OPINION
FLANDERS, Justice.
This is a worker’s compensation case in which we confront the following issue: How does an employee’s settlement of a third-party tort claim arising out of his work-related injuries affect the employee’s ability to obtain a workers’ compensation award for his disfigurement and bodily loss of use?
This question comes before us on a petition for certiorari seeking review of a decision by a panel of the Workers’ Compensation Court’s (WCC) Appellate Division (the panel) construing G.L.1956 § 28-35-58 of the Rhode Island Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA).
To conduct this review, we must consider the workers’ compensation ramifications of an injured employee’s recovery of a settlement from an alleged third-party tortfeasor that is putatively responsible for causing the employee’s work-related injuries. The panel’s decision holds that the employer need not pay any specific-compensation award to the employee if the amount of the settlement (after reimbursing the employer for any worker’s compensation benefits already paid to the employee) exceeds the amount of any specific-compensation award that would otherwise be payable. However, under the panel’s view, the employee is entitled to a credit in the amount of such award that reduces the § 28-35-58 suspension period during which the employer’s insurer is relieved from paying any compensation benefits to the employee.
Because we conclude that this result comports with the applicable statutory provisions and with the underlying policies of workers’ compensation, we affirm.
Facts and Travel
The material facts of this case are not in dispute. On March 3, 1987 the employee, James Rison III (Rison), sustained employment-related injuries while laboring for his employer, Air Filter Systems, Inc. (Air Filter), as a sheet-metal worker. Rison suffered devastating third-degree bums over half his body when a cataclysmic flash fire of glue scorched him severely. The bums, combined with necessary surgical skin grafts, left Rison with permanent scarring and disfiguration over 78 percent of his body. As a result, patches of shriveled, discolored skin blanket Rison’s elbows, back, and legs and severe scars mar his right jaw, ears, nose, and fingers. Largely because of his reduced manual dexterity, Rison also suffers from a permanent loss of use in his upper extremities of between 11 and 16 percent.
Beginning on March 24, 1987, and pursuant to a memorandum of agreement with Air Filter, Rison began to receive workers’ compensation benefits in the form of weekly indemnity payments at a “weekly comp rate” of $244 per week. Pursuant to G.L.1956 § 28-33-17 of the WCA, these weekly benefits compensated Rison for lost wages due to his incapacity. Thereafter, on November 7, 1991, approximately four-and-a-half years after he began to receive weekly benefits, Ri-son filed an original WCC petition to obtain an additional specific-compensation award under § 28-33-19 of the WCA for his disfigurement and the loss of the use of his hands.
However, before that petition could be heard, Rison entered into a settlement on December 1, 1991, with Stanley Bostitch Company, an alleged third-party tortfeasor, in satisfaction of Rison’s tort claims against Stanley Bostitch for the personal injuries he had sustained in the accident. Although the record does not reveal the precise amount of the settlement, it was apparently in excess of $2.5 million. On December 11, 1991 Rison reimbursed Air Filter $225,312 for the weekly benefits it had paid out to Rison up to the date of Rison’s settlement with Stanley Bos-titch (less the pro rata attorneys’ fees and expenses attributable to Rison’s recovery of this sum from Stanley Bostitch). The parties stipulated that this reimbursement reflected Air Filter’s presettlement workers’ compensation weekly indemnity payments to Rison and liquidated Air Filter’s WCA subrogation rights for having made such payments.
Thereafter, a WCC judge heard Rison’s § 28-33-19 petition for specific compensation on stipulated facts and evidence. After considering medical reports and observing Ri-son’s injuries, the judge determined that the evidence warranted.the maximum statutory award. Consequently, she ordered Air Filter to pay $52,582 to Rison, compensating him for loss of use in his extremities and for his disfigurement.
At the parties’ request, the court also ruled on whether this specific-compensation award should be offset against Rison’s recently obtained settlement proceeds. Describing the issue as “apparently a case of first impression,” the WCC trial judge ruled that a specific award under § 28-33-19 would not be subject to the payment-suspension mechanism detailed in § 28-35-58. However, the WCC judge also held that Air Filter properly had been reim
bursed for the weekly indemnity benefits it had paid to Rison before the Stanley Bostitch settlement and that Air Filter’s duty to pay future weekly indemnity benefits to Rison would be suspended in accordance with § 28-35-58. As stated by the WCC judge, “Consequently, any award of specific compensation after a third-party settlement would be paid in full to the employee without any offset or consideration of the monies which have been paid to him by the third-party settlement.”
