Riske v. Oliver (In Re Oliver)

172 B.R. 924, 32 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 241, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1631, 1994 WL 570895
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedOctober 18, 1994
Docket10-50972
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 172 B.R. 924 (Riske v. Oliver (In Re Oliver)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Riske v. Oliver (In Re Oliver), 172 B.R. 924, 32 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 241, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1631, 1994 WL 570895 (Mo. 1994).

Opinion

ORDER

JAMES J. BARTA, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the “First Amended Complaint for Turnover, Accounting and Payment of Money Owed”, filed on behalf of Charles W. Riske (“Trustee”), and the Trustee’s “Motion for Summary Judgment”. The Trustee has requested that Luther Oliver (“Debtor”) be ordered to turn over to the Trustee the sum of $94,768.53 in tax refunds received by Debtor after the commencement of this bankruptcy case: The Trustee also has requested that he be awarded costs and attorney’s fees associated with *925 bringing this matter. The Debtor has responded by denying the allegations and by presenting the following affirmative defenses: all refunds that he may have received are held with his wife as tenants by the entirety; the Trustee has no standing to bring this Adversary Proceeding because he abandoned his rights to this cause of action; and the Debtor used some of the money from the refunds to pay creditors, thereby mooting any action for turnover by the Trustee.

This is a core proceeding pursuant to Section 157(b)(2)(E) of Title 28 of the United States Code. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 and 1334, and Rule 29 of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. These determinations and orders are the final findings and conclusions of the Bankruptcy Court.

The following determinations are based on a consideration of the record as a whole, including memoranda submitted by Counsel for the Trustee and Counsel for the Debtor. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will enter judgment for the Trustee.

Facts

The facts necessary for this determination are not in dispute. The Debtor filed a voluntary Petition for Relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on August 16, 1989. On August 17, 1989, Charles W. Riske was appointed Interim Trustee, and he has continued to serve as the duly appointed and qualified Trustee of this estate. At all times relevant hereto, the Debtor was married to Mary Oliver, who is not a debtor in a bankruptcy case.

Prior to filing his petition for relief in this ease, the Debtor had paid federal income taxes on certain sums of money he had earned. The United States Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) subsequently refunded a portion of these tax payments to the Debtor for the tax years ending December 31, 1987 and December 31, 1988. The total amount refunded was approximately $94,768.53. The Debtor and Mary Oliver filed a joint return for the tax year that ended December 31, 1988. Mary Oliver listed $19,200.00 as her gross wages for that period, with paid-in withholdings in the amount of $1,656.00. However, for the tax year ending December 31, 1987, the Debtor’s tax filing status was “married, filing separately”.

In August, 1991, after the commencement of this case, the Debtor was advised that it was very likely that he would receive a tax refund. The Debtor in fact received refunds from the IRS on or about April 20, 1992 and on or about August 31, 1992. These refunds reflected the Debtor’s overpayments for tax years that ended prior to the commencement of this case. After learning that the Debtor had received the refunds, the Trustee made demand upon the Debtor and Debtor’s counsel to turn over the value of the refunds to the bankruptcy estate. As of the date of this Order, the Debtor has not complied with the Trustee’s demand to pay the refunds into the estate.

The Debtor has stated that he used approximately $60,878.00 of the refunds to pay restitution to the United States Government pursuant to a settlement of criminal charges against him. He has used most of the remainder to pay other expenses. The record does not indicate whether the other expenses paid were prepetition or postpetition expenses.

Discussion

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCivP”), as made applicable through Rule 7056 (“FRBP”).

The Court has determined that for purposes of this motion, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The initial *926 •legal issues are whether the tax refunds constitute tenancy by the entirety property and whether the Trustee abandoned the estate’s interest in the refunds.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has disposed of the threshold issue of whether tax refunds which have not yet been paid to a debtor, and which are based on prepetition earnings, become property of the bankruptcy estate. The Court of Appeals has held that a debtor’s interest in a tax refund is property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate and is not exempt as “earnings” under Missouri’s garnishment statute. See Wallerstedt v. Sosne (In re Wallerstedt), 930 F.2d 630 (8th Cir.1991); see also In re Robinson, 152 B.R. 956 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1993). Therefore, whatever interest the Debtor possessed in the tax refunds at the time of the commencement of the case passed to the bankruptcy estate.

The Debtor has raised the issue of whether the refunds constituted tenancy by the entirety property. The Debtor has argued that because his wife is not a debtor in a ease under Title 11, the refunds are entirety property and thus not subject to administration. See Defendant Luther E. Oliver’s Answer to Complaint for Turnover, Document #4, filed Nov. 5, 1993. Generally, property held by a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety is not includable in a debtor’s bankruptcy estate unless both the husband and wife are debtors under Title 11. See Wetteroff v. Grand (In re Wetteroff), 453 F.2d 544, 546 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 934, 93 S.Ct. 242, 34 L.Ed.2d 188 (1972); In re Burch, 3 BAMSL 1567, Case No. 84-00001(SE) (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1985). An exception to this general rule occurs when the bankruptcy case of one spouse includes debts that are joint obligations with the other spouse. When this circumstance exists, the trustee in the debtor/spouse’s case may administer upon entirety property as an asset of the bankruptcy estate.

In Missouri, entirety property cannot be reached to satisfy the individual debts of one of the spouses making up the entirety entity ... Missouri entirety property can be reached to satisfy joint debts of the spouses, however, even when only one of the entirety-entity spouses is in bankruptcy and not the other.

In re Magee, (Bankr.W.D.Mo. August 29, 1975) (Aff'd and published as appendix to

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Bluebook (online)
172 B.R. 924, 32 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 241, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1631, 1994 WL 570895, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/riske-v-oliver-in-re-oliver-moeb-1994.