Rinaudo v. Treadwell

32 So. 2d 907, 212 La. 510, 1947 La. LEXIS 866
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedNovember 10, 1947
DocketNo. 36131.
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 32 So. 2d 907 (Rinaudo v. Treadwell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rinaudo v. Treadwell, 32 So. 2d 907, 212 La. 510, 1947 La. LEXIS 866 (La. 1947).

Opinion

O’NIELL, Chief Justice.

This is a suit to recover from a building contractor the cost of remedying certain defects in several buildings constructed for the plaintiff. The contract was made on a cost-plus basis, allowing the contractor for his services 10% on the cost of the labor and materials used in the buildings. The contract was a verbal one; hence there is some dispute about its terms or details.

There are six distinct claims for remedies and repairs which the plaintiff alleges he was obliged to make after the buildings were turned over to him. The buildings consisted of a number of tourist cabins and garages and a cocktail lounge, to be built on plaintiff’s land near Shreveport. After hearing the evidence the district judge rejected the plaintiff’s demand. He is appealing from the decision.

His first complaint is that the outside doors of the cabins buckled; which means that the veneering in several instances buckled away from the door itself, as the result of rain water getting in behind the veneer and softening the glue between the veneer and the wood surface. The evidence is conflicting as to whether veneered doors, of the type which were used in this instance, were suitable for outside doors. The defendant admitted that the doors were not waterproof, but he contended that they were suited for outside doors and were used instead of waterproof doors as a matter of economy. Our conclusion from the conflicting testimony in the case is that the doors were not suited for the purpose of outside doors and that the defendant therefore breached the obligation of his contract to use or recommend to the subcontractors suitable materials. Our conclusion as to this item therefore is that the defendant is liable for the cost of replacement of the doors. The cost of installing suitable doors will be greater, of course, than the original cost of the doors which were not suitable. The defendant should be held liable only for the original cost of the doors, because if the suitable doors had been installed they would have cost the plaintiff more than the doors which were installed. The evidence shows that there are 31 doors on which the veneering has buckled, and which will have to be replaced with suitable doors. The cost of the 31 doors was $11 each plus the 10% commission, or $12.10 per door, making a total of $375.10. But, inasmuch as the doors which have buckled *259 were not altogether worthless, but were of some value to the plaintiff, we have concluded that an allowance of $250 for this item will meet the ends of justice.

The second claim of the plaintiff is that a well which was drilled to supply-water to the cabins did not produce potable water. The original plan or intention of the parties was to secure water from the Shreveport waterworks. But it developed that that would be too expensive. Hence it was decided that the contractor should have a subcontractor to drill a well. It was known by both parties to the contract that water from a well in that vicinity was apt to be brackish and unsatisfactory. The contractor obtained bids from two subcontractors, and after he and the plaintiff had discussed the two bids they decided to accept the bid made by one Forsong. His bid did not carry a guarantee as to the quality of the water to be obtained. The other bid did carry such a guarantee, but according to the evidence amounted to about four times as much as Forsong’s bid. The well which he drilled produced water which was brackish, and unfit for drinking purposes. The plaintiff, therefore, subsequently had two other wells drilled, the second one of which produced satisfactory water. The plaintiff did not at any time attempt to have the original well re-worked, notwithstanding there is evidence to the effect that it might have become satisfactory if it'had been re-worked. Inasmuch as the plaintiff was a party to the acceptance of Forsong’s bid, knowing that it carried no guarantee of producing suitable water, and knowing that the result was apt to be unsatisfactory, our conclusion is that he is not entitled to be compensated for the loss or cost resulting from the acceptance of the Forsong bid. There is some evidence to the effect that the well was drilled in an unsatisfactory way and with unsuitable pipe, but we do not consider the evidence sufficient to establish those facts. The plaintiff’s claim for the drilling of the well therefore was properly rejected by the district court.

.The plaintiff’s third claim is for the cost of painting a water tank which was discolored by impure water from the original well. Since we have concluded that the defendant is not liable for the failure of the well to produce pure water it follows that he is not liable for the discoloration of the tank caused by the overflow of the water.

The plaintiff’s fourth claim is for the cost of repairing the floor of the cocktail lounge which in consequence of dampness became buckled in several places. The floor was constructed by laying first a four inch concrete slab, then laying on the slab a membrane of waterproof paper, and on top of that applying a coat of pitch. Wooden strips or screeds were fastened to the concrete, and the floor was laid on the screeds. The plaintiff contends that this method of construction was faulty in that two coats of pitch should have been

*260 applied to the concrete slab, the two coats of pitch being separated by a membrane of waterproof material, and that the applying of only one coat of pitch, instead of two coats separated by the membrane, is what caused the buckling of the floors, by allowing moisture from the ground to penetrate into the wooden or upper layer of the floor and causing it to expand. The defendant’s contention is that the buckling of the floor was caused by negligence on the part of the plaintiff, in allowing a drain behind the bar in the cocktail lounge to become stopped up, causing water that was spilled on the floor behind the bar to spread over the floor beyond the bar. Two expert witnesses for the plaintiff and one for the defendant testified that the proper way to construct a waterproof floor was to apply two coats instead of one coat of pitch to the concrete slab, with a waterproof membrane between the two coats of pitch. The evidence convinces us that the buckling of the floor was caused by defective construction in applying only one coat of pitch on the concrete slab, instead of two coats separated by a waterproof membrane, and that the defendant therefore is liable for the cost of replacing the floor. One witness for the plaintiff estimated the cost at $500 and another estimated it at $530. Inasmuch as the wood in the floor may be salvaged to some extent, and considering that the floor served its purpose for a considerable time, our conclusion is that the estimated cost should be reduced, and that an allowance of $300 to the plaintiff would do justice.

The fifth item in the plaintiff’s claim is for the cost of repainting parts of the interior walls beneath the windows in the cabins. The plaintiff contends that the window sills were not properly waterproofed or protected by metal flashing against the entering of rain water, and that that is what caused the paint below the windows to flake. The defendant insists that the windows were properly waterproofed, and that the flaking of the paint below them was caused by the condensing of moisture on the inside of the windows ¡ during cold weather and the running down of the condensed water onto the wall be-' low the windows.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

A & M Pest Control Serv., Inc. v. FEJTA CONST. CO. INC.
338 So. 2d 946 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1976)
Knight v. Johnson
253 So. 2d 632 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1971)
Joyner v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company
251 So. 2d 166 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1971)
Dyess v. Weems
178 So. 2d 785 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1965)
Kuhlman v. Talley
145 So. 2d 101 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1962)
Rotolo v. Stewart
127 So. 2d 24 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1961)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
32 So. 2d 907, 212 La. 510, 1947 La. LEXIS 866, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rinaudo-v-treadwell-la-1947.