Air Filter appealed to the WCC’s Appellate Division, 'alleging that it should be entitled to set off the amount of the specific-compensation award against the settlement proceeds Rison had received from Stanley Bostitch without having to pay this sum to Rison. The panel agreed and reversed the trial judge, holding that any specific compensation awarded under § 28-33-19 would be subject to the suspension mechanism of § 28-35-58. The panel further determined that although Air Filter would not be required to pay any specific-compensation monies to Rison, the amount of the specific award would reduce “on a dollar for dollar basis” the period of time during which Air Filter’s duty to pay future workers’ compensation benefits to Rison would be suspended.
Rison petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted, to resolve this important workers’ compensation question.
I
Standard of Review
This petition presents questions of statutory construction. We review the Appellate Division’s decision de novo, pursuant to § 28-35-30, for any error of law or equity.
See also Pion v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co.,
637 A.2d 367, 370 (R.I.1994);
Wright v. Superior Court,
535 A.2d 318, 320 (R.I.1988).
II
Discussion
Before we ton to the questions of statutory interpretation raised by this petition, it is helpful to consider what is not at issue here. No party disputes that in WCA parlance “weekly benefits” (also referred to as “regular compensation,” “disability benefits,” or “indemnity benefits”) are awarded pursuant to § 28-33-17 as compensation for an employee’s lost wages due to his or her work-related incapacity, whereas “special compensation” or “specific compensation” is awarded pursuant to § 28-33-19 for an employee’s specific, scheduled bodily injuries, including disfigurement. The parties also appear to agree that the WCA, as a general proposition, does not bar an injured employee from recovering damages from a third-party tort-feasor and thereafter obtaining workers’ compensation benefits from the date of settlement forward. Although the parties clash over how the statutorily prescribed suspension period affects their respective rights and obligations, they appear to agree that Rison sustained a work-related injury and that Air Filter remains potentially obligated to pay future weekly disability benefits to Rison despite Rison’s settlement with Stanley Bos-titch.
They also appear to agree that Air Filter’s obligations, at least with respect to weekly indemnity benefits, are suspended for as long as the WCA benefits that would otherwise be due and payable to Rison can be set off or credited against any settlement proceeds remaining from the Rison-Stanley Bostitch settlement after Air Filter has been reimbursed for its presettlement compensation payments.
The essential controversy then is whether any specific benefits awarded to an employee under § 28-33-19
after
the employee has received a third-party settle
ment of a tort claim are likewise subject to § 28-35-58’s suspension mechanism.
A.
Background
Before 1985, the law in Rhode Island was that an injured employee who settled or recovered a money judgment in connection with a tort claim against a nonemployer third party could not thereafter obtain workers’ compensation benefits for the same injury.
See Travis v. Rialto Furniture Co.,
101 R.I. 45, 48, 220 A.2d 179, 181 (1966);
Colarusso v. Mills,
99 R.I. 409, 416, 208 A.2d 381, 385 (1965);
see also Matteson v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
738 F.2d 619, 621-22 (1st Cir.1984) (Breyer, J.). Rather, an injured employee who chose to pursue a third-party tort claim was compelled to sink or swim monetarily based upon the results of that lawsuit. Thus in
Travis
a truckdriver injured in an on-the-job traffic collision elected to pursue a tort claim against a third party and recovered $6,750.
Travis,
101 R.I. at 46, 220 A.2d at 180. The
Travis
court held that the employee was thereafter barred from seeking weekly WCA indemnity benefits from his employer for his incapacity to work — regardless of whether the tort settlement proved to be sufficient to compensate him for all the lost earnings he might otherwise have been entitled to recover under the WCA during the period of his incapacity.
Id.
at 48-49, 220 A.2d at 181.
The
Travis
court based this holding on its construction of § 28-35-58 of the WCA, which at the time read in pertinent part:
“[T]he employee may take proceedings, both against [the third party] to recover damages and against any person liable to pay compensation under said chapters for such compensation,
but shall not be entitled to receive both damages and compensation.”
