Rita Bradley v. John Donald Motes

214 So. 3d 312, 2017 WL 1238140, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 179
CourtCourt of Appeals of Mississippi
DecidedApril 4, 2017
DocketNO. 2015-CA-00465-COA
StatusPublished

This text of 214 So. 3d 312 (Rita Bradley v. John Donald Motes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rita Bradley v. John Donald Motes, 214 So. 3d 312, 2017 WL 1238140, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 179 (Mich. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

GRIFFIS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Rita Bradley appeals the chancellor’s modification of custody. We find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Rita Bradley and John Donald Motes were divorced in Hamilton County, Tennessee, on February 9, 2009. Rita was awarded primary custody of their two minor children, JHM and LHM. 1 Both Rita and John are now remarried. Rita currently resides in Petal, Mississippi, and John resides in Pelham, Alabama.

¶ 3. On August 11, 2009, John filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Forrest County, Mississippi, and requested a modification of custody of the two minor children, as well as other relief. During a hearing on May 1, 2012, the parties agreed that John’s request for modification of custody would be held in abeyance and custody of both minor children would remain with Rita until such time as John renewed his request. A judgment was subsequently entered April 8, 2013.

¶ 4. On September 23, 2013, John filed a petition to modify child custody based on various grounds. A two-day trial was heard by the original chancellor on May 15, 2014, and June 4, 2014. On June 4, 2014, after she had spoken with the minor children, the chancellor advised the parties about a comment JHM had made and asked if they wanted her to recuse. Rita advised that she wanted the chancellor to recuse. As a result, the chancellor stated she would re-cuse.

¶ 5. On June 5, 2014, the chancellor entered a temporary order modifying custody. The chancellor awarded primary custody of LHM to John for the remainder of the summer. Primary custody of JHM remained with Rita. Thereafter, on July 11, 2014, the chancellor entered an order of recusal, and the case was reassigned.

¶ 6. On July 31, 2014, the newly assigned chancellor entered a temporary order, which revised the earlier temporary order *314 entered by the original chancellor. The newly assigned chancellor declined to modify custody of LHM on a temporary basis and found that the judgment entered on April 8, 2013, would remain in effect until trial.

¶ 7. The trial was held on September 3, 2014. At that time, JHM was fifteen years old, and LHM was fourteen years old. The parties stipulated that JHM elected to live with Rita, and LHM elected to live with John. In his petition to modify child custody, John sought custody of both JHM and LHM. However, at trial, John advised that he was seeking modification of custody of LHM only. 2

¶ 8. By judgment entered September 11, 2014, the chancellor found that John’s allegations for modification of custody were meritless, but ultimately determined “that the ongoing medical and emotionfel] problems both children [were] going through [was] a material change in circumstances that adversely affect[ed] the minor children and it [was] in their best interest that custody be changed.” The chancellor modified custody and awarded physical custody of LHM to John. Physical custody of JHM remained with Rita.

¶ 9. Rita subsequently filed a motion to set aside or reconsider the judgment, which was denied by the chancellor on February 12, 2015. The chancellor did, however, set a visitation schedule, which allowed JHM and LHM to see each other every weekend.

¶ 10. Rita now appeals and argues: (1) the original chancellor erred in modifying custody after recusal, (2) the separation of the minor children is not in their best interests, (3) the extensive litigation, which adversely affected the children, was caused by John, and (4) the chancellor erred in performing an Albright 3 analysis.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11. “[We] will not disturb the factual findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard.” Campbell v. Watts, 192 So.3d 317, 318 (¶ 5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). “Questions of law are reviewed de novo.” Id.

ANALYSIS

I. Recusal

¶ 12. Rita first argues the original chancellor erred in modifying custody after she announced that she would recuse. We find this issue is moot since the temporary order entered by the original chancellor was subsequently revised by the newly assigned chancellor.

II. Modification of Custody / Separation of Siblings

¶ 13. Rita next argues that the separation of JHM and LHM is not in their best interests. In other words, Rita argues the chancellor erred in modifying custody.

¶ 14. A modification of custody is warranted when the moving parent shows “(1) that a material change of circumstances has occurred in the custodial home since the most recent custody decree, (2) *315 that the change adversely affects the child, and (3) that modification is in the best interest of the child.” Id. at (¶6). “The chancellor must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether such a material change in circumstances has occurred.” Id. at 319 (¶ 6). “The concept [of a material change in circumstances adversely affecting the child] is intended to encompass its broadest possible meaning in order to protect children,” including changes that negatively impact the child’s “mental and emotional well-being.” Marter v. Marter, 914 So.2d 743, 748 (¶ 14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

¶ 15. “After finding an adverse material change, ‘the next step is to apply the Albright factors to determine whether modification is in the child’s best interest.’” Campbell, 192 So.3d at 319 (¶ 6) (quoting White v. White, 26 So.3d 342, 351 (¶ 28) (Miss. 2010)). Although “[we have] never adopted any per se rule to the effect that children should not be separated ... in the absence of some unusual and compelling circumstance dictating otherwise, it is not in the best interest of children to be separated.” Sellers v. Sellers, 638 So.2d 481, 484 (Miss. 1994).

¶ 16. The chancellor relied heavily on medical records introduced at trial as Exhibit 12. The medical records show JHM has significant behavioral issues, with diagnoses of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, bipolar disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder. The medical records further show that on at least one occasion, JHM became very aggressive toward LHM and Rita. In March 2013, JHM was suspended from school and was ultimately enrolled in an alternative school beginning in January 2014.

¶ 17. With regard to LHM, the medical records show that in April 2014, LHM expressed a desire to go live with John. 4

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Related

White v. White
26 So. 3d 342 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 2010)
Sellers v. Sellers
638 So. 2d 481 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1994)
Albright v. Albright
437 So. 2d 1003 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1983)
Marter v. Marter
914 So. 2d 743 (Court of Appeals of Mississippi, 2005)
Gregory Campbell v. Catherine Ann Watts
192 So. 3d 317 (Court of Appeals of Mississippi, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
214 So. 3d 312, 2017 WL 1238140, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 179, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rita-bradley-v-john-donald-motes-missctapp-2017.