Ringo v. Dept. of Rev.

CourtOregon Tax Court
DecidedApril 23, 2026
DocketTC
StatusUnpublished

This text of Ringo v. Dept. of Rev. (Ringo v. Dept. of Rev.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ringo v. Dept. of Rev., (Or. Super. Ct. 2026).

Opinion

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT REGULAR DIVISION Personal Income Tax

CHARLES RINGO, ) ) Plaintiff, ) TC 5480 v. ) ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ) MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY State of Oregon, ) JUDGMENT AND DENYING ) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR Defendant. ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS

Plaintiff appeals from a Magistrate Division decision upholding Defendant’s assessment

for 2018 of additional personal income tax, penalties, and interest totaling $44,766.79. After an

agreed adjustment, 1, the assessment is based on Defendant’s conclusion that Byzantium Corp.

(Byzantium), an S corporation of which Plaintiff was an 85 percent shareholder and manager,

underreported its gross receipts by $369,777. 2 Plaintiff denies any underreporting; Plaintiff

asserts that Byzantium’s only gross receipts are the $52,500 reported on its return.

Plaintiff seeks full summary judgment, based on three legal theories. Plaintiff first argues

that Defendant has failed to satisfy its requirements under this court’s summary judgment

1 Defendant made a small adjustment ($2,036.09) for improper deductions. (See Am Compl, 3, ¶ 16; Ans Am Compl, 4, ¶16.) 2 As discussed below, Defendant’s conference decision explaining the assessment contains two numbers purporting to represent “estimated fair market value (FMV) of an adjusted inventory”: $369,780 and $369,777. (Ptf’s Decl of Ringo, Ex 6 at 3.) The court is unable to resolve the discrepancy but considers the difference immaterial because the lower number, $369,777, was used to compute the additional tax assessed. (See id. at 2.)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TC 5480 Page 1 of 22 standards to “produc[e] evidence” of “specific facts” supporting the amount of additional gross

receipts reflected in the assessment. Tax Court Rule (TCR) 47 C, 47 D. (See Ptf’s Reply &

Resp at 1-3.) Second, Plaintiff argues, without explanation, that Defendant violated his

procedural due process rights. Third, Plaintiff argues that his substantive due process rights have

been violated because Defendant arrived at its sevenfold increase in gross receipts through

“sheer speculation,” “without any evidence.” (Ptf’s Mot Summ J at 2, 15.)

As to Plaintiff’s first theory, Defendant does not cross-move for summary judgment to

establish the correctness of the assessed amount; Defendant seeks only to defeat Plaintiff’s

motion in order to allow the correct amount to be determined at trial. Defendant argues that

record evidence of Plaintiff’s lack of credibility creates a genuine issue of material fact, because

Plaintiff’s declaration is the only evidence that Byzantium’s gross receipts were limited to those

reported on its return. (See Def’s Resp & XMot Part Summ J at 3.) In Defendant’s view, it has

no need to point to specific facts supporting its much higher assessment amount, which it

resorted to only because Plaintiff failed to keep and produce Byzantium’s records as required by

law. (See id. at 8-14.) The court agrees with Defendant. See Barnett v. Redmond School

District 2J, 209 Or App 724, 734 (2006) (applying “principle that, when the nonmovant can

show some specific factor that directly places the affiant’s credibility in jeopardy, that showing

raises a fact issue sufficient to defeat summary judgment.”); To v. State Farm Mutual Ins., 319

Or 93, 105, 873 P2d 1072, 1079 (1994) (“If the nonmoving party produces specific facts related

to the affiant’s credibility, then summary judgment may be inappropriate, particularly * * *

where ‘the knowledge of the events or occurrences on which the action is based lies exclusively

within the control of the party moving for summary judgment.’”). The court will deny Plaintiff’s

motion as to this issue, leaving the correct assessment amount to be determined at trial.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TC 5480 Page 2 of 22 The parties cross-move as to Plaintiff’s second and third theories, that his due process

rights have been violated. Plaintiff raises a procedural due process argument but makes no

specific allegations, and the court finds no evidence in the record that could cause a reasonable

juror to find unfairness in his audit, his administrative appeal that led to the conference decision

and notice of assessment, or his judicial appeal in the Magistrate Division. Plaintiff instead