(Emphasis added.) Section 28-35-58;
Travis,
101 R.I. at 46, 220 A.2d at 180.
The court inferred from this statutory language an underlying legislative policy to preclude an employee’s recovery of both damages and workers’ compensation for the same injuries.
Travis,
101 R.I. at 48, 220 A.2d at 181. The decision was grounded on the notion that an employee recovering tort damages has been “fully compensated for his injury and [has been] made whole by the recovery of such damages.”
Id.
at 49, 220 A.2d at 181. Thus, after receiving a settlement award from an alleged third-party tort-feasor, the employee was deemed to have no remaining uncompensated injuries requiring redress under the workers’ compensation system.
Id.
at 48-49, 220 A.2d at 181.
But in 1985 the General Assembly amended this provision of the WCA. It struck the above-noted language from § 28-35-58 and in its place provided:
“[T]he employee shall be entitled to receive
both damages and compensation
provided that the employee, in recovering damages either by judgment or settlement * * * shall reimburse [the employer] to the extent of the compensation paid as of the date of the judgment or settlement and the receipt of such damages by the employee
shall not bar future compensation.”
(Emphases added.) P.L.1985, ch. 186, § 1.
The amendment also introduced a suspension mechanism pursuant to which an employer’s liability for future workers’ compensation payments, that is, compensation accruing after the employee has obtained a third-party tort recovery via a settlement or a judgment, would be suspended for a length of time. The suspension period is calculated according to an arithmetic formula whose variables are the employee’s weekly compensation rate as defined in the WCA (colloquially referred to as the “comp rate”) and the excess of the settlement proceeds over the benefits already paid by the employer or its insurer as of the date of the third-party tort settlement or judgment. But the statute provides no express guidance for computing the suspension period when specific-compensation has been awarded. No explicit cues appear in the text and the explanation accompanying this WCA amendment states only that, “[T]his act would allow a person receiving compensation to sue a third party for damages and recover both the compensation and damages as long as the person paying the compensation is reimbursed for the compensation paid up to the date of judgment or settlement.”
Rison posits that his entitlement to payment of specific compensation for his scheduled injuries under § 28-33-19 does not fall within the ambit of § 28-35-58’s suspension mechanism because he obtained such an award
after
he concluded his third-party tort-claim settlement with Stanley Bostiteh. Ri-son argues that the WCA’s language and purpose, and particularly the nature of the § 28-35-58 suspension mechanism, indicate that the suspension formula should be applied only to weekly indemnity benefits and not to specific-compensation awards under § 28-33-19, which, by the express terms of that section, are payable immediately to the employee in a lump sum. Therefore, Rison contends, he is entitled not only to recover a specific-compensation award from Air Filter in addition to keeping his tort settlement from Stanley Bostiteh but also to receive a cash payment of that award from Air Filter in an immediate lump-sum recovery.
Air Filter counters that § 28-35-58’s reference to “compensation” embraces both future specific-compensation awards and future weekly indemnity benefits and that the two types of compensation should be treated similarly. Air Filter points out that the Legislature knew how to exempt medical benefits from § 28-35-58’s suspension provisions, but it took no similar action with regard to specific-compensation awards. It further argues that because Rison has presumptively been made whole by ms large tort recovery from Stanley Bostiteh, a lump-sum cash payment to Rison would allot him a double recovery and a windfall.
As previously noted, the panel held that the “benefits for loss of use otherwise payable to the employee * * * and benefits for disfigurement .* * * [are to be] credited against the excess proceeds of the employee’s third party settlement to reduce the period of time in which the employee’s entitlement to benefits are [sic ] suspended.” Our reading of the panel’s decree is that Rison may obtain the benefit of a specific-eompensation award — not by receiving any lump-sum payment from Air Filter — but by having the amount that Air Filter would otherwise have to pay as specific compensation credited against the excess settlement proceeds received by Rison from Stanley Bostiteh. The result of this setoff or credit is to shorten Rison’s suspension-of-compensation period by the number of weeks corresponding to the value of the § 28-33-19 specific-compensation award.
To convert the abstract into the concrete, under the approach adopted by the panel Rison’s specific-compensation award of approximately $53,000 is to be set off or credited against the excess-settlement proceeds, thereby reducing the 179-year period during which Rison’s benefits otherwise would be suspended by a little over four years.
