on the
particular conflicts of law that require resolution.
The court makes one final point. Defendants argue that
Rivera waived any argument regarding the application of Nevada
law because in the joint discovery plan he agreed that New
Hampshire law would apply, and he relied on New Hampshire law in
previous filings. Likewise, Rivera argues that defendants
should be estopped from denying that Nevada law applies because
they relied on Nevada law in certain filings.
The court does not find the parties’ arguments persuasive.
Given the procedural machinations of this case, the court does
not consider it surprising that all of the parties have
alternatively relied on Nevada and New Hampshire law at various
points during this litigation. The court is not convinced that
such conduct rises to the level of waiver, concession, or
estoppel, particularly where it is still relatively early in the
litigation, there is little in the way of demonstrable
prejudice, and the issue has not been previously addressed by
the court. See Levin, 459 F.3d at 72 (stating that the point at
which a party must raise a choice-of-law argument is “based on
[each] case's own facts and equities”); see also Grecon Dimter,
5 Inc. v. Horner Flooring Co., Inc., 114 F. App’x 64, 66 (4th Cir.
2004) (declining to find waiver where party’s reliance on other
state’s law “ended early in the case”).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Alejandro Rivera
v. Civil No. 17-cv-512-LM Opinion No. 2018 DNH 076 Body Armor Outlet, LLC, et al.
O R D E R
Before the court is plaintiff Alejandro Rivera’s motion
requesting that the substantive law of Nevada be deemed
“controlling” (doc. no. 58). Defendants Body Armor Outlet, LLC
(“Body Armor Outlet”) and Ace Welding Co., Inc. (“Ace”) object
and assert that the substantive law of New Hampshire should
apply. Finding the motion premature, the court declines to rule
on the question at this time, and therefore denies Rivera’s
motion without prejudice.1
For three reasons, the court concludes that the choice-of-
law issues presented in this case are better addressed at a
later juncture.
1 In its objection, Ace also cross-moved for an order that the substantive law of New Hampshire applies. The court declines to rule on this request, because under Local Rule 7.1(a)(1), “[o]bjections to pending motions and affirmative motions for relief shall not be combined in one filing.” Regardless, the cross-motion would be denied without prejudice for the reasons stated herein.
1 First, there appears to be a dispute of fact regarding
whether Rivera agreed to a New Hampshire choice-of-law provision
set forth in the “Conditions of Use” on Body Armor Outlet’s
website. Defendants allege that when Rivera purchased the steel
plates from Body Armor Outlet’s website, he checked a box
labeled “Yes, I agree,” next to the following statement:
With the confirmation of this purchase from Body Armor Outlet, LLC I am confirming that I have read the shipping and returns policy and fully understand the policy. By making this purchase I am agreeing to the terms described in this section for my order.
Doc. no. 60-2 at 2. Defendants assert that, by clicking the
checkbox, Rivera agreed to the website’s Conditions of Use.
Rivera appears to challenge the claim that he made such an
agreement, stating that the Conditions of Use were an “optional
link” at the bottom of Body Armor Outlet’s website. Doc. no. 66
at 3.
The court is not in a position to resolve this dispute.
The submissions before the court amount to screenshots of the
relevant webpages, along with unsworn factual statements of each
party’s counsel relating to the operation of the website and
Rivera’s purchase. The evidence is sparse and, more
importantly, unclear. In addition, Rivera appears to make a
claim that the Conditions of Use are unconscionable, which is
itself a “fact-laden” determination. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Koshy, 995 A.2d 651, 669 (Me. 2010) (discussing New
2 Hampshire law). Further discovery and development of the record
would help to clarify and resolve these disputes. See, e.g.,
Picone v. Shire PLC, No. 16-cv-12396, 2017 WL 4873506, at *15
(D. Mass. Oct. 20, 2017) (collecting cases for proposition that
“it is premature to conduct the choice-of-law analysis at the
motion to dismiss stage prior to discovery”).
Second, the parties have not fully addressed a threshold
legal question that relates to the Conditions of Use.
Specifically, there may be a question as to whether the choice-
of-law provision extends to a products liability claim, as
opposed to a contract claim. The choice-of-law provision merely
states that New Hampshire law applies to all “transactions,” a
term which could be interpreted to encompass only contract
claims. See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining
“transaction” as the “act or an instance of conducting business
. . . esp., the formation, performance, or discharge of a
contract”); see also Stonyfield Farm, Inc. v. Agro-Farma, Inc.,
No. 08-cv-488-JL, 2009 WL 3255218, at *4-5 (D.N.H. Oct. 7, 2009)
(discussing law on whether choice-of-law provisions extend to
tort claims). Only Ace addresses this issue.
