Rita Boucher v. AGRI

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedAugust 8, 2019
Docket16-1654
StatusPublished

This text of Rita Boucher v. AGRI (Rita Boucher v. AGRI) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rita Boucher v. AGRI, (7th Cir. 2019).

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 16-1654 RITA BOUCHER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et al., Defendants-Appellees. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. 1:13-cv-01585 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 21, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 8, 2019 ____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and HAMILTON, Cir- cuit Judges. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. In the mid- to late-1990s, the late David Boucher cut down nine trees on his family farm in In- diana. For almost two decades, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has disagreed, first with Mr. Boucher and now his widow, plaintiff Rita Boucher, about whether that modest tree removal converted several acres of wetlands 2 No. 16-1654

into croplands, rendering the Bouchers’ entire farm ineligible for USDA benefits that would otherwise be available. Since at least 1985, federal law and regulatory policy have tried to remove financial incentives for destruction of environ- mentally important wetlands. In this case, however, the rec- ord shows arbitrary and capricious action by the agency. The USDA repeatedly failed to follow applicable law and agency standards. It disregarded compelling evidence showing that the acreage in question never qualified as wetlands that could have been converted illegally into croplands. And the agency has kept shifting its explanations for treating the acreage as converted wetlands. The USDA’s treatment of the Bouchers’ acreage as converted wetlands easily qualifies as arbitrary, ca- pricious, and an abuse of discretion. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). We reverse the district court’s affirmance of the USDA’s final determination and remand the case to the district court to en- ter judgment granting appropriate relief to plaintiff Rita Bou- cher. In Part I, we summarize the statutes, regulations, and agency guidance that govern the USDA’s wetland conserva- tion enforcement efforts. In Part II, we set forth the facts and history of this dispute. We explain in Part III the legal stand- ards for judicial review and explain in Part IV why this agency action was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. Along the way, we explain why the agency’s litigation posi- tion has strayed far from the applicable law and science. I. The USDA and Wetland Conservation A. The Statute, its Regulations, and the Agency Wetlands serve vital ecological and economic functions. They provide habitats for birds, fish, and unique species of No. 16-1654 3

wild plants; enhance drinking water supply and quality; pro- tect against loss of life and property from flooding; and offer significant recreational and commercial benefits from fishing, hunting, birdwatching, and other wetland-related activities that generate billions of dollars annually. 16 U.S.C. § 3901. Yet the continental United States has lost over half of its natural wetland habitats since the nation’s founding, with that loss having accelerated sharply from the 1950s through the 1970s. See 16 U.S.C. § 3901(7); Natural Resources Conservation Ser- vice, Introduction to Wetland Conservation Provisions. 1 Those losses have been felt acutely in the Midwest as large propor- tions of wetlands have been converted to agriculture and other uses. Regional Supplement to the Corps of Engineers Wet- land Delineation Manual: Midwest Region at 8 (Aug. 2010) (not- ing historic wetland loss in Indiana (87%), Illinois (85%), Iowa (89%), Minnesota (80%), Missouri (87%), and Ohio (90%)). Concerned about this precipitous loss of wetlands, Con- gress included wetland conservation provisions (known col- loquially as the “Swampbuster” provisions) in the Food Secu- rity Act of 1985. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3801, 3821–24. These laws condi- tion the availability of important USDA farm program bene- fits on farmers’ willingness to protect wetlands on their prop- erty. Farmers who convert (i.e., destroy) wetlands for agricul- tural purposes are denied those benefits. 16 U.S.C. § 3821(a); 7 C.F.R. § 12.4; see also Horn Farms, Inc. v. Johanns, 397 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that initial “Swampbuster” provisions made loss of farm subsidies “proportional to the amount of wetland converted,” but 1990 amendment

1 Available at https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detailfull/na- tional/water/wetlands/?cid=stelprdb1043554 (last visited Aug. 7, 2019). 4 No. 16-1654

“provided that converting any wetland would cause the farmer to lose all agricultural payments”). Two USDA agencies implement this regulatory scheme. The Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) is the USDA’s scientific arm charged with making technical deter- minations about whether wetlands exist or have been con- verted, as well as investigating failures to comply with the Swampbuster provisions. 7 C.F.R. §§ 12.2, 12.6(a)(2) & (c), 12.30(a). And the USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA) relies on NRCS’s wetland determinations to make decisions regard- ing any violations and eligibility for benefits. 7 C.F.R. §§ 12.2, 12.6(a) & (b). B. Soil, Plants, and Water Farmers’ access to important financial benefits can thus turn on NRCS’s identification of “wetlands.” The statutory definition is somewhat technical, but it lies at the heart of our decision: The term ‘wetland’ … means land that — (A) has a predominance of hydric soils; (B) is inundated or saturated by surface or groundwa- ter at a frequency and duration sufficient to support a prevalence of hydrophytic vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil con- ditions; and (C) under normal circumstances does support a prevalence of such vegetation. 16 U.S.C. § 3801(27) (emphasizing key terms discussed be- low); see also 7 C.F.R. § 12.2. No. 16-1654 5

Under this definition, in making wetland determinations, the NRCS must assess whether “the area of interest supports a prevalence of [1] hydrophytic vegetation, [2] a predomi- nance of hydric soils, and [3] wetland hydrology under nor- mal circumstances.” 7 C.F.R. § 12.30(c)(7). All three character- istics must be present for an area to be considered wetlands. B&D Land and Livestock Co. v. Schafer, 584 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1194–95 (N.D. Iowa 2008) (“the statute plainly and unambig- uously defines these three requirements as separate, mandatory requirements”).

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