In
the highly unlikely event that Rison is still alive and incapacitated at the end of that suspension period, Air Filter’s obligation to make weekly indemnity payments would resume. However, although the panel’s decision does not say so expressly, we interpret its decision to mean that Air Filter would have no obligation at that time to make an additional $53,000 specific-compensation payment because Rison has already been credited for his scheduled injuries via the four-year reduction in the suspension period. As explained below, we are of the opinion that this result comports with the salutary principles sought to be effectuated in the Legislature’s 1985 amendment to the WCA and aligns Rhode Island with workers’ compensation practices in other jurisdictions.
B.
Are Specific Benefits a Type of Compensation?
First, we are not persuaded by Rison’s contention that § 28-35-58’s reference to “compensation” applies only to weekly indemnity benefits. Rather we conclude that the unqualified term “compensation” as employed by the General Assembly in § 28-35-58 includes all types of compensation available under the WCA — except medical benefits, which are expressly exempted.
In making this determination, we are guided by the long-established tenet of statutory construction that “when the language of a statute is unambiguous and expresses a clear and sensible meaning, no room for statutory construction or extension exists, and we are required to give the words of the statute their plain and obvious meaning.”
In re Sabetta,
661 A.2d 80, 83 (R.I.1995) (quoting
Ellis v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority,
586 A.2d 1055, 1057 (R.I.1991));
see also Thibault v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.,
111 R.I. 381, 384, 302 A.2d 755, 757 (1973) (noting that clear and unambiguous language is dis-positive of issues under the WCA). We must also bear in mind that given the WCA’s remedial nature, any ambiguities in the statute generally “must be construed liberally in favor of the employee.”
See Coletta v. State,
106 R.I. 764, 772, 263 A.2d 681, 685 (1970).
Black’s Law Dictionary broadly defines “compensation” as “remuneration or satisfaction for injury or damage of every description (including medical expenses).” Black’s Law Dictionary 283 (6th ed.1990). Rison points to our decision in
Jones v. Grinnell Corp.,
117 R.I. 44, 47, 362 A.2d 139, 141 (1976), in support of his argument that despite the usual broad scope of the term “compensation,” this court has assigned it a narrower meaning within the context of the WCA. In
Jones,
the court noted that “the word ‘compensation,’ when employed in our Workmen’s Compensation Act [as it was then known], encompasses a wide variety of benefits. It includes payments for the loss of earning capacity, a limb, hearing, or sight; support of dependents; disfigurement; and the payment of medical and funeral expenses.”
Jones
also noted that specific compensation awarded under § 28-33-19, although a type of compensation, could also be conceived of as “damages” intended to repay an employee for a bodily loss.
Jones,
117 R.I. at 47, 362 A.2d at 141.
Jones
thus distinguished specific compensation from weekly benefit payments that compensate for a lost opportunity to earn wages.
Id.; see also Moniz v. Providence Chain Co.,
618 A.2d 1270, 1272 (R.I.1993) (noting that
Jones
sets out a clarification of the general conception that benefits under the WCA are compensation). Although
Jones
grappled with the question of when an injury had reached an end result for limitations purposes, and accordingly is of limited assistance here, Jones’s description of the nature of § 28-33-19 benefits is accurate as far as it goes. However, to say that specific-compensation benefits are more akin to tort damages than are weekly benefits is not to say that specific compensation is not “compensation” as that term is used in § 28-35-58.
Moreover, § 28-33-19 is entitled “Additional
compensation
for specific injuries” (emphasis added), a designation it has carried since the WCA’s original formulation in 1912. Indeed, it has maintained this title through the 1956 codification of our General Laws and up to and including the present
version of the statute.
See
G.L.1956 § 28-33-19 (1956 enactment) (entitled “Additional compensation for specific injuries”); P.L. 1912, ch. 831, art. 2, § 12 (entitled “Additional compensation for certain injuries”). The first sentence of § 28-33-19 provides that benefits thereunder “shall be paid in addition to all
other
compensation” (emphasis added) — begging the inference that § 28-33-19 benefits are just another type of workers’ compensation. Section 28-33-1, the first section of the relevant chapter, entitled “Workers’ Compensation — Benefits,” provides that employers subject to chapters 29 to 38 must pay “compensation” to employees covered by the WCA. Such an inclusive use of the term, which certainly embraces § 28-33-19 benefits, establishes the tenor of its usage for subsequent sections. The disputed section itself echoes this understanding, stating that the section applies when “compensation is payable under chapters 29 — 38 of this title.” Section 28-35-58.
