Ritchie v. Hill

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 16, 2024
• Docket: 3:23-cv-02163
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOAQUIN RITCHIE, Case No.: 23-CV-2163 JLS (VET)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. FAILURE TO PAY THE REQUIRED FILING FEE 14 ALLYSON HILL and GOLDEN 1

CREDIT UNION, 15 (ECF No. 8) Defendants. 16 17 18 19

20 Presently before the Court is what was generously docketed as Plaintiff Joaquin 21 Ritchie’s “Notice of Intent to Pay Filing Fee” (“Notice,” ECF No. 8). The Notice includes 22 a single page containing the following message: “Pay to the order of Clerk, U.S. District 23 Court, in the amount of one thousand, one hundred dollars & 00/100.” Notice at 1. The 24 Notice is apparently meant to pay the court filing fee. See id. (“Memo: Filing Fee for Case 25 # 3:23-cv-02163-JLS-VET[.]”). As said fee totals only $405, the Notice adds that “the 26 court can have the excess.” Id. Finally, the Notice is signed by “Ritchie, Joaquin,” “Private 27 & Restricted.” Id. 28 / / / 1 To state the obvious, the Notice does not constitute payment of the filing fee. 2 Acceptable forms of payment include “cash (limits apply), personal check (except for 3 material witness and cash bonds), cashier’s check, law firm check, [or] money order. 4 Credit cards are [also] accepted for payment of filing fees or other miscellaneous court 5 fees.”1 Plaintiff’s handwritten submission falls into none of these categories. See Baird v. 6 Ammiyhuwd, No. 1:16-CV-1152, 2017 WL 430772, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2017) 7 (rebuffing argument that parties could pay court fee with “a document entitled ‘Promissory 8 Note’ in the amount of $300,000.00,” in which a defendant “purportedly promise[d] to pay 9 the Clerk of Court the full amount of the filing fees”), report and recommendation adopted, 10 No. 1:16CV01152, 2018 WL 3524465 (S.D. Ohio July 23, 2018). If Plaintiff wishes to 11 proceed with this action, he must pay the filing fee using one of the enumerated forms of 12 payment. 13 Ordinarily, the Court would end its Order here. Plaintiff’s Notice, however, 14 represents only the latest of Plaintiff’s frivolous attempts to avoid paying the required filing 15 fee. Along with his Complaint (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1), Plaintiff filed an Application to 16 Proceed in Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (“First Appl.,” ECF No. 2). Plaintiff also appended 17 pages from the 1968 “Revised Fourth Edition” of “Black’s Law Dictionary” to his 18 Complaint. See Compl. at 5–7. Plaintiff highlighted within those pages the following 19 definition of “money”: “In usual and ordinary acceptation it means gold, silver, or paper 20 money used as circulating medium of exchange, [a]nd does not embrace notes, bonds, 21 evidences of debt, or other personal or real estate.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff thus appeared to 22 argue that—pursuant to a cherry-picked and eighty-five-year-old2 definition of “money”— 23 he needed only report physical cash and could omit, inter alia, any property or 24 electronically available funds from his First Application. The Court deemed Plaintiff’s 25 26 1 Fees of the U.S. District Court; 28 USC § 1914 and Local Rule 4.5, United States District Court, S. Dist. of Cal. (eff. Dec. 1, 2023), https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/_assets/pdf/courtinfo/Fees%20of%20the 27 %20U.S.%20District%20Court%20(CASD).pdf. 28 1 contention baseless and entirely without merit. See ECF No. 3 at 4. Finding further that 2 Plaintiff’s claim to have no expenses was contradicted by evidence in his pleadings, the 3 Court denied the First Application. See id. at 3–5. 4 In a renewed IFP Application (“Second Appl.,” ECF No. 6), Plaintiff supplanted his 5 “money” argument with an equally frivolous contention. The Second Application was 6 accompanied by a Response to the denial of the First Application (“Resp.,” ECF No. 5). 7 In the Response, Plaintiff explained that Joaquin-Ramon (“a living man”) and “JOAQUIN 8 RITCHIE” (his “ens legis/public corporation”) were distinct legal entities. Resp. at 1. Per 9 Plaintiff, Joaquin-Ramon did not earn income or own assets—JOAQUIN RITCHIE 10 handled that—and Plaintiff filled out his First IFP Application accordingly. See id. at 1–2. 11 Plaintiff then graciously reported that he had provided “all the commercial activity for 12 JOAQUIN RITCHIE” in his Second Application. Id. at 2. Setting aside the 13 meaninglessness of Plaintiff’s Response, the Court denied the Second Application after 14 concluding that Plaintiff had not shown an inability to pay the filing fee and still afford the 15 necessities of life. See ECF No. 7 at 3. The Court granted Plaintiff until January 22, 2024, 16 to pay the required filing fee. See id. Plaintiff’s Notice followed on January 9. 17 Each of Plaintiff’s evasive tactics—including this attempt to pay using his 18 handwritten note—have roots in “sovereign citizen” ideology,3 and “[c]ourts across the 19 country have uniformly rejected arguments based in sovereign citizen ideology as 20 ‘frivolous, irrational, or unintelligible.’” Bland v. Moffett, No. 119CV01750JLTSKOPC, 21 2022 WL 5049934, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2022) (quoting Bland v. Warden, No. 2:21-cv- 22 00518 TLN DB P, 2022 WL 1597730, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2022)), report and 23 24 25 3 See, e.g., Baird, 2017 WL 430772, at *2; Corbin-Bey v. All Parties in Evidence & Principles of Subsidiaries, No. CV 17-5400, 2017 WL 11541165, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2017) (denying IFP 26 application where plaintiff claimed to “receive[] no wages nor income neither in U.S. currency nor U.S. minted money in gold or silver”); Bachmeier v. Einerson, No. 3:23-CV-00179-SLG, 2023 WL 6796213, 27 at *2 (D. Alaska Oct. 13, 2023) (rejecting petitioner’s “attempt to separate himself into two entities—a 28 natural, living person and a corporation or “ens legis” with the same name as Petitioner, but written in all 1 || recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 15523567 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2022). As Plaintiff’s 2 || frivolous antics show no signs of abating, the Court now references this authority to warn 3 || Plaintiff that future such attempts to avoid paying the filing fee will not be entertained. See 4 ||United States vy. Davis, 586 F. App’x 534, 537 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining courts 5 ||“confronted with sovereign citizens’” arguments “have summarily rejected their legal 6 || theories”). 7 To ensure that Plaintiff is not operating under the misunderstanding that his 8 || obligations have been satisfied, the Court now clarifies that the Notice does not constitute 9 payment of his $405 filing fee. Accordingly, Plaintiff MUST PAY the filing fee within 10 || fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order if he wishes to pursue this action. If Plaintiff 11 || fails to pay his filing fee, this action will be dismissed for failing to comply with a court 12 ||order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See Hells Canyon Pres. Council 13 || v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[C]ourts may dismiss under Rule 14 ||41(b) sua sponte . . . under certain circumstances.”); Sivak v. Doe, 837 F. App’x 552, 553 15 || (9th Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal after the district court “warn[ed] [litigant] that failure 16 pay the filing fee... would result in dismissal”). Such a dismissal may be with 17 prejudice. See Fed R. Civ. P. 41(b); Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962) 18 || (“The authority of a federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff’s action with prejudice because 19 || of his failure to prosecute cannot seriously be doubted.”’). 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 ||Dated: January 16, 2024 tt 22 ja Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28