Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Daniel

20 S.W.2d 369
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedAugust 7, 1929
DocketNo. 1732.
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 20 S.W.2d 369 (Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Daniel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Daniel, 20 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Ct. App. 1929).

Opinions

HIGHTOWER, C. J.

This suit was filed by the appellee, A. H. Daniel, against appellant, Rip Bravo Oil Company, a private corporation, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged by appellee to have been sustained by him in consequence of negligence on the part of appellant on October 30, 1927. Appellee alleged in substance that appellant was engaged in the production and storing of crude petroleum oil at what is known as Spindletop oil field in Jefferson county, and that on October 30, 1927, appellee was an employee of appellant as a common laborer, and that his duties were to do whatever he was directed to do by appellant or by its foreman; that on said date appellee and other fellow employees were directed by appellant’s foreman to clean out an oil tank owned [370]*370by appellant on its lease at Spindletop oil field wbicb had been used for the storage of crude petroleum oil; that the tank which he was so directed to clean out contained large quantities of poisonous and deadly gases, which fact was known to appellant and its foreman at that time, or by the use of ordinary care could have been, known, but that appellee did not know of the presence in the tank of such poisonous and deadly gases; and that he was not warned or notified in any manner by appellant of the presence .of the gases in the tank nor of the danger that would be attendant upon the attempt to clean the tank, and that if he had been so notified or warned by appellant he would not have undertaken to clean the tank as he did. Ap-pellee then further alleged that, complying with the direction and order of appellant’s foreman to go inside of the tank and proceed to clean it, he ascended the tank and went upon top of the same and went down from the top through a manhole and on a ladder to the bottom of the tank, and that after being in the tank a few minutes in the discharge of his duties of cleaning it out, he was overcome and prostrated by the inhalation of the poisonous and deadly gases that were in the tank, in consequence of which he was made very sick and became unconscious, and was thereafter confined for a great length of time in a hospital on account of the injuries sustained by him, which injuries resulted in permanent impairment and destruction of ap-pellee’s ability to work and earn money, and that he had sustained damages to the extent of $35,000. The injuries alleged to have been sustained were specified as injuries to his lungs, kidneys, head, nervous system, heart, and all the tissues of his body.

The grounds of negligence relied upon for recovery were specified as follows: (1) That appellant was guilty of negligence in failing to furnish appellee with a reasonably safe place in which to perform the services required of him; (2) that appellant was guilty of negligence in failing to expel the poisonous and deadly gases from the tank and thereby make it reasonably safe for appellee to enter therein for the purpose of .cleaning it out; (3) that appellant was guilty of negligence in ordering and directing appellant to enter the tank under the circumstances and conditions at the time he was so ordered to enter the tank; (4) that appellant was guilty of negligence in failing to warn appellee of the presence of the poisonous and deadly gases in the tank and the dangers incident to his attempt to clean the same; (5) by trial amendment appellee alleged in substance that appellant was guilty of negligence in failing to warn and instruct him not to go inside of the tank to clean it out. It was alleged further by appellee that each act of negligence specified‘was a proximate cause of his injuries.

Appellant’s answer consisted of a general demurrer and general denial.

The case was tried with a jury and was submitted upon special issues, all of which were answered in favor of appellee, and upon the verdict as returned judgment was rendered in his favor for $7,500 with interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum from the date of the judgment; and its motion for new- trial having been overruled, appellant has duly prosecuted this appeal.

A number of errors have been assigned challenging the correctness of . the verdict and judgment against appellant relating to the form of the issues submitted to the jury, the refusal of the court to submit a special issue requested by appellant, errors in the instruction of the court as to legal terms, and the insufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

In answer to the special issues submitted, the jury found, in effect: (1) That appellant directed appellee to go inside of the tank to clean it; (2) that appellant was guilty of negligence in directing appellee to go into the tank to clean it; (3) that appellant was guilty of negligence in failing to direct appellee not to go into the tank to clean it; (4) that appellant was guilty of negligence in failing to warn appellee of the danger of going into the tank to clean it; (5) that appellant was guilty of negligence in failing to expel the gas from the tank before appellee entered the same to clean it. The jury also found that each of the acts of negligence established by their finding was a proximate cause of appellee’s injuries, and further found that he had been damaged to the extent of $7,500.

The first two propositions advanced by appellant relate to the refusal of the trial judge to submit for the jury’s consideration the following special issues:

(1) “Was the plaintiff, A. H. Daniels, in going into the tank under the conditions and circumstances under which he went into said tank on the occasion in question guilty of negligence as that term has been defined to you?”

(2) “If you have answered the foregoing question ‘yes,’ then answer this question: Was said negligence on the part of the plaintiff, A. H. Daniel, the sole and proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff, if any? Answer Yes or No.”

Appellant, in connection with its contention that these requested issues should have been submitted, makes the following propositions:

“Eirst Proposition. It being a settled and undisputed rule of law that where a claimant’s negligence is the sole and proximate cause of his alleged injury or injuries, he cannot recover, the trial court erred in refusing to give Appellant’s Special Issue No. 1, which in effect submitted the issue of the defendant’s negligence being the sole and prox[371]*371imate cause of his injury, the evidence being abundant to show negligence on Daniel’s part in entering the said tank, which negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the alleged injury, if any.
“Second Proposition. The fact that the trial court submitted the question of the defendant’s negligence to the jury in Special Issues Nos. 1 to 9 inclusive, and the jury answered these Special Issues in the affirmative, does, not cure the error of the trial court in refusing to submit defendant’s Special Issue No. 1 as to plaintiff’s negligence being the sole cause of his injury, because this defendant was entitled to an affirmative presentation of all its defenses.”

Let it be conceded, as we think it should be, that appellant’s first proposition in this connection states a correct abstract proposition of law, and therefore we will not further notice this proposition.

We also agree with appellant as to the soundness of its second proposition in this connection as a correct proposition in the abstract, but we cannot sustain it for the reason that in our opinion there is no basis in appellant’s pleading to support it. We have already shown that appellant’s answer in this case interposed only a general denial.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Sanders
216 S.W.2d 288 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1948)
Continental Ins. Co. of New York v. Guerson
93 S.W.2d 591 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1936)
Northern Texas Traction Co. v. Brannon
61 S.W.2d 156 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1933)
Armour & Co. v. Tomlin
42 S.W.2d 634 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1931)
Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Swanson
41 S.W.2d 436 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1931)
Horton & Horton v. House
13 S.W.2d 966 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1929)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
20 S.W.2d 369, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rio-bravo-oil-co-v-daniel-texapp-1929.