But perhaps the most convincing factor from an interpretive standpoint is that § 28-35-58 explicitly excludes medical expenses from the scope of its suspension-of-compensation mechanism. Following the maxim
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius,
we can infer that the Legislature, having specifically exempted the payment of medical expenses from the suspension applicable to other forms of WCA compensation, similarly would have mentioned § 28-33-19 benefits had it intended to exempt them from § 28-35-58 as well. Indeed, the Legislature did precisely that in § 28-33-17, in the context of cost-of-living adjustments, by explicitly providing, “This section shall apply only to payment of weekly indemnity benefits to employees *
*
* and shall not apply to specific compensation payments for loss of use or disfigurement or payment of dependency benefits or any other benefits payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Section 28-33-17(f)(6). Thus the term “compensation” as it appears in § 28-35-58 must be taken to include specific compensation as well as weekly indemnity benefits.
Our conclusion in this regard is reinforced by an examination of the context and purpose of the pertinent statutory provisions. “This court has consistently held that ‘[w]hen charged with the duty of statutory construction, one must read the language so as to effectuate the legislative intent behind its enactment.’ ”
Sabetta,
661 A.2d at 83 (quoting
Gilbane Co. v. Poulas,
576 A.2d 1195, 1196 (R.I.1990)). Pursuant to the Legislature’s 1985 amendment of § 28-35-58, an injured employee is “entitled to receive both damages and compensation” without having to give up one type of award entirely if he or she receives any monetary benefits from either potential source of recovery. The amendment obviously sought to provide employees with a statutory right to obtain both types of monetary relief — a right that had been denied to them under the prior version of the WCA as interpreted in
Travis.
On the other hand, there is no indication that the Legislature intended the amendment to confer a windfall on the employee. Were we to accept Rison’s proposition that § 28-35-58 does not apply to specific-compensation awards, employees would be allowed to obtain not only both types of benefits (tort damages and workers’ compensation) but also a double recovery for the same injuries. Because we conclude that this is not what the General Assembly intended when it amended § 28-35-58 in 1985, we reject this interpretation of the statute.
C.
Is Specific Compensation Subject to the Suspension Mechanism?
Having determined that § 28-35-58’s reference to compensation includes any postset-tlement specific compensation awarded to the employee, we next address whether a specific compensation award is subject to that section’s suspension and reimbursement provisions. Here we are reminded that “no construction, particularly of a remedial statute, should be adopted which would defeat its evident purpose.”
Coletta,
106 R.I. at 770, 263 A.2d at 684. The duty of the Judiciary is to attribute to a statute the meaning most consistent with its evident purpose in order to effectuate the Legislature’s intent.
See Gilbane Co.,
576 A.2d at 1196;
see also McCarthy v. Environmental Transportation Services, Inc.,
WCC (Appellate Division) 91-11115 at 6 (citing
Gilbane Co.).
Although the precise language employed by the Legislature is somewhat peculiar to our statute, the overall operation of § 28-35-58 is comparable to similar workers’ compensation statutes in other jurisdictions. These statutes share a common policy: to permit injured workers to recover tort damages from third parties while preserving their employers’ potential workers’ compensation liability as security against a deficient tort re--covery and, at the same time, guarding against any double recovery or windfall to the injured employees. Thus, under most state workers’ compensation statutes, an employer’s liability is not completely extinguished even after a third-party tortfeasor has paid a judgment or a settlement in connection with the employee’s injuries.
See generally
Arthur Larson, 6
Workers’ Compensation Law
§ 74.16(a)-(e) (1997) (and cases cited therein). However, to avoid an excessive or a double recovery by the employee, the employer is allowed to obtain reimbursement of its compensation payments from damages recovered by the employee from responsible third parties. The employer’s workers’ compensation obligations are typically set off against the proceeds of any tort settlement or judgment so that the employer is reimbursed for any compensation previously paid or payable in the future to the employee. Once this is done, the injured employee is allowed to retain any excess tort damages (net of reimbursed or credited workers’ compensation benefits) recovered from the settling third-party tortfeasor. “The central objective is to provide the mechanics that will achieve the result described * * * the third party paying what he would normally pay if no compensation question were involved; the employer and carrier [insurer] ‘coming out even’ by being reimbursed for their compensation expenditure; and the employee getting any excess of the damage recovery over compensation.”