Third, the parties have only explicitly identified one
relevant conflict between Nevada and New Hampshire law. See
Levin v. Dalva Brothers, Inc., 459 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir. 2006)
(“An initial task of a choice-of-law analysis is to determine
3 whether there is an actual conflict between the substantive law
of the interested jurisdictions.”). Specifically, in strict
products liability cases, New Hampshire recognizes a defense of
comparative fault—which permits the jury to reduce the
plaintiff’s damages by the percentage that the plaintiff’s
misconduct caused his injuries, if not greater than 50%—while
Nevada does not. Compare Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395
A.2d 843, 850 (N.H. 1978), with Young’s Mach. Co. v. Long, 692
P.2d 24, 25-26 (Nev. 1984). Instead, Nevada recognizes
traditional defenses like assumption of the risk and misuse of
the product, which, if proven, bar recovery by the plaintiff.
See Long, 692 P.2d at 25.
Although alluding to additional conflicts, the parties do
not fully explain how Nevada and New Hampshire law otherwise
conflict. In his motion, Rivera asserts that, in Nevada,
defendants are subject to joint and several liability, but he
does not describe how New Hampshire law differs. Rivera also
cites numerous Nevada strict-liability principles, but he does
not suggest that those differ from New Hampshire law. Also, Ace
notes that New Hampshire law allows for apportionment of
liability to unnamed parties, but does not cite any Nevada law
to demonstrate a conflict. Finally, while the parties assert
that their preferred state law should govern the case generally,
they do not identify any conflicts with respect to Rivera’s
4 other claims—misrepresentation and breach of express and implied
warranties. Thus, deferring consideration on the choice-of-law
question will not only allow the record to be further developed,
but it will give the parties an opportunity to elaborate on the
particular conflicts of law that require resolution.
The court makes one final point. Defendants argue that
Rivera waived any argument regarding the application of Nevada
law because in the joint discovery plan he agreed that New
Hampshire law would apply, and he relied on New Hampshire law in
previous filings. Likewise, Rivera argues that defendants
should be estopped from denying that Nevada law applies because
they relied on Nevada law in certain filings.
The court does not find the parties’ arguments persuasive.
Given the procedural machinations of this case, the court does
not consider it surprising that all of the parties have
alternatively relied on Nevada and New Hampshire law at various
points during this litigation. The court is not convinced that
such conduct rises to the level of waiver, concession, or
estoppel, particularly where it is still relatively early in the
litigation, there is little in the way of demonstrable
prejudice, and the issue has not been previously addressed by
the court. See Levin, 459 F.3d at 72 (stating that the point at
which a party must raise a choice-of-law argument is “based on
[each] case's own facts and equities”); see also Grecon Dimter,
5 Inc. v. Horner Flooring Co., Inc., 114 F. App’x 64, 66 (4th Cir.
2004) (declining to find waiver where party’s reliance on other
state’s law “ended early in the case”).
The purported “agreement” in the discovery plan is also
ambiguous, in that it is unclear whether it constitutes an
agreement as to the applicable substantive law, a mutual
recognition that New Hampshire choice-of-law principles apply,
or a mere acknowledgement that choice of law is an unresolved
question. The pertinent paragraph appears under the heading
“QUESTIONS OF LAW”:
Based on the holding in Klaxon, the law of New Hampshire should control this litigation. Consequently, New Hampshire’s choice-of-law rules would apply. When New Hampshire is the forum for a suit in which one or more other states also have an interest, a court treats potential conflicts of law as follows: it first decides whether a relevant law is substantive or procedural; if it is substantive, the court determines whether it actually conflicts with the laws of another interested state and, if so, the court then conducts an analysis based upon five choice-of-law-influencing considerations; if it is procedural, the court generally applies its own law.
Doc. no. 51 at 4 (citations omitted). The ambiguity is
compounded by the fact that Klaxon would not appear to apply
under these circumstances. Rather, because this case was
transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), this court would “apply
the state law that would have been applied if there had been no
change of venue,” i.e., Nevada law. Meyer v. Callahan, No. 09-
cv-106-PB, 2010 WL 4916563, at *1 n.3 (D.N.H. Nov. 29, 2010).
6 In the absence of prejudice to defendants, the court
declines to bar Rivera from litigating the applicability of
Nevada law on the basis of defendants’ waiver and estoppel
arguments. Moving forward, the court will be disinclined to
find waiver or estoppel on choice of law merely because a party
seeks to preserve a particular argument or defense under Nevada
or New Hampshire law—for example, by filing a DeBenedetto
disclosure. That being said, the parties should be prepared to
fully address any choice-of-law issues that arise during
subsequent motion practice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Rivera’s Motion to Establish
Nevada Law as Controlling (doc. no. 58) is denied without
prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________ Landya McCafferty United States District Judge
April 10, 2018
cc: Counsel of Record