“focus[es] on the violation of his substantive due process.” (Ptf’s Reply at 5.) Plaintiff attacks

the methodology Defendant used to derive the assessment, on the grounds that Defendant used

data Byzantium reported to the Oregon Liquor Control Commission (OLCC) knowing that the

data were inaccurate. 3 However, the court concludes that, given the largely self-created

circumstances in Plaintiff’s case, the result of that methodology does not “shock the conscience.”

See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 US 833, 845-51, 118 S Ct 1708, 140 L Ed 2d 1043

(1998) (applying the shock-the-conscience test). Nor does Defendant’s use of a square footage-

based methodology to check the assessment, as that use did not cause Defendant to increase the

assessment amount. The court will deny Plaintiff’s motion and grant that of Defendant as to the

due process issue.

II. FACTS

Except as indicated, the following facts are not in dispute.

S corporation. Byzantium filed an Oregon tax return for 2018. (Am Compl at 2, ¶ 6;

Answer Am Compl at 2, ¶ 6.) Byzantium was an S corporation, a so-called “passthrough entity,”

meaning that it generally was not subject to federal or Oregon income tax. (See Am Compl at 1,

¶ 1; Ans Am Compl at 1, ¶ 1); IRC § 1363(a) (2018); ORS 314.732. Instead, items such as gross

3 The full name of the OLCC has since been changed to the Oregon Liquor and Cannabis Commission. See Or Laws 2021, ch 351.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TC 5480 Page 3 of 22 income and deductions were required to be included on the tax returns of its shareholders in

proportion to their pro rata shares. See IRC § 1366(a)(1) (2018); ORS 314.734; see generally

Eustice, Kuntz & Bogdanski, Federal Income Taxation of S Corporations ¶ 7.01 (rev Mar 2026)

(“The system that transfers income and losses to the shareholders is generally referred to as a

pass-through system”). Plaintiff’s pro rata share was 85 percent; thus, nearly all of Byzantium’s

items were reportable on Plaintiff’s personal income tax return. (See Ptf’s Decl of Ringo at 3 ¶

9; id., Ex 2 at 2 (Defendant’s conference decision); Ptf’s Mot Summ J at 3.)

Operation and management; OLCC settlement agreement. Byzantium was a cannabis

business, and Plaintiff managed the operation. (See Ptf Mot Summ J at 3.) Starting sometime in

2017, Byzantium held a license from the OLCC. (See Def’s Decl of Rieder, Ex B at 2

(discussing Marijuana License Acknowledgment dated September 21, 2017).) The OLCC

cancelled Byzantium’s producer license on September 21, 2018, upon the commission’s

approval of a stipulated settlement agreement signed by Plaintiff. (See id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff, as

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Related

County of Sacramento v. Lewis
523 U.S. 833 (Supreme Court, 1998)
To v. State Farm Mutual Insurance
873 P.2d 1072 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1994)
Barnett v. Redmond School District 2J
149 P.3d 250 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2006)
Thunderbird Mobile Club, LLC v. City of Wilsonville
228 P.3d 650 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2010)
Doughty v. Birkholtz
964 P.2d 1108 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1998)
Obergefell v. Hodges
135 S. Ct. 2584 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Allison v. Department of Revenue
11 Or. Tax 431 (Oregon Tax Court, 1990)
Brenner v. Department of Revenue
9 Or. Tax 299 (Oregon Tax Court, 1983)

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Ringo v. Dept. of Rev., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ringo-v-dept-of-rev-ortc-2026.