Id.
at § 74.16(a).
Future workers’ compensation liability, arising from an employer’s continuing obligation to make weekly payments, is generally credited as it comes due against any remaining third-party settlement or judgment proceeds. The steps by which this intended result is to be achieved, however, are not always spelled out in the various workers compensation statutes.
“A complication that, in the nature of things, cannot be avoided is the fact that at the time of distribution of the third party recovery the extent of the [employer’s] liability for future compensation benefits often is unknown. Indeed, this would happen in almost every serious case in which the compensation payments are periodic and the third party recovery is reasonably prompt.”
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡
“If the statute does not take pains to deal explicitly 'with the problem of future benefits, but merely credits the [employer] for compensation paid, or compensation for which the [employer] is liable, the correct holding is still that the excess of third party recovery over past compensation actually paid stands as a credit against future liability of the carrier.”
(Emphasis added.) 6 Larson, at § 74.31(e).
This future-benefits problem is especially apropos to our statute, which requires a work-related injury to have reached “maximum medical improvement” (also referred to as an “end result”) before a claim for § 28-33-19 specific-compensation benefits may be presented.
See
§ 28-33-19(c);
see also Jones,
117 R.I. at 48, 362 A.2d at 141.
We are of the opinion that in amending § 28-35-58, the General Assembly intended to achieve the result described in Larson’s above-quoted workers’ compensation treatise. Two important and salutary policies are served thereby. First, although the WCA creates no-fault liability on the employer’s part to benefit and protect the employee, it also reflects a policy judgment that, whenever possible, any culpable tortfeasor(s) should bear the ultimate financial burden for the employee’s injuries. Thus, when a recovery can be obtained against a responsible third party (who usually cannot be held liable or amenable to a substantial settlement without some degree of culpability), the third party is made to bear the cost of those injuries while the employer whose liability arises solely through the WCA’s no-fault liability provisions is reimbursed or credited pro tanto for
its past and continuing WCA obligations. It is critical to recognize that under the WCA the employer serves as a vanguard for the employee’s welfare, standing ready to advance benefits to the employee without delay and without determination of fault until the employee obtains a recovery from any settling third-party tortfeasor or tort-judgment debtor.
See Wright,
535 A.2d at 320;
Cacchillo v. H. Leach Machinery Co.,
111 R.I. 593, 595-96, 305 A.2d 541, 542-43 (1973). If the employee does obtain a third-party recovery, the employer’s WCA obligations are then credited or reimbursed only
to
the extent that any recovery from the third party equals or exceeds the employer’s WCA obligations. But the employee is never required to reimburse the employer or its insurer out of his or her own pocket.
The second policy reflected in the statute is that the employee may pursue a recovery from alleged third-party tortfeasors either before or after collecting WCA benefits and may retain any excess proceeds recovered from such third parties. Thus the WCA implicitly recognizes that workers’ compensation benefits are sometimes inadequate to compensate an employee for his or her injuries fully.
See Wright,
535 A.2d at 320. Indeed, the very concept of workers’ compensation embodies a compromise between the relative certainty of no-fault employer liability for an employee’s work-related injuries and the fixed, but limited, schedule of benefits recoverable for such injuries. Thus under the WCA a lost eye or injured arm is worth only a scheduled maximum amount, an incapacitated employee recovers only a portion of his or her reduced earning capacity, and no pain-and-suffering or punitive damages may be awarded to the injured employee. But on the other side of the equation, the employee is guaranteed these benefits without exposure to the vagaries of fault-based tort litigation. These dual policies un-dergird and percolate through the majority of our sister states’ workers’ compensation statutes.
