Rivera Ojeda v. SHHS
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
July 6, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
___________________
No. 93-2194
PEDRO RIVERA OJEDA,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant, Appellee.
__________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
___________________
Before
Boudin, Circuit Judge,
_____________
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, and
____________________
Stahl, Circuit Judge.
_____________
___________________
Raymond Rivera Esteves and Juan A. Hernandez Rivera on brief
______________________ ________________________
for appellant.
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Maria Hortensia Rios,
_____________ ____________________
Assistant United States Attorney, and Robert J. Triba, Assistant
_______________
Regional Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services, on
brief for appellee.
__________________
__________________
Per Curiam. Claimant Pedro Rivera Ojeda filed an
__________
application for Social Security disability benefits on June
20, 1990, alleging a back condition, severe back pain, and a
nervous condition. After a hearing, the ALJ conceded that
claimant had a severe back impairment that precluded his
return to his former job as a janitor required to do heavy
work. The ALJ found, however, that despite claimant's
exertional impairments claimant retained the residual
functional capacity to perform light work. The ALJ further
found that claimant's non-exertional impairments (his pain
and mental condition) did not significantly restrict his
capacity to perform the full range of jobs requiring light
work. Accordingly, the ALJ found claimant not disabled at
step 4 of the sequential evaluation process, 20 C.F.R.
404.1520(e), on the ground that claimant's impairments,
although they precluded performing his former janitor job,
did not preclude his return to his former type of work as a
____
janitor. This type of work, the ALJ ruled, generally
requires no more than light work.
After the Appeals Council denied claimant's request for
review of the ALJ's decision, claimant appealed to the
district court, which affirmed. Claimant appeals, contending
that the Secretary's determination is not supported by
substantial evidence. We affirm.
The objective medical evidence concerning claimant's
physical condition can be summarized as follows. Dr. Ruiz, a
general practitioner, examined claimant on January 5, 1990,
and diagnosed cervical and dorso-lumbar spondlyoarthritis and
muscle spasm and left carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Vargas, a
physiatrist, treated claimant between February and April 1990
and reported moderate to severe muscle spasm, but good muscle
tone and no atrophy, and left carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr.
Gonzalez Cotto, a neurologist, examined claimant on July 23,
1990, and diagnosed chronic discogenic disease.
The record contains substantial evidence to support the
ALJ's functional conclusion that claimant, despite these
impairments, retains the exertional capacity to perform light
work. Dr. Sanchez, a non-examining physician, reviewed the
medical evidence in the record and prepared a residual
functional capacity assessment form on February 5, 1991,
accompanied by brief medical findings. On the form, Dr.
Sanchez checked boxes indicating that claimant can lift or
carry 20 pounds, 10 pounds frequently, can stand, walk, or
sit six hours, and can climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,
and crawl occasionally. Dr. Sanchez further found that
claimant could not perform repetitive movements in his upper
extremities, and was limited in his capacity for gross
manipulation by the hands.
Another non-examining physician, Dr. Marxuach, reviewed
the medical evidence in the record and prepared a residual
functional capacity assessment form on August 13, 1990,
accompanied by brief medical findings. Dr. Marxuach, like
Dr. Sanchez, checked boxes indicating that claimant can lift
or carry 20 pounds, 10 pounds frequently, can stand, walk, or
-3-
sit six hours, and can climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,
and crawl occasionally. Dr. Marxuach noted no further
limitations.
The governing regulations state that light work
"involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10
pounds [and] requires a good deal of walking or standing."
20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b). These regulations do not require
that a person be able to perform repetitive movements of the
upper extremities or gross manipulation of the hands, or be
able to climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl more
than occasionally, in order to be able to perform a full
range of jobs requiring light work. Thus, both Dr. Sanchez'
and Dr. Marxuach's findings support the ALJ's determination
that claimant can perform light work.
We have held that the amount of weight that can properly
be given the conclusions of non-testifying, non-examining
physicians "will vary with the circumstances." Berrios Lopez
_____________
v. Secretary of Health and Hu
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