Rivera-Gomez v. Holt

102 F. Supp. 2d 62, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9225, 2000 WL 890735
CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedJune 29, 2000
DocketCiv. 00-1563(JAF)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 102 F. Supp. 2d 62 (Rivera-Gomez v. Holt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rivera-Gomez v. Holt, 102 F. Supp. 2d 62, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9225, 2000 WL 890735 (prd 2000).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

FUSTE, District Judge.

Petitioner Luis Raúl Rivera-Gómez, a prisoner at the United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado (“penitentiary”), brings this habeas petition asking that we vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994).-

I.

A jury convicted Petitioner of three counts of carjacking pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1996), and three counts of aiding and abetting the use and carriage of firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(a) (2000) and 924(c) (2000). The district court sentenced him to concurrent 180-month incarceration sentences for the first two carjacking counts, fife imprisonment for the third carjacking count, and concurrent five-year sentences for the firearms counts.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994), Petitioner filed a habeas petition alleging three errors by the district court: (1) erroneous admission of evidence; (2) failure to declare a mistrial; and (3) unconstitutional application of the life sentence. The district court denied Petitioner’s petition and he appealed. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination.

Petitioner then attempted to file a successive habeas petition alleging a new rule of constitutional law based upon 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as articulated in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999). The First Circuit denied the motion on the grounds that the Court expressly did not assert any new rule of constitutional law in Jones, 526 U.S. at 227,119 S.Ct. 1215.

Now, Petitioner moves for habeas relief pursuant to 28 .U.S.C. § 2241, alleging erroneous interpretation of the statute upon which he was convicted based upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Jones, 526 U.S. at 227,119 S.Ct. 1215.

II.

We are presented with a somewhat unique situation in that Petitioner seeks to file a section 2241 motion subsequent to the denial of his section 2255 motion. This is an area which has not been addressed by the First Circuit. However, other circuits have examined the issue in the context of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.02d 472 (1995). 1 See Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th *64 Cir.1998); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir.1997); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3rd Cir.1997); In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192 (4th Cir.1997) (en banc); United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278 (9th Cir.1997). The analyses in these cases are useful because the basic issue which they examined was the same one with which we are faced: does the savings clause in section 2255 2 permit filing of Petitioner’s claims under section 2241? 3

Each of the Circuits adopted a different holding, but the main contention emanating from the decisions is that the savings clause of section 2255 does not permit petitions which would be prohibited otherwise because of procedural bar or denial of previous motions. The Fourth Circuit unequivocally stated:

[T]he remedy afforded by § 2255 is not rendered inadequate or ineffective merely because an individual has been unable to obtain relief under that provision ... or because an individual is proeedurally barred from filing a § 2255 motion....

In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194 & n. 5; see also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 608 (finding that the savings clause does not permit § 2241 motions to be filed whenever § 2255 bars a second or successive petition); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251 (noting that savings clause could not be invoked when a petitioner fails to meet “stringent gatekeeping requirements of § 2255” because to do so would “effectively eviscerate Congress’s intent in amending § 2255”). Nonetheless, each Circuit recognized the possible viability of a section 2241 claim which is filed subsequent to a denied section 2255 claim. The circuits differ slightly as to the interpretations and *65 requirements for a viable section 2241 claim.

We are most persuaded by the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1236. The court thoroughly analyzed the legislative history of the amendment to section 2255 and all prior case law on the topic before reaching its holding. The Circuit determined:

The savings clause of § 2255 applies to a claim when: 1) that claim is based upon a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision; 2) the holding of that Supreme Court decision establishes the petitioner was convicted for a nonexistent offense; and 3) circuit law squarely foreclosed such a claim at the time it otherwise should have been raised in the petitioner’s trial, appeal, or first § 2255 motion.

Id. We find this to be a sagacious approach and, therefore, adopt it in our analysis of the instant case.

We need go no further than the first prong to deny Petitioner’s current claim. As the First Circuit pointed out to Petitioner in his previous failed successive petition:

According to the Supreme Court itself, Jones did “not announce any new principle of constitutional law but merely interpreted] a federal statute in light of a set of constitutional concerns that ha[d] emerged through a series of ... decisions over the past quarter century.” Since the Supreme Court does “not express a new rule of constitutional law ... when it merely interprets] a substantive criminal statute using rules of statutory construction, petitioner’s claim fails.” This conclusion is not altered by the fact that Jones “interprets a federal statute in light of a set of constitutional concerns” since the decision is still fundamentally one of statutory construction. Furthermore, insofar as Jones

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Related

Rodriguez v. Martinez
935 F. Supp. 2d 389 (D. Puerto Rico, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
102 F. Supp. 2d 62, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9225, 2000 WL 890735, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rivera-gomez-v-holt-prd-2000.