Section 28-35-58, as amended, promotes both policies by' preserving an employer’s potential liability for future weekly benefits as insurance against the possibility that the employee’s tort recoveries will prove to be insufficient to indemnify him or her for the duration of his or her incapacity. In so providing, the 1985 amendment impliedly rejects the irrebuttable presumption expressed in
Travis
that a third-party tort recovery will always be deemed to compensate an employee fully for all his or her work-related losses. At the same time § 28-35-58 also requires the proceeds of such recoveries to be used to reimburse the payer of any WCA benefits to prevent double recovery by the employee. We further note in passing that if the employee had obtained a specific-compensation award from the employer before securing a third-party recovery, such an award would have to be repaid to the employer or its insurer out of any subsequent third-party-settlement or judgment proceeds. Although this court has never had occasion to rule on this issue directly, such a result appears to follow inescapably from § 28-35-58’s reimbursement provisions.
In sura we conclude that the panel’s treatment of specific-compensation awards granted after the employee has obtained a third-party tort recovery comports with the language of the WCA while also heeding its underlying policies. At the same time the panel’s approach has the virtue of not discriminating among specific-compensation awards based upon whether the employee receives them before or after any third-party tort recovery. Accordingly an injured employee who receives a specific-compensation award after his or her recovery of a third-party settlement or judgment is to be immediately credited with a setoff against the excess-settlement proceeds recovered from the third party in the form of a reduction of the suspension period.
As applied to the facts in this ease, this credit reduces the $2.5 million of excess settlement proceeds used to calculate the § 28-35-58 suspension period by approximately $53,000 — the same result that would obtain in the case of a pre-settlement specific-compensation award. We also note that the immediate vesting of the specific-compensation award in the form of this setoff satisfies in our opinion § 28-33-19’s requirement that awards be credited in a one-time lump-sum amount and also heeds § 28-33-24’s mandate that “specific compensation * * * payments shall be vested and are not to be divested by any subsequent happening or contingency.”
Because of the large settlement amount in this case, it is almost certain that Rison will not outlive the 175-year suspension period. Nonetheless, the amended WCA allows him (and his estate) to retain any remaining excess settlement proceeds, no matter how sizable that sum may prove to be. And although this result is a significant advantage to the employee (recall that in
Travis
the employee was not allowed to recover any WCA benefits after a tort recovery), none of the central policies informing the WCA are offended. Air Filter, in its role as the no-fault-liability vanguard, is made whole for any workers’ compensation expenditures it may have been required to advance to Rison. And for his part, Rison is guaranteed financial support during the period of his work incapacity — however long that may prove to be — but he is not allowed to retain any excess-settlement proceeds unless and until Air Filter and/or its insurer have first been made whole.
D.
Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction
Finally, we discern no merit in Rison’s remaining contention that the panel decided issues beyond the scope of Air Filter’s appeal. The panel stated in its final decree, “The sole issue before the court is an interpretation of the provisions of R.I.G.L. § 28-35-58,” and it described the question before it in this manner: “Essentially this ruling revolves around what is the meaning of compensation.” We agree with those characterizations. The panel was called upon to interpret § 28-35-58 and to determine how that provision’s suspension mechanism applies to the facts of this case. The panel did so, and we perceive no error in its ruling.
E.
Order
Pursuant to our prerogative under § 28-35-36, we frame the following order and remand this matter to the WCC:
1. The employee, James Rison III, shall be entitled to an award of specific compensation in the amount of $52,582 for the loss of use of his upper extremities and the disfigurement resulting from his work-related injuries, as provided by § 28-33-19.
2. In lieu of payment, however, the aforementioned specific-compensation award shall be credited against the excess settlement damages according to the provisions of § 28-35-58, thereby reducing the otherwise applicable suspension period by a number of weeks to be determined in accordance with this opinion.
3. Air Filter’s liability for future weekly indemnity benefits under § 28-33-17 and its potential liability for all other benefits or compensation to which Rison may be entitled under chapters 29 to 38 of the WCA (except those for which Rison has already received credit or payment) shall continue, subject to all other WCA provisions relating to cessation of benefits upon death or to modification of benefits due to a reduction of his incapacity, provided that Air Filter’s liability for future compensation payments shall be suspended for a period to be determined in accordance with this opinion.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the employee’s petition for certiorari is denied, and the writ heretofore issued is quashed. The decision of the Appellate Division is affirmed and the papers of the case shall be remanded to. the WCC with our decision endorsed thereon for such further proceedings as may be necessary to implement this opinion and order.