Rivas v. McDonnell

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Rivas v. McDonnell

308 A.D.2d 572, 764 N.Y.S.2d 870

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedSeptember 29, 2003

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 308 A.D.2d 572 (Rivas v. McDonnell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rivas v. McDonnell, 308 A.D.2d 572, 764 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action, inter alia, pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to quiet title to real property, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Douglass, J.), dated October 16, 2002, which denied her motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

The New York Recording Act (Real Property Law § 290 et [573]*573seq.) protects a good faith purchaser for value from a prior unrecorded interest in real property provided, inter alia, that the subsequent purchaser’s interest is the first to be duly recorded (see Yen-Te Hsueh Chen v Geranium Dev. Corp., 243 AD2d 708, 709 [1997]; Morrocoy Mar. v Altengarten, 120 AD2d 500 [1986]; Goldstein v Gold, 106 AD2d 100, 101-102 [1984], affd 66 NY2d 624 [1985]; Real Property Law § 291; 11 Warren’s Weed, NY Real Property, Recording §§ 1.05, 1.07; 92 NY Jur 2d, Records and Recording §§ 85-88). It is undisputed that the plaintiff recorded her deed one day before the defendants Dewey Perone and Josephine Cruz, the subsequent purchasers, recorded their deed. As a result, Perone and Cruz may not invoke the protection of the recording statute. Under these circumstances, whether the plaintiff as the prior purchaser paid a valuable consideration for the property is irrelevant. Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in denying the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

In light of our determination, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kangs County, to remove the temporary receiver pursuant to CPLR 6405, to direct the filing of an accounting by the temporary receiver, and for the entry of a judgment pursuant to RPAPL 1521 (1) declaring the validity of the plaintiff’s deed and the invalidity of the deed of Perone and Cruz. Florio, J.P., Feuerstein, Crane and Rivera, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—In an action, inter alia, pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to quiet title to real property, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Douglass, J.), dated October 16, 2002, which denied her motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

The New York Recording Act (Real Property Law § 290 et [573]*573seq.) protects a good faith purchaser for value from a prior unrecorded interest in real property provided, inter alia, that the subsequent purchaser’s interest is the first to be duly recorded (see Yen-Te Hsueh Chen v Geranium Dev. Corp., 243 AD2d 708, 709 [1997]; Morrocoy Mar. v Altengarten, 120 AD2d 500 [1986]; Goldstein v Gold, 106 AD2d 100, 101-102 [1984], affd 66 NY2d 624 [1985]; Real Property Law § 291; 11 Warren’s Weed, NY Real Property, Recording §§ 1.05, 1.07; 92 NY Jur 2d, Records and Recording §§ 85-88). It is undisputed that the plaintiff recorded her deed one day before the defendants Dewey Perone and Josephine Cruz, the subsequent purchasers, recorded their deed. As a result, Perone and Cruz may not invoke the protection of the recording statute. Under these circumstances, whether the plaintiff as the prior purchaser paid a valuable consideration for the property is irrelevant. Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in denying the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

In light of our determination, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kangs County, to remove the temporary receiver pursuant to CPLR 6405, to direct the filing of an accounting by the temporary receiver, and for the entry of a judgment pursuant to RPAPL 1521 (1) declaring the validity of the plaintiff’s deed and the invalidity of the deed of Perone and Cruz. Florio, J.P., Feuerstein, Crane and Rivera, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

308 A.D.2d 572, 764 N.Y.S.2d 870, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rivas-v-mcdonnell-nyappdiv-2003.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack