Rink v. McCabe
This text of Rink v. McCabe (Rink v. McCabe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BERNICE RINK, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-02880 (UNA) ) ) JUDGE MCCABE, et al., ) ) Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF
No. 2, and his pro se complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1. The Court grants the application and, for
the reasons discussed below, dismisses the complaint in its entirety for want of subject matter
jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Plaintiff, a resident of the District of Columbia, sues the D.C. Superior Court judge who
oversaw certain probate matters, see Estate of Henry Marrow v. Rink, No. 2023 LIT 000005 (D.C.
Super. Ct.); In Re Marrow, Henry, No. 2021 ADM 784 (D.C. Super. Ct.), as well as attorney
Matthew Hertz, who served as the court-appointed personal representative of the estate of Henry
Marrow in those matters. Apparently, Plaintiff, who holds herself out as the surviving domestic
partner of Mr. Marrow, attempted unsuccessfully to intervene and remove Mr. Hertz as personal
representative, and to oppose the objectives of the probate proceedings. Ultimately, the Superior
Court granted the estate of Henry Marrow (1) judgment on the pleadings; (2) the partition of a
parcel of real property, located in the District; (3) the appointment of a trustee to sell that real
property; and (4) the eviction of the occupants of that property, including Plaintiff. Plaintiff now
asks this Court to review the actions of the Superior Court and to reverse its determinations. This Court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. A federal
district court may not review judicial decisions by D.C. courts. See, e.g., Richardson v. D.C. Ct.
of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also
Chen v. Raz, 172 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of complaint seeking
review of Superior Court’s decision in probate matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). To
whatever extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge the Superior Court’s determinations, she must pursue
such relief in the D.C. Court of Appeals. See D.C. Super. Ct. Probate Div. R. 8. Further, Plaintiff’s
complaint does not cite any basis for federal jurisdiction: it does not establish diversity of
citizenship among the parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, or cite any basis in federal law for granting
Plaintiff relief, see id. § 1331. The Court also notes that federal courts cannot exercise subject
matter jurisdiction over probate actions, as such matters generally fall within the purview of state
courts. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 309 (2006).
For these reasons, this action is dismissed without prejudice for want of jurisdiction. A
separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
Date: November 7, 2023 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge
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